I. The Failure of Coercive Denuclearization Policy Against DPRK

Since the first North Korean nuclear crisis during the Kim Young-sam government in the early 1990s, the DPRK’s nuclear weapons development has continued unabated. Kim Jong Un, who assumed power at the age of 28 in 2011, has firmly established his position as the supreme leader over the past decade. Nevertheless, he continues to challenge South Korea’s security and the ROK-U.S. alliance through a series of military provocation, leveraging the nuclear threat, even amid economic crises and international isolation. Over the last 30 years, South Korea and the U.S. have tried various strategies of pressure and conciliation to achieve DPRK denuclearization, even amid leadership changes in both countries. However, these efforts have not been successful. Instead, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have persistently advanced in both quality and quantity during this time.

Following the breakdown of the summit with former President Trump in Hanoi 2019, North Korea has once again escalated military tensions and provocations, exemplified by multiple missile tests. With the upcoming U.S. presidential election in November and the uncertain prospect of DPRK-U.S. dialogue, potential military actions against ROK are anticipated. The Korean Peninsula and inter-Korean relations appear highly unstable in the coming months.

The South Korean government must develop strategies to manage this instability and respond effectively. This requires a strong military deterrence combined with medium- and long-term approaches to bring about denuclearization and peace on the Peninsula. Specifically, an effective coercive diplomatic strategy is critical to deter North Korean provocations and nuclear development, aiming to bring the DPRK to the negotiating table while maintaining stable peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Coercive diplomacy involves the use of threats or the “actual use of limited force” to compel an adversary to comply with specific demands. As Alexander George (1994) explains, unlike deterrence—which uses threats to prevent an adversary from taking a damaging action not yet initiated—coercive diplomacy responds to actions that have already occurred. The goal is to persuade the adversary to back down by making the threat of greater force credible. If necessary, limited force may be used to demonstrate resolve, making it a “more flexible, refined psychological instrument of policy” than a swift, decisive military strategy (George and Simons 1994).

At its core, coercive diplomacy is a defensive strategy aimed at reversing an adversary’s actions or policies. By combining the threat of force with diplomatic persuasion or incentives, it allows for more flexible negotiations. The primary objective is not to punish but to persuade, potentially reducing the risk of unwanted escalation. In other words, it seeks to manage crises and achieve desired outcomes with minimal political and psychological costs and limited use of force. However, if the adversary remains defiant, coercive diplomacy can inadvertently escalate into a serious crisis or even armed conflict. Additionally, the complex nature of international relations means that even a well-designed coercive strategy can be undermined by various limitations and uncertainties.

According to George, the success of coercive diplomacy depends on how effectively demands and intentions are communicated to the adversary, using both words and actions. The alignment of these two forms of communication is crucial for effective crisis management. However, in practice, there are many instances where words and actions send conflicting or paradoxical messages, leading to confusion. This reflects the challenging reality that the two dimensions of communication are not always successfully coordinated.

Another key factor in the success of coercive diplomacy is the nature of the demands and how the adversary perceives them. If the demands are modest, they are easier for the adversary to accept; if they are substantial, they are more likely to be resisted. In crafting demands, one must consider not only the material cost but also the psychological and political costs to the adversary. The perception of these costs can significantly influence the adversary’s response. Ultimately, the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy depends on finding a balance where the relative opportunity costs and motivations of both parties intersect.

How would applying the theory of coercive diplomacy to DPRK denuclearization negotiations look in practice? Simply put, using coercive diplomacy by South Korea and the international community to reverse North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is a challenging endeavor. South Korea, along with the international community led by the U.S., has employed numerous coercive diplomacy strategies over the years to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions and achieve denuclearization on the Peninsula. These included gradual turning of the screw, try-and-see, carrots and sticks, and other strategies short of an ultimatum. However, since the first DPRK nuclear crisis in the early 1990s, North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests and has continuously strengthened its nuclear capabilities. Following the failed attempt to secure sanctions relief and normalize relations with the U.S. through “big deal” with former President Trump in 2019, North Korea responded to the collapse of the summit by enacting its Nuclear Force Policy Law and declaring five guiding principles for nuclear use during the Supreme People’s Assembly.

