I. Second NPT Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference

Currently, the second preparatory committee (July 22 - August 2, 2024) for the 11th Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, scheduled for 2026, is underway in Geneva, Switzerland. Following the decision at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference to “indefinitely” extend the treaty (UNODA 1995), the role and significance of these conferences, held every five years to ensure “that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized” as stipulated in Article VIII, Paragraph 3 of the Treaty (UNODA 1968), have grown considerably. The NPT is widely regarded as the most successful international regime in the history of international institutions and the backbone of nuclear governance, leading to the establishment of nuclear non-proliferation norms and a nuclear taboo. However, the 9th (2015) and 10th (2022) Review Conferences failed to reach a consensus and did not adopt a final document. Although a failure to reach an agreement was not unprecedented, it was the first time in the NPT’s 50-year history that two consecutive review conferences ended without adopting a final document.

The failure to adopt the final document at the 2022 Review Conference was primarily due to Russia, and main challenge facing the NPT regime is also attributed to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, one of the fundamental issue undermining the NPT regime is North Korea, which acquired peaceful nuclear technology as an NPT member but then developed nuclear weapons and publicly conducted nuclear tests. Technically, North Korea has not yet withdrawn from the NPT, and its ambiguous status is maintained at NPT review conferences by holding its nameplate under the chair’s discretion, known as the Molnar Formula (ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008).

This paper examines the potential future paths of the NPT regime, which is at a crossroads between decline and resilience, through the lens of literature on international norms. It also explores how the international community should cooperate to address the North Korean nuclear issue, which poses a serious challenge to the legitimacy of the NPT regime.

II. Current Status of the Global Nuclear Order: “Fragility” vs. “Antifragility”

The NPT has undeniably achieved remarkable milestones. Of the 31 states capable of building nuclear weapons, only ten have done so. Specifically, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea developed nuclear weapons after the NPT’s establishment. With 191 states out of 195 having joined the Treaty, including the five recognized nuclear-weapon states, the NPT has set universal non-proliferation standards and contributed to the emergence of a nuclear taboo in global policy circles.

However, recent developments, especially since 2022, have taken a troubling turn. At the 10th NPT Review Conference, for the first time in the treaty’s 50-year history, two consecutive conferences failed to reach consensus. Russia suspended its participation in the New START treaty, which is set to expire on February 5, 2026. In November 2023, President Putin officially rescinded Russia’s ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Additionally, Russia and China vetoed UN Security Council resolutions condemning North Korea’s unprecedented missile provocations in 2022, during which Pyongyang launched over 90 missiles. Russia also vetoed the renewal of the UN Panel of Experts mandate in March 2024 and, in June 2024, violated several UN resolutions by concluding a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with the DPRK.

One might argue, “What’s new? The NPT has faced challenges before. Considering the four cases of nuclear armament mentioned earlier and other instances of failure, such as Iraq in the 1990s, this seems normal. Historically, the NPT has proven its resilience by adapting to new threats and becoming stronger.” Indeed, the concept of “antifragility” in nuclear non-proliferation literature suggests that a system can benefit from stressors, learning, improving, and adapting to both internal and external changes. To determine whether the NPT is in a state of fragility or antifragility, we need to assess whether the conditions for antifragility are present in the current non-compliance cases.

Literature on international norms identifies conditions for antifragility as (1) joint condemnation, (2) in-group binding, (3) meaning clarification, and (4) institutional production of new rules, initiatives, and procedures in response to deviant events (Smetana and O’Mahoney, 2022). The UN Security Council has adopted nine major sanctions resolutions on North Korea since 2006. Numerous countries, more than 40, including South Korea, France, the United States, Japan, Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands, have engaged in joint condemnation of North Korea’s actions.

Does this suggest that the NPT remains a robust antifragile system? Evidence indicates that the NPT is veering towards fragility. First, despite the numerous sanctions and joint condemnations, there has been no creation of new rules or procedures to address North Korea’s blatant non-compliance. In contrast, significant developments followed previous non-compliance challenges, such as the establishment of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) export controls after India’s nuclearization and the implementation of the Additional Protocol (AP) in response to Iraq’s clandestine nuclear program. North Korea’s case is particularly troubling as it is the only country to have developed nuclear programs under the NPT, declared its withdrawal from the Treaty, and conducted nuclear tests publicly. The lack of new, meaningful rules or procedures beyond economic sanctions against the DPRK non-compliance case highlights a gap in the NPT’s response mechanism.

