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(This article is a revised and expanded version of Jung, Seungho. 2026. "Assessment of North Korea's 9th Party Congress: Overall Economy." KDI Review of the North Korean Economy, 28(3).)

I. Background

At the final plenary session of the 8th Central Committee held in December 2025, Chairman Kim Jong Un declared that “the five-year plan, together with this year’s economic development goals, has been fulfilled.” He characterized the past five years as “a period of historic transformation that has provided the momentum for transitioning to a new stage,” expressing strong confidence. This assessment is not confined to official North Korean announcements. According to the Bank of Korea’s estimates, the North Korean economy recorded negative growth from 2020 to 2022, but shifted to positive growth of 3.1% in 2023 and 3.7% in 2024; if 2019 GDP—just before the COVID-19 pandemic—is indexed at 100, 2024 GDP is estimated at 101.8, indicating recovery to pre-pandemic levels. In particular, the Bank of Korea attributed the 2024 growth to the promotion of domestic policy initiatives such as the five-year national economic development plan and the Regional Development 20×10 Policy, as well as increases in manufacturing, construction, and mining driven by the expansion of North Korea–Russia cooperation.

On the basis of these official evaluations and external estimates, projections emerged that the new economic plan to be presented at the 9th Party Congress would move away from the “consolidation and reinforcement” strategy of the 8th Party Congress (2021) and instead lean toward a more aggressive growth strategy closer to what was put forward at the 7th Party Congress (2016).

However, the actual policy orientation of the “new five-year plan” announced at the 9th Party Congress turned out to be different from expectations. As evidenced by expressions such as “stabilization and consolidation” and “gradual qualitative development,” the plan was, on the whole, a management-oriented one that inherited a considerable portion of the policy orientation of the 8th Party Congress. The general review report evaluated the past five years as “the clearest and most significant achievement in the economic sphere in over thirty years” and as the opening of a “phase of comprehensive socialist development,” yet the actual content of the economic plan placed stable management, rather than aggressive growth, at the forefront. Furthermore, sectoral tasks for key foundational industries such as metals, chemicals, and electricity were presented in markedly less specific terms than at previous party congresses.

Accordingly, this article compares the main contents of the 9th Party Congress economic plan with those of the preceding 7th and 8th Party Congresses, and analyzes the background behind North Korea’s choice of this management-oriented plan despite declaring the 8th term a success, with a focus on domestic and external uncertainties. The article also presents prospects for the new five-year plan and its implications for inter-Korean relations.

II. Main Contents and Characteristics of the 9th Party Congress Economic Plan

1. Assessment of Economic Performance

The 9th Party Congress assessed the economic achievements of the past five years more positively than any previous party congress. The general review report officially declared that the five-year national economic development plan had been “essentially fulfilled,” defining this as “the clearest and most significant achievement in the economic sphere in over thirty years.” It further established the current stage of North Korea’s development as a “phase of comprehensive socialist development,” asserting that the overall economy had entered a path of sustained growth. Notably, however, the report employed the expression “the possibility of simultaneously lifting the entire economy has been opened”—a phrasing worth close attention. The basis for these achievements also centered not on industrial production performance but on the outcomes of policy implementation and improvements in living conditions, including local development policies, changes in rural areas, housing construction, and the construction of hospitals and greenhouse farms.

This stands in sharp contrast to the two previous party congresses. The 7th Party Congress (2016) assessed that the material and technical foundations of a self-reliant national economy had been strengthened and a springboard for building an economic powerhouse had been established, but did not explicitly state whether the plan’s targets had been achieved. The 8th Party Congress (2021) publicly acknowledged that the targets of the five-year national economic development strategy had not been met, citing not only external factors but also internal problems such as the plan’s failure to “be established on the basis of scientific calculation” and “inefficient methods of work.”

〈Table 1〉 Comparison of Economic Performance Assessments by Party Congress

2. Policy Orientation of the Economic Plan

While strongly promoting these achievements, the 9th Party Congress framed the economic plan in a direction that emphasized stability and continuity over an aggressive growth strategy. This is starkly illustrated by the designation of “stabilization and consolidation” and “gradual qualitative development” as the guiding directions for economic development. Here, “qualitative development” appears to mean improving productivity through technological innovation and managerial reform in the production process, rather than quantitative expansion of output. This can be interpreted as an acknowledgment of the limits to expanding inputs amid persistent sanctions-induced resource constraints. Consequently, policy objectives have shifted toward driving production increases through improved productivity.

Changes are also evident in policy priorities. Whereas the 7th and 8th Party Congresses placed policy emphasis on the normalization and expansion of production in foundational industries such as metals, chemicals, and electricity, the 9th Party Congress shows a shift in which policy tasks directly connected to residents’ livelihoods—such as local development, rural transformation, and public health—come to the fore.

〈Table 2〉 Comparison of Economic Plan Policy Orientations by Party Congress

3. Major Sectoral Tasks

The most prominent feature of the 9th Party Congress in terms of sectoral tasks is that targets for leading sectors and basic industries are presented in markedly more abstract terms than at previous party congresses. The “qualitative strengthening” of the production base was set as the task for key industries such as electricity, coal, and metals; however, specific production targets, power plant construction plans, and equipment expansion plans are absent from the publicly released report. This stands in stark contrast to the 7th Party Congress, which explicitly specified concrete items such as the construction of the Tanchon Power Station, the mechanization of coal extraction, and the establishment of a Juche iron production system.

However, this does not necessarily indicate that specific plans were absent. The concluding remarks of the 9th Party Congress state that “the state of work carried out by the 8th Central Committee of the Party was specifically analyzed and reviewed through data briefings and work review reports,” and the Politburo meeting held during the party congress announced that it had “reviewed and approved the draft five-year plans for the twenty major sectors of the national economy.” This suggests that specific sectoral figures may exist internally but were omitted from the public report in consideration of domestic and external uncertainties.

In the agriculture, local development, and public health sectors, by contrast, relatively specific tasks were presented. In agriculture, alongside grain production targets, specific items were stipulated—such as the expansion of wheat processing capacity, a seed revolution, and tidal flat reclamation; continued implementation of the Regional Development 20×10 Policy was also confirmed. Particularly noteworthy, and distinguishing this congress from previous ones, is the designation of the tourism industry as “a new industry that drives the country’s economic growth and civilizational development.” This reflects an intention to utilize the tourism sector—which is not a direct target of sanctions against North Korea—as a new engine of growth.

〈Table 3〉 Comparison of Major Sectoral Tasks by Party Congress

The defining characteristic of the 9th Party Congress economic plan lies in the fact that, in place of an aggressive growth strategy, it presented economic policy centered on stability and continuity, qualitative growth, and strengthening of the production base. At the same time, the targets and tasks for key foundational industries such as metals, chemicals, and electricity remained abstract compared with those at previous party congresses. Since not all of the specific content of the party congress documents has been made public, interpretation is necessarily limited. Nevertheless, these characteristics can be read as a reflection of the domestic and external uncertainties facing the North Korean economy. The following section examines the main constraining factors in this regard.

III. Background to the Adoption of a Managed Plan: Domestic and External Uncertainties

1. Domestic Environmental Uncertainty

Domestic uncertainty can be summarized under three broad headings. First, there is market instability. North Korea’s dollar exchange rate and rice price followed a comparatively stable trajectory in 2019—just before the COVID-19 pandemic—at approximately 8,000 won and 5,000 won, respectively. However, from the second half of 2024 onward, following the lifting of border closures, the exchange rate began to surge into the 13,000-won range, and as of March 2026 exceeded 41,300 won, reaching approximately five times the long-term average. The rice price also rose with a lag, climbing to approximately 26,300 won in September 2025—5.5 times the long-term average—before declining to around 18,000 won at present. Such sharp price instability is likely to erode residents’ real purchasing power and increase livelihood pressures.

[Figure 1] Trends in North Korea’s Market Exchange Rate and Rice Price (January 2019 – March 2026)

 (Unit: North Korean won)

Source: Daily NK, North Korean Market Trends

Second, there is the constraint on the state’s fiscal capacity. The growth rate of North Korea’s budget revenue stood at approximately 5% in the early years of Kim Jong Un’s rule from 2012 to 2016, but fell to 3.3% during the period of tightened sanctions against North Korea from 2017 to 2019, and dropped sharply to around 1% during the COVID-19 border closure period from 2021 to 2023. Although a rebound to the 2–3% range has been observed since 2024, it is difficult to conclude that the state’s fiscal condition has sufficiently recovered given the prolonged fiscal deterioration (Lee Jong-gyu, 2022, 2025). This fiscal constraint served as the core background factor driving the adoption of a “qualitative strengthening” strategy that emphasizes productivity improvement over direct expansion of production through increased investment. Under conditions in which financing for equipment investment and infrastructure expansion is difficult, a management-oriented plan was arguably an unavoidable choice.

Third, there is instability in rural society. The strengthening of state control over food and commodity distribution, high-intensity COVID-19 quarantine measures, and prolonged economic hardship disproportionately burdened rural areas, and it appears that dissatisfaction and departure from rural areas among rural residents have deepened. Kim Jong Un himself, at the expanded Politburo meeting in January 2024, remarked that “the failure to smoothly supply even the most basic daily necessities to local residents is a serious political problem,” presenting the bridging of the economic gap between the capital and the provinces as an imperative task. That the 9th Party Congress presented measures for local development and rural stabilization in more concrete terms than tasks for leading sectors reflects this social background.

2. External Environmental Uncertainty

External uncertainty stems largely from North Korea’s relations with Russia and China. First, cooperation with Russia has contributed to North Korea’s recent recovery, but significant uncertainty remains regarding its sustainability and broader effects. According to the Bank of Korea’s 2024 estimates of industry-level growth rates, growth in heavy and chemical industries (10.7%) and construction (12.3%) stands out, which is interpreted as reflecting the demand for munitions production driven by the Russia–Ukraine War. However, such cooperation is heavily dependent on the ongoing conflict and is structurally unstable. If the war ends, the current munitions-centered trade structure may prove difficult to sustain; and given the poor logistics infrastructure and low trade complementarity between the two countries, some analyses suggest that a long-term expansion of North Korea–Russia trade is also difficult to anticipate (Jung and Lee, 2024). Indeed, the market prices of energy and flour expected to be supplied from Russia have not stabilized but have rather continued to rise, indicating that the benefits of external cooperation have not been sufficiently transmitted to the public welfare sector.

Next, relations with China also constitute an important source of uncertainty. China appears to be managing its level of cooperation with North Korea within a certain range, in light of the international sanctions regime and its own foreign policy strategy. Given that China has positioned itself as a responsible actor in the international order and has framed the defense of the UN-centered international system and the rule of international law as major principles of its foreign policy, it is difficult for China to adopt a form of active cooperation with North Korea that would directly neutralize UN sanctions (Lee et al., 2023). Furthermore, as reflected in China’s characterization of the North Korea–Russia summit and treaty conclusion as “a bilateral matter between North Korea and Russia” and its maintenance of distance from the arrangement, the likelihood that North Korea–China–Russia triangular cooperation will develop into an institutionalized alliance is limited. Ultimately, under conditions in which it is difficult to design an offensive economic plan premised on Russian support or an expanded economic cooperation with China, North Korea’s adoption of a new five-year plan emphasizing stability and management can be seen as a realistic choice.

IV. Assessment and Implications

Despite its highly positive assessment of the achievements of the past five years, the 9th Party Congress economic plan, in its actual content, placed stability and qualitative strengthening at the forefront rather than an aggressive growth strategy. In particular, for leading sectors and foundational industries, the presentation of sectoral tasks remained abstract compared with those at previous party congresses; in sectors directly connected to residents’ livelihoods—such as local development, rural areas, public health, and tourism—relatively specific tasks were presented. These characteristics can be seen as the result of a complex interplay of domestic factors—market instability, fiscal constraints, and rural instability—and external factors—the structural limitations of North Korea–Russia and North Korea–China cooperation. It is also possible that the very act of publicly presenting specific targets domestically and externally would itself have imposed a political burden on the North Korean authorities.

Several structural limitations can also be anticipated in the implementation of the new five-year plan going forward. First, there is the tension over resource allocation between the military sector and the public welfare sector. At the 9th Party Congress, the military sector went beyond the existing Byungjin(nuclear–economic parallel development) line to emphasize the modernization of conventional weapons and conventional forces as well. Given limited resources, actual resource allocation is likely to tilt further toward the military sector, proportionally constraining inputs for sectors tied to public welfare and residents’ livelihoods.

Second, while the Regional Development 20×10 Policy may carry political significance, its economic limitations are clear. The approach of replicating similar consumer goods production facilities across multiple cities and counties runs counter to the principles of economies of scale and division of labor. In a context where marketization has advanced considerably, strengthening production and distribution centered on state-owned local factories is also likely to reduce the income and efficiency of the existing market sector. In addition, given that imports of consumer goods from China in 2025 have already exceeded pre-pandemic levels, price and quality competition with low-cost Chinese consumer goods may impose a considerable burden on the operation of newly constructed local factories.

The emphasis on the tourism sector, on the other hand, carries important implications. The Wonsan–Kalma zone alone has an accommodation capacity of approximately 20,000; with Chinese and Russian demand alone, stable operation would be difficult. Ultimately, for large-scale tourist zones of this kind to secure profitability, they would need to absorb a portion of South Korean tourism demand. In this respect, even though North Korea has formalized “hostile two-state relations,” tourism retains room to function as a realistic point of contact through which limited inter-Korean cooperation could be resumed in the future. ■ 

References

Lee Jae-young, Lee Yong-jae, Yoon Jeong-hyeon, and Jung Seungho. “Strategies for Responding to U.S.–China Supply Chain Competition and Changes in China–Russia–North Korea Economic Relations.” Korea Institute for National Unification, 2023.

Lee Jong-gyu. “North Korea’s Fiscal Trends and Major Issues.” KDI Review of the North Korean Economy, April 2022.

___________. “Assessment of the North Korean Economy in 2024 and Outlook for 2025.” KDI Review of the North Korean Economy, January 2025.

Jung, Seungho, and Jongmin Lee. “Economic Implications for North Korea of Strengthened Relations with Russia Amid the Russia–Ukraine War.” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 36(4): pp. 449–473, 2024.

Rodong Sinmun. “Work Review Report of the Party Central Committee at the 7th Congress of the Korean Workers’ Party.” May 8, 2016.

___________. “On the Report of the Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un at the 8th Congress of the Korean Workers’ Party, the Great Programme of Struggle for Guiding the Construction of Our-Style Socialism to a New Victory.” January 9, 2021.

___________. “Let Us Carry Forward the Great Victories and Glory Won Through Indomitable Pioneering Struggle as Powerful Peaks and Leaps in a New Journey—Report on the 9th Congress of the Korean Workers’ Party.” February 26, 2026.

___________. “[Thoroughly Implement the Decisions of the 9th Party Congress] Important Tasks Facing the Foundational Industrial Sector.” March 6, 2026.

___________. “On the Settlement of the Implementation of the State Budget of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for Juche 112 (2023) and on the State Budget for Juche 113 (2024).” January 16, 2024.

■ Seungho JUNG is a Professor of School of Northeast Asian Studies at the Incheon National University.

■ Translated and edited by Sangjun LEE, EAI Research Associate; Inhwan OH, EAI Senior Research Fellow; Sowon KIM EAI Intern.

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