Pragmatic, National Interest–Centered Diplomacy and North Korea

What kind of North Korea policy will President Lee Jae Myung pursue? Will he follow the trajectory set by the administrations of Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and Moon Jae-in, or will he chart a new course? President Lee has articulated pragmatism as the central tenet of his foreign policy approach. If so, what does pragmatism entail in the context of inter-Korean relations? President Lee's fundamental principle regarding North Korea is that “no matter how costly, peace is better than war.” He has stated that a sound security policy is one that builds a state of peace without resorting to conflict. Emphasizing that overwhelming military force alone cannot guarantee security, he pledged to “foster a situation in which neither side has the need or incentive to invade or attack the other, grounded in strong deterrence—namely, the robust ROK-U.S. alliance, South Korea’s status as the fifth-ranked military power in the world, and national unity—augmented by communication, dialogue, and cooperation.” In President Lee’s view, achieving peace on the Korean Peninsula through a combination of strong deterrence and sustained dialogue and cooperation represents the most pragmatic and effective North Korea policy.

To this end, President Lee has declared a pragmatic, national interest–centered diplomacy aimed at strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance and stabilizing relations with China and Russia, in order to build peace upon a foundation of robust security. In regard to Korea-Japan relations, the administration has also pledged to pursue pragmatic policies, including the restoration of shuttle diplomacy between the two leaders. President Lee's appointment of Representative Wi Sung-lac, an expert in the ROK-U.S. alliance and North Korean nuclear issues, as Director of National Security, and his nomination of former Vice Minister Cho Hyun, who previously served as Ambassador to the United Nations, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, clearly reflects his commitment to strengthening diplomacy with neighboring countries and fostering cooperation with the international community.

President Lee’s pragmatic diplomacy is being articulated not only in the management of relations with neighboring countries but also in the formulation of North Korea policy. During his presidential campaign, President Lee identified the easing of tensions on the Korean Peninsula and the normalization of inter-Korean relations as core pledges. He has since expressed his intention to restore military communication lines, reopen the inter-Korean liaison office, and reinstate the September 19 Military Agreement. Notably, his immediate suspension of loudspeaker broadcasts toward North Korea and the prohibition of leaflet distribution across the border are interpreted as early signals of a pragmatic North Korea policy—one aimed at reducing inter-Korean tensions, preventing unnecessary clashes, and improving the quality of life for residents in border areas. President Lee’s nomination of former Unification Ministers Lee Jong-seok and Chung Dong-young—both with prior experience in inter-Korean engagement—as Director of the National Intelligence Service and Minister of Unification, respectively, appears to reflect a strategic readiness to respond swiftly to potential shifts in inter-Korean relations. This may signal an intent to actively seize opportunities for dialogue and cooperation, should North Korea seek renewed engagement with South Korea and the United States, as it has in the past.

Toward a Realistic and Pragmatic Peace

President Lee’s remarks on peace on the Korean Peninsula evoke the long-standing efforts to establish a permanent peace regime—an agenda frequently raised during negotiations on the North Korean nuclear issue. Past discussions on a Korean Peninsula peace regime—through inter-Korean talks, U.S.-North Korea negotiations, and the Six-Party Talks—have reflected an elevated conception of peace, driven by a deep-seated yearning to end decades of hostility. Notably, the 2018 inter-Korean and U.S.–North Korea summits pledged to build a ‘permanent and solid’ and ‘lasting and robust’ peace regime on the peninsula. These agreements were widely seen as meaningful attempts to ease acute military tensions and substantively reduce the risk of war. However, it is important to acknowledge that these efforts have largely failed to produce concrete outcomes due to divergent conceptions of peace and differing political intentions among the parties involved. In practice, such a high-level vision of peace has neither been realistic nor pragmatic within the context of the Korean Peninsula. Perhaps driven by an overwhelming urgency for peace, visions for a peace regime have often drifted into idealism, rendering them difficult to realize.

Johan Galtung, widely regarded as the founder of peace studies, distinguished between ‘negative peace’ and ‘positive peace,’ emphasizing the significance of the latter. Negative peace refers to the absence of war and the management of conflict—a form of order maintained through deterrence or regulation. In contrast, positive peace entails the elimination of indirect and structural forms of violence across military, political, economic, and cultural dimensions, leading to relationships based on mutual equality. Kenneth Boulding likewise categorized peace into ‘stable peace’ and ‘unstable peace.’ Stable peace denotes a condition in which the likelihood of war is entirely absent, rendering even preparations for war unnecessary. Unstable peace, on the other hand, describes a state in which the possibility of war persists, yet is managed or prevented through deterrence and institutional agreements. President Lee Jae Myung’s articulation of peace on the Korean Peninsula appears to move beyond a negative peace limited to managing the North Korean nuclear issue or reducing armaments. Instead, it aspires toward a vision of positive and stable peace, in which the structural sources of violence between the two Koreas are eliminated, and a more equitable and enduring relationship is established.

However, considering the broader dynamics of the international order surrounding the Korean Peninsula, a slightly more modest vision of peace—less idealized than past proposals—may be more realistic and pragmatic. For any peace roadmap to be viable, it must address the complex web of national interests deeply embedded in the region. Given the current lack of institutional frameworks and practices necessary to sustain peace, expectations of achieving ‘positive and stable peace’ through a fully developed security community remain premature. A more practical approach would involve the establishment of a security regime aimed at reducing the security dilemma in the region, thereby mitigating conflict, avoiding war, and managing peace. The most realistic and pragmatic North Korea policy would therefore be a gradual effort to achieve peace on the Peninsula through a combination of strong deterrence and constructive dialogue and cooperation. In the short term, the Lee administration should pursue negative and unstable forms of peace as a foundation, while keeping the long-term goal of positive and stable peace in sight. Overly idealistic policies, however well-intentioned, are not synonymous with pragmatism.

Challenges Facing Lee’s North Korea Policy

Nevertheless, the Lee administration’s North Korea policy faces a series of formidable challenges. Chief among them is the unpredictable nature of the Trump administration’s foreign policy, which could become a major variable. Following the war in Ukraine and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, the U.S. airstrike on Iran’s nuclear facilities has increased the likelihood that a second Trump administration would become even more disengaged from Korean Peninsula affairs. Some observers, recalling the 2018 U.S.–North Korea summit, are hopeful that a renewed Trump administration may once again initiate direct diplomacy with Pyongyang, raising expectations for a shift in U.S.–North Korea relations and broader Korean Peninsula policy. Given Trump’s highly personalized and impulsive decision-making style, it would not be surprising if he were to propose a summit with Kim Jong Un as early as tomorrow—nor would it be surprising if he withdrew the proposal the following day. Such erratic and nonstrategic policy behavior would present a significant source of instability for the Lee administration as it attempts to formulate a coherent North Korea policy. Amid rapidly changing global dynamics, the North Korean issue is likely to remain low on the list of U.S. foreign policy priorities for the foreseeable future. Of course, Trump has demonstrated that he is willing to abandon long-standing allies and pursue friendly relations with adversaries if it serves his interests. While a transformation in the historically adversarial U.S.–North Korea relationship cannot be ruled out, it remains questionable whether North Korea, and Kim Jong Un in particular, can offer any tangible benefits that would appeal to Trump’s notion of self-interest. Although Trump held historic summits with Kim in Singapore and Hanoi in 2018–2019 to negotiate the nuclear issue, those talks ultimately failed to produce lasting change in U.S.–North Korea relations. This was largely because Kim Jong Un was unable to satisfy what Trump perceived as a meaningful return on engagement. It is therefore unlikely that such dynamics would fundamentally change in a second Trump administration. If U.S.–North Korea relations remain stagnant, the Lee administration will also find it difficult to make meaningful progress with its North Korea policy, as Kim Jong Un is unlikely to seek changes in inter-Korean relations without corresponding shifts in U.S. policy.

Kim Jong Un’s recent policy direction also presents a significant burden for Lee’s North Korea policy. Since 2024, Kim has advanced a new framework for inter-Korean relations and reunification, asserting the notion of “two hostile warring states.” This marks a fundamental departure from previous rhetoric that emphasized unification of two Koreas. A North Korea that positions itself as a separate, antagonistic state is a profoundly different counterpart from one that seeks unification. Unless there is a significant shift in circumstances, Pyongyang is unlikely to respond positively to Seoul’s initiatives, placing considerable constraints on Lee’s ability to advance its inter-Korean agenda. Kim’s ‘Russia-first’ policy also presents a major strategic challenge to the South Korean government. His perception of the international order has changed markedly. He now views the world as entering a new Cold War and transitioning toward a multipolar structure, believing that the era of U.S. hegemony has come to an end. Based on this assessment, Kim has prioritized deepening ties with Moscow. He has reportedly dismissed any possibility of resuming negotiations with the United States, stating that he had already “explored all possible avenues” through his past engagements with President Trump. North Korea has demonstrated active support for Russia in the Ukraine war, even reestablishing a formal security alliance and dispatching troops. Most recently, Pyongyang reportedly agreed to send as many as 6,000 personnel to Russia, including engineering units. Kim Jong Un currently appears far more interested in strengthening ties with Russia and improving relations with China than in resuming inter-Korean or U.S.–North Korea negotiations. The fact that Kim continues to maintain close ties with Vladimir Putin—someone Trump has openly expressed admiration for—presents an additional strategic burden for the South Korean government. Of course, if the war in Ukraine comes to an end and Putin’s need for strategic cooperation with North Korea diminishes, changes in the North Korea–Russia relationship could occur. However, such a shift is likely to take considerable time. Until that happens, it will be extremely difficult for the South Korean government to make meaningful progress in inter-Korean relations.

Above all, South Korea’s previous approaches to North Korea are no longer sustainable. The North Korea issue remains one of the most critical yet least successful agendas in South Korea’s foreign policy portfolio. Despite its significance, inter-Korean relations have seen little substantive improvement over the past several decades, underscoring the fundamental limitations of previous policies and casting doubt on their continued viability. South Korea's North Korea policy has historically followed two main trajectories: progressive administrations have adopted an engagement-oriented approach, while conservative governments have prioritized pressure and sanctions. The Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and Moon Jae-in administrations pursued engagement based on progressive principles, whereas the Lee Myung-bak, Park Geun-hye, and Yoon Suk-yeol administrations took a conservative stance, focusing on coercion and containment. Over the past 30 years, successive progressive and conservative governments have alternated between ‘carrots and sticks’ or ‘engagement and pressure’ in an effort to resolve the North Korean problem. Yet, these efforts have largely failed to yield meaningful change. North Korea remains defiant, and inter-Korean relations have not fundamentally improved. Conservatives have criticized progressive policies as naïve ‘giveaway strategies’ that only embolden Pyongyang, while progressives argue that conservative hardline approaches provoke aggressive North Korean responses and undermine the foundations of inter-Korean trust. However, neither camp has succeeded. The failure lies not in ideological orientation but in the inability of either approach to overcome the structural and environmental constraints surrounding the North Korean issue. The central challenge, therefore, is not a matter of ideology but one of strategy: how to devise a North Korea policy that can transcend ideological divides and effectively address the deeply rooted structural realities of the Korean Peninsula.

Policy Recommendations for a Pragmatic North Korea Policy

For the Lee Jae Myung administration’s pragmatic approach to North Korea to succeed, it is imperative to transcend the binary ideological confrontation between conservatives and progressives that has long shaped South Korea’s North Korea policy. Historically, conservatives have prioritized the South Korea–U.S. alliance over inter-Korean relations, while progressives have often placed inter-Korean cooperation above alliance considerations. However, from a foreign policy standpoint, a successful North Korea strategy must coordinate both inter-Korean relations and the ROK-U.S. alliance in tandem—at times even allowing them to compete when strategically necessary. Admittedly, due to the structural constraints of the international order surrounding the Korean Peninsula, South Korea cannot resolve the North Korean issue through its own policies alone. Nonetheless, a truly pragmatic policy must move beyond ideological simplicity and instead be constructed through a more nuanced lens that incorporates both domestic and international perspectives. A rigid progressive-versus-conservative framework is inadequate for unraveling the complex web of issues tied to the North Korean nuclear crisis, inter-Korean relations, and the question of unification. The North Korea issue is entangled across three levels: the global, the regional (East Asian), and the peninsular. Thus, any effective policy must emerge from a dynamic interplay between international political considerations and domestic political realities. The nuclear issue is not solely a matter of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula—it is also linked to broader concerns such as nuclear proliferation in East Asia, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and the international community’s handling of so-called ‘rogue regimes.’ For the United States, the North Korean nuclear problem is not simply a peninsula-specific issue. It intersects with U.S.–China strategic competition, regional power dynamics in East Asia, and the reconfiguration of the global order. The restoration of the North Korea–Russia alliance, North Korea’s involvement in the Ukraine war, and the evolution of North Korea–China relations amid intensifying U.S.–China rivalry have all significantly influenced South Korea’s policy options. Furthermore, the issue of Korean unification must also be treated as an international political matter, with outcomes heavily dependent on the positions of key regional actors such as the United States, China, Japan, and Russia. It is important to remember that the division of the Korean Peninsula was itself a product of the post–World War II global order shaped by U.S.–Soviet Cold War rivalry. At the same time, both North Korea policy and unification must be approached as domestic political issues that require the consent and support of the Korean people—both in the South and the North. Accordingly, any successful North Korea policy must be tightly interwoven with South Korea’s internal political landscape and public sentiment.

South Korea’s policy toward North Korea must shift from being a reactive response to structural constraints to a confident, proactive strategy rooted in self-assurance and leadership. While it is generally difficult for middle powers like South Korea to exercise full autonomy in foreign policy due to the hierarchical structure of the international order, North Korea policy should be seen as an exception rather than the norm. Precisely because it deals with the uniquely Korean issue of inter-Korean relations, South Korea should assert greater initiative. Given South Korea’s current national capabilities, there is no compelling reason to avoid an engagement policy toward North Korea. As a leading democracy and market economy, South Korea should not shy away from criticizing North Korea’s human rights abuses and rigid authoritarianism. Certainly, the current international environment—marked by escalating U.S.–China strategic rivalry and deepening North Korea–Russia military cooperation—poses significant challenges to a more assertive North Korea strategy. Nevertheless, the strategic landscape on the Korean Peninsula remains fundamentally favorable to South Korea, whose national power significantly exceeds that of North Korea. Under these conditions, the South Korean government should pursue a self-confident and forward-leaning policy direction. In this regard, restoring communication channels with North Korea must remain a priority in order to enhance South Korea’s leverage over Pyongyang. If, for any reason, U.S.–North Korea dialogue is resumed, South Korea must act swiftly and actively to utilize that momentum as a springboard for advancing inter-Korean relations. Admittedly, this will not be easy, especially given that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the goal of unification and now frames the inter-Korean relationship as that of two hostile, belligerent states. However, for a pragmatic North Korea policy to succeed, it is essential that South Korea leads the way in shaping inter-Korean dynamics and boldly articulates a renewed vision for peaceful unification.

Finally, it is essential to formulate a long-term North Korea policy based on the premise that the North Korean issue will not be resolved in the near future. While the common domestic and international tendency is to respond quickly and reactively to developments on the Korean Peninsula, such an approach risks generating misperceptions and misguided policies due to information shortages and the proliferation of misinformation. Instead, North Korea policy should be developed through a comprehensive understanding of the regime’s structural characteristics, long-term dynamics, and key variables. Above all, it must be recognized that North Korea has persisted as a hereditary dictatorship for nearly eight decades since the establishment of its government in 1948, with the regime leadership exerting tremendous effort to maintain its grip on power. Although the three generations of North Korean leaders—Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un—may appear irrational and impulsive at times, in reality they have carefully crafted long-term national strategies that have enabled their survival. These leaders, despite being ruthless autocrats, have demonstrated an astute capacity to weigh costs and benefits and maintain a relatively clear understanding of North Korea’s position within the global order. Through this calculated leadership, the regime has preserved the hereditary succession across three generations, underscoring its remarkable durability. They have skillfully managed the mechanisms of authoritarian control and acted with calculated pragmatism to ensure regime survival. While many analysts predicted the regime’s collapse following the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the opposite has occurred. Most scenarios for Korean Peninsula unification are predicated on the collapse of the North Korean regime; however, there have been no credible reports of significant threats such as popular revolution or military coups undermining the regime’s stability. As a classic authoritarian state, North Korea under Kim Jong Un continues to actively utilize tools of autocratic control. Accordingly, South Korea’s policy toward North Korea must begin from the assumption that the regime will endure for a considerable period. Moreover, China and Russia are likely to prefer maintaining the status quo rather than risking instability within the North Korean regime. Although South Korea’s approach should not be grounded in a two-state framework akin to that of North Korea, its long-term policy must nonetheless be developed under the realistic premise that two separate governments will persist on the peninsula. ■ 

■ Jihwan HWANG is Professor in the Department of International Relations at the University of Seoul..

■ Edited by Inhwan OH, Senior Research Fellow
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