Second, the overall decline of the global nuclear order exacerbates this issue. The three pillars of the nuclear order—strategic stability, the nuclear taboo, and non-proliferation—are all weakening (Knopf 2022). This is evident in several trends:

(1) The nuclear arms race between the U.S. and China and the modernization of nuclear forces by major nuclear powers.

(2) Russia’s “Escalate to De-escalate” strategy and North Korea’s “secondary mission” of nuclear forces, both of which disregard the nuclear taboo.

(3) The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) reflects non-nuclear weapon states’ growing impatience with the nuclear weapon states’ lackluster efforts toward nuclear disarmament as stipulated in NPT Article VI, possibly leading to a loss of confidence in the treaty itself.

The entire nuclear order is under threat and potentially crumbling. This erosion undermines the NPT’s ability to maintain its antifragile status, pushing it towards fragility.

Lastly, the post-2022 world highlights a significant lack of cooperation among major powers, critically undermining the NPT (Gibbons and Herzog 2022). This is a severe assault on the NPT’s antifragility and challenges its universal nature. The primary catalyst for this shift is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which has dramatically altered the global landscape by fostering cooperation among authoritarian regimes. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit Declaration of July 10 (2024) outlines this new authoritarian partnership. It identifies Russia as the “most significant and direct threat” to European security, China as a decisive enabler of Russia’s war efforts through extensive support for Moscow’s defense industry, and DPRK and Iran as direct suppliers of military assistance to Russia, including missiles, munitions, and unmanned aerial vehicles. This partnership of Russia, China, DPRK, and Iran represents a strategic marriage of convenience that undermines meaningful cooperation among major powers and hampers efforts to strengthen the NPT regime. This development is a critical blow to the regime’s status as a universal norm.

III. Turning the Tides: Addressing DPRK’s Nuclear Challenge

To address the current crisis and redirect the global nuclear order, one of the root causes must be addressed: North Korea’s nuclearization. This issue has fundamentally destabilized the international nuclear regime and is exacerbated by recent events, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Since 2022, North Korea’s actions have been deeply troubling. In April 2022, Kim Jong Un outlined two primary roles for DPRK’s nuclear forces: deterring war and executing a “second mission” if its “fundamental interests” are threatened. By September 2022, the DPRK adopted a law detailing conditions for nuclear weapons use, including seizing an upper hand in the early phase of the war. A year later, this law was enshrined in its constitution, making it more irreversible. Recently, Kim Jong Un declared a fundamental shift in policy towards South Korea, labeling Seoul as the “most dangerous and first enemy state and invariable archenemy” and asserting a “legal entitlement” to preemptively strike and “annihilate” South Korea if provoked (Ha and Kim 2024).

This poses an existential threat to South Korea, as North Korea is believed to have the capability to launch a tactical nuclear missile that can hit any part of South Korea at a moment’s notice. The DPRK’s KN-23, a solid-fuel missile capable of carrying a tactical nuclear warhead, has the range to cover the entire territory of South Korea (CRS 2023).

Compounding these threats, the DPRK has revived Cold War-era alliances by signing a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Russia. This agreement obligates Russia to provide military support to North Korea, potentially escalating a conflict to include Russia’s full military might should North Korea start a war against South Korea (KCNA 2024).

Given this context, South Korea must shift from a purely defensive posture, as it now faces the threat of a preemptive nuclear strike. This urgency has led South Korea to emphasize its “Three-Axis” System, which includes Kill Chain, Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD), and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR). However, this strategy heavily depends on the U.S. maintaining credible nuclear extended deterrence. While the U.S. is committed to nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT, its move toward disarmament could jeopardize South Korea’s survival. This is the primary reason why the TPNW remains untenable for South Korea while the North Korean threat persists.

In short, without addressing the DPRK’s blatant non-compliance, the NPT’s fragility will persist, and the global nuclear order will remain at risk. Turning the NPT from a fragile to an antifragile system requires confronting and resolving the North Korean challenge.

In this regard, enhancing the effectiveness of sanctions is crucial, but it is also imperative to acknowledge North Korea’s remarkable resilience in withstanding even the harshest isolation measures. The regime has demonstrated its adaptability by enduring extreme self-imposed isolation during the pandemic, including the closure of all its borders. Many speculate that this resilience is due to North Korea securing alternative income sources. For instance, experts suggest that Pyongyang has been funding its weapons program through cyber operations. Anne Neuberger, the U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser for Cyber Security, noted in 2022 that North Korea “use[s] cyber to gain, we estimate, up to a third of their funds to fund their missile program” (Lyngaas 2023). Some estimates suggest that up to 40% of their weapons of mass destruction programs are funded by illegal cyber activities (UN Security Council 2024). Given this, it is crucial to consider expanding the ROK-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Diplomatic Working Group on DPRK Cyber Activities into a broader international initiative to enhance the effectiveness of global sanctions against North Korea.

At the same time, South Korea must prudently position itself within the international community. The intensifying North Korean nuclear threat undeniably poses an existential danger to South Korea’s survival. However, advocating for South Korea’s nuclear armament not only jeopardizes its status as a model adherent to the NPT regime but also significantly aggravates the fragility of the NPT, accelerating the collapse of global nuclear governance. This outcome is ultimately not in South Korea’s national interest. Instead, South Korea should continue to adhere strictly to the NPT and focus on enhancing its non-nuclear assets using cutting-edge technologies like AI to deter the North Korean nuclear threat. Additionally, strengthening economic sanctions within the existing international order will help ensure the effectiveness of its efforts to dissuade Pyongyang from further developing nuclear weapons. 

References

Congressional Research Service (CRS). 2023. “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs.” https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10472

Gibbons, Rebecca Davis and Stephen Herzog. 2021. “Durable Institution under Fire? The NPT Confronts Emerging Multipolarity.” Contemporary Security Policy 43, 1: 50-79. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2021.1998294

Ha, Young-Sun and Yang-Gyu Kim. 2024. “Deciphering North Korea’s Policy Shift: Annihilation of ROK vs. End of Kim Regime.” Global NK Zoom & Connect. March 11. https://globalnk.org/publications/view?cd=COM000133

Knopf, Jeffrey W. 2021.”Not by NPT Alone: The Future of the Global Nuclear Order.” Contemporary Security Policy 43, 1: 186-212. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2021.1983243

Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). 2024. “DPRK-Russia Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.” June 20. http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2024/202406/news20/20240620-04ee.html

Lyngaas, Sean. 2023. “Half of North Korean Missile Program Funded by Cyberattacks and Crypto Theft, White House Says.” CNN. May 10. https://edition.cnn.com/2023/05/10/politics/north-korean-missile-program-cyberattacks/index.html

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 2024. “Washington Summit Declaration.” July 10. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm

ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2008. “Regarding North Korea’s Status as a Nuclear State [in Korean]. December 15.https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4081/view.do?seq=319099&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=&srchTp=&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1

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Smetana, Michal and Joseph O’Mahoney. 2021. “NPT as an Antifragile System: How Contestation Improves the Nonproliferation Regime.” Contemporary Security Policy 43, 1: 24-49. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2021.1978761

UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). 1968. “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” July 1. https://treaties.unoda.org/t/npt

__________. 1995. “1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Final Document.” June. https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/WMD/Nuclear/pdf/finaldocs/1995%20-%20NY%20-%20NPT%20Review%20Conference%20-%20Final%20Document%20Part%20I.pdf

UN Security Council. 2024. “Final Report of the Panel of Experts Sumitted Pursuant to Resolution 2680.” March 7. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S%202024%20215.pdf

■ Yang Gyu KIM is the Executive Director (Principal Researcher) of EAI and a Lecturer of Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University.

■ Edited by: Jisoo Park, Research Associate
    For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr