TRANSCRIPT (Subtitles)

Greetings. Today’s video will address the ongoing crisis involving the Maduro regime in Venezuela. This situation invites significant comparisons to the North Korean context and offers substantial implications for predicting the regime's future strategic behavior and prospects. While I acknowledge that this crisis carries broader geopolitical significance within the sphere of international relations, my primary objective today is to provide a concise overview of the situation in Venezuela, followed by an analysis of its specific relevance to North Korea. Please be advised that there may be a time gap between the date of this recording and the time of viewing. Therefore, I will outline the developments in Venezuela as they stand on the 7th—the date of recording—before proceeding to discuss the implications for North Korea.

The U.S. Arrest of Maduro

The United States' arrest of Maduro was an event executed with lightning speed. Although I have been closely monitoring the situation, it was difficult to imagine that the United States would remove the leader of a foreign nation through a "pinpoint" attack, akin to a surgical strike. The crisis in Venezuela has been ongoing since last September. The implementation of a naval blockade represented a very high level of armed demonstration. 

U.S. Takes Action Beyond Simple Coercive Policy. The operation took place on January 3rd, at a safe house in Venezuela’s capital, Caracas. The U.S. Department of Justice operated alongside military forces. From the perspective of the United States, they assert that U.S. domestic laws were violated. On the 5th, local time, during his first appearance at a New York court, Maduro told international media that he had been kidnapped. The United States has cited four specific charges. The U.S. asserts that all four charges constitute violations of U.S. domestic law. The four charges are conspiracy to commit narco-terrorism, conspiracy to import cocaine, and possession as well as conspiracy to possess machine guns and destructive devices. It is reported that if convicted on all counts, a sentence of life imprisonment is possible. 

 As a historical precedent, there was the case of Manuel Noriega, the dictator of Panama in the 1990s. At that time, the United States transported him under custody in a similar manner. However, I believe there are two distinct differences between that event and the current situation in Venezuela. First, in the Panama case, the United States launched a full-scale attack. Since that occurred in the latter half of 1989 and into the 90s, the international order was defined by the post-Cold War era and a U.S. unipolar system, where U.S. operations were backed by its status as the world's most powerful nation. The current situation is different. The U.S. did not mobilize its entire military force but instead arrested only Maduro through a special operation. Furthermore, rather than the U.S. being the sole hegemon boasting the world's supreme power in a unipolar system, this event occurred amidst the conflict between the U.S. and China surrounding Venezuela, and within the broader framework of ongoing strategic competition between the U.S. and China. That is another important distinction. 

The situation in Venezuela continues to change rapidly. As of today, the 7th, Vice President Delcy Rodriguez has been sworn in to serve as interim president for the next 90 days. She has effectively become the president. However, immediately after the incident, Vice President Rodriguez presided over a cabinet meeting in her capacity as Vice President, issuing a statement alongside key figures of the Maduro regime, such as the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Interior, strongly condemning the United States. They stated, "The only president of Venezuela is Maduro." 

However, on the 4th, local time, President Trump once again threatened that if Venezuela did not conduct itself properly, he would launch a second attack. He stated that this second attack would be a military operation on a much larger scale than the first. While President Trump’s rhetoric may contain exaggerations, this incident showed that the United States was willing to take concrete action, and in referring to a second attack, he used language suggesting that he would not rule out a full-scale invasion.. Consequently, on the 3rd, President Rodriguez, who had expressed a determination to resist , suddenly posted a message in English on her social media. "We hope that our country can live without external threats in an environment of respect and international cooperation." Crucially, she added, "To strengthen sustainable community coexistence with the U.S. government, we request cooperation on agendas aiming for mutual development within the framework of international law." To put it simply, this means: "We will cooperate with the U.S. We have no intention of fighting the U.S. We will not resist the U.S." She posted a message on social media that is tantamount to a declaration of surrender. Although voices criticizing and blaming the U.S. are still being raised at the inauguration site of the interim president, there has been a clear indication that Venezuela does not intend to antagonize the U.S. or respond militarily—such as engaging in war—and has sufficiently expressed and discussed resolving the issue through dialogue and negotiation with the U.S.

