TRANSCRIPT (Subtitles)

Thank you sincerely to everyone tuning in.

I am teaching a graduate course on North Korea's nuclear issues in the Department of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University. There was one question: Will North Korea be able to use their nuclear weapons? With 20 graduate students, we've been delving into this question for 15 weeks, covering numerous works and academic papers.

I've been carefully reviewing scholarly work from both Korean and international researchers. Perhaps it's due to my limited knowledge, but I think Professor Hwang Il-do's work is the most outstanding. In terms of the quality of sources, logical structure, theoretical analysis, and various other aspects, I believe I have yet to come across any work that surpasses Professor Hwang Il-do's research achievements.

The reason I revisited this topic again is that, on March 8th, North Korea announced that it was constructing a nuclear-powered submarine and released photos of Kim Jung Un inspecting the site. In North Korean terms, this type of submarine is described as a "nuclear-powered strategic guided missile submarine." To put in simple terms, it's a nuclear-powered submarine. North Korea revealed its first ballistic submarine, the Hero Kim Kun Ok, which dates back to 2021, when Kim Jong-un announced a five-year defense development plan to reveal its goal to construct a nuclear-powered submarine.

It is an extremely difficult task, which is why North Korea had not been able to clearly demonstrate its progress until now. This year marks the final year of its five-year defense development plan. There is a high chance that the 9th Party Congress will be held next year, which would evaluate the plan. North Korea has essentially completed almost all of the key and strategic weapons it outlined in its five-year plan. Of course, the level of completion and practical usability are separate issues, but they have largely showcased their weapons. The last piece in the puzzle was the nuclear-powered submarine, but they revealed this as well.

There are several analyses. While we cannot know for certain its practical function and quality, I want to start with a question and will speak about the nuclear-powered submarine at the very end.

The key question is this: Why does North Korea continue to assert its willingness to carry out a preemptive nuclear strike, even though it has yet to secure a credible nuclear strike capability against the United States? In short, the message is whether North Korea can really use their nuclear weapons. I'm afraid I cannot cover this in detail today. For this question, I suggest you refer to my video from January. What is crucial here is that North Korea must possess at least a minimal nuclear strike capability against the United States in order to be able to use nuclear weapons against South Korea.

This is consistent with existing theory as well as past cases, such as those of Pakistan and India, and the point is that North Korea has not yet acquired the capability to strike the United States mainland. To put it more simply, if North Korea were to use a nuclear weapon and if the target were South Korea, the United States, with its overwhelming nuclear capability, would be able to completely destroy North Korea's nuclear arsenal in retaliation.

We call this a "second-strike capability." In such a situation, North Korea would need to be able to use its nuclear forces to strike the U.S. mainland, but it does not possess that capability. The ongoing debate is whether they may possess that capability one day. Nonetheless, I suggest you decide for yourselves after watching this video.

I do not think that North Korea has the capability of instigating a nuclear war against America, but some authorities from America suggest otherwise. A representative figure is Elbridge Colby, the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Although he gave various interviews both at home and abroad, what became most widely known in South Korea before he assumed the position of deputy secretary was his highly provocative remark that questioned whether the United States could continue to provide extended deterrence to South Korea at the risk of exposing its own major cities to a potential North Korean nuclear strike.

The interview that best portrays this question is Voice of America's interview with Colby. If you watch the episode of "Washington Talk," there was a heated debate on this question.

Where does North Korea's Nuclear Capability Stand Today?

To summarize, what I wish to convey to you today is this. What exactly is the nature of North Korea's military capability? Ultimately, North Korea's nuclear weapons can only be considered meaningful if the country possesses the ability to strike the United States. That is also the basis on which its repeated declarations of nuclear use can be taken seriously.

So, the key questions are how much capability North Korea actually has and whether that capability is truly feasible. This is what I will focus on today. This is what I've been talking about so far, which lays the groundwork for what Professor Hwang and I have been trying to solve together.

The core evidence of what I've stated is Professor Hwang's report from the Korea National Diplomatic Academy in December 2023. It is titled "North Korea's Decision of Actual Nuclear Use: Points of Issue and Hypothesis". This is available on the Korea National Diplomatic Academy homepage. Today, drawing on both Professor Hwang Il-do's research and my own ongoing reflections, I will focus on explaining the current state of North Korea's nuclear capabilities and, more importantly, whether the United States is capable of countering them.

The first point to address is North Korea's intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs. The key question is how capable they truly are. The United States has a concept when it comes to its ability against North Korea, and that is what is called "damage limitation." To reiterate, this refers to disarming first-strike capability and interception capability.

What this means is that North Korea would not be able to use nuclear weapons against the United States at all. In the scenario of North Korea's nuclear use, the United States can completely block North Korea's nuclear power itself as well as all possible scenarios of its usage. There are two types of deterrence theories, one being punitive deterrence.

The second one is defensive deterrence. To put it simply, Defensive deterrence is stopping the other person from hitting me. Then I will not receive any damage. That is defensive deterrence. Then what is punitive deterrence? When the other person hits me, I get hit. Getting hit is inevitable, but this means I can also hit back.

So, since both parties hit each other, damage is inevitable. In that case, if one side hits first, it too will get hit, which leads to a calculation of whether it is really worth it to throw the first punch. Especially for nuclear weapons, a single hit from the other party and a reciprocal hit would lead to catastrophic destruction, ultimately establishing a balance of terror that makes the use of nuclear weapons impossible.

What North Korea is aiming for is the possession of deterrent nuclear power, meaning if America launches a nuclear attack at them, they will inflict damage by responding with nuclear forces as well. However, what I mean by damage limitation or a disarming first strike is that the United States would prevent North Korea from hitting at all when it tries to do so.

Even if a missile is launched, it would not reach the United States, and even before the launch, the U.S. would be able to detect it in advance and carry out a strike to stop the launch itself. These are the two aspects being referred to here. To explain once again, if the U.S. determines that a launch is imminent, one option is to preemptively carry out a precise strike on the ground.

The other aspect is this. Even if North Korea barely survives the first strike and manages to launch a missile, there are still ground-based ballistic missile interceptors deployed in places like Alaska and California. These are known as GBI(Ground-Based Interceptors), and through them, the missile can be intercepted. So, in any case, North Korea's missile launch cannot target the U.S. mainland.

This is the most crucial point, so I will now explain these capabilities. Of course, North Korea has carried out three main efforts in recent years to develop such capabilities. The first is concealment. They are hiding their nuclear capabilities so that the United States cannot detect or identify them in advance. Then, the chance of their nuclear survival grows, increasing the possibility of attacking America.

That's the first effort of concealment. The second is enhancement efforts. This refers to the protection of nuclear capabilities they already possess. They are reinforcing efforts to prevent an early U.S. strike by placing their assets underground or inside bunkers, making it harder for the United States to carry out early neutralization.

The third effort is securing redundancy. In other words, they are increasing the number of warheads. By possessing a larger quantity, they aim to retain enough capability to strike the United States even if some of their warheads are destroyed or eliminated by the U.S. So these three efforts, namely concealment, reinforcement, and redundancy, are what North Korea has pursued over the past several years in order to acquire the capability to strike the U.S. mainland.

Now, I will discuss whether they are truly effective.

ROK-U.S. Force Mobilization Can "Disarm" North Korea

First, to what extent does the United States have the capability to strike North Korea? This is explained in detail in the report by Professor Hwang Il-do, which I mentioned earlier. This report also cites studies conducted in the United States, including the 2017 U.S. Congressional Research Service report and a report from Stratfor.

In addition to these, Professor Hwang used other various sources to explain the situation. Although 2017 was some time ago, I will include updates on development events, at least up to those that I am aware of. The key point is that the United States is capable of striking North Korea's nuclear weapons.

To strike North Korea's nuclear forces, the United States would first consider deploying fighter jets and strategic bombers. The B-2 strategic bomber is a well-known one for people interested in this field. Another is a stealth fighter called the F-22 stealth raptor. This is regarded as the world's most powerful fighter jet. America can use these two key assets to strike North Korea's key nuclear facilities.

For example, even if only the B-2 were deployed, it could launch a total of 20 GBU (guided bomb unit), which is a precision-guided bomb. A single B-2 can carry a total of 20 GBU-57 and 160 GBU-32 bombs. So, a single B-2 strategic bomber can carry approximately 180 precision-guided bombs, which can be used in an attack against North Korea.

North Korea can never detect a B-2 attack in advance. They would be unable to spot it. In reality, even if the aircraft flies all the way to Pyongyang, North Korea is unlikely to detect it. Even if it does, its virtually nonexistent air defense system makes interception impossible.

This means that, using the approximately 180 precision-guided GBU bombs I mentioned, it is possible to strike North Korea's key nuclear facilities. If F-22s are also deployed, that capability increases significantly. According to Professor Hwang's report, even with just the B-2 and F-22, the U.S. can attack and destroy almost all of North Korea's nuclear power and development assets.

The United States does not rely solely on this strategy, either. One of the most powerful strategic assets the United States possesses is the nuclear-powered submarine. An Ohio-class submarine, for instance, is equipped with approximately 300 Tomahawk cruise missiles per vessel. The B-2, F-22, including the Ohio-level submarine altogether, is capable of handling and striking approximately 1000 on-ground and 100 underground bunkered targets simultaneously.

You can see them as possessing an overpowering capability. We are only talking about American capabilities, but what about Korea? We, too, have the F-35, and we also possess precision-guided bombs. The core argument of this report is that North Korea can, in fact, be disarmed if South Korea's military capabilities are mobilized [alongside those of the United States].

Of course, South Korea is omitted here, meaning disarmament is possible only with American forces. Since a year and a half ago, the ROK-U.S. alliance has been strengthening extended deterrence by what is called CNI (conventional and nuclear integration). This refers to the integrated use of conventional and nuclear weapons.

As I just explained, the United States would employ both its nuclear and conventional weapons, while South Korea, which does not possess nuclear weapons, would contribute its conventional forces. Together, these assets could strike North Korea's key targets and neutralize them completely. The ROK-U.S. alliance is continuing with its precise development.

North Korea vs ROK-U.S. Alliance (1): 'Concealment Efforts' vs 'Surveillance & Reconnaissance'

North Korea is, of course, aware of this. That's why they are putting in efforts to minimize destruction and increase survivability, especially in the case of the ICBM, where they showcased the final version of Hwaseong-19 last October. The more recent ICBMs have two characteristics. One is solid fuel, the other is mobility.

Mobile launchers, as the name suggests, can be both moved and concealed, and solid fuel allows for rapid launch because fueling takes less time. Because North Korea knows the capabilities that the ROK and the U.S. possess, they are constructing such things to combat them.

The problem is that this does not necessarily yield a significant effect. This is because North Korea's territory is too small. A small territory means it is conducive for surveillance and reconnaissance. For example, China and Russia are difficult to monitor. Because both countries are vast in size, they can easily conceal their key strategic assets. However, North Korea is not in the same position.

Although the details are classified, South Korea and the United States have already identified clear targets in advance, particularly with regard to North Korea's key nuclear forces, and are continuously conducting surveillance and reconnaissance on them. For example, the United States and its allies possess around 20 satellite assets that can be activated in the event of a contingency for surveillance and reconnaissance.

In addition to these, there are approximately four fixed, high-altitude, unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, as well as around four stealth unmanned reconnaissance aircraft capable of penetrating North Korean airspace. According to U.S. research, in the event of a contingency, approximately 97 percent of all roads in North Korea are under constant surveillance. The figure being cited is 97 percent. At present, this capability is likely improving and continuing to advance.

Of course, these capabilities are highly classified and have not been made public, but considering recent trends over the past few years, it is likely that the United States, particularly through the application of AI and other advanced technologies, has developed and implemented increasingly enhanced surveillance and reconnaissance strategies.

North Korea vs ROK-U.S. Alliance (2) 'Defense Fortification' vs. 'Three Axis System'

Second, I will now discuss the strengthened defense, which is one of the measures North Korea is pursuing in order to enhance its survivability. "Strengthened defense" refers to efforts to protect their nuclear capabilities.

As I've mentioned before, if the conventional forces possessed by the United States and South Korea alone cannot completely eliminate North Korea's key nuclear capabilities, then the use of nuclear forces becomes inevitable. The question then is whether the United States truly has the capability to do so with its nuclear forces. That is the point I will now address.

We call America's nuclear capability the three axis system. The first type is nuclear weapons deployed on fighter jets and strategic bombers. The second type is nuclear deployment through the ICBM(intercontinental ballistic missile). The third type is the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launched from nuclear-powered submarines.

Among these three, the one the United States focuses on most and that is considered the most effective is the SLBM. Currently, about 70% of all nuclear warheads the United States has deployed for operational use are mounted on these submarine-launched ballistic missiles. That is why the most well-known base, Vandenberg Base in California, located in the northeastern part of the United States, is home to the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles. But those ICBMs are considered more of a supplementary force.

In the event of actual combat, it is highly likely that they (the U.S.) would rely on submarine-launched ballistic missiles rather than intercontinental ballistic missiles. Moreover, more than 40% of America's total nuclear capability is operated in this Pacific region.

Let me give you an example. A single Ohio-class strategic nuclear submarine operated by the United States carries about 20 Trident SLBMs, or submarine-launched ballistic missiles. What makes the Trident missile so powerful is that each missile can carry four or five MIRVs, or multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles.

In simple terms, the Trident SLBM has a range of over 10,000 kilometers and functions at the level of an intercontinental ballistic missile. But in a single missile, there are 4-5 MIRVs. A single missile can technically function as around 5 missiles. Its destructive power is unmatched. Moreover, the SLBM, specifically the Trident II, is currently undergoing upgrades.

There are around 20 Trident IIs, and among them, it is estimated that 2-3 are equipped with low-yield warheads. The remaining missiles will be equipped with high-yield warheads, but around 2-3 of them will be equipped with low-yield, commonly known as tactical nuclear weapons. So we can estimate a single Ohio-level nuclear-powred submarine can launch approximately 90+ strategic nuclear warheads.

This means that even considering only the submarine forces operating in the Pacific, the United States could launch around 100 SLBMs carrying roughly 500 strategic nuclear warheads toward North Korea. In addition, it could deploy 20 to 30 low-yield nuclear warheads. This is an unmatched level of power.

Of course, the United States would not operate or use all of these assets at once, and even without using its full capacity, even a small portion would be enough to completely neutralize North Korea. This shows the level of capability the United States has.

It is therefore estimated that the number of targets that could realistically be struck with strategic nuclear warheads exceeds 250. It's being revealed that North Korea is constructing mobile missile storage facilities, or the underground storage unit called silo. But we cannot accurately estimate how many they possess. At least in the private sector. I believe the ROK-US information authorities have made assessments to a certain extent.

So, if we speak in terms of rough estimates, let us say North Korea possesses around 100 mobile missile storage facilities and perhaps around 200 silos, though it is highly unlikely they actually have that many. Even if they did, using only the SLBMs I just mentioned, if the United States were to launch a strike on North Korea, the number of nuclear missiles that North Korea could preserve would likely be zero or, at most, one.

It is reasonable to conclude that North Korea's nuclear capabilities could be completely neutralized. During Trump's first term, the U.S. focused on modernizing its nuclear capabilities. They mainly focused on low-yield nuclear weapons.

A key example of this is the W76-2 submarine-launched low-yield nuclear warhead, which was put into operational service in 2020. During Trump's second term, when Pete Hegseth was a candidate, he mentioned he would strengthen modernization efforts during his congressional hearing.

Other than low-yield nuclear warheads, the nation's overall nuclear capability will be under modernization. This was conducted during the Biden administration, but I believe the budget was partially cut. Then, the current Trump administration will strengthen this [modernization] even more, and one of Hegseth's mention of key targets is North Korea.

In discussions on how to respond to North Korea's nuclear threat, the conclusion was to strengthen modernization efforts of low-yield nuclear weapons. This suggests that the numbers I've mentioned can increase significantly, further enhancing US capabilities in the future. This is the potency of low-yield nuclear weapons.

Suppose the North has an underground bunker. If the United States uses a low-yield nuclear weapon to break through and disable that bunker, the usual concerns with nuclear weapons come up, like fallout and radiation contamination. But the low-yield nukes the U.S. has today are known to be so precise and so well-calibrated that they could carry out a strike with fewer than 100 casualties. That's how the situation is currently understood.

This kind of capability is still advancing. Of course, this does not mean the United States is planning to strike first. However, if North Korea really tries to use nuclear weapons, then for U.S. policymakers, using low-yield nuclear weapons to completely shut down North Korea's nuclear capability is now something that could realistically be considered and acted upon. In that sense, it shows once again just how strong the U.S. capability really is.

Another point is that China, unlike in the past, is now aiming to possess a nuclear force that is nearly on par with that of the United States and is steadily increasing the number of its warheads. Of course, it is also continuing to advance its missile technology. What matters here is that the United States is fully aware of this, and in response to both China and, to some extent, Russia, it has been pursuing nuclear modernization efforts since the Trump administration.

This means U.S. capabilities are being significantly enhanced. As the United States strengthens its capabilities to counter major nuclear powers like China and Russia, its deterrence and strike capabilities against North Korea are also being enhanced. No matter how much effort North Korea pours into strengthening its defense capability within its small territory, it's only natural for us to question its true effectiveness.

North Korea vs ROK-U.S. Alliance (3) 'Securing Redundancy' vs. 'Interceptor Missile'

Third, let me move on to the next point. I mentioned earlier the idea of securing redundancies. Another path that North Korea may choose is to possess a larger number of nuclear warheads. That is why North Korea has recently shown great interest and is focusing its efforts on what is called the MIRV, or multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle.

This is a system in which a single missile carries 3-4 warheads that separate and strike different targets. North Korea claims to have succeeded in this, but it is actually an extremely difficult technology to develop. In reality, they have not yet demonstrated it.

Even if North Korea were to complete this capability, the United States would respond by expanding its ability to intercept such systems. Currently, the ground-based interceptor carrying around 44 missiles in the Alaska Fort Greely Site is set to intercept North Korea's missiles.

If North Korea further advances its MIRV technology, the U.S. will increase this interceptor missile. Of course, there are some controversies regarding this conclusion. Some claim that the U.S.' interceptor missiles are insufficient, but that claim rests on the premise that North Korea's MIRV is complete. So far, there has been no confirmed evidence on this.

Regardless, all of this points to the fact that North Korea is putting in effort, and to the question of whether this is real or not, I can say the following. North Korea's alleged tactic against the U.S. to strike after an initial defense, also known as the assured retaliation capability, is impossible, in my view. This is North Korea's train of thought.

Despite the overwhelming power of the United States, North Korea may believe that even one percent, one missile, can slip through and strike the U.S. mainland, and that alone could be enough to deter the United States. In the theory of deterrence, we call this the "first-strike uncertainty."

Even if the chances of the U.S.'s capacity to completely remove North Korea's nuclear weapons on its first strike is 99%, because the destructive power of nuclear weapons is so great, the 1% can be leveraged as a threat to mainland America, hence North Korea possessing deterrence capability against the United States.

So the question is, is this really possible? Let me reiterate. If the United States carries out a disarming strike but cannot be completely certain that it has destroyed all of North Korea's long-range missiles, and even just one or two remain, then North Korea could still believe that it has deterrence.

But again, this is extremely difficult. Having that level of capability is very hard to begin with, as I mentioned earlier. And the bigger issue is this. If North Korea is trying to claim that it can achieve even the most minimal level of deterrence through this uncertainty around a first strike, then the key premise is this.

North Korea must not strike first with a nuclear weapon. They absolutely cannot be the ones to use it first. In this scenario, what they're saying is that if the United States attacks first, and if North Korea somehow manages to preserve one or two missiles, then they would be able to hit the U.S. mainland in response. That is their argument.

The idea that they would first use nuclear weapons against the United States or South Korea and then somehow keep and maintain their remaining nuclear capability to carry out another strike just doesn't make sense. But the issue here, as I've repeatedly emphasized, is that North Korea claims it can carry out a preemptive nuclear strike, and over the past two to three years, it has consistently demonstrated a high level of intent to do so.

In particular, it has stated that a conventional war could at any moment escalate into a nuclear one. So what they are saying is that even a single strike could somehow protect them, that it is a means of self-defense and self-preservation. But within the framework of North Korea's own aggressive nuclear doctrine, this logic simply does not hold.

In the end, if they were to initiate a preemptive nuclear strike, it would be nothing short of suicide. It is extremely unstable, and at best, there is only a slim possibility that North Korea could deliver even a single strike on the U.S. mainland. On the other hand, the United States possesses overwhelming nuclear capabilities. It has the ability not only to eliminate all of North Korea's nuclear assets but to erase the North Korean state itself. The United States maintains a credible second-strike capability.

This remains a critical challenge that North Korea has yet to resolve, and I believe it is one of the strongest reasons why North Korea cannot actually use nuclear weapons. If it did, it would inevitably lead to the end of the regime and the collapse of Kim Jong Un's leadership.

Kim Jong Un's Last Resort: Nuclear-Powered Submarines and SLBM

So the final step that Kim Jung Un is pushing towards is the submarine ballistic missile. This is one of the reasons why Kim Jung Un showcased its nuclear-powered submarine with their local map on March 8th. This is because the ultimate form of nuclear weapon is the submarine-launched ballistic missile deployed from nuclear-powered submarines.

Possessing this capability provides the most credible strike ability. Just based on common sense, detecting a submarine is no easy task. That is why key states maintain at least a minimal level of deterrence through nuclear-powered submarines equipped with submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

In particular, countries like the United Kingdom and France actively rely on this capability. Of course, the United States and Russia possess far larger and more offensive nuclear arsenals, but for the purpose of minimum deterrence and self-protection, that level of capability is considered sufficient.

As I've emphasized repeatedly, North Korea is not speaking in terms of minimum deterrence but rather in aggressive terms. Still, the important point is that even if its goal were simply to secure a minimum deterrent capability, such systems would be necessary.

That brings us to the question: Is what Kim Jong Un showcased on March 8 actually viable? Can it be operationally deployed? And do South Korea, the United States, and even Japan lack the capacity to detect, identify, and intercept it? I would like to share my thoughts on this.

To state the conclusion first: it would be difficult. It is very unlikely that North Korea could use such a system to strike the U.S. mainland. The submarine would need to head out to the East Sea, not the West Sea, and from there navigate toward the Pacific. However, that route is already under tight surveillance by South Korea, the United States, and Japan.

When South Korea and Japan's relations improve, they occasionally conduct ROK-U.S.-Japan anti-submarine operation drills. The core objective of these drills is precisely that. If North Korea were to deploy such submarines, they would be detected precisely, and their possible routes would be closely monitored and guarded.

Because of this, I question whether North Korea's deployment is feasible. Even during the Cold War, when the United States and the Soviet Union possessed overwhelming military and nuclear capabilities, there was no instance in which Soviet submarines crossed the Pacific and approached the U.S. mainland.

It's because the U.S.' anti-submarine strategy has overwhelming capability that they were able to thoroughly counter the Soviets. The Soviets themselves never strategized using their submarines to attack the U.S. along the Pacific. This shows that the U.S. is unmatched in its anti-submarine strategy.

Japan comes after America when it comes to their anti-submarine capability. In other words, the two countries with the most advanced anti-submarine warfare capabilities in the world are guarding the East Sea, and South Korea also possesses strong anti-submarine capabilities.

Can North Korea penetrate all those layers of anti-submarine defense? I don't think this scenario is realistic. I say it's almost impossible. Then what should they do? This is what the Soviet Union and China did: they had nuclear-powered submarines positioned at a distance.

Using an SLBM with a range of 10,000 km, which is comparable to an ICBM, they can strike mainland America from a distance. North Korea will think likewise. Then, they have to complete a nuclear-powered submarine that has a range exceeding 10,000 km, but the question is if that's possible.

North Korea is indeed developing those missiles, which it refers to as the Pukguksong series. These are submarine-launched ballistic missiles that fall into the short- to medium-range category, although there is some ambiguity as to whether they can be classified as true medium-range missiles.

We cannot confirm if the missiles were launched from the submarines, and if you ask if they can develop their range to exceed 10,000 km, I say it's going to be very difficult. It's because SLBMs require a level of technology much more advanced than the ICBMs.

So, it's extremely difficult to develop this nuclear-powered submarine, and it's even difficult to deploy them in combat. I am extremely skeptical of them developing the SLBM on top of this.

At this point, some raise the question: What if Russia provides North Korea with this technology? Would that not shorten the timeline and make such capabilities more feasible? I would approach this very cautiously. Historically, even during the Soviet era, Russia has never shared such sensitive technologies, not even with its closest allies or friendly states, because it seeks to maintain its monopoly over them.

Moreover, given the current situation, where Russia needs U.S. cooperation to bring an end to the war in Ukraine, providing North Korea with technology capable of striking the U.S. mainland would be a serious escalation. Would the Trump administration stand by and allow that? And China, too, does not want to see this happen.

From China's perspective, if North Korea acquires such technology, it would gain the capability to strike the United States. This would give the U.S. both a justification and an opportunity to significantly expand its forces in the region to contain China. That is why China does not want this either.

After North Korea's release of the March 8th nuclear-powered submarines, the U.S. had several reactions. Most of them were very negative. Acquiring the necessary materials and knowledge for nuclear advancement is an extremely time-consuming task.

It took even China a considerable amount of time. Designing the reactor required for a nuclear-powered submarine is an extremely difficult task. Launching a ballistic missile from a submarine is also far more complex than launching one from land.

Even with full capability and experience, a country like the United States still requires at least eight to nine years to build a strategic nuclear submarine. In addition to construction, operating such a submarine requires at least another two to three years. While North Korea could accelerate the process by disregarding serious safety concerns, the likelihood of failure would increase significantly.

Moreover, even if North Korea really did construct a nuclear-powered submarine, American assets would be more than capable of detecting it and sinking it. North Korea's construction of this Romeo-level submarine is easily detectable due to its extreme noisiness, and the aforementioned ROK-U.S.-Japan superior anti-submarine strategy capability to detect, identify, and destroy it.

Conclusion: North Korea's Preemptive Nuclear Attack is a Suicide Mission

To summarize today's remarks: North Korea does not possess nuclear capability. Nevertheless, they continue to claim that it can launch a preemptive nuclear strike and that it is prepared to use nuclear weapons even in a conventional war. I must reiterate that such an action would clearly amount to a suicidal move by Kim Jong Un.

No country in the world, especially one facing the combined military strength of the United States and South Korea, can overcome such overwhelming force. This, I believe, is more than sufficient reason for Kim Jong Un's North Korea to pursue denuclearization.

Thank you. ■

■ Won Gon PARK is the Chair of EAI Center for North Korea Studies and a Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ Translated by Chaerin KIM, Research Assistant
    For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | crkim@eai.or.kr