■ See Korean Version on EAI Website

President Trump has consistently expressed a willingness to reengage with Kim Jong Un, frequently citing their personal rapport as a foundation for renewed diplomacy. Most recently, on March 31, 2025, he reaffirmed the importance of dialogue during an exchange with reporters at the White House, noting that the United States was “communicating” with North Korea (Chosun Ilbo 2025).

Despite this seeming rapprochement, however, the Trump administration’s stated approach to the North Korean nuclear issue remains unequivocal. At the inaugural ROK-U.S. foreign ministers’ meeting held during the Munich Security Conference, the U.S. Secretary of State reaffirmed the administration’s objective of complete denuclearization and pledged continued alignment with Seoul. This objective was subsequently reiterated in a trilateral statement by the U.S. Secretary of State and foreign ministers of Japan and South Korea (U.S. Department of State 2025a), where the three officials reaffirmed their commitment to “complete denuclearization of the DPRK,” as was stated in the preceding U.S.-Japan summit meeting. A G7 statement released at the same forum further asserted that North Korea must “abandon all its nuclear weapons, existing nuclear programs, and any other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) (U.S. Department of State 2025b).”

In parallel, President Trump has also foregrounded the significance of global nuclear arms reduction, advocating for negotiations that include Russia and China (White House 2025a). He has characterized reductions in nuclear stockpiles as historic achievements and suggested that such disarmament initiatives should eventually encompass other nuclear-armed states, including North Korea, India, and Pakistan (White House 2025b).

The central dilemma lies in the widening gap between Trump’s rhetorical overtures and the administration’s formal goal of denuclearization. This dissonance has raised concerns over the potential for a narrow bilateral deal between Washington and Pyongyang that could marginalize Seoul and erode U.S. extended deterrence. However, such concerns may ultimately prove misplaced. North Korea’s recent posture in defense and diplomacy signals a clear reluctance to pursue negotiations centered on denuclearization. Pyongyang’s articulation of a ‘maximalist counterstrategy against the U.S.,’ unveiled during the WPK plenary session in late 2024, provides critical insight into its strategic orientation for Trump’s second term.

I. Strengthening Nuclear Readiness under the Doctrine of the Nuclear Shield

North Korea has reaffirmed the irreversibility of its nuclear development trajectory, announcing an intensified push to expand fissile material production as part of a broader counterstrategy against the United States. During visits to a nuclear material production site and a nuclear weapons research center, Kim Jong Un underscored the necessity of continuously reinforcing the nation’s nuclear deterrent, describing it as both a political-military imperative and a sovereign obligation (KCNA 2025a). Pyongyang dismissed NATO and EU statements denying North Korea’s nuclear status as “loose sophism without common sense,” reiterating that its nuclear arsenal is neither symbolic nor negotiable but a permanent operational force (KCNA 2025b). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs further reinforced this position, declaring that nuclear weapons constitute peace, sovereignty, and a constitutionally enshrined right to self-defense (KCNA 2025c).

When the USS Carl Vinson—part of the U.S. Navy’s Carrier Strike Group 1—made port in Busan on March 2, Kim Yo Jong characterized the move as a provocation that justified the indefinite expansion of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, warning of reciprocal escalation and employment of their “strategic deterrent” should the U.S. continue to display military force.

It is worth examining where North Korea is pursuing record-setting displays of deterrence under the catchphrase of strengthening nuclear readiness and the doctrine of a nuclear shield. First, it is developing sea-based nuclear capabilities and posture. Kim Jong Un inspected the construction of a ‘nuclear-powered strategic ballistic missile submarine’ (SSBN), emphasizing that North Korea’s maritime defense capabilities would extend to any waters. Kim revealed the construction of a nuclear-powered submarine for the first time, showing images of the vessel and outlining the basic direction for strengthening naval forces during his on-site guidance. He demanded that the Party “simultaneously push forward with the modernization of surface and underwater warships and further improvement of their operations capabilities,” announcing fleet acquisition plans, phased objectives, and subsequent directions for the defense economy to achieve these goals (KCNA 2025d).

On March 20, the day the Trump administration’s first ROK-U.S. joint exercise (Freedom Shield) concluded, Kim Jong Un visited the Nampo Shipyard, a military vessel construction base, emphasizing the need to prioritize and fully support the comprehensive modernization of shipbuilding to strengthen naval power (KCNA 2025e). North Korea has been developing sea-based nuclear deterrent components to enhance survivability, including the Hero Kim Gun-ok submarine capable of launching nuclear warhead ballistic and cruise missiles, a new nuclear submarine under construction, the nuclear-armed underwater drone ‘Haeil,’ and strategic cruise missile launches in the West Sea.