The reason behind the failure of denuclearization negotiations with North Korea can be better understood through the variables and conditions outlined in the coercive diplomacy strategy.

First, consider the issue of key interests. For North Korea, relinquishing nuclear weapons is exceedingly difficult because these weapons are integral to the survival of the Kim Jong Un regime. While the DPRK’s nuclear arsenal poses a serious security threat to both South Korea and the United States, it is also the very backbone of North Korea’s own security and regime stability. As the conventional military capabilities gap between North Korea and the ROK-U.S. alliance continues to widen, nuclear weapons remain North Korea’s only means to counter its conventional inferiority. Moreover, the nuclear program is central to the regime’s legitimacy, which has been rooted in a military-first (Songun) policy since the death of Kim Il Sung. Abandoning nuclear weapons would mean relinquishing both internal and external legitimacy for the regime, making it nearly impossible to persuade North Korea to denuclearize through external threats or incentives.

Second, North Korea’s internal political and economic dynamics in relation to foreign pressure play a significant role. In reality, the pressure and sanctions imposed by South Korea and the U.S. often serve as effective political tools for the regime to strengthen internal solidarity and control. Since the Korean War, the Kim regime has portrayed the U.S. imperialism and its “hostile policy” as the primary existential threat, using this narrative to justify its policies and maintain power. U.S.-led economic sanctions and the annual joint ROK-U.S. military exercises are cited as evidence of the hostile policy. By blaming external factors for the persistent inefficiency of the North Korean economy, the regime deflects criticism from its own failures. The regime’s propaganda, such as the emotional displays of support during military parades showcasing nuclear missiles aimed at the U.S., further solidifies this narrative. Although the authenticity of this support is questionable, it is clear that the blame for economic hardship is directed at the U.S., not the North Korean regime.

Third, North Korea’s isolated and closed economy limits the effectiveness of external economic sanctions. Despite the ongoing economic crisis and the daily struggles of its citizens, the regime appears to be able to secure the necessary funds for its nuclear program and internal stability. Moreover, China, North Korea’s largest economic supporter, plays a crucial role in undermining the impact of international sanctions. Although China superficially supports UN sanctions against DPRK, it is concerned that severe economic pressure could destabilize or even collapse the regime. As a result, China continues to provide essential food and energy aid to North Korea. The U.S.-China competition and the lack of cooperation from China and Russia with U.S.-led sanctions since the Russia-Ukraine War have further weakened their effectiveness. These factors make it exceedingly difficult to pressure North Korea into denuclearization.

II. Three Factors of Effective Coercive Diplomacy: The Case of Libya’s Nuclear Disarmament

Bruce Jentleson (2005) examines U.S. coercive diplomacy, particularly its success in achieving the nuclear disarmament of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime, which had previously defied the U.S. through terrorism and a nuclear weapons program during the Cold War. On December 19, 2003, Gaddafi announced that Libya would relinquish all weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, and would allow international monitoring. This decision resulted from secret negotiations with the U.S., following Libya’s initial indication of its willingness to abandon its nuclear program conveyed through the United Kingdom in early 2003.

As a first step, Libya joined the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in January 2004. Subsequently, it permitted inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and transferred nuclear missile equipment, including Scud missiles, to the U.S. In return, the U.S. announced the lifting of economic sanctions in April 2004 and normalized diplomatic relations with Libya after 24 years of non-recognition by opening a liaison office in June. The complete disarmament of WMDs marked the third step, culminating in the elevation of the U.S. liaison office to an embassy in May 2006 and the removal of Libya from the list of state sponsors of terrorism in June after 25 years of calling it a terrorist regime.

The nuclear disarmament negotiations with Libya were far from straightforward. Libya had long been a prominent rogue state in the Middle East, pursuing anti-U.S. policies after overthrowing the pro-U.S. Idris monarchy. From the outset, Gaddafi’s regime actively sought to develop nuclear weapons. After failing to acquire nuclear weapons from China, Pakistan, and India during the 1970s, Libya built nuclear reactors with Soviet assistance and focused on developing nuclear weapons through uranium enrichment. The regime also invested heavily in creating large-scale chemical and biological weapons, including nerve gas, and long-range ballistic missiles.

Gaddafi’s regime was a notorious state sponsor of terrorism, engaging in various terrorist activities across Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. This began with the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre and the 1973 assassination of the U.S. ambassador to Sudan. In response, the Nixon and Reagan administrations imposed various sanctions and severed diplomatic relations with Libya. The Reagan administration designated Libya as the most active sponsor of terrorism and initiated military actions against it. In 1986, the U.S. attempted to assassinate Gaddafi by bombing his residential compound, a raid that left Gaddafi injured and claimed the life of his child. In retaliation, Gaddafi orchestrated the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Scotland in December 1988, killing all 259 passengers, including many American students returning home for the Christmas holidays. This act of terrorism sparked global outrage and cemented Gaddafi’s status as the U.S.’s number one enemy.

What then prompted Libya, once the world’s worst state sponsor of terrorism and a developer of nuclear weapons, to suddenly agree to nuclear disarmament and the normalization of diplomatic relations? Bruce Jentleson examines the disarmament negotiations between Libya and the U.S. that spanned three administrations: Reagan in the 1980s, H.W. Bush and Clinton in the 1990s, and George W. Bush in the early 2000s. Reflecting on Libya’s nuclear disarmament, Jentleson identifies three key elements that contributed to the success of U.S. coercive diplomacy: proportionality, reciprocity, and coercive credibility (Jentleson and Whytock 2005). He concludes that the effective balance of these three principles is crucial for a successful coercive diplomacy strategy.

First, proportionality refers to the extent to which the measures taken in coercive diplomacy align with the objectives being pursued. In other words, the level of coercion applied must be proportional to the importance of the objective. The underlying principle is that threats or the use of force should be limited to avoid escalating into full-scale war. If coercive measures lead to a large-scale conflict, it signifies the failure of coercive diplomacy. The limitation on force implies that the objectives should also be limited—coercive diplomacy should focus on reversing a specific policy or action of the adversary, not on changing the regime itself.

Compared to Reagan’s aggressive and hostile approach, U.S. policy toward Libya under George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush shifted from aiming for Gaddafi’s regime change to focusing on altering Libya’s policies on terrorism and nuclear weapons. For example, in the late 1990s, the Clinton administration clarified that it would not hold the Gaddafi regime accountable if it agreed to hand over those responsible for the Pan Am bombing and provided adequate compensation to the victims’ families. Similarly, the George W. Bush administration emphasized that its goal was Libya’s nuclear disarmament, not the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime. By clearly delineating that the objective was policy change rather than regime change, the U.S. established a foundation for negotiation based on proportionality.

Second, reciprocity involves clearly communicating that if the adversary complies, they will receive corresponding incentives or compensation. In Libya’s case, as it began showing a willingness to cooperate in the late 1990s by turning over terrorists, diplomatic, and economic sanctions imposed by the United Kingdom, Europe, and the U.S. were gradually alleviated. Particularly during the Bush administration, once negotiations on nuclear disarmament were underway, the U.S. laid out a clear step-by-step process for normalizing diplomatic relations and lifting economic sanctions.

Third, coercive credibility ensures that the adversary understands the consequences of non-compliance. If the adversary refuses to cooperate, they must perceive that the costs of this decision will be severe. The U.S. demonstrated this through its invasion of Iraq in 2003 following the 9/11 attacks, which led to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Hussein’s refusal to abandon his nuclear ambitions and allow inspections, as demanded by the United Nations and the U.S., was a key reason for the invasion. This action sent a strong warning to the Gaddafi regime, making it clear that failure to comply with U.S. demands would lead to significant consequences. The Bush administration effectively communicated the coercive credibility of its threats, contributing to Libya’s decision to disarm.

III. The Path Forward for ROK’s Policy

Since George W. Bush labeled North Korea as part of the “axis of evil” in 2001, the DPRK has remained a quintessential rogue state, alongside Iran, in the 21st century. As of 2024, North Korea has declared that inter-Korean relations are in a state of war, denouncing the ROK-U.S. joint military exercises as war drills and threatening to use maximum force, including nuclear weapons, in the event of conflict. Within South Korea, both the government and the public are increasingly pessimistic about the possibility of North Korea’s denuclearization. Indeed, since the failed Hanoi summit in 2019, there has been little to no progress in inter-Korean or ROK-DPRK dialogue, let alone in denuclearization efforts. Instead, tensions between the two Koreas have escalated, particularly as the U.S. focuses on its upcoming presidential election. Incidents such as North Korea sending balloons filled with trash into Seoul and South Korea resuming loudspeaker broadcasts into the North have further exacerbated the situation, making the prospect of armed conflict between the Koreas seem more imminent. The current situation on the Korean Peninsula is precarious and fraught with danger.

Despite the strong ROK-U.S. alliance, which makes it difficult for North Korea to pursue full-scale provocations, the risk of limited warfare or military escalation remains. The unexpected nature of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Hamas’s attack on Gaza are stark reminders of how quickly conflicts can erupt. In both cases, the failure to adequately understand the deep-seated distrust, dissatisfaction, and anger of Russia and Hamas towards their adversaries has been pointed out as a critical policy oversight. The complete denuclearization of North Korea remains the official policy of both South Korea and the U.S. Unfortunately, this goal seems increasingly unattainable. Yet, it is an objective that cannot be abandoned, as North Korea’s nuclear capabilities are not complete yet and still in development (Chun 2024). Preventing further advancement or at least reversing these developments before it is too late is crucial.

The U.S. currently lacks sufficient will and interest in resolving the North Korean nuclear problem. Meanwhile, the risk of a crisis on the Korean Peninsula continues to rise. The primary victims of the Ukraine and Hamas conflicts are the people and combatants from both sides. Before it is too late, prioritizing dialogue between North and South Korea over conflict is essential.

This effort must begin with a renewed approach to coercive diplomacy against North Korea. The current policy primarily emphasizes strong military deterrence and punitive measures. Simultaneously, the ROK government’s “unification through freedom” policy could be perceived as a call for de facto regime change (Sneider 2024). This perception is a key reason why President Yoon Suk Yeol’s Audacious Initiative has failed to earn North Korea’s trust. The success of coercive diplomacy hinges on maintaining coercive credibility while ensuring that the objectives—focused on policy change rather than regime change—are proportional. Additionally, clear and sufficient reciprocity in offering compensation for denuclearization must be part of the strategy. While such a policy may not lead to immediate North Korean denuclearization, it could pave the way for renewed inter-Korean or U.S.-DPRK dialogue, helping to prevent unwanted military escalation on the Korean Peninsula.

Recently, various reports of potential earthquake disaster created deep fears in many part of the world, a reminder of how sudden and devastating natural disasters can be. However, armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula is a man-made disaster that could occur at any moment. Unlike a natural disaster, the fate of the Korean Peninsula rests within our control.

References

Chun, Chaesung. 2024. “Denuclearizing North Korea: The Challenging Yet Essential Path to a Peaceful Future.” Global NK Zoom & Connect. August 6. https://globalnk.org/publications/view?cd=COM000153

George, Alexander, and William Simons. 1994. The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy. 2nd rev. ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc.

Jentleson, Bruce W., and Christopher A. Whytock. 2005/06. “Who ‘Won’ Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy.” International Security 30 (3): 47-86.

Sneider, Daniel. 2024. “President Yoon’s Vision of Unification: Liberation, not Engagement.” The Peninsula. Korea Economic Institute of America. August 16. https://keia.org/the-peninsula/president-yoons-vision-of-unification-liberation-not-engagement/

■ Seong-Ho SHEEN is a professor at the Graduate School of International Studies at Seoul National University.

■ Translated and edited by: Jisoo Park, Research Associate
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