It has been six years since the severance of inter-Korean dialogue, marking the longest period of suspension since the commencement of inter-Korean talks in 1971. The discontinuation of dialogue and exchanges has entailed heightened military tensions and the following risk of conflict, leading to a deterioration of relations. Public expectations for amelioration have largely diminished despite the exigent necessity for the improvement of inter-Korean ties. In particular, Pyongyang’s shift in South Korea policy at the end of December 2023, at which it declared that the “Republic of Korea (ROK)” is no longer an entity for reconciliation and reunification and that inter-Korean relations would be defined as those between “Two Hostile States,” significantly exacerbated tensions between the two Koreas. Such a change in Pyongyang’s South Korea policy has severely dampened the prospects for any potential détente. The North’s promulgation of the “Two Hostile States” doctrine has entrenched public skepticism on the possibility of inter-Korean reconciliation. In a government survey conducted in the fourth quarter of 2024, only 6.5% of South Korean respondents believed that inter-Korean relations in 2025 would improve compared to 2024. In contrast, nearly half (45.6%) anticipated further deterioration and 45.9% expected no change (Peaceful Unification Advisory Council 2024).

Will inter-Korean relations in 2025 remain stagnate or further deteriorate, as indicated by public opinion surveys? Is improvement in inter-Korean relations possible? This paper examines the rationale behind North Korea’s theory of “Two Hostile States” and assesses the potential for change, proposing measures to facilitate progress in inter-Korean relations.

I. The Rationale Behind the “Two Hostile States” Doctrine

At the end of December 2023, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) officially announced a fundamental shift in its policy toward South Korea through a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea. The key elements of this policy shift are as follows:

• “The general conclusion drawn by our Party, looking back upon the long-standing North-South relations is that reunification can never be achieved with the ROK authorities that defined the ‘unification by absorption’ and ‘unification under liberal democracy’ as their state policy, which is in sharp contradiction with our line of national reunification based on one nation and one state with two systems.”

• “I think it is a mistake we should no longer make to regard the clan, who publicly defined us as the ‘principal enemy’ and is seeking only the opportunity of ‘collapse of power’ and ‘unification by absorption’ in collusion with foreign forces, as the partner of reconciliation and reunification.”

• “The North-South relations have been completely fixed into the relations between two states hostile to each other and the relations between two belligerent states, not the consanguineous or homogeneous ones any more” (Rodong Sinmun 2023).[1]

Several explanations may account for North Korea’s adoption of the Two Hostile States doctrine. First, the prolonged and deepening asymmetry of power between North and South Koreas is a significant factor. Pyongyang’s wariness to unification by absorption has persisted since the collapse of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, primarily due to the widening gap in economic and conventional military capabilities. The North Korean ideology of “Our State First,” emphasized by the state since the late 2010s, encapsulates the regime’s determination to build a powerful nation independent of South Korea by enhancing its economic and military capabilities (Koo 2024). The ratification of multiple laws preventing the spread of South Korean culture, such as the Law on Rejecting Reactionary Ideology, and Culture and Law on Protecting the Pyongyang Cultural Language, after 2020, additionally reflects concern over the developmental gap and the perceived threat of absorption.

Recent changes in international dynamics are another factor influencing Pyongyang. North Korea has sought to actively leverage newly-emergent dynamics such as U.S.-China competition and U.S.-Russia confrontation, construing them to be indicative of a new Cold War and a global trend towards multipolarity (Kim 2024a). This approach, which may be termed a “New Cold War/Non-Western” diplomatic strategy,” has led North Korea to focus its foreign policy efforts on strengthening ties with Russia, China, and the Global South while maintaining a hardline stance against the United States and South Korea (Kim 2024c). Such classifications have materialized in the restoration of military alliances and an expansion of multidimensional cooperation with Russia. National motivation to improve inter-Korean relations has seemingly weakened with the pursuit of this diplomatic course.

Third, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration’s antagonism toward North Korea and its pursuit of unification by absorption have also played a paramount role. This suggests that North Korea’s policy shift is, in part, a reaction to the South Korean government’s approach (see Table 1). Since the preliminary stages of his candidacy in early 2022, President Yoon has consistently labeled North Korea as an “enemy,” even before Pyongyang formally characterized its South Korea policy as a “struggle against an enemy.” Furthermore, in January 2023, President Yoon publicly expressed an intention to achieve de facto absorption unification under the South Korean system. Throughout the summer and fall of that year, he continued to issue confrontational messages in both ideology and systematic governance, constantly underscoring the necessity of victory over communist forces. Following the dismantling of Seoul’s organizations dedicated to inter-Korean dialogue, exchanges, and cooperation within the Ministry of Unification, Pyongyang also disbanded its own institutions for inter-Korean dialogue, solidarity, and cooperation. It is plausible that the Yoon administration’s confrontational policies contributed to the DPRK’s shift to the Two Hostile States rhetoric.

Table 1. The Yoon Suk Yeol Administration's DPRK Policy and North Korea's Response

*Source: Kim 2024b. 

II. Potential for Change in "Hostility" and "Two States Theory"

Should North Korea continue to pursue its Two Hostile States theory, improvement of inter-Korean relations would be impossible due to its inherent rejection of “unification” abut also any intention for “reconciliation.” However, the doctrine is not immutable, and prospects of betterment between the Koreas still remain.

Here, it is necessary to view the doctrine of two hostile states as a combination of two distinguishable concepts: “hostility” and “the two-state theory.”[2] Regarding the doctrine of “two states,” North Korea’s position is likely to persist for an extended period, with minimal prospects for short-term change. This is because the fundamental factors underpinning the theory, most notably the structural asymmetry in power and development between North and South Koreas, are unlikely to be resolved in the short term. Pyongyang’s skepticism toward unification by absorption, rooted in long-standing structural factors, and its governance discourse centered on the “Our State First” ideology, would likely remain intact. On the contrary, Seoul is unlikely to accept the two-state theory, as it contradicts the South Korean Constitution, which does not recognize North Korea as a separate state. Instead, the ROK is expected to uphold the “special relationship” framework outlined in the 1991 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement. Given these positions, both North Korea’s adherence to the two-state theory and South Korea’s commitment to the special relationship framework are likely to continue for the foreseeable future.

However, Pyongyang’s stance on “hostility” toward the South has a considerable potential for short-term change. The primary driver of North Korea’s antagonism is the third factor discussed earlier, namely, the Yoon administration’s hostile policies and pursuit of unification by absorption. During the Moon Jae-in administration, though the DPRK often denounced South Korea using discourteous expressions, it did not designate the ROK as an “enemy.”[3] Even in the phase of strained inter-Korean relations after 2019, the exchange of letters between the South and North Korean leaders continued until the end of President Moon’s term. This may be because the Moon administration did not designate North Korea as an enemy, while maintaining a stance that excluded absorption unification. Conversely, President Yoon designated the DPRK as the principal adversary, and Pyongyang responded like a mirror. The nature of North Korea’s response to South Korea appeared contingent upon the level of hostility exhibited by the South. This dynamic of North Korea’s responsiveness to South Korea’s DPRK policy is empirically substantiated by historical precedents in inter-Korean relations, extending prior to the Moon administration (Kim 2024b).

Shifts in international dynamics are also expected, with significant potential to influence North Korea’s strategic posture. The launch of the second Trump administration, which would not prioritize ideology or values, could weaken the ideological and systemic confrontation structure of the new Cold War perceived by North Korea. Additionally, the Russia-Ukraine war may be resolved in the near future. Trump has sent friendly messages to Kim, signaling a proactive approach toward Pyongyang. While competition for national interests around the Korean Peninsula will persist, tensions regarding the ideological and systemic dyad may ease. Such changes may weaken North Korea’s commitment to its “New Cold War/Non-Western” diplomatic strategy and set grounds for a reduction in hostility toward South Korea.

As such, “hostility” has the possibility of change different from the “two-state theory.” Therefore, North Korea’s “Two Hostile States” theory is likely to undergo partial modifications in the short term. The most significant external factor driving this potential shift is South Korea’s policy toward the DPRK. In the future, alterations in South Korea’s stance toward the North could lead to corresponding changes in North Korea’s hostility toward the South. Additionally, the international context may evolve in ways that mitigate ideological confrontation. Even if North Korea’s two-state theory persists, it does not necessarily entail continued hostility toward the South. Consequently, there is a possibility for the improvement of inter-Korean relations by 2025. The process of alleviating and resolving hostility can evolve into a process of enhancing and developing inter-Korean relations.

III. Policy Recommendations for Improving Inter-Korean Relations

To improve relations, both Koreas need to first acknowledge their divergent views on the two state or unification issue. In a situation where South Korea adheres to the special relations theory and North Korea maintains the two-state doctrine, if both sides refuse to acknowledge their differences and force their own positions, the conflict will persist, and improvement in relations will be difficult. North Korea should refrain from imposing the two-state system on South Korea, just as Seoul should avoid pressuring Pyongyang to abandon the doctrine or accept unification. South and North Korea should regard the resolution of differences regarding the two-state doctrine or unification as a long-term task. When hostility is alleviated or resolved, overcoming differences on unification will become easier.

Hence, Seoul’s DPRK policy should prioritize resolving hostility in inter-Korean relations. Basic foundations of the policy should shift from hostility and confrontation to reconciliation, cooperation, and the pursuit of peaceful coexistence. Specifically, acts that may be perceived as threatening must be put to a halt or appropriately adjusted. To terminate the vicious cycle of retaliation between the Koreas consisting of trans-border leaflets, trash balloons, and loudspeaker broadcasts, South Korea needs to take measrures to stop the distribution of provocations and demand corresponding measures from North Korea. Furthermore, Seoul should refrain from excessive displays of military deterrence to urge Pyongyang to avoid provocative military actions. In this regard, South Korea needs to consult with the United States to review the adjustment of the ROK-U.S. joint military exercises and the deployment of U.S. strategic assets. Both Koreas should showcase uttermost caution in managing their messages not to provoke unnecessary antagonism.

Second, the Koreas must resume communication to manage a crisis, restore the 9/19 military agreement, and promote exchanges and cooperation. Inter-Korean communication channels must be restored to ensure expeditious contact in the event of a crisis near the demilitarized zone (DMZ) or the Northern Limit Line (NLL), warranting quick situation management and conflict prevention. Additionally, inter-Korean military talks should be recommenced to reinstitute the agreement, which will play a crucial role in preventing border-area skirmishes and easing peninsular tension. Re-implementation of the agreement would directly contribute to alleviating hostilities and establishing trust. Exchanges and cooperation in fields other than the military are also important for resolving hostility. With the continuation of exchanges and cooperation, the Koreas would be more inclined to act in a manner aligned with mutual expectations, capacitating a shift of identity in the relationship from adversarial to friendly.

Third, Seoul should acknowledge Pyongyang’s suspicions about absorption unification in order to prevent it from hindering reconciliation and cooperation. To this end, South Korea should distinctly articulate its policy principle of excluding unification by absorption. For a historical example, the three principles of the Kim Dae-jung administration’s North Korea policy, which facilitated a period of vibrant mutual cooperation and successfully hosted the first inter-Korean summit, emphasized the exclusion of absorption unification, along with the non-use of force and the promotion of reconciliation and cooperation. The 2018-2019 Korean Peninsula peace process was possible in part by the shared and publicly-stated stance of both the South Korean and U.S. governments against the collapse of DPRK and absorption unification.

Fourth, policies regarding North Korea should go beyond the peninsula to incorporate international diplomatic efforts, aiming to mitigate the structured ideological and systematic confrontation that surrounds the Koreas. The alleviation of this confrontation could manifest in the weakening of the new Cold War framework perceived by North Korea, as well as an increased motivation for the Kim regime to improve its relations with South Korea. The second Trump term presents a valuable opportunity, and South Korea’s astute foreign policy may allow Seoul to seize the chance. South Korea must pursue a foreign policy centered on national interests that go beyond ideology and political blocs, and seek cooperation not only with the United States and Japan but also with China and Russia. Improving South Korea’s relations with China and Russia, which are currently strained or deteriorated, could ease the structured confrontation surrounding the Korean peninsula, leading to a more supportive atmosphere for advancing inter-Korean relations and ensuring peace on the peninsula.