Second, North Korea is strengthening its aerial and anti-aircraft capabilities. Recently, North Korea reported Kim Jong Un’s guidance of defense R&D initiatives involving an unmanned aerial technology consortium and an electronic warfare research team, emphasizing the integrated development of surveillance assets, unmanned platforms, radar, and electronic warfare technologies with applied artificial intelligence (KCNA 2025g). In July 2023, at a weapons exhibition, North Korea unveiled a reconnaissance aircraft resembling the Global Hawk, describing it as a new unmanned strategic reconnaissance aircraft capable of tracking and monitoring enemy activities on land and sea. They also showcased for the first time an aircraft similar to Russia’s IL-76 transport plane fitted with a radome, likely intended as an airborne early warning and control system. After demonstrating suicide attack drones destroying a BMW passenger car last November, North Korea recently displayed vertical takeoff and landing quadcopter bomb-dropping drones. These were presented as next-generation suicide attack drones with artificial intelligence technology designed to target military vehicles including tanks, armored vehicles, and self-propelled artillery.

Meanwhile, during the ROK-U.S. ‘Freedom Shield’ joint exercise from March 11-20, Russian military aircraft unusually entered South Korea’s Air Defense Identification Zone (KADIZ) eight times without prior notification (Yonhap 2025a). Coincidentally, on March 20, as Russian military aircraft approached within 20km of South Korean airspace north of Ulleungdo, North Korea conducted a test launch of its latest anti-aircraft (surface-to-air) missile system for comprehensive combat performance verification. Kim Jong Un expressed gratitude to the anti-aircraft weapons research group and relevant defense industry enterprises, stating that “the Korean People’s Army will be equipped with another major defense weapon system with laudable combat performance (KCNA 2025e).”

Third, North Korea is enhancing its special operations forces. When North Korea accelerated its nuclear missile capabilities advancement by launching the Kwangmyongsong satellite in February 2016, South Korean military authorities announced plans to create a special unit dedicated to ‘decapitation operations’ targeting enemy leadership, nuclear facilities, missile bases, and WMD-related facilities in case of emergency (Chosun Ilbo 2016). In response, North Korea reported Kim Jong Un’s inspection of a special operations battalion on November 4, 2016, providing detailed coverage of the unit’s combat missions. Until the South Korean military officially reorganized the existing 13th Airborne Special Forces Brigade into the 13th Special Mission Brigade (decapitation unit) with an inauguration ceremony on December 1, 2017, Kim Jong Un unusually conducted four visits to special operations units, including combat training guidance. Thereafter, reports of Kim’s visits to special operations units ceased until 2024, when they increased ahead of North Korea’s participation in the Ukraine war. In 2024, on-site guidance visits to Western District important operational training bases (March), special operations forces training bases (September), and Western District special operations unit training bases (October) were reported. In April 2025, Kim Jong Un visited training bases for special operations units, stating that strengthening special operations forces is a key component of the current military development strategy and presenting important tasks for advancing special operations capabilities (KCNA 2025h).

II. Elevating Bilateral DPRK-Russia Strategic Cooperation over Trilateral Dynamics

During and after the first Freedom Shield joint exercise of Trump’s second administration, North Korea prioritized comprehensive diplomacy with Russia rather than direct military responses. On March 14, after the joint exercise began on March 10, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko arrived in Pyongyang for “wide-ranging consultations on bilateral cooperation and international and regional issues,” including vice-ministerial talks and a meeting with Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui (Yonhap 2025a). A North Korean delegation led by Minister of External Economic Affairs Yun Jong-ho departed Pyongyang on March 17 for Moscow to participate in the joint chairmen’s meeting of the Russia-DPRK Intergovernmental Committee on Trade, Economic, and Scientific-Technical Cooperation. On March 21, Russia’s Ministry of Natural Resources issued a statement explaining that Russia and North Korea were meeting within the framework of the ‘Intergovernmental Committee for Cooperation in Trade, Economy, Science and Technology,’ discussing cooperation in various economic sectors including industry, agriculture, transportation infrastructure, education, and culture, described as traditional areas of mutually beneficial interaction (Yonhap 2025b). That same day, Chairman Kim Jong Un met with Sergei Shoigu, Secretary of Russia’s Security Council, who delivered a personal letter from President Putin and provided detailed explanations about U.S.-Russia contacts regarding the Ukraine ceasefire proposal (Yonhap 2025c; KCNA 2025f).

II. Elevating Bilateral DPRK-Russia Strategic Cooperation over Trilateral Dynamics

During and after the first Freedom Shield joint exercise of Trump’s second administration, North Korea prioritized comprehensive diplomacy with Russia rather than direct military responses. On March 14, after the joint exercise began on March 10, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko arrived in Pyongyang for “wide-ranging consultations on bilateral cooperation and international and regional issues,” including vice-ministerial talks and a meeting with Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui (Yonhap 2025a). A North Korean delegation led by Minister of External Economic Affairs Yun Jong-ho departed Pyongyang on March 17 for Moscow to participate in the joint chairmen’s meeting of the Russia-DPRK Intergovernmental Committee on Trade, Economic, and Scientific-Technical Cooperation. On March 21, Russia’s Ministry of Natural Resources issued a statement explaining that Russia and North Korea were meeting within the framework of the ‘Intergovernmental Committee for Cooperation in Trade, Economy, Science and Technology,’ discussing cooperation in various economic sectors including industry, agriculture, transportation infrastructure, education, and culture, described as traditional areas of mutually beneficial interaction (Yonhap 2025b). That same day, Chairman Kim Jong Un met with Sergei Shoigu, Secretary of Russia’s Security Council, who delivered a personal letter from President Putin and provided detailed explanations about U.S.-Russia contacts regarding the Ukraine ceasefire proposal (Yonhap 2025c; KCNA 2025f).

