As the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) exhibits greater strategic alignment with Russia, experts are divided over whether Beijing is displeased with Kim Jong-un’s closer partnership with Vladimir Putin (C. Lee 2025), or if China, North Korea, and Russia are actively coordinating a bloc against the U.S.-led international order (Kendall-Taylor and Fontaine 2024). Beijing and Pyongyang apparently failed to hold major celebrations or exchanges in 2024 to commemorate the “Year of DPRK-China Friendship,” marking 75 years of diplomatic relations (IDCPC 2024). Meanwhile, the Kim regime has held six times more high-level exchanges with Moscow since mid-2023 than with Beijing (MOU 2025).

In September 2023, Kim toured a Russian space launch facility with Putin, and in June 2024, Putin visited Pyongyang and signed the DPRK-Russia Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (KCNA 2024b). Preparations may be underway for another visit to Russia by Kim, signaling plans for cooperation beyond the war in Ukraine. North Korea has already sent Russia an estimated 15,000 soldiers (H. Kim 2025), and possibly 20,000 containers of military equipment, including ballistic missiles, self-propelled artillery, and millions of 152mm and other caliber shells (Xu 2025). Moscow’s payments in goods, money, and services for North Korean military support could already total US$3 billion, a sum equal to nearly one-third of the DPRK’s annual budget (E. Lee 2025), with further financial and technological transfers likely forthcoming.

In light of these developments, what are Chinese perceptions of North Korea? Is Beijing willing to restrain Pyongyang? And how sustainable is a trilateral coalition with Russia? To help structure and advance analytical debate, this article addresses each of these three questions by discussing theories of China-North Korea relations frequently referenced in media commentaries and articulated in the academic literature, but not yet rigorously applied to current geopolitical trends. The result is a collection of competing explanations that analysts can apply to new data on DPRK-China interactions, while assessing the challenges posed by, and internal contradictions involved in, a possible Pyongyang-Moscow-Beijing axis.

I. Is Beijing Suspicious of DPRK-Russia Cooperation?

Historically, China has considered North Korean security inherently intertwined with its own, along the lines of an adage attributed to Mao Zedong: “If the lips are gone, the teeth will be cold” (Chen 2023). From this perspective, North Korea acts as a buffer state, keeping the American military away from China’s borders as U.S. forces remain stationed in – and conduct combined exercises with – the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea). To some extent, Chinese strategists consider the Korean Peninsula part of a sphere of influence (Park 2016), allowing Beijing to protect its interests and project economic and political strength in the region. Regime change or state collapse in North Korea would bring unacceptable levels of geopolitical uncertainty to China’s front doorstep, feeding into a “siege mentality” about encirclement by outside powers (Easley and Park 2016). Beijing often states that how DPRK-Russia bilateral relations develop is a matter between two independent sovereign states (PRC MOFA 2024). This toleration of Pyongyang’s cooperation with Moscow may be indicative of a Chinese calculation that the Russia partnership provides the Kim regime with additional means for maintaining domestic stability.

At the same time, North Korea serves the role of a useful provocateur, distracting the U.S. and its allies from devoting resources to confronting China’s revisionist policies toward Taiwan, the South China Sea, and elsewhere. Although correlation is not direct evidence for Beijing using Pyongyang as a proxy, DPRK provocations tend to increase during periods of strained U.S.-China or China-ROK relations (Chung 2023). As for North Korea’s support of Russia’s war of aggression in Europe, from the perspective of Chinese strategists, a Washington preoccupied with Ukraine is a rival less focused on China – allowing Beijing to prepare measures to offset the effects of U.S. policies that may stifle its economy (Stokes 2025).

On the other hand, China-DPRK relations have shown signs of divergence under the leadership dynamics of Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un. Although Xi is a paramount leader with great power concentrated in a cult of personality, the Chinese government remains an institutionalized bureaucracy where merit is more important than blood ties. In comparison, North Korea and Putin’s Russia are more personalistic dictatorships, especially with the Kim family passing down national leadership over generations. While Xi and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) emphasize the importance of keeping the party in power, their policies are pursued with reference to the national interest (Greitens 2025), in contrast to Kim Jong-un and Putin’s regime-centric policies. Many in Beijing appear to believe that Pyongyang has gone too far by sending troops to fight Ukrainians, and they do not want to be associated with actions that damage diplomatic and economic relations with European countries while offering little benefit to China (Wong 2024).

II. Is China Willing to Restrain Pyongyang?

While China’s interests are affected by DPRK-Russia transactions, it is unclear whether Beijing is willing to restrain its provocative partners for the sake of broader international cooperation. Chinese elites have long seen North Korea as a “little brother” that should follow in China’s footsteps by undertaking similar political and economic reforms to become a prosperous and stable neighbor (Kong 2019). By sharing its growth model, China seeks to implement its regional development plans and reduce direct liabilities for sustaining North Korea (Hamilton and Primiano 2025). However, Pyongyang’s decision to closely align with Russia leaves it sanctioned and isolated from most other countries. In addition to supporting economic growth, Beijing exercises seniority by steering Pyongyang away from its worst tendencies – such as conducting a seventh nuclear test – in order to limit DPRK provocations from catalyzing further security cooperation among Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo (Easley and Kim 2024).

Outsiders may be unable to observe the scale and character of Chinese intervention if it occurs via non-publicized party-to-party relations. China-DPRK relations are less transparent than most other bilateral relationships, being managed primarily by the CCP and the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) rather than state agencies (Fook 2019). This is due to the historical and ideological alignment of the communist neighbors and is evident in the officials China sends to North Korea, who often represent CCP leadership or its international liaison department rather than the foreign ministry (Yang and Lee 2025). Thus, while Beijing may not publicly rebuke North Korea and frequently blocks international accountability at the United Nations, its communication with Pyongyang is likely complicated and mixed, including subtle signs of displeasure – such as snubs in protocol or breaks from historical precedent.

Despite North Korean transgressions against Beijing’s interests and Pyongyang’s repeated failure to follow its larger partner’s advice, China remains hesitant to pressure or punish its rogue ally. After Beijing’s attempts to discipline the Kim regime by withholding aid and even going along with U.S.-led sanctions resolutions at the United Nations, many Chinese strategists have come to believe that doing so is not worth the risk of further isolating North Korea, which could result in hostility directed at China itself (Lin 2024). Beijing does not want to sacrifice its relations and influence with Pyongyang, and the Kim regime appears cognizant of this and is more than willing to exploit it (Howell 2024). Pyongyang even goes so far as to police China’s loyalty, such as criticizing Beijing for signing onto a joint declaration with the ROK and Japan that merely mentioned “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” (KCNA 2024a). China’s self-restraint effectively means that North Korea can get away with military, economic, and technological exchanges with Russia that violate international law.

III. China–DPRK–Russia: Northern Triangle or Axis of Transactionalism?

Beijing’s reticence to intervene, despite concerns about Russia–DPRK cooperation, suggests that relations among the three countries are complex. China’s economic size and political status give it the ability to enable pariah regimes, relatively unconstrained by domestic budgetary battles or the liberal international order. By expanding trade with sanctioned countries, providing diplomatic cover and coordination at the United Nations, and propagating disinformation and alternative narratives, Beijing supports Moscow and Pyongyang as they continue to violate international norms (Easley and Chow 2024). This strategy involves significant economic investment and political risk but deepens dependencies on China and enhances Beijing’s international influence.

China may be attempting to restore the tianxia (“all under heaven”) traditional order in Asia, with a modern incarnation that casts Russia as a junior partner and North Korea as a loyal tributary state. While formally equal nation-states, China would informally act as the regional hegemon. Historically, tributary states showed deference to the central civilization in exchange for benefits associated with stable military relations and profitable trade (Kang 2017). If realized and sustained, such a regional geometry could present a “Northern Triangle” that opposes the U.S.-led international order and attempts to push American presence and influence out of Asia.

A key challenge for any prospective China-led hierarchy is that nationalism remains a potent force in international politics, as evidenced by North Korean resentment of Chinese influence (Chow and Easley 2019). Indeed, a major motivation behind Kim and Putin’s cooperation is likely reducing reliance on Beijing, while Moscow also seeks to regain influence in the Asia-Pacific to balance its position within the China–Russia relationship (Bowen, Manyin, and Nikitin 2025). Russia is dependent on China for manufactured goods and as a market for its energy exports, but amid its war of aggression against Ukraine, it has become desperate for ammunition and soldiers. North Korea, meanwhile, is dependent on China for most of its external trade but wants more financial benefits and technology transfer. Hence, both Putin and Kim are behaving according to supply and demand (S. Lee 2025). While China, North Korea, and Russia may share a desire to stand up to the U.S. and evade Western sanctions, the would-be “Northern Triangle” appears less a coherent bloc than an “axis of transactionalism,” given its lack of trust and institutionalization (Easley 2024).

IV. Conclusion: U.S.–ROK–Japan Trilateralism Instead of a “Reverse Kissinger”

Considering the number of political variables in today’s rapidly changing international environment, taking stock of existing theories about China–DPRK relations is useful to structure and inform debates over the foreign policies of Beijing, Pyongyang, and Moscow. The Xi government has reasons to be concerned about Kim Jong-un and Putin’s deepening cooperation. Nonetheless, because of its strategic competition with the United States and strong preference for stability in North Korea, Beijing does not object to Pyongyang’s policies as much as observers in Washington might hope or expect.

From the perspective of many in Seoul, Beijing should cooperate with its neighbor and trading partner, South Korea, while doing more to restrain the DPRK in line with China’s obligations to uphold United Nations resolutions as a permanent member of the Security Council. Policymakers in Tokyo believe Beijing should see Pyongyang as a rogue ally rather than a useful provocateur. Yet Chinese leaders still consider North Korea as a buffer and even tributary state, akin to a little brother on a similar development path. Despite strained leadership dynamics, the CCP continues to maintain opaque party-to-party relations and enable the pariah Kim regime.

China–DPRK–Russia coordination does not constitute an alliance, especially while the bilateral relationships entail resentful reliance (Wishnick 2025). However, attempts at a “reverse Kissinger” strategy of improving relations with Moscow to counter Beijing (Washington Post 2025) would be ill-advised. Putin is far from a reliable partner, and China, North Korea, and Russia have enduring and overlapping interests beyond the war in Ukraine. Past efforts at strategic engagement – such as when the Group of Seven (G7) welcomed Russia as a member in 1998, or when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) established a cooperation council with Russia in 2002 – did not weaken links between Moscow and Beijing. In fact, Russia–China economic ties have rapidly expanded under Putin. The current bilateral relationship is not comparable to the Sino-Soviet split of the past: ideological divisions as witnessed between Mao and Nikita Khrushchev no longer play a significant role, and border issues do not escalate to anywhere near the level of the Zhenbao Island incident of 1969.

Moscow is now so economically dependent on Beijing that “flipping” Putin’s Russia is not a feasible strategy. However, the so-called “Northern Triangle” should not be treated as a monolith; each government and society can be the target of diplomacy to find openings for constructive engagement (S. Kim 2025). Beijing, Pyongyang, and Moscow often attempt to drive wedges between the U.S., South Korea, and Japan by blaming trilateral cooperation for measures they planned to pursue anyway. Authoritarian propaganda should not dissuade democratic allies and partners from doing more together. To defend common security, prosperity, and a rules-based order, Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo must ensure that inevitable interactions of domestic politics and foreign policy do not undermine their trilateral cooperation. ■

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■ Leif-Eric EASLEY (Ph.D. in Government, Harvard University) is Professor at Ewha Womans University in Seoul where he teaches international security and political economics. He appreciates excellent research assistance from Jennifer Yaewon Lee.

■ Edited by: Chaerin KIM, Research Assistant
    For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | crkim@eai.or.kr