Preface

In Korea, the distribution of unification discourse has often been coupled with optimism arising from political affairs involving both Koreas, or pessimism following Pyongyang’s military provocations. In the past, events such as the announcement of the Inter-Korean Joint Statement in 1972, the adoption of the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement in 1991, the first Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, and the announcement of joint declarations at several inter-Korean summits have precipitated sanguine unification discourse. On the other hand, negative discourse intensified following North Korea’s nuclear tests, missile test launch, military engagement in the West Sea, the sinking of the Cheonan, and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. On the Korean Peninsula, in which hope and fear coexist, unification discourse is a key task in achieving a unified and peaceful Korea.

Past administrations have consistently presented their versions of unification discourse based on the unification policy put forth since the division. Authoritarian governments had a tendency to pursue unification through achieving victory over the national system competition. Following democratization, each government had its own unification policy framework, differentiating its policy from that of its precedent. As such, there was no continuity.

Three Approaches to Unification Discourse

Unification discourse, which emerged following the division of the Korean Peninsula, can be classified into three broad categories. The first is nationalistic discourse, which justifies unification on the grounds of restoring national homogeneity. The second is discourse centered on establishing peace and order within the international community. The third is pragmatic discourse based on the economic benefits that can be expected from unification.

Nationalistic discourse on unification argues that South and North Korea must be unified as they come from one nation. There are several criticisms to this view. First, since several nations across the world are composed of multiple ethnicities and a single ethnicity is conversely spread across several nations, the nationalist bloc’s “one nation, one country” argument only pertains to the specific circumstances the Korean Peninsula lies in. Hence, it lacks validity as a general proposition. Multiple public opinion surveys suggest that there are less people who view that unification should be achieved on the basis of ethnicity. On the other hand, a large majority of the population believes that unification should be achieved for other reasons, such as to reduce the threat of war and for Korea to develop into an advanced country. It can therefore be confirmed that pragmatic unification discourse based on economic interests and the establishment of peace has increasingly gained momentum.

As the nationalist discourse on unification is no longer easily justifiable, many expected it to be replaced by discourse centered on the establishment of peace. North Korea’s military provocations have not ceased even after the end of the Cold War. Under such circumstances, the pursuit of peaceful order on the Korean Peninsula seems desirable. The fact that there is public consensus on the peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas across all generations shows that peace-centered discourse is a fitting substitute. However, we must be aware that without the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, peace will remain unsustainable and unstable. Such discourse may result in temporary peace rather than providing a gateway towards unification. In this regard, peace-centric discourse may invite criticism in that it considers peace as the end-state rather than a process towards unification. Subsequently, the public could label it as an approach that opposes unification and as a mere tool for crisis management.

In that sense, pragmatic unification discourse centered around the advantages of unification seems like an apt approach in that reduces the excessive costs borne with division and provide a new driving force for the Koreas to advance. The expected benefits of unification outweigh the costs; they can ultimately lead to a happier nation for all. However, such pragmatic discourse has its shortcomings.

Above all, there is no social consensus on the gains and losses of unification. Studies on the benefits and costs of unification show that there are large discrepancies in the estimation of the net benefit of unification as large as 100 times the cost of other findings. These difference arise from variances in the conceptualization of the costs and benefits of unification and the conditions used to calculate them.

Additionally, if the costs to unification cancel out the benefits, pragmatic discourse no longer stands valid. As there is reluctance over unification taxes, justification for unification will be lost if there are no economic benefits. A such, in a 2018 survey, only 47% of respondents claimed that they would pay unification taxes, while 30.6% stated that they would not. 22.3% provided no response. On top of that, respondents willing to pay unification taxes (47%) claimed that they would pay less than 20,000 won, which is too small of a figure to undertake preparations for a financially-stable unification.

Proposal for a New Unification Discourse

Both Koreas have long endured the ebb and flow in inter-Korean relations. While cultural exchanges, economic cooperation, and inter-Korean summits brought forth positive change, tensions rose due to military provocations. In addition, North-South relations largely fluctuated depending on the nature of Seoul’s unification policy. While political leaders instilled hope for unification through statements such as “Unification can come like a thief,” “Unification is a jackpot,” and “Unification can happen even next year.” However, from a realistic point of view, we cannot ignore the concerns associated with the prospects of a unified Korea.

Unification without thorough preparation will inevitably be an excruciating process. Unification discourse must be backed with public opinion based on a national consensus and should be sustained through institutional arrangements. Until now, unification discourse has been centered on the policies of political leaders. Nonetheless, its nature varied according to the government that took office; such fluctuations added onto public frustration on unification. A flexible consensus-based policy on unification, rather than a leader-centered consensus would serve to alleviate such problems. Although there have been many agreements between Seoul and Pyongyang, a majority of such failed due to the lack of public support and a social consensus. From now on, the Korean society should facilitate national debate on the method, cost, and taxation concerning unification. ■

■ Jaeyoung Hur is an Assistant Professor at the Global Leaders College, Yonsei University. He received his M.A., and Ph.D. in the Department of Political Science from Yonsei University (Seoul, Korea). His current areas of research include unification of the Korean Peninsula, inter-Korean relations, political and media discourse analysis, public opinion, media politics. He has published articles about framing of media in South Korea, the effects of North Korean issues on major elections in South Korea, content analysis of president speeches, economic sanctions toward North Korea. He can be reached at jyounghur@yonsei.ac.kr.

■ Typeset by Seung Yeon Lee, Research Associate
    For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | slee@eai.or.kr