Finally, unification should be pursued as a long-term objective. While peaceful unification is an obligated duty under the South Korean Constitution, it cannot be realized if hostility between the two Koreas persists. A gradual and phased process starting with the alleviation of hostility is needed. In the process, the “special relationship” theory and the “National Community Unification Formula” may serve as the foundation and pillars of South Korea’s North Korea policy. The “special relationship” theory encapsulates the dual concept that, despite the international recognition of the two Koreas as separate states, their relationship is not one of state-to-state relations but rather an internal relationship within the nation, fundamentally oriented toward unification. The “National Community Unification Formula,” established through bipartisan agreements in 1994, asserts that the primary task in the reality of inter-Korean confrontation and antagonism should create a stage of reconciliation and cooperation. Our Constitution, the “Special Relationship Theory” and the “National Community Unification Formula” provide the fundamental principles and direction for policy toward North Korea. Indeed, reconciliation and cooperation are instrumental courses of action in easing and resolving hostility, which is the key objective highlighted in this paper.

※ Note: Parts of this article have been revised and supplemented from my recent paper: Kim, Sang Ki. 2024. “Changes in the Kim Jong-un Regime’s Policy Towards South Korea: Focusing on Responsiveness to South Korea’s North Korea Policy (in Korean).” Journal of Korean Politics 33, 3: 95–126.

References

Koo, Kab-Woo. 2024. “A Genealogy of North Korea’s ‘Our State-First Principle’(in Korean).” Review of North Korean Studies 27, 1: 9–53.

Kim, Sang Ki. 2018. “The Concept and Conditions of a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula (in Korean).” In Establishing a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula and ROK-U.S. Relations, eds. Kim, Sang Ki, Hong Min, Kab-Woo Koo, and Hye-Jeong Lee, 26–41. Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification.

_____. 2024a. “North Korea’s Post-Pandemic Diplomacy: Characteristics, Intentions, and Outlook.” Global NK: Zoom & Connect. August 12. https://www.globalnk.org/publication/view.php?cd=COM000154&ctype=1&s_search_keyword=+sang+ki&start=0.

_____. 2024b. “Changes in the Kim Jong-un Regime’s Policy Towards South Korea: Focusing on Responsiveness to South Korea’s North Korea Policy (in Korean).” Journal of Korean Politics 33, 3: 95–126.

_____. 2024c. “North Korea’s Foreign Policy After the 8th Party Congress: Status, Analysis, and Evaluation (in Korean).” In Korean Peninsula Focus: Implementation and Challenges of Key Decisions from the 8th Party Congress, eds. Choi, Yonghwan, Sangbeom Kim, Ilhan Kim, Sang Ki Kim, Cheolwoon Jang, and Minjoo Park, 87–105. Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University.

Korea Central News Agency (KCNA). 2022. “Press Statement by Kim Yo Jong, Vice Department Director of C.C., WPK.” November 24.

_____. 2023. “Report on the 9th Enlarged Plenum of the 8th WPK Central Committee.” December 31. https://kcnawatch.xyz/newstream/1704014527-622062548/report-on-9th-enlarged-plenum-of-8th-wpk-central-committee/.

Peaceful Unification Advisory Council. 2024. Public Opinion and Trends on Unification (4th Quarter, 2024) 40. https://www.puac.go.kr/ntcnBbs/detail.do.

Rodong Sinmun. 2021. “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Speech at the Defense Development Exhibition of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.” October 12.

[1] Quotes are cited from a KCNA press release: https://kcnawatch.xyz/newstream/1704014527-622062548/report-on-9th-enlarged-plenum-of-8th-wpk-central-committee/.

[2]This distinction was preliminarily discussed in a seminar hosted by the Institute for Northeast Asia Peace Economy on January 15, 2025, during a presentation by Lee Jong-seok and subsequent discussions involving the author.

[3] Though Pyongyang had once referred to Seoul as an “enemy” during the Moon Jae-in administration with the emergence of the issue regarding leaflet distribution in June 2020, this was an isolated incident. In his speech on October 11, 2021, Kim Jong Un stated that the principal enemy was not a specific country but war itself. Additionally, Kim Yo Jong’s press statement on November 22, 2024, which expressed extreme hostility toward the Yoon administration, remarked that “at least Seoul was not our target” during the Moon administration.

■ Sang Ki KIM is a research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU).

■ Translated and Edited by: Sheewon Min, Research Associate; Chaerin Kim, Research Intern 
    For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | swmin@eai.or.kr