Q. Crisis in North Korean Leadership

Those who view the North Korean issue narrowly might question why I emphasize Kim Jong Un’s leadership crisis in 2025. Reflecting on the past year and looking ahead to 2025, it is clear that North Korea must navigate its leadership risk in 2025 with great caution, as this challenge is as critical as the global and ROK leadership crises. Reports on the 11th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee, held from December 23 to 27, are now coming out. Also, reflecting on how events unfolded last year, particularly through Kim Jong Un's speeches on numerous occasions, it is evident that this year underscores the DPRK’s leadership crisis.

As you all know, 2025 is a pivotal year for North Korea as it marks the conclusion of its five-year economic plan outlined during the 8th Party Congress. Therefore, “economy” has inevitably been a recurring focus in Kim’s speeches throughout 2024. He has to show that that progress has been made over the past five years, and beyond that, he has to outline the direction the economy should take over the next five years.

So where does the problem lie? Economic development will remain a critical objective throughout 2024. They are pursuing a new approach, namely the "20x10 Regional Development Policy," aiming to establish development plans for 20 key areas over a span of 10 years. But what truly concerns me is its troop deployment to the Russia-Ukraine War.

In 2024, North Korea had no choice but to deploy its troops and further reinforce its military posture. In forecasting 2025 with the current state in mind, on one hand, things appear to be going well, as North Korea is rapidly advancing its nuclear weapons and bolstering its strategic assets targeting South Korea. There are also expectations of certain short-term military or economic benefits from troop deployments to Russia, despite the considerable risk of many young soldiers losing their lives.

What I am skeptical about, however, is whether the deployment will yield any benefits. In fact, many North Korea and Russia experts are forecasting potential advantages from the deployment. Yet to me, this appears fundamentally different in nature from South Korea’s troop deployment during the Vietnam War.

In North Korea’s perspective, it would have been part of its survival strategy, aimed at strengthening its international capabilities. But to understand why this is unlikely to succeed, we should look at where Russia stands now. Russia’s current position in its war with Ukraine is fundamentally different from that of the United States during the Vietnam War. 

There are two indicators that illustrate this—global GDP in 2024 is estimated to be around 105 trillion dollars, with the United States accounting for 27 trillion. Meanwhile, China stands at 19 trillion, Japan at 4.4 trillion, Russia at 2.1 trillion, and South Korea at 1.7 trillion. This means that Russia’s economy is only slightly larger than South Korea’s. So the idea that North Korea could gain significantly from its relationship with Russia, beyond what it already receives from China, seems highly limited. I assume China is monitoring North Korea and its actions very closely. 

Even in terms of changes in military expenditure, the 2024 SIPRI data shows that approximately 2.4 trillion dollars were spent globally, with the U.S. accounting for 900 billion. China spent about 300 billion, while Japan and South Korea each spent 50 billion. Although one might assume that Russia is spending immensely as it engages in a widespread war across Europe, its total military expenditure, including wartime costs, is estimated to be around 100 billion.

In this context, while DPRK's deployment may temporarily help its international capacity-building, it was ultimately a misguided decision in the long run. It will be very difficult for North Korea to secure full economic support from China while deploying troops and maintaining ties with Russia. If the DPRK had to make a choice, it would have to choose China.

So, if North Korea's first major misstep in its survival strategy over the past 20–30 years was nuclear development, the second would be troop deployment. While there are statistically visible signs of slight improvement this year, as I always emphasize, single-digit economic growth in North Korea is far from sufficient to meet its needs.

So, unless DPRK achieves economic growth comparable to the level of reform and opening seen in China or Vietnam, sustaining double-digit growth for 10–20 years—or even an entire generation—it will struggle to maintain its global presence. In light of this, 2024 did not demonstrate wise leadership in tying together nuclear development, troop deployment, and economic growth.

In short, I have a grim outlook for North Korea in 2025, as it continues to focus on strengthening nuclear capabilities while seeing limited success from troop deployment and struggling to improve relations with China.

Q2. Future of Extended Deterrence and Korea’s Way Forward

Another important point is the North Korean nuclear issue. So a fundamental agreement on integrated extended deterrence between ROK and U.S. has been made through the Washington Declaration. Should this be abandoned?

At this point, with the lack of leadership among those who initially agreed on it, my personal view is that if we ask what the most cost-effective solution is for North Korea, China, the United States, Japan, and South Korea, the answer is that it should not be abandoned.

Why? I have stated that DPRK’s pursuit of a survival strategy centered on nuclear weapons is a misguided choice. Moreover, in the emerging era of AI-nuclear weapons nexus, the cost-effectiveness of nuclear weapons will decline rapidly, contrary to DPRK’s expectations. So it is inevitable for North Korea to seek a new survival strategy.

However, there is a dilemma, as the current leadership relies on nuclear weapons as one of the two main pillars supporting the regime's stability, making it difficult to abandon them easily. From an objective standpoint, however, this appears to be the result of a highly impractical choice. On one hand, progressive perspectives suggest that, since North Korea has declared a hostile two-state relationship, we should advocate for a peaceful two-state relationship. But this is not a realistically cost-effective solution either, as North Korea has explicitly and officially committed to its nuclear strategy.

North Korea acknowledges that it lacks the capability to strategically threaten the United States comprehensively. As a result, it adopts a stance of using these weapons tactically, at the very least, against the South. Alongside this, it employs highly harsh rhetoric, asserting that the non-nuclear South has no choice but to comply with North Korea's demands.

When dealing with a nuclear-armed state, it is essential to respond in a way that demonstrates that North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons cannot play a decisive role. But from another perspective, the argument that ROK should also develop its own nuclear weapons is, in my view, not a cost-effective option either.

Some, hoping that Trump’s return might lead to the United States allowing South Korea to develop nuclear weapons, base their optimism on figures like Elbridge Colby. In his book, Colby suggests that if the cost of deterring North Korea’s nuclear threat becomes too high, the U.S. might consider a shift in strategy.

He argues that while the U.S. must prioritize deterring threats against itself, extending deterrence to cover threats to South Korea and Japan, including missile defense against North Korea's growing nuclear capabilities, may eventually become too burdensome. In such a scenario, the U.S. might tell its allies, "You handle your defense, and we will focus on our own." This nuanced argument about potential cost-benefit calculations has been oversimplified domestically, leading to the misconception that Trump would easily permit South Korea and Japan to acquire nuclear weapons, significantly lowering the associated costs. Such views are fundamental misjudgment, rooted in a hopeful perspective. So for now, we do not have a choice for but to continue the integrated extended deterrence despite its side effects.

However, if this approach appears overly aggressive to North Korea or China, there is room for adjustment, particularly regarding China. For North Korea, another pathway could also be sought. It must be emphasized that our stance is a response to the presence of North Korean nuclear weapons and serves as a form of deterrence rooted entirely in the pursuit of peace.

The question now lies in how to develop a pathway to improve inter-Korean relations while simultaneously maintaining the integrated extended deterrence. In this regard, the Camp David should be newly developed from the perspective of complex symbiotic evolution, integrating self-organization and coevolution.

Resolving the North Korean nuclear issue ultimately requires addressing the root cause: if North Korea’s reliance on nuclear weapons is indeed a misguided survival strategy born out of existential threats, then serious efforts must be made to explore how a new, non-nuclear, complex North Korean state can be constructed in the 21st century. This is a challenge that South Korea may have to take the lead. It requires collaboration with Japan, as well as consultations with China and the United States. Even if Kim finds it difficult to accept in the short term, we must engage in discussions about setting new targets for a transformative shift in civilization. This could hopefully pave the way for gradually establishing a central point for discourse.

■ Young-Sun HA is the Chairman of the East Asia Institute and Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University.

■ Translated and edited by: Jisoo Park, Research Associate
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