U.S. Perception of a Changed International Order

Then how should we understand this situation? In a way, it is a radical act that damages the international order established by the U.S. Considering that the UN itself was established in 1945 under the leadership of U.S. President Roosevelt, this is a clear challenge to Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter. "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." In other words, Article 2(4) defines the prohibition of changing the status quo through force, respect for sovereign states, and the principle of territorial integrity. However, in this case, force was used to arrest and abduct the leader of another country, so this can be seen as a clear violation of Article 2(4). The UN stipulates only two cases where such military operations are permissible. One is the exercise of military response in self-defense upon facing an actual invasion, and the other is when a UN Security Council resolution is passed authorizing the use of military force to repel aggression, as in the Korean War; otherwise, it is not recognized. Therefore, this situation is clearly a violation of international law. Additionally, there is the "rules-based international order" that the U.S., along with the UN, has established. The rules-based international order includes respect for sovereignty, opposition to changing the status quo by force, the rule of law, as well as free trade and open multilateralism, but this is the core issue. 

The U.S. Chooses Might over Rule of Law. This is speaking from the perspective of international law. However, if we consider the practical lessons signified by this event—where the U.S., the very nation that created international law and formed and sustained the rules-based order since 1945, is now undermining that order under a figure like Trump—the first lesson here is the demonstration of U.S. "muscle," or a show of force and a message of deterrence. It can be viewed that the U.S. has shown willingness to take military action to forcibly extract the non-compliant party if its demands are not heeded. To many nations opposing the U.S.—limiting the scope to South America, countries like Cuba, Nicaragua, or other anti-American states—the U.S. has clearly sent a message that it can use military force if they cross the line. Particularly, the National Security Strategy released last November discussed Donald Trump's "Monroe Doctrine," stating that "the Western Hemisphere is our backyard." This refers to the Americas. While it includes Greenland up north, referring to the region as its backyard shows a determination to secure influence so that no one else can touch it in the future. Therefore, by demonstrating power against Venezuela in South America, it can be determined that the U.S. has once again shown the world that the Western Hemisphere is within its sphere of influence. 

The second point involves the acronym TACO. It stands for "Trump Always Chickens Out," implying that Trump is all talk and retreats at the moment of actual action. Yet, that was not the case this time. Thus, it is now referred to as FAFO. This is a rather vulgar slang term, so I will not explicate it fully, but in Korean, it translates roughly to " mess around and find out." Trump himself posted that specific picture on his social media. He wrote FAFO underneath it, and this theme also appeared in the speech given by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth last year when he summoned all U.S. generals. As he put it, "If you mess around, you will face consequences"— a message of peace through strength, proven by action. 

Regional countries are now facing pressure to choose. In other words, they must clearly clarify their stance. Because the U.S. has shown that it will act if countries lean towards an anti-American and pro-Chinese stance in a zero-sum game. Whether it be U.S. or China, pro-American or anti-American—I believe the pressure to choose felt by regional countries is immense. 

Of course, I believe there are also domestic political calculations involved. The U.S. midterm elections are scheduled for this coming November. Currently, Trump's situation is not particularly favorable. The Epstein files continue to be linked to Trump's political scandals, and criticism against Trump continues to grow due to excessively high inflation in the U.S., causing his approval ratings to fall. Attempting to break electoral deadlock by highlighting decisive action.

Of course this involves complex U.S. domestic issues. This is because the MAGA (Make America Great Again) base that supports Trump possesses isolationist characteristics. Isolationism implies a strong aversion to interfering in the internal affairs of other countries or deploying troops to fight wars. Trump has mentioned this multiple times. He has stated that interfering in others' domestic affairs or engaging in so-called "regime change" is a very foolish endeavor. Trump also voiced strong criticism at the time regarding U.S. military offensives in Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, after being elected president, he stated he would not commit such foolish acts, receiving significant support from the MAGA base; however, he showed a different appearance this time. Consequently, there is a high probability that Trump will not conduct further military operations beyond this. More specifically, regarding deploying ground forces to occupy Venezuela—referred to as "Boots on the Ground"—it is highly likely that he will avoid getting dragged into a situation resembling the 20-year War on Terror experienced by the U.S. If success is achieved at this level, and Venezuela shows a genuinely pro-American stance, allowing the utilization of oil facilities and oil—which Trump constantly emphasizes—and shifting to a situation where energy dominance is secured, Trump could declare another political victory without further military operations, and the MAGA base would likely not raise issues but rather evaluate it positively. I believe such domestic political calculus was also at play. 

Beyond this, governing strategy is important. When looking at the Trump administration's policy and the process of abducting and arresting Maduro in connection with North Korea, a very different pattern from the past is being staged.

