1. Why Focus on North Korea’s National Strategy?

This study examines the recently highlighted North Korea (DPRK)-China-Russia triangular relationship, with a particular emphasis on North Korea’s strategies and motives. As a key actor shaping this partnership, North Korea’s role warrants close analysis. It is especially noteworthy that North Korea’s national strategy, a pivotal factor driving the trilateral alignment, is shaped by its recent and abrupt policy shift. The origins and intensity of this shift are closely linked to North Korea’s assessment of global, structural, and long-term developments that underpin the triangular relationship. Building on this premise, this analysis explores DPRK-China-Russia relations through the lens of these changes in North Korea’s national strategy.

II. Transition to a “Balancing Strategy” After the Korean Peninsula Peace Process

1. Politics of Succession and the Change in National Strategy

National strategy can be understood as a regime’s vision for rationally advancing national interests within the constraints of international circumstances and capabilities. This concept encompasses a country’s grand strategy, including its political, diplomatic, economic, and military dimensions. In this context, how can North Korea’s national strategy be conceptualized and categorized?

Since the end of the Cold War, North Korea has faced acute security crises, making regime survival a paramount concern—arguably more so than for any other nation. As a result, North Korea’s national strategy has been fundamentally characterized by its strong emphasis on security since the post-Cold War period. However, North Korea’s choice of security strategy is not limited to security concerns alone; it is deeply intertwined with the regime’s struggles to reform and open up. These challenges persist under the constraints of its isolation within the remnants of the Cold War order.

In this context, North Korea’s national strategy can be classified into two main types. The first is the “balancing strategy,” which seeks to counter threats by leveraging power and achieving “structural peace” through physical strength (Ahn 2023). This strategy can be divided into two subcategories: internal balancing, which focuses on strengthening capabilities through armament, and external balancing, which relies on forming alliances to mobilize external support.

The second is the “bandwagoning strategy,” which seeks to mitigate threats by easing hostility and fostering “relational peace” rather than engaging in direct confrontation. This strategy can be further divided into two types: “typical bandwagoning,” where the weaker party unilaterally surrenders and makes concessions, and “conflictual bandwagoning,” where leverage or bargaining chips are employed to reduce power asymmetry.

North Korea’s true intentions are always subject to various interpretations. Nevertheless, it is widely acknowledged that during the Cold War, its official strategy aimed to address asymmetries and establish a Korean Peninsula-centered post-Cold War order through bandwagoning. This approach is reflected in agreements such as the Geneva Agreed Framework, the North Korea-U.S. Joint Communiqué, and the September 19 Joint Statement, all of which involved exchanges of denuclearization commitments for security guarantees and improved relations.

Signs of a shift away from the bandwagoning strategy began to surface with the rise of the Kim Jong Un regime in 2009. The Six-Party Talks and their agreements became obsolete as North Korea redirected its focus from improving relations with the U.S. to achieving security through nuclear armament and power balancing. This marked an acceleration of balancing strategies under Kim’s leadership. A key indicator of this shift was North Korea’s move from the denuclearization framework centered on the Korean Peninsula to advocating for a “global denuclearization” narrative, representing a stark departure from the principles of the bandwagoning strategy (Ahn and Kang 2020).

At the March 2013 plenary meeting of the Workers’ Party Central Committee, the party introduced the dual-track policy of nuclear and economic development, known as the “Byungjin Line,” which exemplifies North Korea’s balancing strategy. The session concluded that this was not merely a “temporary countermeasure for coping with the rapidly changing situation but a strategic line to be always held fast to, in the supreme interests of the Korean revolution” (KCNA 2013). Kim Jong Un’s declaration to develop defensive nuclear capabilities in response to the nuclear threats and invasive schemes of “imperialists and their followers” served as a clear embodiment of this doctrine. This policy was formalized and institutionalized, particularly with its incorporation into party regulations during the 2016 Seventh Party Congress. The period from 2013 to 2017 represents the full-scale implementation of the balancing strategy.

2. The Hanoi No-Deal and the Reorientation of National Strategy

However, during the 3rd plenary meeting of the 7th Workers’ Party Central Committee in 2018, North Korea announced the end of the Byungjin Line, signaling a shift toward improving relations and establishing a peace system in exchange for denuclearization—a clear return to a bandwagoning strategy. This policy pivot came just one week before the inter-Korean summit and amidst preparations for successive U.S.-North Korea summits. The plenary resolution’s declaration to create favorable international conditions for socialist economic construction and safeguard peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the world garnered significant attention. This was because this new strategic line bore striking similarities to China’s reform and opening-up strategy during the late 1970s and early 1980s, which sought to establish a stable external environment while transitioning from heavy and military industries to broader development initiatives. However, as is widely known, this attempt ended in dramatic failure.

Despite extensive preparations for the 2019 Hanoi Summit, including Kim Jong Un’s widely publicized 60-hour train journey that captivated global attention, North Korea appeared unprepared for the summit’s failure. The breakdown, which North Korea described as an unforeseen event despite having a groundbreaking declaration draft ready, exposed the regime’s profound frustration and surprise.

Following the failed Hanoi summit, North Korea’s deliberations over maintaining its “new strategic line,” indicative of a bandwagoning strategy, lasted nearly three years before being abandoned in March 2022. The regime reverted to a balancing strategy focused on nuclear armament and self-reliance, rejecting the exchange of denuclearization for economic development through external cooperation.

The dismantling of mutual moratorium agreements, initially established during the 2018 peace process, marked North Korea’s return to a balancing strategy. After the resumption of U.S.-South Korea military exercises following the no-deal outcome of the 2019 Hanoi summit, North Korea came to view the moratorium as merely a unilateral gesture of its own “goodwill.” This shift was exemplified by the March 2022 test launch of the Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The transition was solidified on September 8, 2022, when North Korea formalized its nuclear policy by enacting the “Law on DPRK’s Policy on Nuclear Forces,” codifying its commitment to the Byungjin Line. It had explicitly chosen to pursue structural peace based on its own capabilities.

In short, by 2022, North Korea’s national strategy was officially anchored in a combination of “the logic of an arms race centered on nuclear forces” and a “realist perspective emphasizing national capabilities and variables.” The appearance of Kim Jong Un’s daughter, Kim Ju Ae, at the launch site of the Hwasong-17 in November 2022, symbolized this strategic shift. The regime’s earlier commitment to “not let the next generation bear the burden of nuclear arms” has evolved into a new assertion that nuclear forces are the “most powerful guarantee for the survival and prosperity of future generations.” The contradictions inherent in its denuclearization narrative—pursuing nuclearization as a means to achieve the denuclearization of the Peninsula—had also disappeared.

III. The Rise of “Expanded Internal Balancing” and the DPRK-China-Russia Triangle

What, then, are the contemporary implications of this transition process and the content of North Korea's state strategy? Two key points are important in this regard. First, to what extent will the current strategy maintain its continuity? Second, what is the relationship between this strategy and the strengthening of the North Korea-China-Russia triangular relationship? Let us begin with the first question.

1. Two Tests and the Sustainability of the New Balancing Strategy

As previously mentioned, the formalized shift from a bandwagoning strategy to a balancing strategy unfolded cautiously over a nearly three-year transitional period. It is clear that the primary background for such prolonged deliberation was the sheer gravity of the issue of a national grand strategy itself. Beyond this fundamental political dimension, more technical and immediate considerations also played a role. These included the “evaluation of alternatives” and the “feasibility of a new strategy.”

i. Evaluation of alternatives

First, an evaluation of alternatives was conducted. The natural alternative to reverting to a balancing strategy was to continue pursuing the bandwagoning strategy. Despite the unexpected collapse of the Hanoi summit, North Korea continued to “test” the bandwagoning approach for an extended period, both during the Trump administration and into the early stages of the Biden administration. This persistence is evident in North Korea’s willingness to leave room for negotiation, even as the U.S. failed to uphold its promise to suspend joint military exercises with South Korea after the June 2019 Panmunjom meeting or to propose a “new calculus” during the Stockholm working-level talks. North Korea maintained its conditional stance on nuclear armament, linking it to demands for the withdrawal of the U.S.’s “hostile policy” and the establishment of a peace regime.

However, the Biden administration’s promise of a “calibrated, practical approach,” which hinted at the possibility of exchanging partial denuclearization for partial sanctions relief, ultimately failed to materialize. From North Korea’s perspective, this policy increasingly resembled Obama’s “strategic patience.” As a result, North Korea’s final assessment of the feasibility of the bandwagoning strategy was decidedly negative.

ii. Feasibility of a new strategy

The feasibility tests centered on two key pillars determining the viability of the balancing strategy: nuclear power and self-reliance. On the nuclear front, the primary question was whether North Korea could credibly deter an attack from the United States, the world’s most powerful military. Following the Hanoi summit, North Korea intensified its efforts to develop a range of weapons systems, particularly tactical nuclear capabilities aimed at South Korea. This approach sought to bolster deterrence without crossing critical red lines, such as conducting nuclear or ICBM tests, actions that would jeopardize the foundation of the bandwagoning strategy. North Korea’s significant advancements in this domain are widely recognized.

The second pillar is the capability for self-reliance. Since the fundamental premise of any national strategy is survival, success requires not only military advancements but also the resolution of basic welfare challenges. For North Korea, completely isolated and under strict international sanctions, system resilience became crucial to the viability of its balancing strategy. In this context, the border shutdown initiated in early 2020 to prevent the spread of COVID-19—a situation akin to a sanctions regime “that former Trump national security advisor John Bolton, a foreign policy hard-liner, could only have dreamed of”—helped dispel some “wishful thinking” about North Korea’s potential collapse within a year. This demonstrated resilience provided North Korea with considerable confidence (Cha 2021a; 2021b).

In other words, North Korea’s strategic reversion, visibly marked by the dismantling of the moratorium with the Hwasong-17 ICBM launch in March 2022, was not an act of impulsivity or unpredictability. Instead, it stemmed from a leadership decision grounded in prolonged testing and careful evaluation. The institutionalization of policies, such as the Nuclear Force Policy Act, formalized and reinforced this strategic shift.

2. The Evolution of the Balancing Strategy

However, this “long transition,” spanning 3–4 years from the Hanoi Summit to the conclusion of the 2018 Korean Peninsula Peace Process, coincided with a new structural shift just as it was being formalized. This shift stemmed from the structural consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, particularly the effects of the war’s “prolongation.” At the heart of this transformation were the strengthening of the New Cold War dynamics and the emergence of multipolarity discourse as a counter-narrative from adversarial states.

North Korea seems to have closely monitored and analyzed these evolving dynamics and the opportunities they present. Although the concepts of the New Cold War and multipolarity have been longstanding themes in North Korea’s official documents, significant shifts in their evaluation and tone began to surface in the latter half of 2022.

North Korea has been using the term “New Cold War” since the 2010s. However, they employed this term not to describe reality, but to criticize hostile actions against them and issue warnings. Even in Kim Jong Un’s September 2022 speech, delivered in conjunction with the drafting of the Nuclear Force Policy, the focus remained on condemning the U.S. as the instigator of a New Cold War and justifying North Korea’s nuclear development—essentially reaffirming its balancing strategy. However, beginning with the December 2022 Sixth Plenary Meeting of the 8th Workers’ Party Congress, the New Cold War began to be framed not as a policy or future scenario but as a present structural reality demanding both response and strategic utilization.

Similarly, the concept of multipolarity underwent a significant reevaluation during this period. While multipolarity had been referenced as a normative goal in critiques of U.S. hegemony since the late 1990s and described as an emerging competitive trend following the 2008 financial crisis, Kim Jong Un’s September 2022 policy speech elevated “a multipolar world” to the status of an inevitable trend and an imminent reality.

This reassessment of the international political structure began to shape the evolution of North Korea’s balancing strategy. Initially, the strategy was centered on principles of “autonomy over dependence” and “security over economy,” emphasizing self-reliance and a security-first approach to internal balancing. However, the unexpected prolongation of the Ukraine War, the entrenchment of the New Cold War structure, and the growing prominence of the multipolarity narrative bolstered global anti-American and anti-hegemonic alignments. This shift created an opening for North Korea to actively explore and leverage external balancing opportunities.

Ultimately, the internal balancing strategy formalized in 2022 evolved into an “expanded” internal balancing strategy by 2023. This approach retained the primacy of internal balancing while actively incorporating elements of external balancing through strengthened international alliances and cooperation. Central to this evolution was the deepening of the North Korea-China partnership and the significant enhancement of ties with Russia, fostering a virtuous cycle within the North Korea-China-Russia triangular alignment. A symbolic demonstration of this strategy was Kim Jong Un’s attendance at the 70th anniversary military parade commemorating the Korean War armistice on July 27, 2023. At the event, he reviewed advanced ICBMs—key targets of international sanctions—while flanked by high-ranking representatives from China and Russia, both permanent members of the UN Security Council.

In fact, Pyongyang’s efforts to strengthen ties with Beijing and Moscow were evident as early as the 2018 Korean Peninsula Peace Process. During this period, Kim Jong Un’s March 2018 visit to China, along with five subsequent summits over the course of roughly a year, and his April 2019 meeting with Russia, underscored these diplomatic efforts. However, these moves were more aligned with a hedging strategy, aimed at preparing for potential failure, rather than a fully realized balancing strategy. This approach was driven not only by Pyongyang’s commitment to a grand bandwagoning strategy and self-reliance but also by its deep-rooted distrust of both China and Russia. Specifically, this distrust stemmed from China’s prior cooperation with the U.S. on sanctions and Russia’s relatively passive stance amid increasing U.S. criticism of China.

In other words, North Korea fully recognized that China and Russia’s approach to the Korean Peninsula was primarily driven by their responses to U.S. aggression and their efforts to manage the situation in anticipation of a potential shift in North Korea-U.S. relations. Despite the outward strengthening of North Korea-China-Russia ties, Pyongyang’s cautious stance was evident in the “frontal breakthrough” announced during the December 2019 Central Committee Plenary Session. This speech emphasized terms such as “self-sufficiency,” “self-reliance,” and “internal power,” signaling North Korea’s careful assessment of its relations with these two countries. Kim Jong Un articulated North Korea’s “firm revolutionary faith to defend the country’s dignity and defeat imperialism through self-prosperity even though we tighten our belts.” He underscored that the DPRK should “more actively push forward the project for developing strategic weapons,” as it “cannot give up the security … just for the visible economic results … in reality now that hostile acts and nuclear threat against us are increasing” (KCNA 2020).

However, as the “expanded” internal balancing strategy emerged, notable shifts in this rhetoric began to appear. While Kim’s 2022 policy speech at the Seventh Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly repeated traditional terms of “develop[ing] … cooperative relations … with all countries opposing and rejecting the imperialists’ aggression and interference, domination, and subordination” (KCNA 2022), by September 2023, Kim emphasized “solidarity with the nations standing against the U.S. and the West’s strategy for hegemony,” aligning with the multipolar strategies advocated by China and Russia (KCNA 2023).

In this context, North Korea’s consistent, unwavering, and exceptional support for Russia following the Ukraine War, along with its proactive engagement with Russia, can be interpreted as stemming from this strategic shift. Kim’s declaration of the “two hostile states” rhetoric during the 9th Enlarged Plenary of the 8th WPK Central Committee reflects this reorientation. By effectively abandoning the pursuit of inter-Korean relations and reunification—the last remaining asset of its bandwagoning strategy—he highlighted the necessity for North Korea to respond proactively and strategically to the evolving international order and to shape a diplomatic trajectory commensurate with its status as a powerful state.

IV. The Future of the North Korea-China-Russia Triangle and the Trump Era

The North Korea-China-Russia triangular alliance has steadily strengthened, as evidenced by North Korea’s strategic shift in alignment with China’s ongoing resistance to the U.S. containment strategy and Russia’s position on the frontlines of the U.S.-led confrontation, particularly following the Ukraine war. The signing of the DPRK-Russia Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in June 2024 and the subsequent deployment of North Korean troops to Russia have further deepened the North Korea-Russia relationship and broadened its global impact, drawing unprecedented attention. In light of these developments, what lies ahead for the North Korea-China-Russia triangle with the return of Trump?

1. The Operating Mechanism of the Triangular Relationship

While historical particularities and common identities have shaped the alliance, all such relationships ultimately operate within the political calculus of national interests and power politics between states. As a result, the future of the North Korea-China-Russia triangular relationship is likely to be determined by two key factors: the “structure of interests” and the “structure of power” among the three parties.

i. Structure of interests

What does North Korea aim to achieve through its trilateral partnership with China and Russia? The core of this objective can be traced back to North Korea’s national strategy, which centers on ensuring security. After considerable deliberation, North Korea has arrived at the conclusion that internal balancing, primarily through nuclear armament, is the only viable path to achieving this security. Therefore, it is highly likely that North Korea’s goal in strengthening the North Korea-China-Russia triangle is directly tied to this overarching objective.

First, this partnership offers North Korea the potential to buy time, benefiting from implicit support from both Moscow and Beijing for its nuclear development and the alleviation of international pressure. Second, through military cooperation with Russia, North Korea seeks more substantial backing to accelerate its nuclear development timeline. This cooperation may also provide North Korea with opportunities for economic aid and strategic partnerships to address domestic economic issues, with the ultimate goal of building a “civilized nation” through comprehensive socialist development. In addition, this dynamic has the potential to evolve into what some analysts describe as a “limited” northern economic zone, though such economic ambitions will never take precedence over North Korea’s security concerns. The primary focus of the expanded internal balancing strategy remains maintaining the primacy of self-reliance and internal balancing, while integrating external cooperation in support of its goals.

However, potential friction may arise from differences in the structures of interests between North Korea and its partners, China and Russia. A key point of divergence lies in the approach to global governance and the existing Western order. As articulated in Russia’s 2023 Concept of Foreign Policy, Moscow has defined the Western-led global order as “imperialism” and “colonialism,” positioning itself clearly in opposition to the West (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2023). While China shares opposition to the Western order, it has framed itself as a status quo power and emphasizes its role as a responsible major power. This difference in positioning could become a source of tension, particularly for China, given the potential implications of rejecting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime.

Moreover, China, as a regional power, bears a much greater burden than Russia in terms of the potential chain reactions of nuclear armament in South Korea and Japan. The growing security instability on the Korean Peninsula resulting from North Korea’s nuclear development is something that China views with increasing concern. This, in part, explains China’s cautious approach to North Korea, its passive stance, and its more controlled management of relations with the regime. In other words, while there is broad alignment among North Korea, China, and Russia within an anti-U.S. framework, differences in the pace of action and specific issues related to nuclear proliferation and regional stability are clearly evident.

ii. Structure of power

One of the most striking aspects of the North Korea-China-Russia triangular relationship is the “power asymmetry” that exists within it. Both the North Korea-China and North Korea-Russia alliances exhibit characteristics of a typical asymmetric alliance, which has led to various “alliance games” in the interplay between the nations. Ultimately, these games likely determine how these disparities in interests influence the triangular relationship. The key question then becomes: to what extent can North Korea’s autonomy as the weaker nation, or the “tyranny of the weak,” be exercised in this unequal power structure? The answer likely depends on two critical elements: the needs of China and Russia, and North Korea’s capabilities.

It is widely recognized that the primary factor influencing China and Russia’s needs is their ongoing conflict with the United States. According to power transition theories, which emphasize structural shifts, or clash of civilization theories, which highlight identity and cultural conflicts, the prospects for an improvement in U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia relations in the short term are minimal. While opinions may differ on the pace of these shifts, there is general consensus that the power gap between the U.S. and these two countries is narrowing. The clash of identities, as seen in China and Russia’s growing independent civilization narratives, further supports this notion. Furthermore, North Korea’s military value, demonstrated by its role in the Ukraine war, coupled with China’s increasing demand for development in its Far Eastern regions and Russia’s “Turn to the East” policy, has led to a reassessment of the economic significance of North Korea’s border regions.

The next key variable is North Korea’s capabilities. Although technical evaluations vary regarding the completeness of North Korea’s core deterrence capability—the “second-strike capability”—there is broad consensus, including from the U.S. government and numerous researchers, that North Korea has developed a certain level of capability to strike the U.S. mainland. Furthermore, North Korea’s development of tactical nuclear weapons since 2019, aimed at enhancing deterrence by securing the ability to strike South Korea, has been both significant and undeniable. In other words, North Korea’s internal balancing strategy has achieved considerable success over time. Such autonomous deterrence capability is crucial because it serves as the most vital asset for mitigating the risk of abandonment by more powerful countries within an asymmetric alliance and enhancing the autonomy of a weaker nation.

Despite these factors, the resurgence of North Korea’s Cold War-era opportunistic pendulum diplomacy appears unlikely, largely due to the strengthening of friendly relations between China and Russia. In Lowell Dittmer’s (1981) framework, the current North Korea-China-Russia triangle resembles more of a loose “ménage à trois” than a “romantic triangle” based on the assumption of a China-Russia conflict. However, it remains important to recognize that the geopolitical competition between China and Russia, with North Korea as a focal point, continues to be a relevant factor. Furthermore, while China and Russia’s needs may be structural and long-term, North Korea’s capabilities have notably strengthened, enhancing its influence and autonomy within this triangular relationship. Therefore, when compared to the Cold War-era North Korea-China and North Korea-Russia relations, it is evident that North Korea now possesses a significantly higher level of autonomy.

It is also important to recognize that subjective assessments of North Korea’s capability are evolving alongside the actual enhancement of its military capacity. Autonomy, after all, is shaped not only by “capability” but also by “will,” with subjective evaluations playing a crucial role in determining the latter. In this regard, the substantial shifts in North Korea’s self-identity and narrative since the onset of its nuclear development are noteworthy. The discourse that North Korea is no longer a weak state but has instead achieved a “strategic status” in which it can assert its position on the global stage underscores the country’s transition toward the concept of a strategic or strong nation. This narrative is particularly significant in how it has converged with the multipolarity discourse, which not only critiques the decline of U.S. hegemony but also emphasizes the erosion of hierarchical structures within international alliances, thus highlighting the more equal footing in North Korea-China and North Korea-Russia relations.

2. Assessment and Future Outlook

In sum, the current and future dynamics of the North Korea-China-Russia relationship can be described as follows. Due to the disparities in interests and the asymmetry of power, it is difficult to compare the trilateral partnership to the institutionalized, summit-driven cooperation of the ROK-U.S.-Japan alliance. Furthermore, the lack of a clearly defined shared identity encompassing all three parties makes it a reality that this triangular relationship is closer to a sum of bilateral ties rather than a singular "axis." Moreover, the potential for “abandonment” can manifest in various forms, including the withdrawal of military, economic, and external support, and thus the limits of North Korea’s autonomy in alliance dynamics are clear.

Despite all these limitations, the increasingly strengthened ties between these three countries, combined with North Korea’s de facto nuclear status and the prevailing trends of the New Cold War and multipolarity, present a favorable opportunity for North Korea to pursue its balancing strategy as a “revisionist weak power”.

So, what role will Trump 2.0 play in this situation? Can it replicate the dramatic progress made in 2018? North Korea’s unexpected pragmatic choices thus far suggest it will continue utilizing its southern diplomacy, but with caution. However, as reaffirmed in Kim Jong Un's November 21 speech, which served as a notable official response following Trump's election, it should not be overlooked that the key element in North Korea's current strategy lies in its realist logic. In other words, North Korea is likely to continue prioritizing "state over regime" and "capability over intention" moving forward.

In this context, even if southern diplomacy, including engagement with the U.S., becomes more prominent, it is likely to be approached strategically: not something to be entirely avoided, yet not something to be “clung to” either. From this perspective, North Korea's northern diplomacy, centered on its relations with China and Russia, is likely to take priority over its southern diplomacy aimed at improving ties with the United States, South Korea, and Japan for the foreseeable future.

References

Ahn, Kyung-mo. 2023. “North Korean National Strategy after the ‘the New Strategic Line’: Re-emergence of Balancing Strategy and Its Implications.” Korean Political Science Review, 32(1): 165-196.

Ahn, Kyung-mo and Hye-suk Kang. 2020. “North Korean Strategy toward South Korea in the Kim Jong Un Era, 2018-2020.” Korea and World Politics, 36(4): 171-204.

Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). 2013. “Report on Plenary Meeting of WPK Central Committee.” March 31.

_____. 2020. “Report on 5th Plenary Meeting of 7th C.C., WPK.” January 1.

_____. 2022. “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Policy Speech at Seventh Session of the 14th SPA of DPRK.” September 10.

_____. 2023. “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Speech at 9th Session of 14th SPA.” September 28.

Cha, Victor. 2021a. “North Korea could become one of Biden’s biggest challenges—and not just because of its nukes.” Washington Post. January 15. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/01/15/why-north-korea-could-become-one-bidens-biggest-challenges/

_____. 2021b. “Caught in the COVID dilemma between ‘carrots and sticks’ concerning North Korean denuclearization (in Korean).” Chosun Ilbo. July 19. https://www.chosun.com/opinion/chosun_column/2021/07/17/RJ2USQGMOZFE5FXZUC2OHQWMCM/

Dittmer, Lowell. 1981. “The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretical Analysis.” World Politics, 33(4): 485–515. https://doi.org/10.2307/2010133

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. 2023. “The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation.” March 31. https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/fundamental_documents/1860586/

■ Kyungmo AHN is a Professor at Korea National Defense University.

■ Translated and edited by: Jisoo Park, Research Associate
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