TRANSCRIPT 

Chaesung CHUN: Today we invited Professor Cheng-Chwee Kuik, who is a prominent scholar in the area of international relations. He is a professor of International Relations at the Institute of Malaysian and International Studies of the National University of Malaysia. He is concurrently a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute, School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University and a non-resident scholar at Carnegie China.

Q. The Known-Knowns, Unknown-Knowns, and Unknown-Unknowns of Trump 2.0

Chaesung CHUN: So today we will talk about the upcoming Trump administration's foreign policy, its impact on Asia and how that impacts South Korea, Southeast Asia, and so on.

So for the first question, with President Trump having won the election, how do you anticipate and evaluate his foreign policy from the perspective of Southeast Asia? Additionally, could you discuss the [potential] differences and continuities between the foreign policies of President Trump's first administration and his upcoming second administration? How might these changes impact the region?

Cheng-Chwee KUIK: Thank you very much, Professor Chun, for having me here.

Despite the very different opinions within a diverse region like Southeast Asia, I will highlight the common denominators—how most of us from the region see what is going on. To begin with, many would describe the upcoming Trump 2.0 administration as a “known-unknown.” The word “unknown” here refers to unpredictable—a trademark of Trump 1.0., and since we all have experienced Trump 1.0, many of us remember, expect, and know that Trump 2.0 will again be very unpredictable. So the big-picture impression is that Trump 2.0 is a known-unknown.

We can further unpack Trump 2.0 into three aspects: the known-knowns, the unknown-knowns, and the unknown-unknowns. Together they reflect a complex assessment of a complex situation. They reflect how we in Southeast Asia—a group of small and middle-sized countries—view what is going on in the US and the broader developments at the global level.

First, the notion of known-knowns—this refers to the impression that Trump 2.0, like Trump 1.0, is going to be very transactional. We also know that there will be less commitment to multilateralism and international liberalism. And we also know that there will be less emphasis on value-based foreign policy, on democracy, and on human rights. These known-knowns are among the first assessments that many observers would highlight.

The second aspect is the unknown-knowns. That is, although we know that Trump 2.0 is going to be transactional, more sticks and more punitive, less emphasis on multilateralism and less emphasis on democratic values; however, what we don’t know is how bad, how unstable, and how volatile all these expected patterns and outcomes will be. Put differently, we already knew what the likely patterns of Trump 2.0 policies are, but we are not quite sure how bad the possible consequences can be. There are a number of issues that we can highlight. For example, we know that Trump has threatened tariff for many countries—not just the adversary, China, but even immediate neighbors and also longstanding allies. So these are happening: the threats of tariffs and punishments are happening even well before he formally comes back to office. We know what to expect, but we do not know how and how bad we will be affected. Some will be benefited, and some will be affected negatively—some more negatively than others.

But don't get me wrong. I'm not saying that it's all bad news. Certainly, some are still quite optimistic, saying that we can still benefit in one way or another from the intensifying U.S.-China rivalry. For example, as supply chains shift, some are seeing the “China plus one” diversification trends. In some sectors, like semiconductors, for example, there are spillover [benefits] to some countries. India has benefited. Some economies in Southeast Asia have also benefited—Vietnam, Malaysia for example—from the semiconductor supply chain, to other areas like data centers. Some would say that in AI, we are seeing more diverse diversification [trends], so there would be some benefits.

But more are worried about the threat of tariffs. They are also worried about the restrictions being imposed on the export of high-tech materials, and so on. Those things are beyond our control in the sense that we still want to enjoy the benefits that are spilled over from U.S.-China rivalry, but we do not know how long can we do that. It's beyond our control because we know that it's primarily up to the big powers. So those are among the unknown aspects about trends that we know will happen.

And then there are other anxieties, about things that will happen in a parallel way, [similar to] what we saw during Trump 1.0. Trump 1.0 withdrew from TPP; and this will happen to IPEF. It is good that TPP was transformed into CPTPP. Despite the U.S. withdrawal from TPP, many Southeast Asian states still showed interests about the IPEF, seeing it as an effort for Washington to signal to allies and partners in the region and beyond, although we all know the U.S. is not in the position of joining CPTPP. Many see the IPEF as a signal by the Biden Administration that the U.S. still want to engage the region economically. So you see a number of countries from the region joining IPEF, even though we would quietly or openly say that IPEF is not the same as TPP because there is no a market access, but we still join in a positive spirit. But now, we are not quite sure whether the IPEF can survive [under Trump 2.0]. So those are among the examples of the unknown-knowns.

Finally, the third aspect is the unknown-unknowns. To many in Southeast Asia, perhaps even beyond, the unknown is the scariest. Of course, uncertainty will always be there, but we are talking about unknown unknowns [under Trump 2.0]—so unprecedented that we do not know the directions we will move into. It can be anything. Let's take the big picture—the macro-dynamics, the big trends. We know the U.S.-China rivalry will continue, but nobody can say for sure whether it is going from bad to worse, how worse [off], and the scope of it.

Other than that, [there is] the risk of abandonment and entrapment. These risks are, of course, among the more concerning aspects of unknowns. The issue of abandonment—we read [about it] from everywhere. I think the U.S. allies in Europe and also Northeast Asia clearly are more concerned than many in Southeast Asia. In Southeast Asia, there are only the Philippines and Thailand as the U.S. treaty allies. The Philippines, to some extent, has reasons to worry about the abandonment issue. If the U.S. [becomes] more transactional and less committed to longstanding arrangements like alliances and the hub-and-spoke [system], then allies certainly will have to worry, but to different degrees. So, there are reasons to believe that some in the Philippines might worry about abandonment, just like the U.S. allies in Europe and in Northeast Asia.

But entrapment—that’s a bigger concern [for virtually everyone in Southeast Asia]. Entrapment, in the sense that if U.S.-China rivalry escalates into an armed conflict—either over Taiwan or the South China Sea, [through] accidental issues—many of us [will feel the effects]. So the risk of abandonment and the risk of entrapment—for us, it is quite worrying. Even though policymakers might not want to talk about it openly, it's certainly on the minds of many who are in the security establishment, as military assets move around Asian waters. So [in the event that conflict erupts], [even if] we say 100 times that we are neutral, we might still be entrapped.

There is also some quiet anxiety as to whether or not, under Trump 2.0, the transactional approach will go so far that Washington and Beijing might strike a deal. Although this is not so likely, there are still some who are worried that there might be big power transactional deals at the expense of smaller countries. But again, those are the kind of things that we know are beyond our control. So, these unknown-unknowns are more worrying than the earlier aspects that we highlighted.

Chaesung CHUN: Thank you very much. When we talk about President Trump's foreign policy, the word “unpredictability” [often] comes up. But you gave a very good explanation of what is predictable and what is unpredictable, and in policy terms, what kind of unpredictability needs our preparations. So that was a very good explanation based on Southeast Asian countries' experiences.

Q. Southeast Asian States Navigating the U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry

Chaesung CHUN: You talked about U.S.-China rivalry. So let me dive a little bit deeper in that issue. So as an expert and leading authority in hedging theory, how do you anticipate President Trump will navigate the U.S.-China strategic competition during his second term, specifically from Malaysia's perspective? How does the hedging theory inform Malaysia's strategies in responding to this great power rivalry?

Cheng-Chwee KUIK: Sure, there is a big debate among those who work on hedging and alignment theories. The debate is that on the one hand, many are saying that with intensifying U.S.-China rivalry, the space for non-big powers like Southeast Asian countries to maneuver, or to hedge, is actually shrinking. So that's the first school of thought.

I belong to the second school of thought, who argue that yes, the space for maneuvering is certainly shrinking. But non-big powers, including, or especially those in Southeast Asia, are at the center of big power competition, do not want to depart from hedging because the alternatives would invite bigger problems. So as long as the big power rivalry continues without direct confrontation, the possibility of one day [entirely losing] hedging would not persuade smaller countries [to stop hedging] under the current circumstances. [This is] because of survival instinct, not because hedging is a panacea. Hedging is chosen [not because it is ideal, but] because it is more acceptable, and it is less unacceptable than many other [approaches].

What is unacceptable would be if we stop hedging and begin to side with one power against the other. That is unacceptable, regardless of which power we choose to align with. To have complete alignment with one power against the other—we know that it's not going to work.

We are going to have more problems, such as the dangers of entrapment and abandonment.

Yes, hedging cannot solve every problem, but it is more acceptable because it still gives grounds and a platform for us to maximize cooperation [as much as we can]. We can still pursue cooperation like RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) is very much a product of the ASEAN-plus framework. We want to avoid the dangers if and when conflict escalating into war. Yes, the hedging approach is not risk-free, but it serves to avoid those bigger problems.

You know that you are going to invite trouble when you start aligning with one against the other. In that sense, externally, you are going to see a more hostile approach and reaction from the opposing power. As smaller countries, you'll be the first victim because you’re an easier target for any big power.

Internally, it won't work because in the ASEAN region, in Southeast Asia, all of us are post-colonial states except Thailand. Post-colonial states means that yes, we want security and prosperity just like any other countries, but we also pay particular attention to autonomy. We want to be our own boss, to make decisions for ourselves. We have had enough [of being] victims of centuries-long colonization. We do not want to be pushed around by any big power.

Again, when we make some decision on any issue, either alignment arrangements or non-military cooperation like 5G or semiconductors, and so on, we want to make decisions that are based on our own calculations. We make those decisions, some might say that they are contradictory, but we know that we make [them] not because we are kowtowing or subjecting [ourselves] to any big power pressure. That can be counterproductive. So, although hedging has its own sets of problems amid uncertainties, it is still the more acceptable approach because it allows countries like Southeast Asian states to maximize autonomy while still keeping options for security and prosperity under uncertainty. These are not either-or issues.

Hedging [exists] because of uncertainty, not another way around. So the logic of the second school of thought in the debate is that — so long as uncertainty continue or deepen, hedging will survive, last, and continue. As long as things remain uncertain, hedging would prevail. I'm not saying it will last forever. We know it very much depends on the top-down structural conditions. So here, under Trump 2.0’s unpredictability and the unknown unknowns, the structural conditions are going to be more uncertain rather than more certain. Unless and until, for example, there is an immediate direct threat in Southeast Asia or in Asia, AND unless and until there is an unshakable and aligned support—someone you can count on when you need them—the structural conditions will continue to be uncertain. Currently, there is no such black-and-white perception of realities.

All big powers are part of the problems, but they are also a part of the solution. This is especially [true] for ruling elites, particularly in Southeast Asian countries. We [often] say that our leaders wake up every day not thinking about U.S. and China or who will prevail in the long-term bigp=-power competition. But leaders in the region wake up every morning thinking about domestic, domestic and domestic [issues]. We are not interested in being trapped in a big power conflict. We are more interested in how big power interactions—not just tier-one superpowers, but also next-tier powers and middle powers in Europe, Asia, [including] Northeast Asia—approach us in a way that is pragmatic and mutually beneficial, so that we can translate those power competitions into productive processes. [Through this,] we can create jobs and we can position ourselves better in the technological transformation that we are seeing, [including] AI, high-tech, 4IR and all of that. All politics is local.

[There are] things that are beyond our control, but within those [boundaries], some are still possible. We do want big powers to compete to cooperate, not to compete to fight. We are not interested in siding with one [power] against the other.

Q. Understanding Southeast Asia’s Neutrality

Cheng-Chwee KUIK: I think one last point to emphasize would be [that] in Southeast Asia, with the exception of the Philippines, most countries in the region are doing what can be called “non-alignment via multi-alignments.” Non-alignment is the policy goal, [while] multi-alignments or multi-partnerships are the means to achieve that goal. Non-alignment means neutrality—not taking sides. Not taking sides doesn't mean not taking position.

I know our neutrality is [often] criticized by [some in] the mainstream, [saying that] neutrality is bad and equating neutrality as not-taking-a-position. This is an inaccurate interpretation. For many in Southeast Asia, the position [is clear]: the regional countries don't want to take sides. The position is the stance of not-taking-sides helps to avoid tension escalation, and helps to give peace a chance. We don't want to see conflicts or disagreements [to escalate] into armed or military clashes. That's in nobody's interests. Neutrality might not be able to solve many problems, but at least it provides space to manage problems without escalating into polarization and conflict.

By giving peace a chance, we can all concentrate on the more pressing domestic tasks. Whether or not your [country is] democratic, non-democratic, or less democratic countries, we want something similar. We want security, we want prosperity, and we want autonomy. We make our decisions based on our internal debates and internal [considerations], rather than being pushed around.

Chaesung CHUN: Thank you very much. I know you have a much more detailed and profound base for your hedging theory, but you gave us a very succinct and elaborate account of how nation-states, especially small and middle powers [can navigate these dynamics].

Q. ROK and Southeast Asia’s Approach to Relations with U.S. and China

Chaesung CHUN: Korea's experience [resonates] because we were colonized as well, and in Northeast Asia, both Koreas have been victims of colonialization by other powers in [the region]. So I think there are lots of implications [to draw] between Southeast and Northeast Asia. So the next question is: given that different regions are likely to adopt various approaches to great power rivalry, what implications do you observe between Southeast Asia and South Korea—or Northeast Asia in general—in their relations with the U.S. and China? And what implications might these differences and similarities have for the Korean Peninsula and the relationship between Malaysia and South Korea?

Cheng-Chwee KUIK: This is a very important and timely question precisely because we are at a crossroad with many unprecedented trends that are beyond our control. So, in that sense, we could use a term “middle states,” meaning the sovereign countries sandwiched between two or more competing powers. Of course, there are lots of differences internally and regionally, but again, middle state sandwiched between competing powers mostly [face] greater uncertainty and unprecedented pressures militarily, non-militarily, and even technologically.

So what are we going to do? We are going to do what we can within the space that is possible. Diversification is certainly the approach for survival, adding values and maximizing space.

South Korea wants diversification beyond the big powers. We know that before South Korea launched the Indo-Pacific Strategy under the [Yoon] administration, under earlier Moon administration, [there was] this New Southern Policy. Southeast Asia views the New Southern Policy as South Korea’s efforts to diversify beyond the traditional big power circle and beyond Northeast Asia, focusing on Southeast Asia plus India, plus perhaps South Asia. We see a broader geographic scope. We also know that under South Korea's Indo Pacific Strategy, you have the Korea-ASEAN Solidarity Initiative. So Southeast Asia got the message. South Korea, even under a new policy with different levels, the ASEAN region is still very much within your radar and in fact the center of cooperation.

ASEAN countries and Southeast Asian countries, regardless of the level of development or political systems, also want what you want, which is diversification. And the type of diversification is an inclusive one, in the sense that we all want to diversify in all directions. Therefore, South Korea and ASEAN countries converge in that sense. There are push and pull factors bringing South Korea and Southeast Asia together. As a student of IR, I would like to see this as an early stage of a new trend. In that sense, South Korea has many [comparative] advantages and strength in Southeast Asia.

Q. Three Things ROK Should Consider When Engaging with ASEAN

Cheng-Chwee KUIK: I think [there are] at least three aspects that South Korea should keep in mind when engaging with Southeast Asian countries, either bilaterally or as a group.

Number one is about how Southeast Asia sees South Korea. You have both the soft power and tech power. Almost every country in Southeast [see South Korea’s] cultural attractiveness, regardless of religion in the respective countries. And it's not just cultural but technological aspects as well. The transformation of Korea [is what] so many Southeastern countries admire.

Second aspect is the possible transformation from a K-Pop to K-Model or “Korea as a model.” Many in Southeast Asia can relate to because South Korea is not a big country. South Korea's example and journey, the Miracle of Han River is a relevant model. And when I say model, I'm not saying that we choose one model over the other—we want multiple models. [In this context,] the Korean model entails more attractiveness precisely because we are more comparable in terms of size and the historical journey. Earlier on you mentioned about the shared experience and the memory.

The third aspect, I would say, is that South Korea doesn't have the sort of political or historical baggage [that other] Northeast Asian countries [have when] engaging Southeast Asia. We see South Korea as a country with very little or no baggage, but with lots of potentials because of South Korea's strengths, as I highlighted earlier.

Q. Three Phases of ROK-Southeast Asia Relations

Cheng-Chwee KUIK: If we [look at] the evolution of the relationship between South Korea and Southeast Asia, I think we can see three phases. First phase is mainly economic. We wanted to benefit from trade and investment opportunity and some [level of] technology transfer. These have been [ongoing] and [were] the main focus even before and during the New Southern Policy.

The second stage is more about people-to-people [connections] and tourism. Korean tourists are everywhere in places like Vang Vieng in Laos and Kota Kinabalu in Malaysia, and so many other examples in Thailand and Indonesia. The people-to-people relationship between South Korea and Southeast Asia is reflected not just in tourism but also in education. More and more Southeast Asian people are going to South Korea for higher education. But we anticipate that there will be the other direction of the traffic as well. More South Korean scholars and also researchers are coming to Southeast Asia for these interactions.

We are at the beginning of the third stage [where] we are also discovering the strategic convergence between South Korea and Southeast Asia, either bilaterally with individual countries or with ASEAN as a group. Two-way and multiple-way traffic are emerging, [driven] in large part by individual countries' strategies to diversify and as a survival response to the [growing] global unpredictability and uncertainty. With greater uncertainty, we need a wider range of cooperative mechanisms.

South Korea, with all the comparative advantages that we talked about, is seeing or discovering the strategic dimensions [with Southeast Asia]. There are early attempts in [areas like] maritime security, defense industry, and strategic dialogue. I think there is much more that can be done along these directions. So in the coming years and decades, I foresee more strategic interactions and convergence between South Korea and Southeast Asia.

We just talked about Malaysia and Korea as an example. Our Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim visited Korea recently, and both sides [committed] to elevate the bilateral relations to a strategic partnership. There are talks that next year we may see another upgrade. Next year will be critical because South Korea will be the host of APEC and Malaysia will be the host of ASEAN and ASEAN-related summits. So we are anticipating that strategic partnership can be upgraded to a comprehensive strategic partnership. That, I think, would capture and the journey [of cooperation] between Southeast Asia and South Korea very well. It also sets the stage for both sides to do more for mutual benefits [in the coming years].

Chaesung CHUN: Great, thank you very much. I learned a lot about various dimensions between South Korea, Malaysia, and Southeast Asian countries in general. You talked about how like-minded countries in both regions can cooperate not just in culture or people-to-people exchange, but [also in] developing strategic aspects in which both countries can cooperate to deal with all these difficulties, uncertainties, and great power rivalries. We have to cooperate with like-minded countries in Southeast Asia. So I think your talk will give a lot of insights to not just scholars but also to policymakers. Thank you very much, Cheng Chwee.

Cheng-Chwee KUIK: Thanks again for having me here.

■ Cheng-Chwee KUIK is Professor of International Relations at the National University of Malaysia (UKM)’s Institute of Malaysian and International Studies (IKMAS) and concurrently a Nonresident Scholar at Carnegie China.

■ Edited by: Jisoo Park, Research Associate
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