Governing Strategy via Leader Replacement

One of the key aspects is that they are executing a "Leadership Change" rather than a "Regime Change." Previously, whether in Afghanistan or Iraq, the U.S. approach was to invade, completely change the nation's system, and transform it into a democracy. However, it failed. The U.S., having experienced a disgraceful withdrawal from Afghanistan despite immense costs and sacrifices over 20 years, has decided not to continue that approach anymore. That stance is being shown in this case. It is a very new aspect of U.S. foreign policy, considered to be a method of leaving the existing system in place while extracting only the anti-American leader who refuses to listen. Although Vice President Rodriguez has taken office as interim president, if the power elites who shared power with Maduro switch to a pro-American stance and cooperate with the U.S., it would represent the success of the Trump administration's policy direction. U.S. Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, gave interviews to U.S. media regarding this. 

When Trump held a press conference, he used the term "run" regarding Venezuela; here, "run" implies not administering the country itself, but dictating its policy. It does not mean the U.S. will go there, seize Venezuela, set up a pro-American regime, and take over administrative duties, but rather that the existing system will be made to drive and execute policies in the direction the U.S. desires. Whether through coercive methods, threats, or persuasion, they have reaffirmed that they will utilize the existing system. Secretary of State Marco Rubio also reaffirmed that the direction of U.S. policy is to force Venezuela to move in the direction the U.S. wants. As mentioned, this is being done by learning from the mistakes in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Another point is that utilizing Rodriguez can prevent a security vacuum and allow the continued use of the military and bureaucratic organizations classified as Maduro loyalists. One of the characteristics appearing here is that President Trump has no interest in things like democracy. Because if he were truly interested in democracy—given that the people appointed under the Maduro regime possess anti-democratic tendencies and believe that the 2024 election was fraudulent— these people should be removed, not just physically, but through holding elections. There is a representative democratic leader of the opposition, Maria Corina Machado, is there not? She is a prominent opposition leader in Venezuela who won a Nobel Prize this time; they could have put her forward and achieved regime change through elections, but he stated he would not do so. President Trump said, "Machado is not that popular within Venezuela." Trump pursues national interest rather than the spread of democracy. He stated, "Right now, restoring a broken country takes precedence over elections." Secretary of State Marco Rubio also said, "Elections are premature." I believe they are making it clear that they will take the current ruling forces, not the Venezuelan opposition, as partners. This is a new facet of the U.S. not seen before, and I will discuss what significance this holds in connection with North Korea.

Implications for North Korea

Can this operation be applied to Kim Jong-un of North Korea? In the broad scope, I see it as difficult. There is a significant difference between North Korea and Venezuela. The arrest and abduction of Maduro in Venezuela was possible because three conditions were met. First, he was indicted under U.S. domestic law. He is a figure indicted on charges of violating the four matters mentioned earlier under U.S. law. Second, demonization was successfully carried out. That is, the idea that Maduro is a very bad person is accepted worldwide and sufficiently understood within the U.S. Third, success was achievable with a single operation. Although military force was mobilized, it was not a sustained operation but one with a very high probability of success without casualties. It is a well-known fact that they prepared for months, and while these three conditions were met, North Korea currently does not meet these three conditions. 

Furthermore, the biggest difference is that North Korea is a state that possesses nuclear weapons. Therefore, undertaking such a military operation against North Korea implies total war or the possibility of using nuclear weapons. The first question is whether the U.S. can bear that level of risk. North Korea also has its own calculus; the 2022 Nuclear Forces Policy Law explicitly stated that even an imminent threat to the safety of Chairman Kim Jong-un would transition to nuclear war. 

Additionally, North Korea has no alternative forces. In Venezuela's case, even if Maduro steps down, there is a Vice President, a No. 2 figure, to serve as an alternative force to lead, but North Korea operates under a monolithic leadership system with a single Supreme Leader, so if the Supreme Leader disappears, there are no figures capable of leading properly. Moreover, there are no opposition parties or alternative forces existing in North Korea like in Venezuela. I believe the U.S. calculus is bound to become very complicated. Finally, there is China, a country sharing a border. If a military operation is conducted, the question is whether China would stand by and watch; the various issues arising from U.S.-China strategic competition cannot be ignored. In that sense, it is clear that there are distinct differences between Venezuela and North Korea. 

Nevertheless, I believe the pressure felt by North Korea will be immense. The U.S. has demonstrated physically that it will enact FAFO, not TACO mentioned earlier—meaning, "mess around and find out." Watching this scene, is it not possible that Kim Jong-un of North Korea might recall 2017? What did President Trump say in 2017? "Fire and fury," "Totally destroyed"—he openly pressured North Korea with such rhetoric. In reality, he also raised armed demonstrations to the highest level. In September 2017, three aircraft carrier strike groups were mobilized for a show of force. For reference, the mobilization of three carrier strike groups represents the level of force the U.S. deploys when starting a war. By mobilizing such massive power and pressuring North Korea with maximum force, North Korea bore a significant burden. I believe this was one of the biggest reasons Kim Jong-un came out for the so-called Korean Peninsula Peace Process in 2018. It likely reminded him of that occasion. 

