Chairman Kim Jong Un did not provide a New Year’s Address in 2022. Nonetheless, North Korea’s prospects for 2022 can be inferred from his speech entitled “On the Orientation of the Work of the Party and State for 2022[1]” delivered at the 4th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Party Central Committee.

Self-assessment on 2021

In his speech, Kim Jong Un provided a general assessment of the past year, stating that 2021 is “‘a year of great victory’ that opened up a prelude to the great change toward the overall development of socialist construction despite severe trials.” Specifically, Kim summarized the accomplishments made in 2021 in the following three points. First, on the economic front, an evident stride was made in the agricultural sector. The pursuit of huge construction projects greatly demonstrated the development and potential power of “our style socialism.” Furthermore, improvements and achievements were made in the implementation of the tasks in the first year of the five-year economic plan. Second, on the political and ideological front, the political center transitioned from the military to the party. Furthermore, the Party accomplished the goal of enhancing ideological awareness for socialist development of all people. Third, he discussed developments made in the national defense industrial front, claiming that the defense sector developed one ultra-modern weapon system after another under its correct plan. This demonstrated the advancement and modernity of North Korea’s military force and was “one of the very important achievements made this year.”

In 2020, North Korea endured the worst economic downturn since the “Arduous March” in the 1990s. This is due to the “triple whammy” of continuous international sanctions against its nuclear and missile development, border closures to prevent the spread of COVID-19, and natural disasters. It was a daunting journey for the regime to push toward the goal of socialist construction despite the “severe trials,” which continued into 2021.

Orientation for 2022

Kim Jong Un stated that the struggle in 2022 “is a great life-and-death struggle to be vigorously waged successfully for sure for the overall development of socialist construction, our great people and beloved posterity.” He first emphasized that the “economic sector, the main front of socialist construction, should concentrate all its efforts on putting the country's economy on the growth orbit” and “providing stabilized and improved living to the people by reenergizing production” and pursuing “adjustment and improvement.” Second, he set important tasks for stimulating the overall development of socialist construction by innovating work in the “field of culture including science, education, public health.” Third, “the military environment of the Korean peninsula and the trend of the international situation getting instable day after day demand that bolstering the state defence capability be further powerfully propelled without a moment's delay.” Therefore, the munitions industrial field should continue making achievements true to the decisions made at the 8th Party Congress and “attain the goal of putting the defence industry on a Juche, modern and scientific basis in a planned way.” Fourth, he set forth “principled issues and a series of tactical orientation, all of which should be maintained by the sectors of the North-South relations and external affairs to cope with the rapidly changing international political situation and the circumstances in the surroundings.” Fifth, he provided tasks for strengthening the Party and enhancing its leading role in order to successfully carry out important tasks for a “fresh victory of socialist construction.”

Reading Kim Jong Un’s Mind

North Korea’s pursuit of expanding its capacity for socialism has been deterred by the “triple whammy.” On top of that, South Korea’s presidential elections are coming up and the U.S. remains to take a cautious stance towards North Korea. While Kim Jong Un’s speech spared no detail in explaining the tasks in major fields for “our-style” socialist construction for strengthening domestic capabilities; it only briefly covered inter-Korean and external relations without getting into the specifics. However, it is essential to unpack what is discussed in Pyongyang not only for North Korea watchers to make an accurate forecast on inter-Korean and North Korea-U.S. relations in 2022 but also to encourage North Korea to choose a more promising path. It is imperative to not fall into subjective optimism or pessimism by interpreting Kim’s mind in our own ways. Moreover, a simple application of positivist methods such as content analysis or big data analysis would not help us much in identifying Kim Jong Un’s perception of the current inter-Korean and international climate. With a hermeneutic approach, we could finally arrive at a “fusion of horizons,” or a correct understanding of his worldview.[2] Accordingly, it is necessary to carefully reread the “On Report Made by Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un at the Eighth Party Congress[3]” from early January 2021, his policy speech to the Supreme People’s Assembly[4] from late September, and his speech delivered at the Defence Development Exhibition Self-Defence 2021[5] in October, which best manifest Chairman Kim Jong Un's current thoughts.

Inter-Korean Relations

Chairman Kim Jong Un emphasized three principles for inter-Korean relations in his report to the 8th Party Congress. First, “it is necessary to take stand and stance to resolve the basic problems first in the north-south relations, halt all acts hostile toward the other side, and seriously approach and faithfully implement the North-South declarations.” The report, therefore, stressed that South Korea should cease the import of latest military hardware and joint military exercises with the U.S. instead of pursuing cooperation in epidemic prevention and humanitarian field and individual tourism, which North Korea deems “inessential.” Second, it stressed that if South Korea continues to push North Korea “with a double-dealing and biased mindset,” the North has no other option but to deal with them in a different way. Third, the report analyzed that “North-South relations may return to a new starting point of peace and prosperity in the near future … as they did in the spring three years ago, depending on the South Korean authorities' attitude.”

At the policy speech delivered in late September 2021, Kim spoke on the end-of-war declaration, which was proposed by South Korea as a fundamental step in solving inter-Korean problems. He stated that “it is the invariable demand repeatedly explained by us to ensure the respect for each other and withdraw the partial view, unfair and double-dealing attitude and hostile viewpoint and policies towards the other side before declaring the termination of war, and this is an important task to be settled beforehand in order to control the inter-Korean relations and open up a bright future.”

North Korea’s horizon on inter-Korean relations is centered on the second principle. Therefore, North Korea states that the withdrawal of a “double-dealing” mindset and hostile North Korea policy are prerequisites to the end-of-war declaration, which South Korea proposed as an important agenda in resolving inter-Korean tensions. However, under the context of high mutual distrust between the two Koreas, South Korea also views that North Korea must meet its prerequisites. In other words, South Korea may view that North Korea, with its simultaneous pursuit towards nuclear arsenal development and discussion over end-of-war declaration, comes from a place of hostility and a double-dealing mindset. At present, we are at a stage in which both sides are unable to concurrently solve this dilemma. In order for the end-of-war declaration to put an end to war, it is necessary for both Koreas to mutually acknowledge the large gap in perspective and find practical ways to narrow it.

North Korea-U.S. Relations

The report of the 8th Party Congress presented three principles for external relations. First, the field of external work should strictly adhere to the principle of independence in its activities, regarding it as the first mission of the DPRK's diplomacy “to defend the dignity of the WPK, enhance the prestige of the nation and champion the interests of the state.” Second, political activities should focus on subjugating the U.S., “the fundamental obstacle to the development of our revolution and our principal enemy” and “adopt an adroit strategy toward the U.S. and steadily expand solidarity with the anti-imperialist, independent forces,” given that the entity of the U.S. and the real intention of its policy toward the DPRK will never change. Third, the report claimed that the key to establishing new DPRK-U.S. relations lies in the U.S.’ withdrawal of its hostile policy toward the DPRK.” Therefore, the Workers’ Party of Korea will approach the U.S. on the “principle of power for power and goodwill for goodwill” in the future.

At the 5th Meeting of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly, Kim Jong Un pointed out that the U.S. remains “utterly unchanged in posing military threats and pursuing hostile policy toward the DPRK.” Instead, it has used more cunning ways and methods in doing so, as proven by what the Biden administration has done for the past eight months since its emergence. Kim stated that the U.S.’ “diplomatic engagement” and “dialogue without preconditions” is no more than a “petty trick for deceiving the international community and hiding its hostile acts and an extension of the hostile policy pursued by the successive U.S. administrations.” Therefore, in terms of external activities, Kim emphasized that North Korea must provide tactical measures to implement a strategic policy towards the U.S “on the basis of strictly studying and analyzing the present U.S. administration's stand on the DPRK, the prospects of the US political situation and ever-changing international balance of forces within the framework of their correlations.”

We should be cautious before expecting DPRK-U.S. relations to improve in 2022. The unsuccessful 2019 Hanoi Summit and the failure of the following meeting in Stockholm revealed the wide gap between the two sides in their approaches to address the problem. Unless they are to take new moves, it is unlikely for working-level negotiations to progress into another summit. The Biden administration officially stated that it would take a “calibrated and practical approach.” The “calibrated” measures, however, do not mean that Washington would accommodate any kind of Pyongyang’s demand. The lower limit of the American bargaining range is a nuclear freeze that demonstrates some level of sincerity towards complete denuclearization. Yet, North Korea has never made a strategic decision to abandon its nuclear weapons program in the Byungjin line. The maximum price that Kim Jong Un is willing to pay is what he suggested in Hanoi, a partial denuclearization in Yongbyon nuclear facility in exchange for a synchronized action of the U.S. like sanctions relief. Accordingly, it is almost impossible to reconcile the two sides’ positions: a nuclear freeze with the sincere intention of denuclearization vs. a partial denuclearization in exchange for sanctions relief.

Denuclearization of North Korea

Chairman Kim Jong Un delivered a congratulatory speech at the Self Defense-2021 exhibition in October and said that the military danger arising from the military tension prevailing around the Korean peninsula “is different from that ten or five, nay, three years ago.” He went on to strongly criticize the various military exercises the U.S and South Korea frequently wage and South Korea’s attempt to modernize its armaments. He stated that the U.S. has frequently sent signals that it is not hostile towards North Korea “but its behaviours provide us with no reason why we should believe in them.” He also said, “under the prevailing unstable situation on the Korean peninsula, steadily strengthening our military might to cope with it is the demand of the times of our revolution and the supreme duty which we have assumed for the revolution and the future.” Therefore, in accordance with the 2nd Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) of the Defense Industry Revolution presented at the 8th Party Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, Kim underscored the need to “further strengthen the already-gained war deterrent in terms of both quality and quantity and further accelerate the development and production of strategic and tactical means essential for guaranteeing national security.”

At the 8th Party Congress, Kim claimed that the construction of the national nuclear force was “a miracle unprecedented in history and the exploit of greatest significance in the history of the Korean nation the Seventh Central Committee performed for the Party and revolution.” The construction was completed in 2017, only four years after the pursuit of the Byungjin line, which simultaneously pushed for economic development and nuclear development. Therefore, Kim will continue his efforts to reinforce the quality and quantity of nuclear weapons and missiles during the second five-year plan for the defense industry.

However, his efforts are to encounter two significant hurdles. First, Kim’s Byungjin line will face mutual contradiction. Partial denuclearization alone will not guarantee that international sanctions will be alleviated up to North Korea’s standards. Therefore, the regime will be left to choose between nuclear development and sanctions relief. Second, the international military order has been massively transformed due to the revolutionary development of advanced technology. Amid such upheaval, the U.S. has pursued integrated deterrence that extends beyond nuclear deterrence and developed a concept of “Joint All-Domain Operations” that encompasses cyber and outer space. Thus, the political and military utility of North Korea's nuclear force will rapidly diminish.

Therefore, in order to prepare a new strategy for survival and prosperity in the 21st century, North Korea must come up with new moves beyond the current outdated Byungjin line. To this end, intelligentization, which will help Chairman Kim accurately visualize the external world under rapid transformation in his mind, should become his key task.■

[1] “Report on 4th Plenary Meeting of 8th C.C., WPQ,” Rodong Sinmun, January 1, 2022.

[2] Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (London: Continuum, 2004).

[3] “On Report Made by Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un at the Eighth Party Congress of WPK”, The National Committee on North Korea, January 9, 2021.

[4] “Kim Jong Un makes historic policy speech at Fifth Session of 14th Supreme People’s Assembly,” Pyongyang Times, September 30, 2021.

[5] “Kim Jong Un delivers commemorative speech at Defence Development Exhibition Self-Defence 2021,” Pyongyang Times, October 12, 2021.

■ Young-sun HA is Chairman of the board of trustees at the East Asia Institute. He is also Professor Emeritus of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University. Dr. Ha serves as a member of senior advisory group for the Inter-Korean Summit Talks Preparation Committee (2018-). He also served as a member of the Presidential National Security Advisory Group (2008-2016), the Co-chairman of Korea-Japan Joint Research Project for New Era (2009-2013), the Director of the Center for International Studies and American Studies Institute at Seoul National University, the President of the Korea Peace Studies Association, and a research fellow at the Center for International Studies at Princeton University, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in Stockholm. He received his B.A. and M.A. from Seoul National University, and holds a Ph.D. in international politics from the University of Washington

■ Typeset by Seung Yeon Lee, Research Associate
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