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Trump’s Strategic Documents and North Korea

The Trump administration released two key national security documents for its second term: the National Security Strategy (NSS) in November last year and the National Defense Strategy (NDS) in January. The NSS outlines the U.S. government’s core national security concerns and the broad approaches it intends to adopt in response. The NDS, prepared by the Department of Defense, complements the NSS by translating those priorities into military guidance and a strategic framework for addressing the evolving security environment. 

What, then, do these documents reveal about Trump’s global strategy—and what do they mean for North Korea? 

At first glance, the answer appears underwhelming. The NSS makes no direct reference to North Korea at all. The NDS, while more explicit, devotes only limited attention to the issue compared to earlier iterations. Still, North Korea is addressed as a distinct threat within the section on the strategic environment. The document states that “the DPRK poses a direct military threat to the Republic of Korea (ROK) as well as to Japan, both of which are U.S. treaty allies.” It also highlights the growing danger to the U.S. homeland, warning that “the DPRK’s nuclear forces are increasingly capable of threatening the U.S. Homeland,” and that these forces are “growing in size and sophistication,” presenting “a clear and present danger of nuclear attack.”

Contrary to expectations, however, the Trump administration’s portrayal of the North Korean threat in the NDS does not differ markedly from that of previous administrations. Emphasizing Pyongyang’s nuclear and conventional capabilities is hardly novel in a document devoted to U.S. global military strategy. In this sense, the treatment of North Korea reflects a bipartisan continuity rather than a distinctive Trump-era departure. This raises a more consequential question: if Trump’s strategic documents do not introduce a fundamentally new assessment of the North Korean threat, where should we look to identify the administration’s unique perspective on Pyongyang and its approach to North Korea policy? The answer lies less in what the NSS and NDS say about North Korea explicitly, and more in the broader global strategic framework they advance. It is within that framework—how the administration defines competition, prioritizes threats, and conceives the role of military power—that the real implications for North Korea begin to emerge.

NSS, NDS, and the “Donroe Doctrine”

The Trump administration’s second-term strategy documents offer a rough outline of what might be called the “Donroe Doctrine”—a Trumpian reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine first articulated in 1823. At its core, this approach re-centers U.S. strategic priorities on the Western Hemisphere while markedly downgrading attention to the Indo-Pacific. 

Both the NSS and the NDS explicitly frame the Western Hemisphere as “the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.” The stated objective—“to protect our homeland and our access to key geographies throughout the region”—closely reflects Trump’s longstanding preoccupation with homeland security issues such as immigration, narcotics trafficking, and border control. While the Indo-Pacific region is not ignored altogether, its treatment in these documents is strikingly limited when compared with the first Trump administration or the Biden administration. The deterioration of relations between President Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during Trump’s second term symbolically underscores this shift. 

The relative deprioritization of the Indo-Pacific is closely linked to the administration’s recalibration of U.S.–China relations. The Trump administration argues that more than three decades of U.S. policy toward China rested on flawed assumptions and calls for a fundamental rebalancing of the relationship. Reflecting this view, the NDS states that the United States seeks to “deter China in the Indo-Pacific through strength, not confrontation.” It emphasizes the goal of achieving “a stable peace, fair trade, and respectful relations” with Beijing, while the NDS operationalizes this vision by stressing deterrence without direct confrontation. 

At the same time, the NSS frames the overarching objective as restoring a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific so that both the United States and China can enjoy what it describes as a “decent peace.” This peace, the documents suggest, is one achieved through strength—but not one imposed unilaterally by the United States. Rather, it is presented as an order that China, too, can accept and coexist within. In this respect, Trump’s foreign policy rhetoric bears an unexpected resemblance to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 2012 proposal for a “new type of great power relations.” At the time, Xi told President Barack Obama that “the vast Pacific Ocean has enough space for the two large countries of China and the United States,” advocating non-confrontation, mutual respect for core interests, and win-win cooperation.

Yet this emphasis on stability with China is paired with a clear expectation that U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific shoulder a greater share of the regional security burden. Both the NSS and the NDS urge key allies to “do more for the collective defense.” In particular, they argue that allies such as South Korea should take primary responsibility for their own defense. Under this logic, South Korea is expected to assume primary responsibility for deterring North Korea, albeit “with critical but more limited U.S. support.” Such a shift in defense responsibility is also likely to be reflected in changes to the U.S. force posture on the Korean Peninsula. Taken together, the NSS and NDS suggest that Trump’s approach to the region is less about sustained U.S. forward engagement and more about strategic retrenchment, selective deterrence, and alliance burden-sharing within a broader framework of great-power accommodation.

Trump’s Second-Term Security Strategy and the North Korea Challenge

The security strategy of the Trump administration’s second term represents a significant departure not only from previous administrations but also from Trump’s own first term. This shift demands careful analysis—and swift policy adaptation. Any serious assessment of U.S. policy toward the Korean Peninsula and North Korea must be situated within this broader transformation in Washington’s global strategy. Yet much of South Korea’s current approach to North Korea still rests on assumptions and experiences drawn from Trump’s first term, a reliance that now reveals clear limitations. What, then, do the new NSS and NDS imply for the future of North Korea policy? 

A useful starting point is the administration’s renewed emphasis on the Western Hemisphere and its potential—if indirect—implications for the Korean Peninsula. At first glance, Trump’s hemispheric focus may appear to have little bearing on Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula. But the security effects of this agenda are best understood by tracing how seemingly disconnected issues are linked under a broader strategic logic. This logic is evident in Trump’s views on Venezuela, Greenland, and even Canada. The Western Hemisphere emphasis is driven not only by domestic political concerns—such as immigration and narcotics—but also by emerging economic security priorities, including energy, critical minerals, and supply chains. Seen through this lens, North Korea would not be treated as an isolated nuclear problem. Trump may increasingly frame Pyongyang not in terms of denuclearization, but in relation to U.S. interests defined more broadly. Should Trump’s attention shift to North Korea’s underground resources or tourism potential, his already limited interest in denuclearization could quickly fade. Rather than drawing simplistic parallels between figures like Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro and Kim Jong Un, South Korea must consider how North Korea fits into Trump’s evolving China policy and his reconfigured Indo-Pacific strategy.

While the Indo-Pacific remains part of Trump’s second-term rhetoric, its strategic importance has declined sharply compared to the first term. Previously, the Indo-Pacific strategy was presented as a pillar of U.S. global leadership. Today, it is increasingly framed as a region for maintaining balance of power and enforcing burden-sharing among allies. This change is especially evident in the administration’s China policy. The second-term strategy documents still call for deterring China through strength, but crucially, this deterrence is no longer premised on confrontation. Instead, it is embedded in a vision of coexistence.

If the United States now seeks a “decent peace” with China through a stable balance of power, a similar logic may shape its approach to North Korea. Despite Trump’s personal fascination with summitry and his past engagement with Kim Jong Un, U.S. attention and investment in resolving the North Korea issue are waning. As a result, China’s influence over the Korean Peninsula is likely to grow. In this context, the upcoming U.S.–China summit scheduled for April deserves close scrutiny. Beijing’s long-standing objectives on the Korean Peninsula—denuclearization, peace and stability, and the establishment of a peace regime—may evolve under Trump’s new strategic framework. If Xi Jinping accepts Trump’s vision of a “decent peace,” China could adopt a more proactive role on North Korea, potentially opening space for renewed U.S.–North Korea diplomacy. Whether Xi will ultimately embrace Trump’s proposal remains uncertain. Still, the likelihood is arguably higher than at any point in recent years. The Trump administration’s notion of a “decent peace” resonates closely with Xi’s long-standing call for a “new type of great power relations.” Moreover, Washington’s emerging emphasis on a denial defense strategy focused on the First Island Chain is far more palatable to Beijing than earlier U.S. concepts such as Air-Sea Battle or Multi-Domain Operations. Even if Xi declines to formally accept Trump’s offer, one point is already clear: both Washington and Beijing no longer view the North Korea issue in isolation. Instead, it is increasingly embedded within their respective visions for the broader regional order. If Washington and Beijing converge on a shared vision of the Indo-Pacific order defined by a “decent peace,” or a balance of power, the Korean Peninsula would inevitably be drawn into that framework, and the possibility of a grand bargain between two great powers could no longer be ruled out. Trump, for his part, may seize this moment as an opportunity to revive summit-level diplomacy with Kim Jong Un, allowing him to refocus on what has always been a deeply personal interest. Kim, meanwhile, has pursued a foreign policy aimed at reinforcing a multipolar order by restoring ties with Russia and China. Yet shifts in U.S.–China relations could prompt Pyongyang to explore renewed engagement with Washington, possibly through Beijing as an intermediary. The South Korean government should therefore closely monitor how North Korea coordinates with China in the lead-up to the April summit, particularly in the aftermath of the Workers’ Party’s Ninth Congress.

At the same time, Trump’s insistence on greater alliance burden-sharing carries profound implications for South Korea’s role in addressing the North Korea problem. While this shift clearly places greater responsibility on Seoul for defending the Korean Peninsula, it also demands a more proactive Korean role in shaping diplomatic outcomes. South Korea has recently portrayed itself as a “pace-maker” on North Korea. Under the Donroe Doctrine, however, it must become a genuine “peace-maker.” In practical terms, South Korea is the only actor capable of mobilizing the resources, political will, and sustained engagement necessary to make negotiations with North Korea viable. While changes in inter-Korean relations ultimately require movement in U.S.–North Korea relations, only Seoul can credibly set the agenda and bridge the fundamental gaps between Washington and Pyongyang. North Korea continues to advance its narrative of “two hostile states,” while the United States views the region through the prism of a broader Indo-Pacific balance aimed at securing a decent peace. Under these conditions, neither side is likely to initiate serious negotiations on its own. 

This leaves South Korea as the sole actor capable of performing the role of a true peace-maker. The task is undeniably difficult, especially as Pyongyang remains unresponsive to Seoul’s overtures. Yet sustained efforts to keep channels open and explore pathways toward U.S.–North Korea dialogue remain essential. Trump’s strategic documents suggest a gradual retreat from U.S. security commitments on the Korean Peninsula. Yet only the existence of a credible negotiating platform on North Korea can create the conditions for meaningful change on the peninsula. ■ 

■ Jihwan HWANG is a Professor at the Department of International Relations at the University of Seoul.

■ Edited by Sangjun LEE, EAI Research Associate
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