Action beyond mere display, putting pressure on North Korea. That burden is not just a thought but appears in North Korea's actual reactions. On January 4th, via the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), a spokesperson for the North Korean Foreign Ministry responded to a reporter's question. "We are paying attention to the gravity of the current Venezuela situation caused by the U.S. exercise of strong-arm power in connection with the increasing instability imposed on the already fragile regional situation." This is a situation where they have admitted quite clearly that they view their position in connection with the Venezuela crisis. 

Seven hours after the arrest operation, a missile appearing to be the hypersonic Hwasong-11Ga (KN-23 improved variant) was fired from Pyongyang into the East Sea. Afterward, KCNA reported that Kim Jong-un personally guided the site. Among the things Kim Jong-un said there was this: "Without concealment, these activities of ours are clearly aimed at progressively advancing our nuclear war deterrence. Why this is necessary is explained by the recent geopolitical crisis and complex international upheavals." This is naturally a remark made with the Venezuela situation in mind. To elaborate slightly, it confirms that because serious international incidents like the Venezuela crisis and geopolitical crises are occurring, they need nuclear weapons even more and are paying close attention.

Prospects for North Korea-U.S. Dialogue

Finally, what are the possibilities for future U.S.-North Korea dialogue? Regarding how this will influence matters, there are various judgments and analyses, but I believe both directions exist. The first direction is that, naturally, from Kim Jong-un's perspective, the justification for and obsession with nuclear weapons will become stronger. Because North Korea has constantly stated before, "The reason figures like Iraq's Hussein or Libya's Gaddafi met miserable ends is that their countries did not have nuclear weapons. Therefore, because North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, such a situation will absolutely not occur." They continue to speak of and justify this as the reason they must develop and possess nuclear weapons, and this time is similar. Ultimately, because Venezuela is a powerless nation without nukes, its leader suffered the humiliation of being abducted and arrested; I believe they have already started arguing that their nuclear weapons are even more necessary in an international society where power prevails. If so, it raises the threshold for denuclearization negotiations from the U.S. perspective, and there is a possibility they will not easily enter into negotiations. 

I also believe the exact opposite direction is possible, and I think this probability is more likely. The fact that Trump showed actual military action through "change through strength," not as the TACO he was rumored to be, could be a repetition of a nightmare for Kim Jong-un, making him think of 2017 again as mentioned earlier. Just before the APEC summit last year, did Trump not come to Korea and continue to invite Kim Jong-un? But in the end, the summit did not happen. There is a possibility that Trump will earnestly discuss Kim Jong-un again at the U.S.-China summit in Beijing this coming April; if Kim Jong-un refuses Trump's invitation, Trump could suddenly turn hostile at any moment. He made similar remarks toward Maduro. After the Maduro Incident, Kim Jong-un will find it hard to refuse Trump's demands. 

And North Korea also has reasons to meet Trump. It is not just Trump who wants to meet North Korea; Kim Jong-un also has a clear goal to meet Trump and obtain sanctions relief through negotiation with the U.S. In his policy speech at the Supreme People's Assembly on September 21st of last year, Kim Jong-un stated, "My relationship with Trump is by no means bad." If we look at the various forms of communication from the U.S. and North Korea, I judge there is no major issue in interpreting this as saying they will eventually meet. Because North Korea has its own needs, it intends to pursue such a meeting. Trump’s new action-oriented strategy increases possibility of U.S.-North Korea dialogue. 

Lastly, I will briefly discuss the implications for a sudden change (contingency) in North Korea. When we talk about a North Korean contingency, we usually discuss three scenarios. In the literal sense, a North Korean contingency refers to a situation of very rapid change, discussed in three scenarios: one is leader replacement, another is regime transformation, and the third is state collapse. Usually, we talk a lot about regime transformation regarding North Korean contingencies. It is said that replacing only the leader is not very probable, but this time, signs of leader replacement were visible. In any case, it is highly likely that Maduro will not return to Venezuela. Then, a new alternative force will emerge to govern Venezuela, and if they move in a cooperative direction with the U.S., I believe this can provide significant implications for Kim Jong-un of North Korea, who stands at the vanguard of anti-Americanism in U.S. foreign policy. Today, I have shared a discussion with you regarding the Venezuela crisis. And I have delivered my own analysis regarding what implications this holds for North Korea. Thank you for watching.

■ Won Gon PARK is the Chair of EAI Center for North Korea Studies and a Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ Translated and edited by: Sangjun LEE, EAI Research Associate 
    For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr