I. The Return of Trump and the Fluidity of the DPRK-Russia-China Partnership

The potential impact of the incoming Trump administration’s foreign policy on the trilateral partnership between North Korea (DPRK), Russia, and China remains uncertain. While it is clear that shifts in U.S.-Russia, U.S.-China, and U.S.-North Korea relations will influence the dynamics of the trilateral relationship, these bilateral relationships are currently highly fluid and unpredictable.

Russia’s reliance on North Korea for military support is likely to decrease if President-elect Trump fulfills his campaign promise to expedite a resolution to the Ukraine War and improve U.S.-Russia relations. Such a shift would slow the growing intimacy between North Korea and Russia, which has been a key driver of the North Korea-Russia-China trilateral partnership, and thereby diminish the likelihood of a formalized trilateral alliance. Moreover, this trend could accelerate, if the Trump administration pursues a strategy of engaging Russia to weaken its ties with China as part of a broader effort to intensify U.S. pressure on Beijing. If the U.S.-DPRK relations enter a negotiation phase resembling Trump’s first term, North Korea may adopt a more cautious approach in its ties with Russia. This could reduce the influence of both China and Russia on North Korea, thereby cooling the momentum toward deeper trilateral unity.

On the other hand, if the Trump administration escalates pressure on China, leading to heightened U.S.-China tensions, Beijing’s stance on DPRK-Russia relations and the trilateral partnership could undergo a significant transformation. In the past, China’s reluctance to deepen its involvement in this trilateral framework stemmed from its hesitance to align with rogue states like North Korea and Russia, particularly given the risk of violating international sanctions and complicating critical trade negotiations with the U.S. Should U.S.-China relations deteriorate sharply under Trump, however, China might treat North Korea and Russia as strategic tools to counterbalance U.S. influence. In such scenario, Beijing could potentially support the trilateral partnership, even if only indirectly or unofficially.

This paper seeks to analyze the current dynamics of DPRK-Russia-China relations, predict potential shifts in this trilateral partnership stemming from the fluidity of each country’s bilateral relationship with the U.S. under a Trump administration, and propose strategic recommendations for South Korea (ROK) to navigate and respond effectively to these developments.

II. An Incomplete Triangle: Current DPRK-Russia-China Relations

The DPRK-Russia partnership gained considerable momentum following the visit of then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to Pyongyang in August 2023, during which Russia openly sought North Korea’s military support amid the protracted Ukraine conflict. This partnership further solidified in June 2024 with the signing of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, elevating their bilateral ties to the level of a military alliance. The current DPRK-Russia-China relationship is not a cohesive trilateral alliance but rather a Russia-led initiative driven by the burgeoning DPRK-Russia partnership. North Korea seeks to reduce its reliance on China by fostering closer ties with Russia, while China is uneasy about Russia encroaching on its sphere of influence in North Korea. Consequently, the durability and stability of this trilateral partnership depend on two key factors: the sustainability of DPRK-Russia relations and China’s stance on both the DPRK-Russia relationship and the broader trilateral alignment.

The DPRK-Russia-China partnership can be viewed from two contrasting perspectives. One perspective suggests that while the trilateral relationship has not yet been institutionalized, active bilateral ties within this triangle create a virtuous cycle resembling institutionalized trilateral cooperation. The other perspective argues that structural flaws exist within each bilateral relationship, preventing the formation of a virtuous mechanism, instead characterizing the partnership as an unstable 'three-party coexistence' model.

As DPRK-Russia ties deepen, China may feel compelled to strengthen its relationships with both North Korea and Russia to avoid being marginalized, potentially creating a temporary semblance of a virtuous cycle that also impacts the DPRK-Russia dynamic. However, the inherent structural weaknesses in each bilateral relationship make it unlikely that the trilateral partnership will evolve into a robust institutional framework capable of facilitating micro-level policy coordination across major issues.

Examining DPRK-Russia relations reveals significant challenges in reconciling the two nations’ demands and expectations. North Korea’s requests for advanced military technology, recognition as a nuclear weapons state, and the lifting of international sanctions place substantial strain on Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. As a key pillar of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) framework, Russia is unlikely to support actions that could destabilize the NPT system. Furthermore, its Security Council membership limits its ability to undermine sanctions it has previously endorsed. The DPRK-China relationship also exhibits notable weaknesses, particularly in the area of security. While the two countries signed a military alliance treaty in 1961, the specifics of its 2021 renewal remain ambiguous. Moreover, there is no record of joint military exercises since the treaty’s inception, underscoring an absence of tangible military collaboration.

The Ukraine War has further highlighted the political and economic limitations of Sino-Russian cooperation. China has refrained from providing military support to Russia, while some Chinese companies have been hesitant to engage deeply with Russian entities, fearing the loss of access to Western technological markets. Economic interactions between China and Russia since the outbreak of the Ukraine War have also revealed an increasing imbalance: while China’s exports of manufactured goods to Russia have grown, Russia has become increasingly dependent on resource-based exports to China. This asymmetry has driven Russia to diversify its strategic partnerships, strengthening ties with countries such as India and Vietnam that have ongoing border disputes with China. For instance, during a visit to Vietnam on June 19, Russia finalized an agreement for joint oil and gas exploration in the South China Sea, raising concerns in Beijing. Similarly, during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Moscow on July 16, President Vladimir Putin approved a draft logistics agreement to facilitate joint military exercises, training, and reciprocal access to military facilities.

North Korea, China, and Russia share a mutual perception of the United States as a common adversary, creating the potential for an anti-U.S. coalition. However, structural flaws in their bilateral relationships and China’s cautious stance hinder the institutionalization of such a partnership. As a result, the DPRK-Russia-China triangle functions more as a temporary, loosely aligned 'strategic coalition' than as a cohesive alliance. These structural deficiencies in bilateral relations significantly undermine the three nations’ ability to achieve micro-level strategic coordination, further weakening the coalition’s long-term viability. While DPRK-Russia bilateral cooperation may address some issues, divergent perspectives from China pose substantial barriers to forming unified positions across the three parties.

III. Trump’s Russia Policy and the Future of U.S.-Russia Relations

During his presidential campaign, Donald Trump repeatedly vowed to resolve the Ukraine War within 24 hours, emphasizing his prior efforts to improve U.S.-Russia relations during his first term. These commitments suggest a greater likelihood of progress in U.S.-Russia relations under a second Trump administration compared to the Biden administration. However, the trajectory of these relations will depend significantly on the content and timing of any resolution to the Ukraine War. Negotiations to conclude the war are expected to focus on the current frontlines with the potential establishment of a 1,300-kilometer demilitarized zone and to start from additional security guarantees for Ukraine in exchange for delaying Ukraine’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership by at least 20 years. Key foreign and security officials in the incoming Trump administration, such as Vice President-elect J.D. Vance, Secretary of State-designate Marco Rubio, and National Security Advisor-designate Mike Waltz, have expressed their support for this approach.[1] With Republican majorities in both chambers of Congress, the prospects for achieving an agreement appear plausible.

However, securing a durable peace agreement will be highly challenging. Even if Ukraine agrees to territorial concessions and postpones NATO membership, numerous unresolved issues may persist. These include various sticking and time-consuming tasks such as the immense financial costs of Ukraine’s reconstruction, the potential withdrawal of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) indictment of Vladimir Putin, and negotiating a path to ease over 20,000 sanctions imposed on Russia. Domestically, opposition within U.S. Congress and related institutions to offering concessions to Russia could be significant. Internationally, the European Union (EU), a staunch advocate for sanctions and Ukraine’s security, may resist such measures. Even if a temporary ceasefire is achieved, maintaining a 1,300-kilometer demilitarized zone will present considerable challenges. The low levels of trust among the involved parties may make it likely that the ceasefire could eventually collapse, raising the risk of renewed hostilities.

Contrary to Trump's pre-inauguration remarks, the United States maintained a hardline stance toward Russia during his first term. Through the Executive Order 13849, Trump established a legal mechanism to enforce the sanctions outlined in the “Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATA)” created during the Obama years. Notably, the administration expelled 60 Russian diplomats and closed the Russian consulate in Seattle. In 2019, Trump supported the “Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act (PEESA)” to curb Russia’s economic influence. Additionally, he authorized $47 million in military aid to Ukraine, including FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank missiles and 210 launchers, marking the first provision of lethal military aid to the country.

Substantial improvement in U.S.-Russia relations during Trump’s second term appears unlikely. U.S. foreign policy is primarily driven by structural factors[2] rather than presidential preferences alone. Bipartisan consensus on maintaining a firm stance against Russia remains strong and American public opinion tends to prioritize domestic concerns over foreign policy. Moreover, resolving the Ukraine War is expected to take considerable time, and the technical and logistical hurdles[3] to rapidly lifting sanctions on Russia further reduce the prospects of a significant policy shift.

The Trump administration is also speculated to pursue a strategy aimed at weakening the Russia-China partnership to escalate pressure on Beijing.[4] This approach, often referred to as “Reverse Nixon,” was previously discussed during Trump’s first term. Although it is not an unlikely claim, its feasibility is limited, as the U.S. long-term strategy prioritizes the dual containment of both Russia and China and Russia’s economic reliance on China is intensifying.[5]

The end of the Ukraine War could lead to modest improvements in U.S.-Russia relations, potentially weakening the close ties between North Korea and Russia. However, without a significant breakthrough in U.S.-North Korea relations, the alignment between Pyongyang and Moscow is likely to persist. Consequently, the broader trend of North Korea-Russia-China collaboration is unlikely to diminish substantially in the long term.

IV. Trump’s China Policy and Its Impact on the DPRK-Russia-China Alliance

Several factors explain China's cautious - if not outright negative - stance toward the potential DPRK-Russia-China triangular alliance. First, participating in such a partnership contradicts Beijing’s longstanding criticism of U.S.-led alliances and Cold War-style thinking, creating a significant ideological inconsistencies. Second, the formation of this axis risks accelerating U.S.-ROK-Japan security cooperation, which could intensify regional pressure on China. Third, any formalized trilateral partnership might further deteriorate U.S.-China relations, especially as Beijing seeks to stabilize its ties with Washington under the Biden administration. Fourth, aligning too closely with so-called 'rogue states' like North Korea and Russia could damage China’s international reputation, limiting its capacity for global diplomacy. Lastly, deeper collaboration within this triangle might expose China to economic sanctions, further straining its economy. Since Beijing supports denuclearization just as a means to achieve its geopolitical objective of maintaining a strategic balance of power in Northeast Asia, the widening differences in views between China and Russia regarding the North Korean nuclear issue also pose an additional challenge for China.

Despite its reservations, China appears to be adopting a cautious, wait-and-see approach toward the strengthening of DPRK-Russia relations, which are central to any potential triangular alliance. This restrained stance suggests that Beijing and Moscow may have engaged in prior coordination regarding key aspects of DPRK-Russia ties. For instance, significant developments, such as the deployment of North Korean troops to support Russia, are unlikely to proceed without China’s tacit approval. Diplomatic engagements between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, including their meeting at the BRICS Summit in Kazan on October 22, underscore ongoing communication and alignment between the two leaders on such issues. Military cooperation between North Korea and Russia may reduce China's burden of relations with Russia. It provides an avenue for China to indirectly support Russia in the Ukraine conflict without engaging in direct military aid, thereby avoiding further antagonism from the United States and Europe. Additionally, heightened North Korean threats toward South Korea force Seoul to seek Beijing’s diplomatic assistance, bolstering China’s leverage over South Korea. A similar dynamic applies to Japan, where regional instability may prompt increased engagement with Beijing. By allowing Russia to bear the brunt of international sanctions violations concerning North Korea, China reduces its own diplomatic and reputational burden while preserving its relationship with Pyongyang.

Currently, China perceives the potential costs of formalizing a DPRK-Russia-China alliance as outweighing the benefits, which explains its cautious approach. However, in the broader context of long-term U.S.-China competition, both Russia and North Korea remain strategically valuable to Beijing. Instead of officially endorsing a trilateral partnership, China is likely to adopt a measured, observational approach, ensuring that DPRK-Russia ties remain within manageable limits. Beijing may use economic tools, such as improving relations with South Korea or adhering to Western sanctions, to regulate the depth of this alignment. Recent actions, such as regional Russian banks declining ruble transactions and China repatriating North Korean athletes under the guise of sanctions compliance, may reflect Beijing’s deliberate efforts to manage and moderate the situation.

Trump’s return to the White House could potentially alter China’s position. It is clear Trump will increase pressure on Beijing, as demonstrated by his campaign pledges to impose a 60% tariff on certain Chinese imports and revoke China’s permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status. However, it seems unlikely that U.S.-China tensions under a second Trump administration would significantly extend into security issues. During his first term, Trump’s policies prioritized economic disputes over security concerns, with a marked preference for unilateral U.S. actions rather than multilateral strategies.

If the Trump administration intensifies economic pressure on China, the strategic importance of North Korea and Russia as assets in China’s competition with the United States would increase. However, since U.S.-China tensions are expected to remain focused on economic and trade issues rather than security or Taiwan-related concerns, it is unlikely that China would significantly bolster the DPRK-Russia-China alliance as a countermeasure against the U.S.

Moreover, the robust momentum behind U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation, which flourished under the Biden administration, could weaken under Trump. The QUAD, which Trump revived in 2017, has shifted toward emphasizing economic cooperation over security concerns. This aligns with Trump's primary objective of excluding China from global and regional supply chains. However, Trump’s aversion to multilateralism could ultimately undermine U.S. efforts to pressure China, weakening the alliances and partnerships critical to extending American influence on both global and regional scales.

V. Trump’s DPRK Policy and the Sustainability of DPRK-Russia Relations

Even at the time of the June 19 signing of the “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty” between North Korea and Russia, which included provisions resembling a military alliance, questions lingered about the sustainability of their deepening ties. Many argued that Russia’s urgent need for North Korean weapons, driven by its challenges in the Ukraine War, was the primary driver of this alignment. This dependence, they suggested, would diminish significantly once the war concluded. Economic realities further reinforced this skepticism, as both countries face severe international sanctions and share heavily reliant on resource exports, lacking the complementarity required for robust economic collaboration. If China were to join the equation, a DPRK-Russia-China economic bloc could emerge focused on Russia’s Far East, China’s northeastern provinces, and North Korea. However, such an arrangement would likely be confined to low-value industries, given the relatively low export prices of North Korean and Russian goods to China. Additionally, the conclusion of the Ukraine War would likely push Russia to seek economic cooperation with South Korea to aid its recovery, making it challenging for Moscow to ignore Seoul’s demands to distance itself from Pyongyang. This situation is reminiscent of Russia’s restraint during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War when it economic ties with Azerbaijan and Turkey influenced its decision to withhold military support for its ally Armenia.

However, the formal ratification of the “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty” by Russia’s parliament and Kim Jong Un, along with the deployment of North Korean troops to the Ukraine War, has strengthened the argument that DPRK-Russia relations are rapidly evolving into a de facto “blood alliance.” This shift suggests that the two nations may be aligning their strategic interests for the long term. For Russia, this partnership appears integral to constructing a new Eurasian security architecture aimed at counterbalancing the global framework connecting NATO and the Indo-Pacific Four(IP4). In this vision, North Korea plays a pivotal role in dispersing U.S. deterrence across Europe and Asia while securing Russia’s influence over the Far East. It should be also noted that North Korea has its own motivations to strengthen ties with Russia. Faced with a domestic crisis beyond its internal capabilities, Pyongyang is wary of its excessive economic reliance on China, which it perceives as providing insufficient security guarantees. Seeking greater strategic autonomy, North Korea has turned to Moscow as a key player in its efforts to navigate the current geopolitical and economic challenges.

The strategic alignment between North Korea and Russia will continue to be shaped by developments in the Ukraine War, U.S.-China tensions, and U.S.-North Korea dynamics. However, their evolving “blood alliance” raises serious concerns for regional and global security, particularly given the likelihood of enhanced military and technological cooperation. In the short term, North Korea may receive upgrades to its air defense systems and aircraft, potentially followed by the establishment of a military-industrial production chain. Joint military exercises or Russian naval use of North Korean ports could also become plausible developments. While the transfer of advanced nuclear technologies, such as reentry vehicle technology for ICBMs, remains unlikely in the immediate future, it cannot be entirely dismissed. If the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) fails to be renewed in 2026 during a Trump administration, and if Russia shifts toward advocating nuclear multilateralism, such transfers could become more probable. Russia has already lowered its nuclear-use threshold, by permitting nuclear responses to conventional attacks in 2020 and, more recently, by amending its nuclear doctrine in November 2024 (Kremlin 2020, 2024). Furthermore, some of Putin’s aides have increasingly advocated the concept of nuclear multilateralism. This perspective challenges the traditional nuclear nonproliferation regime, which, while historically effective at mitigating the risks of unauthorized nuclear use and nuclear terrorism, is now criticized for creating inequities that disproportionately disadvantage many non-Western states. These aides argue that controlled nuclear proliferation, rather than strict nonproliferation, could contribute to global peace by addressing these imbalances.

At present, North Korean troops deployed in Ukraine primarily function as mercenaries, and Pyongyang has not formally declared their presence. However, if North Korea officially acknowledges this deployment, it might use this as leverage in future peace negotiations, potentially tying troops withdrawal to demands for sanctions relief. The most alarming scenario would be Russia formally recognizing North Korea as a nuclear weapons state and advocating U.S.-North Korea nuclear disarmament talks. Although such recognition is unlikely, given Russia’s status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a cornerstone of the NPT regime, its actions to undermine sanctions against North Korea are increasingly creating an environment that tacitly legitimizes Pyongyang’s nuclear status.

During Trump’s second administration, renewed negotiations between Trump and Kim Jong Un could materialize, echoing efforts from his first term. Such talks might slow North Korea’s growing alignment with Russia, which Pyongyang has used strategically to advance its interests. However, the administration’s primary focus is likely to remain on resolving the war in Ukraine and addressing conflicts in the Middle East, relegating the North Korean nuclear issue to a lower priority. Moreover, North Korea’s significantly advanced nuclear capabilities since Trump’s first term would make it increasingly difficult to create favorable conditions for negotiations.

The prospect of a “small deal” emerging from direct U.S.-North Korea talks raises concerns, as such an outcome would likely be unacceptable to both South Korea and the broader international community. The pace and outcomes of U.S.-North Korea engagement, alongside the resolution of the Ukraine war, will influence the extent of North Korea-Russia cooperation. Should the U.S. pursue engagement strategies with both North Korea and Russia, China may respond by intensifying efforts to foster trilateral cooperation with North Korea. Nonetheless, achieving substantial progress in U.S.-Russia or U.S.-North Korea relations during a second Trump administration appears challenging.

VI. Prospects for DPRK-Russia-China Cooperation under Trump 2.0

Although a fundamental transformation in the DPRK-Russia-China partnership under a second Trump administration is unlikely, closer alignment among the three parties could gain momentum. This acceleration would stem from the increased strategic importance of North Korea and Russia as instruments for China to counterbalance heightened U.S. pressure. Such developments underscore several dynamics South Korea must consider in shaping its strategic response:

1. The North Korea-Russia relationship exhibits long-term strategic alignment, suggesting that their close cooperation is likely to persist even after the Ukraine War concludes. Consequently, renewed U.S.-North Korea dialogue would face substantial obstacles in attempting to separate Pyongyang from Moscow and Beijing.

2. While a second Trump administration might explore improving U.S.-Russia relations, the entrenched Russia-China partnership would make it highly challenging to diminish China's influence over Russia.

3. Heightened U.S. pressure on China under a Trump 2.0 administration would increase the strategic value of North Korea and Russia to Beijing. However, the formation of a formal bloc remains improbable, as both Pyongyang and Moscow would likely prioritize maintaining flexibility for potential negotiations with the United States.

4. Despite the absence of a formalized alliance, the shared opposition to the United States is expected to sustain bilateral ties among North Korea, China, and Russia under a second Trump administration. These informal relationships may continue to foster functional, albeit unofficial, partnerships.

VII. Highlighting the Risks of DPRK-Russia-China Alignment to Trump

On a global scale, the most significant risk of the North Korea-Russia-China alignment lies in the potential for these three nuclear-armed states to turn their nuclear capabilities into a shared strategic asset. It is imperative to convey to the Trump administration that preventing this alignment through improved U.S. relations with either North Korea or Russia is virtually unfeasible. In particular, the deepening ties between North Korea and Russia are likely to accelerate North Korea’s nuclear program and lead to de facto recognition of its nuclear status, posing grave security threats to both the Korean Peninsula and global stability. In this context, South Korea must develop a concrete roadmap to address the North Korean nuclear issue and take a proactive leadership role in nuclear diplomacy. South Korea’s position must neither be excluded nor marginalized in negotiations involving the United States and North Korea or Russia. South Korea must unequivocally reject North Korea's nuclear status and emphasize the need for stronger nuclear assurance for its own security.

Since the North Korea-Russia-China alignment presents significant challenges to South Korea’s diplomacy, strategic management of relations with Russia and China must be strengthened to prevent their excessive alignment with North Korea, and at that point, South Korea’s role must be highlighted in the U.S. efforts to counter this trilateral cooperation. The U.S.-South Korea alliance remains a vital strategic asset for countering the North Korea-Russia-China alignment. South Korea must further emphasize its critical role in ensuring that North Korea and Russia do not become tools of Chinese leverage against the U.S. in the Trump administration's relations with China.

VIII. Establishing Redlines in Diplomacy with Russia

Russia’s relationship with South Korea holds significant strategic value. By maintaining positive ties with both Koreas, Russia can exert influence over China while benefiting economically from South Korea’s advanced technology and capital—particularly in the evolving post-Ukraine conflict landscape. Accordingly, South Korea should adopt a balanced approach in its diplomacy with Russia, combining measured pressure with appropriate incentives as circumstances dictate.

A key priority for South Korea is establishing a clear redline in its relationship with Russia. If Russia provides North Korea with advanced military technologies, particularly those aiding its nuclear weapons development, the bilateral relationship would cross an unacceptable threshold. South Korea must clearly communicate this boundary to Russia. Should Russia breach this redline, South Korea may need to consider decisive measures, such as supplying lethal aid to Ukraine or even severing diplomatic ties with Russia.

Before resorting to such extreme measures, South Korea should avoid crossing Russia’s implicit redline of direct arms support to Ukraine. Instead, it should adopt a strategy combining diplomatic tools with economic incentives. Its diplomatic means could include criticizing Russia’s role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and intensifying dialogue with China. Given Russia’s emphasis on maintaining its permanent member status, South Korea could work to increase the cost of Russia’s violations of sanctions on North Korea. At the same time, South Korea’s diplomacy must account for China’s potential discomfort with deepening military cooperation between Russia and North Korea.

As the Ukraine conflict moves toward resolution, South Korea could explore expanding economic cooperation in non-sanctioned areas. Potential initiatives include joint projects in Russia’s Far East development and Arctic shipping routes, aligning with South Korea’s strategic interests. Additional opportunities could involve joint investments in Central Asia, partnering with members of the Eurasian Economic Union, such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and observer states like Uzbekistan. South Korea should also prepare to capitalize on market gaps left by Western companies that have exited Russia.

Sustaining communication between think tanks in South Korea and Russia is essential. Although tensions between the two countries are inevitable under current circumstances, engagement at the non-governmental level can serve as a stabilizing factor. 

References

Gavrisheva, Anna. 2024. “How does Trump really feel about Russia and what should Moscow expect from his presidency? (in Russian)” Gazeta.Ru. November 6. https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/20036887.shtml

Karaganov, Sergei A. 2024. “An Age of Wars? Article One.” Russia in Global Affairs. January 1.

Kashin, Vasily. 2024. “How Trump Can Do to Destroy the Russia-China Alliance (in Russian).” Russian Foreign Affairs Council. November 6. https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/comments/na-chto-mozhet-poyti-tramp-dlya-razrusheniya-soyuza-rf-i-knr/

Kremlin. 2020. “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence (in Russian).” Presidential Executive Order No.355. June 8.

______. 2024. “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence (in Russian).” Presidential Executive Order No.355. November 19.

Porter, Tom. 2024. “Trump said he will divide Russia from China. It’s a tough bromance to break.” Business Insider. November 7. https://www.businessinsider.com/donald-trump-plan-divide-china-russia-axis-is-likely-fail-2024-11

Sampson, Eve. 2024. “J.D. Vance’s Opposition to U.S. Support for Ukraine: In His Own Words.” The New York Times. July 15. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/15/world/europe/ukraine-jd-vance.html

Scully, Rachel. 2024. “Waltz compares situation in Ukraine-Russia war to ‘World War I trench warfare.’” The Hill. November 24. https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5006868-waltz-ukraine-russia-world-war-i-trench-warfare/

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[1] Secretary of State-designate Marco Rubio recently stated in an interview that conflicts must be resolved through negotiations and that Kyiv cannot expect the return of all territories occupied by Russia. He also voted against a $95 billion security aid package for Ukraine in April. Mike Waltz, the National Security Advisor-designate, initially supported extensive arms aid to Ukraine but has recently shifted to emphasizing the need to end the war. He has criticized Biden’s Ukraine policy and called for pressure on Russia to bring about “a responsible end” (Scully 2024). Vice President-elect J.D. Vance supported Trump, contending that the U.S. should send funds to the southern border, not Ukraine (Sampson 2024). Elise Stefanik, U.S. Ambassador-designate to the UN, supported Trump and echoed Republican skepticism about U.S. support for Ukraine.

[2] Yuri Samonkin, a political scientist and member of the Izborsk Club, notes that U.S. foreign policy remains fundamentally aggressive, rendering the identity of the president relatively unimportant for Russia (Gavrisheva, 2024). Similarly, Ivan Timofeev, Secretary-General of the Russian International Affairs Council, acknowledges that there is some expectation within Russia for potential deals or constructive relations with Trump. However, he argues that Trump is unlikely to significantly impact U.S.-Russia relations, emphasizing that U.S. foreign and security policy is shaped more by structural factors than by the president’s personal influence (Timofeev, 2024).

[3] 1) During Trump’s first term, sanctions were intensified on countries such as Iran, DPRK, and Venezuela. 2) Given that U.S. sanctions on Russia have minimal impact on the U.S. economy, Trump may consider sanctions an efficient and cost-effective tool. 3) The U.S. legislative framework makes it challenging for the president to ease sanctions unilaterally. For instance, the 2017 “Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA)” imposes specific limitations on the president’s ability to lift sanctions on Russia.

[4] Trump said he would “un-unite” Xi Jinping and Putin to strengthen U.S. pressure against China (Porter 2024).

[5] Vasily Kashin (2024) argues that while the possibility of the U.S. strengthening pressure on China through normalizing relations with Russia under Trump cannot be entirely dismissed, it remains unlikely because Russia does not seek to assert global leadership, and U.S. domestic dynamics, along with its dual-containment strategy targeting both Russia and China, make such an outcome improbable.

■ Gu Ho EOM is a Professor in the Graduate School of International Studies and Director of the Asia-Pacific Center at Hanyang University.

■ Translated and edited by: Jisoo Park, Research Associate
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