III. Implications for Security on the Korean Peninsula

North Korea’s maximalist counterstrategy against the United States in 2025 offers two key implications. First, as the Trump administration shows flexibility toward Russia’s position to end the Ukraine war, strategically leveraging Russia to counter China, North Korea—having provided active diplomatic and military support to Russia in Ukraine—will likely seek to strengthen the credibility of its nuclear deterrence while overcoming vulnerabilities in its anti-aircraft and naval forces through military cooperation with Russia. Considering that Shoigu’s visit occurred immediately after the conclusion of U.S.-ROK and trilateral military exercises, and given that both North Korea and Russia recognize the importance of joint operations through their war experiences, they may discuss and potentially develop the level and scope of Russia-DPRK joint exercises into annual events, using ROK-U.S. joint exercises as a pretext.

Second, the prospects for U.S.-DPRK dialogue and denuclearization negotiations appear remote. Given North Korea’s strategic situation, nuclear shield doctrine, and rapidly advancing bilateral relations with Russia across political, military, diplomatic, economic, educational, scientific-technological, and cultural domains, Pyongyang has little incentive to engage in denuclearization talks. Even the possibility of a small deal would require North Korea to perceive substantial benefits from the United States, but Pyongyang finds far greater advantage in solidifying bilateral relations with Russia, which accommodates North Korean nuclear weapons and circumvents sanctions.

Consequently, the South Korean strategic response must center on developing policies that prevent North Korea from leveraging its Russia relationship into security advantages on the Korean Peninsula. This requires a two-pronged approach: to counter North Korea’s enhanced nuclear posture, we must strengthen ROK-U.S. extended deterrence mechanisms and deepen trilateral security cooperation with Japan; simultaneously, to address the emerging Russia-DPRK strategic partnership, we must coordinate closely with the United States while cultivating strategic relations with Russia that diminish Moscow’s incentives for providing strategic value to Pyongyang. ■

References

Chosun Ilbo. 2016. “U.S. Strategic Assets to Remain on Korean Peninsula (In Korean).” May 28. https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2016/05/28/2016052800235.html.

Chosun Ilbo. 2025. “North Korea’s Latest Provocations Raise Tensions.” April 2. https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2025/04/02/CP4E4E5NUBH55NBAFE4S2MMO4I/.

KCNA (Korean Central News Agency). 2025a. “Report on 30th Enlarged Meeting of Secretariat of Eighth Central Committee of WPK.” January 29.

___. 2025b. “KCNA Commentary on Anti-DPRK Remarks of NATO and EU.” February 8.

___. 2025c. “Press Statement of Spokesperson for DPRK Foreign Ministry.” February 18.

___. 2025d. “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects Major Shipyards to Learn about Warship Building and Advance Strategic Policy for Epochal Development of Shipbuilding Industry.” March 8.

___. 2025e. “DPRK Missile Administration Conducts Test-fire of Latest Anti-aircraft Missile System.” March 21.

___. 2025f. “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Receives Secretary of Russian Security Council.” March 22.

___. 2025g. “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Defence Science Research Work.” March 27.

___. 2025h. “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Visits Training Base of KPA Special Operation Units and Guides General Training.” April 5.

U.S. Department of State. 2025a. “Joint Statement on the Trilateral United States-Japan-Republic of Korea Meeting in Munich.” February 15.

___. 2025b. “G7 Foreign Ministers’ Statement on the Margins of the Munich Security Conference.” February 15.

White House. 2025a. “Remarks by President Trump at the World Economic Forum.” January. https://www.whitehouse.gov/remarks/2025/01/remarks-by-president-trump-at-the-world-economic-forum/.

___. 2025b. “Remarks by President Trump and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte Before Bilateral Meeting.” March. https://www.whitehouse.gov/remarks/2025/03/remarks-by-president-trump-and-nato-secretary-general-mark-rutte-before-bilateral-meeting/.

Yonhap News Agency. 2025a. “ROK-U.S. Joint Exercise ‘Freedom Shield’ Ends; DPRK Remains Relatively Quiet (In Korean).” March 20. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20250320046551504.

___. 2025b. “Recent Activities of DPRK in Photos (In Korean).” March 21. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/PYH20250321020900013.

___. 2025c. “DPRK Discloses Kim Jong Un’s Inspection of Defence Research, Hints at Accelerating Weapons Development (In Korean).” March 27. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20250327146553009?section=nk/news/diplomacy.

■ Ho-ryong LEE is Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA).

■ Translated and edited by: Chaerin KIM, Research Assistant
    For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | crkim@eai.or.kr