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(This article is a revised and expanded version of the forthcoming work by Kyoochul Kim and Jinwook Nam, titled The Impact of North Korea-Russia Alignment on the North Korean Economy and Its Implications.)

1. Background

The deployment of North Korean troops to Russia has demonstrated that the Russia-Ukraine war is a significant variable not only for Europe but also for the situation on the Korean Peninsula. In the early stages of the war, North Korea recognized the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics as independent states, making it one of the few countries in the international community to take an unambiguously pro-Russian stance. In March 2024, Russia refused to extend the mandate of the UN Security Council Panel of Experts on North Korean sanctions, thereby weakening the existing sanctions monitoring system and raising concerns about the possibility of sanctions evasion.

As the war prolonged, relations between the two countries have gradually deepened, centered on military and diplomatic cooperation. When Russia faced shortages of conventional weapons such as artillery shells, North Korea provided military supplies, and in June 2024, the two countries signed a treaty effectively upgrading their relationship to the level of an alliance. Subsequently, North Korea deployed soldiers to Russia and has continued high-level cooperation in diverse fields including the economy, judiciary, and logistics.

It has been consistently confirmed that North Korea and Russia are complementing each other's deficiencies and circumventing sanctions. North Korea is supporting Russia by providing conventional weapons and dispatching workers in addition to deploying soldiers on the field, while Russia is supporting North Korea by condoning the import of items prohibited by sanctions or allowing the export of petroleum products exceeding the cap. This close alignment between North Korea and Russia weakens the effectiveness of sanctions against North Korea, making it difficult to achieve the goal of sanctions, which is to bring North Korea to the negotiating table.

In this situation, objectively analyzing the actual state of economic cooperation between North Korea and Russia and seeking future policy response directions based on this is essential for understanding the situation on the Korean Peninsula and designing policies toward North Korea and Russia. Accordingly, this study utilizes data to analyze the current status of economic cooperation between North Korea and Russia, the nature of their close relationship, and its ripple effects. Specifically, it examines various external economic items such as foreign trade, overseas worker dispatch, and tourism between the two countries, and evaluates the impact that cooperation related to the production of military supplies has had on the overall North Korean economy. Through this, the study aims to understand the implications of the strengthened North Korea-Russia alignment since the Russia-Ukraine war on the environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula, and to provide the grounds necessary for forecasting future North Korea-Russia relations and establishing policies.

2. North Korea-Russia Economic Relations: Focusing on External Economic Data

(1) Foreign Trade

To evaluate how important Russia is as a trading partner for North Korea, this study analyzes aspects of trade volume and commodities. In terms of trade volume, the proportion Russia occupies in North Korea's total trade is very low. Over the past 10 years, North Korea's exports to Russia have remained around 1%, and imports have also been limited to mostly under 2%. In 2020, as trade with China plummeted due to COVID-19, the proportion of imports from Russia appeared to increase, but the actual amount was not significant. Although annual trade volume is known to have increased somewhat over the past two years due to border re-openings and improved North Korea-Russia relations, the share in total North Korean trade remains in the 1% range. Conversely, China occupies an absolute share in both North Korea's exports and imports, accounting for 95% and 98% respectively as of 2024. This shows that even after the Russia-Ukraine war, China remains North Korea's largest trading partner.

In terms of commodities as well, Russia plays a limited role. North Korea's representative export items are exported to China, not Russia, and goods exported to Russia are wind instruments and pumps, the export value of which is not large, making it difficult to view Russia as a meaningful trading partner for North Korea from the perspective of foreign currency acquisition. In terms of imports too, major items such as key food supplies, consumer goods, and industrial intermediate goods are mostly introduced from China, and Russia's share is confirmed to be small.

However, Russia plays a key role in energy and several core industrial goods, particularly refined oil products and industrial facilities for power plants. Russia's share in North Korea's imports of refined oil is more than double the import value from China, therefore the dependence on Russia for petroleum supply is not low. Furthermore, a significant number of North Korean power plants were built based on past Soviet technology and facilities, and related parts and equipment are known to still be procured mainly from Russia. In this respect, although the trade volume is not large, Russia acts as an important trading partner for North Korea as a supplier of key items.

Recently, as North Korea-Russia relations have become closer, circumstances suggesting Russia has provided food to North Korea have been detected, but since official statistics are not published, it is difficult to confirm the actual scale. However, the fact that North Korea's food imports from China have decreased sharply since 2024 supports the possibility that Russian produced food has flowed in.

In summary, trade between North Korea and Russia is limited in total scale, but Russia performs the role of an important partner in terms of supplying key industrial goods and energy that North Korea finds difficult to secure on its own. Considering these characteristics, Russia can be evaluated as a key country providing essential resources for the operation of the North Korean economy, and beyond simple trade volume, it is exerting direct and indirect influence on North Korea's industrial and energy stability.

(2) Dispatched North Korean Workers Overseas

North Korea has long secured foreign currency through the dispatch of overseas workers. In Resolution 2397 of December 2017, the UN Security Council demanded the repatriation of North Korean workers within 24 months, officially banning the employment of overseas workers from 2020. Nevertheless, circumstances are being reported that North Korean workers are still active in various countries including China and Russia. According to research, as of 2017, about 32,000 North Korean workers resided in Russia, of whom about 70% were engaged in the construction industry. These workers are estimated to have remitted $300 to $900 per month to the North Korean authorities, through which North Korea secured approximately $200 million in foreign currency annually.[2]

Since the North Korea-Russia summit in September 2023, the two countries have held two meetings of the Joint Committee for Economic Cooperation, and it is known that the dispatch of North Korean workers to Russia and 'trainee' exchange programs were discussed as major agenda items during this process. Considering past cases where North Korean international students in Russia were mobilized for labor, it is difficult to rule out the possibility that new methods of sending workers to circumvent sanctions were reviewed. The U.S. Department of State, through its 2025 Trafficking in Persons Report, reported these circumstances, stating that in January 2024, about 150 North Korean workers performed construction work in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories.[3]

Additionally, according to research, the "Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership" between North Korea and Russia signed in June 2024 contains circumstances suggesting advance preparation for the dispatch of North Korean workers to Russia. Article 14, which specifies "persons sentenced to deprivation of liberty," is interpreted as a clause mindful of the possibility of defection by overseas dispatched workers, and Article 15 appears to have established a foundation for joint response in the event of defections by regularizing the cooperation system between the judicial and public security agencies of both countries. The fact that the heads of North Korea's major public security and judicial agencies visited Russia immediately after the treaty was signed supports this. Article 17 reflects the intention to prevent defections of high-ranking officials or the loss of foreign currency by including illegal funds and drug issues as well as human trafficking and extremism, and the information and communication cooperation clause in Article 18 is analyzed as having the purpose of blocking the inflow of external information amidst the expansion of personnel exchanges between the two countries.[4]

While the scale and significance of North Korean workers dispatched to Russia can be outlined through existing research and media reports, such information is based on unofficial data, so there are limitations in determining the exact scale or trends. Therefore, this study aims to estimate the scale of North Korean worker dispatch more reliably by utilizing official entry and exit statistics disclosed by Russia.

[Figure 1] Number of Entrants to Russia with North Korean Nationality

(Unit: Persons)

Source: Federal State Statistics Service of Russia (https://www.fedstat.ru/organizations/?expandId=946881#fpsr946881)

Note: The 'Unclassified' item refers to the value calculated by the author by subtracting the sum of classifications by purpose from the total sum.

[Figure 1] shows the scale of entry of North Korean nationals into Russia provided by the Federal State Statistics Service of Russia. This statistic provides the number of entrants by quarter from 2010 to the first quarter of 2025, along with detailed entry records according to the purpose of the visit. According to this, from 2010 until the third quarter of 2017, before sanctions against North Korea intensified, the number of North Korean visitors to Russia maintained an average level of about 5,500 per quarter. However, starting from the fourth quarter of 2017, the number of entrants began to decrease, appearing to drop to 2,488 in the second quarter of 2018.

Visit purposes are classified into business, tourism, visiting relatives, transit, migration for permanent residence, and transport sector workers, and the total is also presented. Interestingly, until the fourth quarter of 2018, the sum of visitors by detailed purpose matched the total number of entrants, but from the first quarter of 2019, a phenomenon appeared where the two figures did not match. In this paper, this difference is distinguished as 'Unclassified' and its trend is analyzed. In 2019, 'Unclassified' North Korean entrants numbered 6,924, corresponding to about one-third of the total 21,481. During the period when borders were closed due to COVID-19, 'Unclassified' appeared as 0, but in the second quarter of 2023, after the borders were reopened, it was confirmed again at 76.

Changes were particularly notable after the signing of the North Korea-Russia 'Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty' in the second half of 2024. In the third quarter of 2024, 'Unclassified' entrants numbered 3,767, and in the fourth quarter, 3,759, accounting for more than 70% of total entrants. This shows that a significant number of North Korean nationals entering Russia at that time entered in a manner not classified by existing visit purposes.

The UN Security Council, through Resolution 2397 in December 2017, totally banned the overseas employment of North Korean workers and stipulated that this be fully applied from 2020 after a two-year implementation period. Combining the point where the sum by visit purpose and the total number of entrants began to mismatch in Russian statistics in the first quarter of 2019, and the rapid increase in entrants classified as 'Unclassified' after the signing of the North Korea-Russia 'New Treaty' in June 2024, it seems reasonable to classify this category as North Korean workers dispatched to Russia.

In sum, although the dispatch of North Korean overseas workers was officially banned by international sanctions, official Russian statistics and various circumstances suggest that the dispatch of North Korean workers to Russia continued even after the sanctions. In particular, it is estimated that the scale has rapidly increased since the second half of 2024, recovering to pre-sanctions levels. As the war prolongs and labor shortages become severe, Russia has a greater incentive to continue accepting North Korean workers even at the risk of sanctions, and North Korea is also utilizing this as a key means of raising foreign currency, creating a situation where the interests of both sides align. Furthermore, the 'Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership' signed by the two countries includes clauses on preventing defection and controlling personnel, confirming traces of advance preparation for expanding the dispatch of North Korean workers to Russia. Furthermore, the possibility is being raised that after the war ends, North Korean troops dispatched to Russia will not return but will effectively be converted into workers and utilized at construction and infrastructure restoration sites.[5]

(3) North Korean Tourism: Focusing on Russian Tourists

As major export items were blocked due to sanctions against North Korea, the country faced a foreign currency crisis and attempted to actively revitalize the tourism industry as a measure to overcome this. However, with the complete closure of borders due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the entry of foreign tourists was suspended, and the strategy of earning foreign currency through tourism had to be halted. Subsequently, after North Korean authorities declared a "victory in the anti-epidemic war" and reopened the borders, they allowed North Korean tourism for foreign tourists; notably, the first tourists were Russians, not Chinese. Additionally, in June 2025, the completion ceremony of the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Area, which Chairman Kim Jong Un has emphasized as a "project on which the dignity of the state depends," was held, and the Russian Ambassador to North Korea and embassy officials attended as special invited guests. This is a symbolic scene showing that North Korean authorities are paying special attention to attracting Russian tourists.

Nevertheless, the scale of Russian tourists who have visited North Korea to date is judged to still fall far short of North Korean expectations.

[Figure 2] Number of Entrants to North Korea with Russian Nationality

(Unit: Persons)

Source: Federal State Statistics Service of Russia (https://www.fedstat.ru/organizations/?expandId=946881#fpsr946881)

[Figure 2] summarizes the status of Russians visiting North Korea by visit purpose from 2010 to the second quarter of 2025 based on data from the Federal State Statistics Service of Russia. Russian visits to North Korea temporarily exceeded 8,000 in 2011, but maintained a level of 3,000 to 4,000 annually from the mid-2010s until the border closure due to COVID-19. As North Korea reopened its borders in 2023, the scale of visits turned to a distinct upward trend. In 2023, 1,238 people visited North Korea, and in 2024, this increased significantly to 6,469. The increasing trend continued in 2025, with 1,267 entrants in the first quarter and 2,772 in the second quarter.

Before COVID-19, purposes related to means of transportation such as vehicle maintenance or personal visits such as visiting relatives accounted for a large proportion, but since 2024, the aspect is clearly different. Entry for tourism has increased markedly. Russian tourists, who numbered only 300 to 700 annually before sanctions, increased to 1,957 in 2024 after the strengthening of North Korea-Russia relations, and the increasing trend continues in 2025 with 262 in the first quarter and 1,673 in the second quarter. This change can be said to be a result showing that North Korean authorities regard attracting Russian tourists as an important means of securing foreign currency and are making active efforts toward this.

Can North Korea's tourism industry expect a boom through the increase in Russian visitors? Experts generally show a skeptical stance. First, it is pointed out that a significant number of Russians visiting North Korea use flights, making it difficult to significantly expand tourism demand in a short period. Also, analysis suggests that the potential demand for North Korean tourism is limited because the Russian Far East region adjacent to North Korea does not have a large population and income levels are low. Issues regarding the competitiveness of North Korean tourist destinations themselves are also constantly raised. Poor transportation infrastructure, low attractiveness as a resort destination, and climatic conditions with a short period available for sea bathing are cited as factors reducing the attractiveness of the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Area, a representative tourist site. In addition to this, continuous surveillance and control of tourists are evaluated as structural problems that lower visit satisfaction and the possibility of revisits. As these factors act in combination, the view is dominant that the possibility of North Korea's tourism industry showing a full-fledged growth trend solely through an increase in Russian visitors is limited.

The general analysis is that for North Korea to secure a meaningful scale of foreign currency through tourism, attracting Chinese tourists is key rather than Russians. According to statistics from the China National Tourism Administration, the number of Chinese visiting North Korea surged from 131,000 in 2010 to 207,000 in 2013, which is interpreted as a result of the Chinese government officially designating North Korea as a group tourism destination. Even before COVID-19, it is estimated that about 240,000 to 270,000 Chinese tourists visited North Korea annually, and group tourism by Chinese people has been consistently emphasized as a success factor for North Korea's tourism industry. Conversely, as shown in official Russian statistics, the number of Russians visiting North Korea for tourism purposes seems to be at a level difficult to exceed 10,000 annually. This can be said to be a result confirming the point that, as per existing assessments, it is difficult for North Korea's tourism industry to achieve its expected foreign currency acquisition goals with Russian tourists alone.

3. Impact of North Korea-Russia Military Cooperation on the North Korean Economy

Until now, economic cooperation between North Korea and Russia has been known to be concentrated mainly in the military sector. Circumstances that North Korea has provided military supplies such as artillery shells and missiles to Russia have been confirmed multiple times through media reports, and as the fact of North Korean troop deployment was revealed in October 2024, it showed that the central axis of cooperation between the two countries lies in the military field. However, existing discussions on North Korea-Russia military cooperation have mainly relied on circumstantial data such as photos of cargo ship and train movements, and there was a lack of concrete analysis on how such military cooperation affected the overall North Korean economy.

Accordingly, this paper conducted an analysis by combining data[6] on the distribution of North Korean enterprises constructed by the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET) with satellite-based night light data widely used as a proxy indicator for capturing economic activity. Through this, the paper aims to empirically evaluate the ripple effects of North Korea-Russia military cooperation on the North Korean economy in a quantitative and structural manner.

To confirm when military supply cooperation between North Korea and Russia began in earnest, the frequency of Chairman Kim Jong Un's visits to munitions factories was examined using the 'Kim Jong Un Public Activity Press Release DB'[7] provided by the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU). Looking at the data, Chairman Kim Jong Un's visits to munitions factories were only once from 2020 until the first half of 2023, but the number of visits increased rapidly starting from August 2023. This increasing trend continued steadily until the first half of 2025. July 2023, when Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited North Korea, is evaluated as an important turning point. At the time, the U.S. Secretary of State assessed this visit as a move linked to securing weapons necessary for conducting the war in Ukraine, and indeed, circumstances of North Korea providing weapons to Russia were captured successively from the second half of the same year. Combining the Russian Defense Minister's visit to North Korea in July 2023, Kim Jong Un's subsequent frequent inspections of munitions factories, and circumstances of weapons provision to Russia, it is reasonable to interpret that military supply cooperation between the two countries was agreed upon in earnest around July 2023, and North Korean munitions factories began operating.

According to research, North Korea's munitions factories mostly belong to the heavy chemical industry sector, and the proportion of chemical, electronic, and machinery industries is particularly high.[8] This shows that North Korea's production base for military supplies is structurally concentrated in these sectors. Considering these industrial characteristics, if North Korea-Russia military cooperation expands, it is highly likely to have stimulated the production activities of the heavy chemical industry and its detailed industries preferentially and most significantly. On the other hand, operation rates are expected to have been relatively limited in industries with low connectivity to military supply production. Based on this background, this study verifies the following hypothesis:

"North Korea-Russia military cooperation strengthened since the Russia-Ukraine war will have increased industrial production more actively in regions where munitions factories are concentrated compared to other regions."

To examine how military cooperation between North Korea and Russia affected North Korea's regional economies, a methodology called the 'Bartik (Shift-Share) Instrument' was utilized. This method is a technique designed to analyze how external shocks affect regions differently by combining industry-specific shocks occurring externally with the industrial structure of each region. First, based on data from 2010 to 2022 provided by KIET, the proportion that heavy chemical industry and munitions industry[9] occupy in the local economy of each county in North Korea was calculated. In other words, using information on the proportion of mentions of production or investment activities of heavy chemical industry and munitions industry enterprises belonging to each region, a 'Heavy Industry Index' and 'Defense Industry Index' for each region were calculated. Through these indices and the changes in night lights, which can be called a proxy variable for industrial activity, one can compare whether production activities actually became more active in regions with a high concentration of military-related industries when military cooperation with Russia was strengthened.

[Figure 3] Geographic Distribution of Industry and Nighttime Light(NTL) in North Korea at the County Level

The results examined through a scatter plot are shown in [Figure 3]. The X-axis displays the proportion of mentions of heavy chemical industry and defense industry enterprises in each county, and the Y-axis displays the value obtained by subtracting the night light of the first quarter of 2020 from the night light of the first quarter of 2025. Looking at the graph, the dots generally spread in the upper right direction and the slope shows a positive (+) value. This demonstrates the fact that regions with a higher proportion of heavy chemical industry and defense industry showed a greater increase in night lights in 2025 compared to 2020. Furthermore, statistical analysis applying an econometric model confirmed the same conclusion. That is, the brightness of night lights increased significantly in regions where heavy chemical industries and munitions factories are concentrated, and among them, industries directly connected to the production of military supplies showed a greater rising effect than other heavy chemical industry sectors. This can be seen as empirical evidence showing that military cooperation between North Korea and Russia went beyond simple military transactions and practically promoted production activities of related industries within North Korea.

This time, more finely than the county, individual enterprises were set as the basic unit to analyze how night lights changed after North Korea-Russia military cooperation. The core of this analysis is to evaluate how much enterprises producing military supplies benefited from cooperation in the military sector. For this, a method was used to set a hypothetical situation ("What if there had been no cooperation?"; counter-factual) and compare it with actual changes. Specifically, first, by utilizing data from both enterprises belonging to the heavy chemical industry and the remaining enterprises, influence factors commonly received by enterprises in the past were identified. Based on this, it was estimated what changes enterprises belonging to the heavy chemical industry would have shown if there had been no North Korea-Russia cooperation. Finally, by comparing this hypothetical scenario with actual night light changes, it was possible to confirm how much North Korea-Russia military cooperation actually revitalized the corporate activities of the heavy chemical industry.

[Figure 4] presents the results of comparing the night light changes of enterprises belonging to North Korea's heavy chemical industry, munitions industry, and light industry with the hypothetical scenario of "What if there had been no cooperation?" using the method explained above. According to this, the activity levels of heavy chemical industry and munitions industry enterprises appeared much higher than in the case where there were no North Korea-Russia cooperation.[10] Specifically examining this, night lights began to rise immediately after North Korea-Russia military cooperation, and after maintaining a certain level, surged significantly immediately after the signing of the new treaty between North Korea and Russia. The upward trend continued for a while afterward, and showed a somewhat stabilizing appearance in early 2025. Conversely, the night lights of light industry enterprises showed a rather declining trend after North Korea-Russia cooperation. This implies the possibility that industries closely related to the lives of residents did not receive sufficient power supply compared to the munitions or heavy chemical industries. In other words, it can be interpreted that industries essential to residents' lives, such as food and beverage processing, were pushed back in the priority of power supply by North Korean authorities compared to industries related to munitions or heavy chemicals.

[Figure 4] Nighttime Luminosity Trends for Key North Korean Firms

 [Table 1] shows the growth rates by industry in North Korea since 2020 estimated by the Bank of Korea. According to this, in the flow of North Korea's industrial growth after COVID-19, the heavy chemical industry showed a noticeable recovery trend in 2023 and 2024. On the other hand, the light industry, which is closely related to residents' lives, showed almost no change during the same period. Of course, other factors such as border reopening would have contributed somewhat to economic recovery, but the fact that the growth gap between heavy chemical industry and light industry is distinct is noteworthy. This suggests that the recent growth trend of North Korean industry was greatly influenced by cooperation in the military sector with Russia. That is, it coincides with the analysis of this study in that the expansion of military supply production clearly contributed to the growth of the heavy chemical industry, but the effect did not spread to the civilian economic sector such as light industry closely related to residents' lives.

[Table 1] Growth Rate by Industry in North Korea (Unit: %)

Source: Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System (https://ecos.bok.or.kr/)

4. Conclusion and Implications

The results of analyzing the external economic relations between North Korea and Russia with data can be summarized as follows. First, the influence of Russia in North Korea's foreign trade is limited in terms of scale. Nevertheless, Russia still plays the role of a key supplier for strategically important items such as petroleum products and power generation facilities. Meanwhile, as the labor shortage in Russia due to the Russia-Ukraine war coincided with North Korea's need to secure foreign currency, circumstances appeared where the dispatch of North Korean overseas workers continued despite international sanctions. Such worker cooperation is highly likely to be maintained as a key cooperation between the two countries even after the war. In the tourism sector, although North Korea is actively stepping forward to attract Russian tourists, the contribution to actually earning significant foreign currency remains limited to Chinese tourists, so the economic effect of North Korea-Russia tourism cooperation appears to be limited.

Several important implications can be derived from the point that worker cooperation between North Korea and Russia may continue even after the Russia-Ukraine war. The circumstance that North Korean workers are being dispatched to Russia despite sanctions suggests that the effectiveness of sanctions should be re-examined, and remittance flows and foreign currency acquisition paths in third countries such as Russia must be closely managed. Also, given that the working conditions and human rights issues of North Korean workers dispatched to Russia can be serious, a strategy to urge human rights protection in cooperation with international organizations is also needed.

Furthermore, since Russia is in a situation where it still needs labor, technology, and infrastructure in the post-war reconstruction process, the South Korean government can review policies to induce Russia to utilize South Korean technology and capital instead of North Korean workers. In particular, fields such as Arctic route development, icebreaker construction, and expansion of port and logistics infrastructure are areas Russia is intensively promoting for future growth and securing strategic competitiveness, where South Korea's technology and experience related to shipbuilding and construction industries can be usefully utilized. In this respect, economic cooperation with South Korea can be seen as a strategic option that is difficult for Russia to rule out, and if the Russia-Ukraine war ends and there is room for improvement in South Korea-Russia relations in the future, it is necessary to review policy options to reconstruct the South-North-Russia economic cooperation structure and induce North Korea's return to dialogue.

The impact of North Korea-Russia military cooperation on the North Korean economy can be summarized as follows. Since the strengthening of cooperation in the military sector, production activities in regions where heavy chemical industries and munitions industries are concentrated have noticeably increased. In particular, while the activities of factories producing military supplies directly related to the Russia-Ukraine war, such as artillery shells or personal firearms, increased significantly, the vitality of companies related to light industry such as food products actually fell, showing a distinct imbalance in industrial growth. This trend is also confirmed in the Bank of Korea's estimates of growth rates by industry; while the heavy chemical industry showed a distinct growth trend since 2023, the light industry appeared to be in a nearly stagnant state.

This shows that while North Korea-Russia military cooperation contributed to strengthening productivity in specific sectors such as munitions and heavy chemical industries, the effect did not spread to the overall civilian economy. Consequently, North Korea's economic growth after North Korea-Russia cooperation represents a structure biased toward the military sector rather than a recovery of the overall industry. The phenomenon where the expansion of production in industries other than heavy chemical and munitions industries is limited as North Korea-Russia cooperation proceeds centered on military supplies plainly shows the structural vulnerability and imbalance of growth in the North Korean economy. Considering that industrial sectors directly linked to people's livelihoods, such as food, energy, and light industry, are being relatively alienated due to military-centered economic growth, the South Korean government needs to closely observe livelihood-related industries and economic activities within North Korea. To this end, it is necessary to continuously evaluate the vulnerabilities of relevant sectors by utilizing international organizations and various information channels, and to establish a monitoring system capable of detecting crisis signals early in fields directly linked to residents' lives. ■

[2] Lukin and Zakharova (2018)

[3] VOA, "State Department Investigates Reality of 'Forced Labor' of North Korean Overseas Workers... Collecting Human Trafficking Information," Nov. 29, 2024.

[4] Ahn Je-no (2024)

[5] Jung Eun-lee (2025)

[6] North Korea Industry and Enterprise Database, Korea Institute for Industrial Economics & Trade (KIET). (https://nkindustry.kiet.re.kr/index.do)

[7] https://www.kinu.or.kr/nksdb/, Based on reports from the Rodong Sinmun and the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), this database categorizes Chairman Kim Jong-un’s activities by date, accompanying personnel, location, and title. Furthermore, it classifies these activities by their nature, such as inspections, attendance at events, field guidance (on-site surveys), and military affairs.

[8] Oh Gyeong-seop et al.(2018)

[9] “Munitions industry” refers to the specific sub-sectors of the heavy and chemical industries, namely chemicals, metals, electricity, electronics, and machinery.

[10] Includes enterprises from the KIET North Korea Industry and Enterprise Database classified as munitions plants by Oh Gyeong-seop et al. (2018).

References

Kim Kyoochul, Nam Jinwook, The Impact of North Korea-Russia Alignment on the North Korean Economy and Implications, Korea Development Institute, forthcoming.

Ahn Je-no, "Issues and Ripple Effects of North Korean Overseas Workers' Human Rights Problems Following the New Russia-North Korea Treaty," Issue Brief No. 597, Institute for National Security Strategy, 2024.

Oh Gyeong-seop, Kim Jin-ha, Han Byeong-jin, Park Yong-han, "Causes and Reality of the Bloating of North Korea's Military Economy," KINU Research Series 18-23, Korea Institute for National Unification, 2018.

Jung Eun-lee, "Why Does Russia Prefer North Korean 'Soldier Workers'?," Online Series 25-32, Korea Institute for National Unification, 2025.

Lukin, Artyom, and Liudmila Zakharova, “Russia-North Korea economic ties: is there more than meets the eye?,” Orbis 62.2, 2018, pp.244-261.

VOA, "State Department Investigates Reality of 'Forced Labor' of North Korean Overseas Workers... Collecting Human Trafficking Information," Nov. 29, 2024.

Federal State Statistics Service of Russia (https://www.fedstat.ru/organizations/)

Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade 'North Korea Industry & Enterprise DB' (https://nkindustry.kiet.re.kr/index.do)

Korea Institute for National Unification, Kim Jong Un Public Activity Press Release DB (https://www.kinu.or.kr/nksdb/)

Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System (https://ecos.bok.or.kr/)

■ Kyoochul KIM is a Fellow at the Office of Global and North Korean Economic Studies, at the Korea Development Institute (KDI) .

■ Translated and edited by Inhwan OH, EAI Senior Research Fellow; Sangjun LEE, EAI Research Associate
    For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr