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1. New Directions in North Korea-China Relations

North Korea and China are showing signs of rapidly advancing relations, with high-level exchanges actively taking place following the September 3 Victory Day events. Beginning with Chairman Kim Jong Un's attendance at China's Victory Day ceremony and the North Korea-China summit on September 3, high-level exchanges have continued in succession: Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui's visit to China and foreign ministers' talks on September 28, and Chinese Premier Li Qiang's visit to North Korea and participation in the foundation of the Workers' Party event on October 9. These exchanges demonstrate that bilateral relations have moved beyond mere improvement to showcase a close bond. Furthermore, the leaders of both countries exchanged congratulatory messages on the 77th anniversary of the founding of the North Korean regime on September 9 and the 76th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China on October 1, respectively, emphasizing the strengthening of strategic communication.

High-level exchanges between North Korea and China have been frequent, but since such exchanges took place during regular major events, they could be seen as part of a routine practice rather than holding special significance. Nevertheless, recent exchanges between the two countries included unusual scenes beyond mere routine, making it necessary to examine their implications more closely.

China staged two unusually noteworthy scenes during its September 3 Victory Day celebrations. The first scene showcased the solidarity among the three countries as President Xi, President Putin, and Chairman Kim stood side by side for the first time in 66 years to observe the military parade. Given that all three nations currently face common pressure and aggression from the United States, it was undeniable that this staging provided ample room for interpretation as a move aimed squarely at the U.S., intended to flaunt North Korea-China-Russia solidarity.

The second scene involved President Xi Jinping extending an exceptional state-visit level courtesy to Chairman Kim Jong Un, including holding a summit meeting with a separate dinner. Chairman Kim's 4-night, 5-day visit to Beijing for the Victory Day celebrations marks his first trip since his fourth visit in January 2019, a gap of 6 years and 8 months. The North Korea-China summit itself is the first in over 6 years and 2 months since President Xi's visit to Pyongyang in June 2019. During the summit, President Xi largely avoided mentioning “denuclearization,” showing noticeable consideration for North Korea's position.

And China reciprocated Chairman Kim's attendance at the Victory Day event by sending Premier Li Qiang to attend North Korea's 80th anniversary celebration of the founding of the Workers' Party on October 10. This represents a higher-level response compared to China's attendance at the 70th anniversary event in 2015, when Liu Yunshan, then fifth in the power hierarchy and a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, attended. Understanding why China, which had maintained a certain distance from North Korea since Xi Jinping took power, is now showing unusual special attention and seeking to strengthen ties offers a crucial clue to forecasting the current unstable and uncertain Korean Peninsula and its surrounding international environment.

2. China's Calculations and Strategy Regarding the North Korea-China-Russia Alignment

Chairman Xi's decision to stand alongside President Putin and Chairman Kim Jong-un at the Victory Day ceremony, exhibiting their close relationship, was likely intended to send a message to the United States. However, a third scene deserves attention. Although the leaders of North Korea, China, and Russia gathered together for the first time in 66 years, they did not hold a trilateral summit. Only bilateral summits between North Korea and China, North Korea and Russia, and China and Russia took place, and even at those meetings, there was no discussion of trilateral North Korea-China-Russia cooperation. In the same vein, China's choice here too may have been made with the United States in mind. That is, China deliberately avoided solidifying and institutionalizing the trilateral relationship, being mindful of the United States and Western nations.

For China, North Korea and Russia serve as minimal safety nets and allies, but they are not the most important partners in terms of economic and diplomatic gains. The Xi Jinping government still prioritizes domestic development above all else, making expanded economic cooperation with Western nations like the United States and Europe more crucial than political solidarity with North Korea and Russia. If China becomes overly close to North Korea and Russia, it risks damaging its reputation and status in the international community. Moreover, it could negatively affect relations with key economic partners in Europe and other Western nations. Especially as China approaches tariff negotiations with the United States, it needs to counterbalance American influence. However, it also does not wish to provoke excessive tension that could escalate conflict and confrontation with the United States.

In December 2023, at the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference held for the first time in five years, China presented its global diplomatic vision: “a multipolar world based on equality and order” and “open, inclusive, and comprehensive economic globalization.” The North Korea-China-Russia alignment may be a necessary condition for advancing the Xi Jinping administration's global vision of “multipolarity and economic globalization,” but it is not a sufficient one. From China's perspective, the SCO summit held in Tianjin prior to the Victory Day celebrations, and the APEC summit to be held in Gyeongju at the end of October carry greater significance for realizing this global vision. China is actively pursuing a multi-pronged diplomacy under the banner of multipolarity, engaging in cooperation with Global South nations as well as Western countries such as Europe and Japan. Despite its efforts to shift toward domestic demand, China remains highly dependent on external markets. Therefore, diversifying its partners under the banner of ‘economic globalization’ is a practical imperative. In short, the strategic value of North Korea and Russia to China is influenced by the Trump variable, and China is likely to continue to actively manage its bilateral relations with North Korea and Russia and to flaunt its ties. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that North Korea-China-Russia relations will develop into a concrete form of solidarity that counters anti-American and anti-Western sentiment.

3. China's complex intentions toward North Korea

President Xi Jinping extended an exceptionally high level of protocol to Chairman Kim Jong Un during his visit to China. At the Victory Day military parade, Chairman Xi, President Putin, and Chairman Kim were seated together at the center of the Tiananmen Rooftop. At the reception, Chairman Xi and his wife provided seats next to Chairman Kim. Notably, unlike other leaders, Chairman Kim alone received treatment equivalent to a state visit, including a private dinner meeting. This extraordinary courtesy extended to Chairman Kim Jong-un by China appears difficult to interpret solely as gratitude for attending the Victory Day celebrations; it seems to be part of coordinated efforts between the two countries.

First, while China's large-scale Victory Day celebrations drew international attention, they were essentially domestic events aimed at rallying support and unity among the Chinese people for the Communist Party and the Xi Jinping regime. Chairman Kim Jong-un also actively leveraged his attendance at the Victory Day events for domestic propaganda purposes, and China effectively supported this. North Korea unusually reported Chairman Kim Jong-un's schedule and movements in detail before and after the event, actively praising and promoting his international stature. Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un mutually cooperated to actively utilize the Victory Day event and the exchange of special honors as events to strengthen their respective domestic leadership and systems.

Second, North Korea and China publicly confirmed and showcased that they had restored their previously strained relations through the Victory Day celebrations and summit meeting. However, in reality, the two countries had already begun moving toward improved relations with the inauguration of the second Trump administration. On February 18, 2025, North Korea's Vice Foreign Minister Park Myong-ho made an unusual visit to the Chinese Embassy in Pyongyang, expressing his desire for improved relations: “We hope that the socialist construction of both the DPRK and China will continuously achieve new and greater successes, and that the two countries will strengthen exchanges and cooperation to propel DPRK-China relations to a higher level.” Ambassador Wang Yajun responded by emphasizing the need to “strengthen strategic communication and deepen practical cooperation.” Since then, China has consistently underscored “strategic communication” with North Korea in official settings, signaling Beijing's intent to improve bilateral relations.

In other words, China recognized the need to improve relations with North Korea after the launch of the second Trump administration. As tariff pressures on China intensified immediately, confrontation with the U.S. escalated, and the possibility of North Korea-U.S. dialogue could no longer be ruled out. According to China's General Administration of Customs, total North Korea-China trade reached $1.46584 billion from January to July this year, a 32% increase compared to the same period last year, indicating that exchanges between the two countries were already active. In short, the primary driver for the restoration of North Korea-China relations was the inauguration of the second Trump administration, confirmed by the events surrounding the Victory Day celebrations.

Third, both North Korea and China fundamentally share the view that the “U.S. variable” is the primary driver for restoring relations. However, on the other hand, there exists a strategic divergence in their specific interpretations of this U.S. variable, which could constrain swift and comprehensive improvement in bilateral ties.

Both China and North Korea experienced difficulties during first Trump term due to his unpredictable, impulsive words, actions, and policies. China was caught off guard in 2018 by President Trump's unexpected push for a summit with Chairman Kim Jong-un and the resulting possibility of a change in the status quo on the Korean Peninsula. Kim Jong-un also has painful memories of being placed in a difficult position by the eventual “Hanoi No Deal.”

China and North Korea share a common challenge in the “Trump variable,” placing them in a position of mutual sympathy. To respond to this identical challenge, China and North Korea first require close strategic communication and coordination. At the very least, a consensus is being formed that strategic communication is critical amid high uncertainty, and that restoring relations is essential for this purpose.

However, the North Korea-China relationship involves complex and divergent strategic calculations beyond merely showcasing an anti-American solidarity. China, already confronting and competing with the United States, has been sensitive to U.S. efforts to extend its influence beyond South Korea to North Korea. Therefore, China anticipates the possibility that a second Trump administration might again bypass China and engage in direct negotiations with North Korea. To prepare for this, China judges it must proactively and stably manage its relationship with North Korea. In this context, it is once again prioritizing the call for “strengthened strategic communication” with North Korea.

North Korea is also wary of the possibility that the two major powers, the U.S. and China, might compromise on its own issues. Even when U.S.-China relations were strained in the past, both countries fundamentally agreed on the principle of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In September 2017, immediately after North Korea's sixth nuclear test, the U.S. and China swiftly and decisively passed the UN Security Council Resolution 2375, which imposed high-intensity sanctions. As a result, North Korea has been suffering from severe economic hardship to this day. North Korea cannot rule out the possibility of a U.S.-China compromise during the second Trump administration, even if it is not highly likely.

On the other hand, North Korea also needs to restore relations with China as a precautionary measure in case negotiations with the Trump administration prove difficult. While China led successive North Korea-China summits since 2018, North Korea also had strategic considerations to showcase China as its backing ahead of major negotiations with the United States. In short, North Korea needs improved relations with China, which can serve as a backer, both to drive negotiations with the U.S. and to deal with the consequences of failed negotiations.

Fourth, while the North Korea-China summit showcased cooperation, it remains questionable whether China can fully restore traditional friendly relations by sufficiently providing what North Korea desires. The most crucial demands North Korea consistently makes of China are essentially recognition of its nuclear status, easing of UN sanctions, and provision of substantial, tangible economic support.

At the summit, Kim Jong-un emphasized, “We hope North Korea and China will maintain close exchanges at every level, share experiences in party building and economic development, and assist in the construction and development of the Workers' Party of Korea and the state.” He added, “We hope both countries will deepen mutually beneficial economic and trade cooperation to achieve more substantial results.” In short, it appears highly likely that Chairman Kim Jong-un focused on raising issues related to economic cooperation with China during the summit, such as expanding trade, attracting Chinese tourists, and dispatching North Korean workers, while requesting economic support. The fact that North Korea included a large number of economic officials in its delegation also suggests a strong emphasis on economic cooperation.

However, while competing with the United States, China places particular emphasis on the value of the United Nations. It is highly unlikely that China would undermine UN resolutions it has agreed to in order to support North Korea. Especially given its ongoing critical tariff negotiations with the United States, China is unlikely to risk violating UN sanctions by providing the specific cooperation North Korea expects and demands. China has observed the North Korea-Russia rapprochement but has not fully accommodated North Korea's demands. Historically, China has provided economic support to manage North Korea during summit meetings. However, even excluding sanctioned periods, China has not provided sufficient economic aid to satisfy North Korea. Particularly under the Xi Jinping administration, the practice of regular summit meetings has ceased, leading to limited support for North Korea.

Ultimately, in a situation where it is difficult to predict what negotiation and pressure cards President Trump will play toward China and North Korea, it is not easy for either North Korea or China to rashly put anti-Americanism at the forefront publicly while strengthening bilateral cooperation. This is because it is still difficult to predict whether strengthening North Korea-China relations will be an asset or a liability in the negotiations with the U.S., which both countries prioritize above all else. In particular, with various expectations and predictions emerging ahead of the APEC summit, uncertainty is actually growing, forcing the relevant parties, including North Korea and China, to be even more cautious.

Furthermore, the strategies and policies of both North Korea and China toward each other are significantly influenced by and can shift based on their respective relations with the United States. For example, if the APEC meeting is followed by US-China and South Korea-China summits, and as a result, a new atmosphere is created on the Korean Peninsula and surrounding areas, North Korea-China relations may also be affected, leading to further changes. Consequently, North Korea-China relations are inherently fluid. In short, while both countries have motivations for improving relations, complex strategic calculations of differing objectives lie beneath. This makes rapid and comprehensive improvement in their relationship unlikely

4. China's Changed Position on the North Korean Nuclear Issue

At the North Korea-China summit, China emphasized “stability” over “denuclearization” regarding the Korean Peninsula. Xi Jinping stated, “China has consistently maintained an objective and fair stance on the Korean Peninsula,” adding, “We will continue to strengthen coordination with North Korea and do our utmost to safeguard peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.” Chairman Kim stated, “North Korea highly appreciates China's fair stance on the Korean Peninsula,” adding, “We hope to continue strengthening cooperation in multilateral platforms like the UN to safeguard the fundamental interests shared by both sides.”

This is not the first time China has omitted mention of the North Korean nuclear issue in official talks. China is believed to have begun shifting its stance on the nuclear issue following the breakdown of the 2019 Hanoi summit between North Korea and the United States. China's shift was formally confirmed starting at the 2022 Bali summit between the US and China. Since then, China has stopped mentioning the ‘Three Principles on the Korean Peninsula’ it had consistently emphasized for over 30 years. It also avoids or does not publicly discuss the North Korean nuclear issue in talks with the U.S. and South Korea.

Nevertheless, signs indicating that China may not entirely support North Korea's position on the nuclear issue have also emerged. A new phrase appeared at the summit, unseen in previous North Korea-China talks: President Xi stated that China maintains an objective and just stance on the Korean Peninsula, and Chairman Kim responded that he respects this. At first glance, this appears to be an indirect expression of China's de facto support for North Korea's position on the nuclear issue. However, the fact that this appears only in the Chinese statement and not North Korea's raises doubts whether North Korea actually respected China's position. Rather, it may indicate that China indirectly conveyed a message that it cannot unilaterally support only North Korea's position on the North Korean nuclear issue, even if it did not publicly mention denuclearization.

Ultimately, the crucial question is whether China is effectively endorsing North Korea's claim to be a nuclear power. China seems to have concluded that, given the lack of a clear U.S. stance on the North Korean nuclear issue, there is no need for it to proactively declare its position. In other words, with the Biden administration already having taken a passive position on the issue, and the Trump administration's position and attitude toward North Korea's nuclear program unclear, China appears to maintain an ambiguous, evasive stance of watching and waiting while closely monitoring the U.S., China is observing the Trump administration's moves and maintaining an ambiguous position, avoiding mention of denuclearization to prevent provoking North Korea.

China harbors significant concerns about the repercussions that would follow if it were to formally recognize North Korea's nuclear status. It fears that acknowledging North Korea's nuclear weapons would ultimately bolster arguments for the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula or for nuclear development within South Korea. This, in turn, could create a serious security crisis for China's key regions, including Northeast China, North China, Beijing, and Tianjin.

China has recently expressed concern over the chance of a war breaking out on the Korean Peninsula, advocating for a ‘political solution’ on the Korean Peninsula. Behind China's call for a ‘political solution’ lies an implicit blame on the United States. In his May 2024 joint statement following his summit with President Putin, Chairman Xi Jinping declared, “We oppose threatening military actions by the United States and its allies that could escalate confrontation with North Korea and lead to an armed conflict and heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula.” This effectively placed responsibility for tensions on the peninsula on the United States and South Korea. At the May 2025 Xi-Putin summit, the joint statement demanded an “end to pressure on North Korea” without mentioning the North Korean nuclear issue or denuclearization at all. In short, while China expresses serious concern over security instability on the Korean Peninsula, it maintains that the responsibility for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue lies with the United States. It seeks to manage the situation by restoring relations with North Korea.

5. APEC Time, Korea's Strategic Preparations

From South Korea's perspective, the trends in North Korea-China-Russia relations are undoubtedly a vital issue. Therefore, it is inevitably a sensitive matter, and we must indeed assess the situation cold-heartedly, and objectively, and prepare our response accordingly. However, there is a tendency within some sectors of South Korea to over-interpret the Victory Day celebrations as a sign of heightened North Korea-China-Russia solidarity, fueling excessive caution and concern. We must be cautious about analyses suggesting the materialization of this solidarity directly targeting South Korea-U.S.-Japan, and that China is driving an anti-U.S., anti-Western alignment. While interpreting this as a bloc confrontation is understandably clear-cut, it risks oversimplification and missing opportunities to develop sophisticated, multifaceted strategies. China may actually be formulating highly sophisticated and meticulous strategies, anticipating various variables, and conducting its Victory Day celebrations within that framework. If all of this is simplistically reduced to an anti-American, anti-Western, Cold War-style framework, there is a substantial risk that the response will be narrowly focused on strengthening South Korea-U.S.-Japan cooperation.

It is difficult to conclude that China's foreign strategy will develop solely along anti-American and anti-Western lines simply because it used the special occasion of the Victory Day to showcase advanced weapons and gather the leaders of North Korea, China, and Russia in one place to demonstrate its might. Rather, China is facing U.S. offensive pressure and is pursuing all-directional diplomacy beyond the China-North Korea-Russia alignment, while also making parallel efforts to diversify its economic cooperation partners. China is actively engaging in diplomacy toward emerging economies and the Global South where U.S. influence is relatively weaker, launching a diplomatic offensive toward Europe, and even meticulously preparing for negotiations while confronting the United States.

The absence of a North Korea-China-Russia summit could signal that a series of close dialogues and negotiations among key nations surrounding the Korean Peninsula may unfold following the upcoming Victory Day events. As the APEC summit begins after Victory Day, a period of fierce negotiations and diplomatic battles, including the US-China summit, will begin. This could confirm all previous expectations and hopes, or it could usher in a new situation of uncertainty. In short, we must now focus on preparing for the new changes and uncertainties that the APEC summit will bring.

From South Korea's perspective, the restoration of North Korea-China relations amid an unstructured North Korea-China-Russia alignment, coupled with Chairman Kim Jong-un's appearance on a multilateral stage—albeit at a domestic event hosted by China—suggests North Korea may not persist solely with reckless provocations. This could also present an opportunity to positively leverage the situation to build momentum for dialogue. Therefore, while South Korea must thoroughly brace for the possibility of a strengthened North Korea-China-Russia solidarity, it also requires sophisticated and creative preparations for the potential unfolding of intense diplomatic battles, including negotiations.

Furthermore, while it is difficult to infer that China has accepted North Korea's claim to be a nuclear power, preemptive preparations are necessary for the possibility of rapidly escalating circumstances. Above all, the Lee Jae Myung administration must prioritize accurately assessing the implications of China's series of attitude shifts and determining what countermeasures China is envisioning regarding North Korea's claim to be a nuclear state. Based on this, South Korea must actively pursue strategic communication with China to share recognition of the repercussions North Korea's ‘nuclear state’ claim would have on the Korean Peninsula, as well as on peace and stability in East Asia.

Priority should be given to enhancing communication and cooperation on the fundamental consensus shared by South Korea and China regarding North Korea-related issues: preventing and deterring instability on the Korean Peninsula caused by North Korean provocations, and exchanging information and taking measures related to stabilizing the North Korean regime. Furthermore, it is crucial to accurately grasp what China means by its claimed ‘constructive role’ in the North Korean nuclear issue and whether this aligns with the role expected by the South Korean government.

Additionally, rather than forcing a breakthrough through the obstacles of China and North Korea's recognition of the North Korean nuclear program and the easing of UN sanctions, there is also another scenario in which the two countries could establish a new relationship through a realistic compromise. This would involve strengthening their strategic understanding regarding the North Korean nuclear issue through close communication and economic cooperation, thereby achieving the practical effect of de facto sanctions-easing without formal relaxation. It is also of paramount importance for South Korea to develop strategic preparedness for how it will respond to this issue should North Korea and China gradually and tacitly recognize the North Korean nuclear program and ease sanctions in an unobtrusive manner.  ■ 

■ Dong Ryul LEE is a Professor in the Department of Chinese Studies at Dongduk Women's University.

■ Translated and Edited by Inhwan OH, EAI Senior Research Fellow; Sangjun LEE, EAI Research Associate
    For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr