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Severed Dialogue

There is currently no dialogue between North and South Korea. Following the collapse of the 2019 Hanoi DPRK–U.S. summit, North Korea's demolition of the inter-Korean liaison office in June 2020 signified not merely the severing of a physical channel, but the collapse of a symbolic communication link. Subsequently, when Kim Jong Un defined the inter-Korean relationship in December 2023 as one between 'two hostile states,' expectations for the restoration of communication channels or the resumption of dialogue diminished significantly. To this day, North and South Korea remain in a state of disconnection, unable to engage in direct dialogue without official communication channels.

Nevertheless, there was a period during which the two Koreas communicated regularly via direct telephone lines. At the first preliminary meeting held on September 20, 1971, in advance of the full-scale inter-Korean Red Cross talks, both sides agreed to establish a permanent liaison office within Panmunjeom and to connect it via a direct telephone line, thereby resuming inter-Korean dialogue for the first time in 26 years following the division in 1945.[1]

Subsequently, the installation and operational procedures of the direct telephone line were institutionalized through several agreements. These included the Agreement on the Operating Procedures of the Direct Telephone Line between the Central Organizations of the North-South Red Cross, signed at the 25th Inter-Korean Red Cross Preliminary Meeting on August 11, 1972, and the Agreement on the Installation and Operating Procedures of the Direct Telephone Line between Seoul and Pyongyang, agreed upon at the time of the announcement of the July 4, 1972 Joint Communiqué.[2]

The inter-Korean direct telephone lines were connected via Panmunjeom or through separate circuits, and served as a foundation for facilitating exchanges and cooperation. In practice, for a certain period, inter-Korean dialogue and exchanges proceeded relatively smoothly, and various communication systems operated―including a summit-level hotline, the Inter-Korean Joint Liaison Office, military communication lines, and channels between intelligence authorities. However, these communication channels were repeatedly suspended and restored through unilateral measures by North Korea in accordance with shifts in inter-Korean relations, and thus failed to become institutionalized as a stable structure for communication.

The fundamental rationale behind severing these communication channels is deeply rooted in Kim Jong Un's designation of the two Koreas as 'two hostile states.' Following the redefinition in December 2023 of the inter-Korean relationship as no longer a relationship between compatriots but a hostile one, North Korea shifted toward effectively dismantling the existing communication channels. As a result, the communication lines of the Inter-Korean Joint Liaison Office and the East and West Sea military communication lines have been unresponsive since April 2023, and the summit-level hotline and the channel between intelligence authorities have also ceased to function. Direct communication known as the 'pink phone,' maintained through the Joint Duty Officer (JDO) responsible for liaison between the United Nations Command and North Korea, had also been operational; however, even this channel also has remained silent, failing to facilitate even basic humanitarian matters such as the repatriation of fishermen.[3]

While the inter-Korean direct channels are severed, reactions to each other's statements and actions continue nonetheless. It is the media that has come to fill the place of official communication channels. As both sides confirm and respond to each other's announcements and actions through reporting and statements, inter-Korean relations have been reduced to a reactive cycle mediated entirely by the press.

Inter-Korean Communication Channels Replaced by Media

North and South Korea read each other's 'actions and statements' through the media and react accordingly. When the South Korean military conducts exercises or the government issues official positions or ministerial statements, North Korean authorities primarily publish responses in the form of statements and communiqués through the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) and selectively publish them in the Rodong Sinmun. Most of these are reactions related to ROK-U.S. combined exercises, the deployment of strategic assets, statements on denuclearization, and announcements by the South Korean Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of Unification—all of which are elements verifiable through media reporting.

The inherent danger is that such reactions rely on the unilateral interpretation of public messages without the ability to verify precise positions through direct communication. Actions and statements conveyed through the media function as signals that the other party reads and interprets. Examining the content of statements and communiqués issued by the North Korean authorities under the names of specific individuals or institutions reveals an acute sensitivity not only to specific inter-Korean incidents, but also to statements made by South Korean ministers. When the Ministry of National Defense or Ministry of Unification announces a position, a communiqué directly targeting it follows. This pattern demonstrates that, in the absence of direct inter-Korean dialogue, statements themselves have come to serve as a substitute for dialogue. North and South Korea do not meet, yet they continue a de facto interaction by reading each other's announcements and responding immediately.

In particular, communiqués issued under the name of Kim Yo Jong, Vice Director of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party, primarily encompass matters relating to South Korea, the United States, and the ROK-U.S. alliance. South Korea's corresponding response is delivered through spokesperson briefings by the Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of Unification, or through official position announcements. A paradigm has emerged wherein both Koreas, devoid of direct dialogue mechanisms, monitor each other's actions via public announcements and formulate corresponding reactions. The difference, if any, is that North Korean authorities employ belligerent and highly charged rhetoric through communiqués issued under individual names, whereas South Korea responds through institutionalized, spokesperson-centered language.

On January 10, 2026, North Korea's KCNA conveyed a statement made by the spokesperson of the Korean People's Army General Staff, issued on the 9th. The expression used in this statement—“we must open even a pinhole-sized opening”—can be seen as echoing a remark by President Lee Jae Myung in connection with inter-Korean relations. This demonstrates that publicly delivered remarks by the South Korean government are being reflected in North Korea's official communiqués. Even in the absence of a direct communication channel, a pattern emerges in which the content of the counterpart's statements is registered and incorporated into responses. The following exchange illustrates this pattern:

In this same context, on February 10, 2026, Minister of Unification Jeong Dong-young, stated that he 'conveys deep regret to the North Korean side regarding the reckless drone infiltration that has occurred' in a congratulatory address at a Mass for 'National Reconciliation and Unity' held at Myeongdong Cathedral in Seoul. In response, Kim Yo Jong directly cited the remark in a communiqué on the 12th, stating: 'I consider it fortunate that South Korea's Minister of Unification, Jeong Dong-young, officially expressed regret on the 10th regarding the anti-DPRK drone intrusion incident that occurred at the start of the new year. I consider this a comparatively sensible action,' thereby offering a rare positive appraisal of a South Korean official’s remarks.

Furthermore, on April 6, 2026, President Lee Jae Myung, at a Cabinet meeting presided over at Cheong Wa Dae, stated in relation to the 'anti-North Korea drone infiltration incident': 'Although it was not the intent of our government, I express regret to the North Korean side that unnecessary military tension was provoked by the irresponsible and reckless actions of some.' In response, Kim Yo Jong, Director of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party, in a communiqué issued through KCNA the same evening, stated: 'Our government evaluates that it is extremely fortunate and a prudent act for his own political survival that the president directly expressed regret and mentioned measures to prevent recurrence,' and 'Our head of state evaluated this as showing the attitude of a frank and magnanimous person.' Thereby, President Lee Jae Myung's statement was immediately responded to and evaluated. This illustrates a pattern in which public statements by senior South Korean government officials and the head of state are reflected without delay in North Korea's official communiqués, where their meaning is reinterpreted and translated into a response.

In this manner, the two Koreas continue their interaction without direct communication by confirming each other's statements through the media and formulating responses on that basis. Public statements become the basis for responses, and those responses in turn generate the other side's interpretations and reactions. Within this structure, statements by the inter-Korean authorities are transmitted and interpreted through the media, effectively functioning as diplomatic acts.

Messages Reconstructed as Hostility

Why has this structure come to be established? The collapse of inter-Korean communication channels and North Korea's refusal to engage with them has constrained our government's access to information on North Korea, and has consequently deepened reliance on North Korean media. This problem has existed for some time, but the situation is being further exacerbated as North Korea has recently shown a tendency to strategically reduce and conceal public information.

As the media fills the void left by direct communication, inter-Korean relations are increasingly restructuring into an interpretation-centered framework. This pattern is even more pronounced on the North Korean side. When actions occur and statements are made, they are interpreted through the media—primarily framed as hostile acts—and subsequently reconstructed to align with Pyongyang's own position, leading to the justification of national policies. Notably, ROK-U.S. combined exercises are interpreted as expressions of confrontational intent, which are then utilized as a pretext for hard-line responses such as the reinforcement of nuclear capabilities. In this manner, the North Korean side displays a pattern of reconstructing South Korean government actions and statements as evidence of hostile intent.

In this way, the two Koreas currently confirm and infer each other's positions indirectly through media broadcasts, official government positions, statements, and communiqués, interpreting these accordingly. When policies, actions, and statements are issued by our government, reactions from the North Korean authorities follow. South Korean media coverage subsequently ensues with government interpretation and response, which in turn feeds back into North Korean communiqués. Even the same incident can have its meaning reconstructed through interpretation, and the resulting direction of response and policy is determined. Over a long period of conflict, following the severing of communication channels, the structure of communication itself is also changing. Inter-Korean relations are now operating not through dialogue but through a structure of interpretation. Direct communication channels are blocked; relations are defined as hostile; messages are publicly delivered; and interpretation is entirely dependent on the media. Within these conditions, a structure is created in which indirect communication through the media amplifies tensions in a state where misunderstandings cannot be corrected.

The Dangers of Interpretation Without Dialogue

This problem is not unique to the two Koreas. In the context of U.S.–North Korea relations as well, patterns are emerging in which U.S. President Trump conveys positions through social media, which are then re-disseminated through the press. As social media has developed and new media platforms have become increasingly diverse, diplomacy today is transforming into a structure that operates through the interpretation of publicly delivered messages rather than through direct negotiation.

This interpretation-centered structure entails inherent risks. As the same message is interpreted in multiple ways, distortion of meaning occurs, and even minor expressions are highly susceptible to over-interpretation and subsequent amplification. Policy may operate on the basis of assumptions rather than verified facts, and in the absence of a buffer mechanism capable of correcting misunderstandings, the potential for miscalculation grows considerably. Within a structure that relies on interpretation without being able to verify the counterpart's precise position, misunderstandings can accumulate continuously.

The central task in current inter-Korean relations is to manage how these indirect signals are interpreted. It is necessary to manage the media-dependent interpretive structure, to strategically design statements, and to simultaneously make efforts to restore at least a minimal direct communication channel. Official government statements must be formulated with the expectation that they will be interpreted, and the media, too, must recognize its role as an intermediary that amplifies and reconstructs interpretations. In particular, with regard to North Korea-related reporting, the media must be aware that it functions as an intermediate mediator that amplifies and reconstructs interpretations. As the space vacated by dialogue is replaced by the media, what has become important in inter-Korean relations is no longer what is conveyed, but how it is interpreted. ■ 

[1] First Preliminary Meeting of the Inter-Korean Red Cross, Ministry of Unification Inter-Korean Dialogue Headquarters website, https://dialogue.unikorea.go.kr/ukd/a/ad/usrtaltotal/View.do?id=2

[2] "Inter-Korean Direct Telephone Line," Ministry of the Interior and Safety National Archives of Korea, https://www.archives.go.kr/next/newsearch/listSubjectDescription.do?id=010084&pageFlag=&sitePage=1-2-1

[3] Richard Kim, "A Test of Restoring Inter-Korean Dialogue Channels… What Will Happen with 'Repatriation of North Korean Fishermen'?", BBC Korea, June 27, 2026. https://www.bbc.com/korean/articles/c79q8y0d2p2o

■ Seunghee HA is a Research Professor at the Institute for North Korean Studies, Dongguk University.

■ Translated and edited by Sangjun LEE, EAI Research Associate; Inhwan OH, EAI Senior Research Fellow; Sowon KIM, EAI Intern.
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