Since 2020, North Korea has enacted three major laws, commonly referred to as the “three evil laws” by the international community: the Law on Rejecting Reactionary Thought and Culture, the Youth Education Guarantee Law, and the Law on Protecting the Pyongyang Cultural Language (Ministry of Unification 2024a). These laws explicitly outline and severely penalize interaction with foreign cultures, such as their viewing and dissemination, despite their previous ubiquity in society. The laws were written to specifically target South Korean culture—labeled as “puppet culture”—and categorize most foreign influences as originating from South Korea. Hence, these laws form the basis for stringent control of South Korean cultural influence.

Since Kim Jong Un defined inter-Korean relations as “two belligerents at war” in 2023, North Korea has amplified its focus on what it perceives as hostile actions by South Korea. According to Article 10, Clause 11, Section 1, Chapter 2 of North Korea’s Legislation Law, issues of national unification and inter-Korean relations are classified as “critical matters” that can only be regulated by formal laws or decrees, highlighting their separation in the legal framework. Although the three so-called “evil laws” are not directly associated with either unification or inter-Korean relations, North Korea’s revised stance on bilateral relations is reflected in the preambles of these laws governing South Korean cultural influences. Specific prohibitions detailed in these preambles insinuate that such activities are both present and widely practiced across North Korean society.

I. Law on Rejecting Reactionary Thought and Culture (2020)

The Law on Rejecting Reactionary Thought and Culture, which is the first of the three “evil laws,” was enacted on December 4, 2020, and subsequently amended on August 19, 2022. Structured into four chapters and 41 articles, Chapter 1 outlines the law’s mission, definitions, and core principles; Chapter 2 focuses on preventing ideological inflows; Chapter 3 bans viewing and dissemination of restricted content; and Chapter 4 specifies legal liabilities for violations. Article 2 defines “reactionary ideology and culture” as a “rotten ideology and culture of hostile forces, including South Korean publications, that paralyzes the people’s revolutionary sense of ideology and social class, and deteriorates and depraves our society, as well as all types of impure and absurd ideology and culture that are not in our style (Daily NK 2023a).” The law’s primary objective is to uphold and safeguard socialist ideology and systems, primarily by suppressing and controlling the inflow, viewing, and spread of publications and propaganda materials.

Chapter 2, titled “Obstruction of Inflow of Reactionary Ideology and Culture,” mandates an extensive blockade against all potential entry points for reactionary ideologies and foreign cultures. The law specifies targeted measures for each sector to prevent such infiltration, identifying key contact points with external influences, such as borders (customs offices and border security), propaganda materials, foreign relations organizations (including the hosting, reception, and meetings of foreign delegations), electromagnetic waves, the internet (TV and intranet), “hostile materials,” and citizens’ overseas activities (such as business trips, personal travel, family visits, and interactions with foreigners or overseas compatriots).

The law particularly underscores measures to block external culture by enforcing regulations that “fix TV and radio channels” (Chapter 2, Article 12) and penalizing the “failure to fix TV and radio channels or undoing fixed settings” (Chapter 3, Article 17), thus prohibiting the viewing and dissemination of foreign broadcasts. This provision confirms that North Korean authorities install frequency-locking devices on electronic equipment to restrict access to TV and radio. Despite these measures, North Korean citizens are reportedly circumventing these controls, illegally modifying devices to access South Korean and foreign broadcasts—a practice corroborated by testimonies from North Korean defectors and scholars. Moreover, the emphasis on blocking internet access implies that North Korea’s intranet, though restricted, also poses a potential channel for contact with external cultures.

Chapter 3, titled “Prohibition of Consumption and Distribution of Reactionary Ideology and Culture,” outlines strict prohibitions on both the viewing and dissemination of restricted materials. This chapter specifies various means by which prohibited content can be accessed or shared, including through “computer and memory devices” (Article 16), “copy machines and printers” (Article 18), “hand phones” (Article 19), “hostile materials and obtained materials” (Article 20), and “confiscated goods” (Article 22). These restrictions suggest continued attempts to access or distribute foreign propaganda through these devices.

Moreover, Article 23 bans “reproducing adult videos and spreading superstition,” while Article 24 prohibits “speaking, writing, or singing” in a South Korean style. These clauses indicate that some North Koreans continue to view, distribute, and reproduce adult films, explicit images, sexually explicit recordings, and superstitious materials. Additionally, they reveal instances of North Koreans adopting South Korean linguistic and stylistic conventions, such as using South Korean dialects in text messages.

In Chapter 4, Article 35 (“Re-Educational Labor Punishment on Citizens who Commit Crimes”) outlines violations subject to re-educational labor. Clause 3, which penalizes “illegally installing operating system programs on hand phones of other people,” suggests that citizens are attempting to bypass government censorship to access foreign culture. Similarly, Clause 4, “when possessing hand phones of foreign countries,” implies that foreign-manufactured devices provide a means for individuals to evade state controls and access external content.

Article 31, titled “Crime of Distributing Impure Culture,” prohibits “any person who views, listens to, or possesses any video recordings, compilations, photographs, and publications that contain decadent and absurd contents produced by individuals.” While reinforcing limits on freedom of expression, this provision also reveals that, despite prohibitions, some North Koreans engage in personal creative activities, with such content being distributed informally.

Additionally, Article 40, “Confiscation of Money and Goods Used for Criminal and Illicit Activities,” states that “any money or goods … obtained through such activities shall be confiscated,” suggesting that some North Koreans are capitalizing on foreign cultural access by leveraging it as an income source through unofficial trade.

II. Youth Education Guarantee Law (2021)

The Youth Education Guarantee Law, enacted on September 29, 2021, comprises five chapters and 45 articles. Chapter 1 introduces the fundamental principles of the Act, while Chapter 2 outlines the duties of youth, emphasizing the significance of youth roles and responsibilities in alignment with North Korea’s youth-focused policies. Chapter 3, titled “Guarantee of Conditions for Youth Projects,” addresses the support provided for youth activities under these policies. Chapter 4 specifies the educational roles of schools, families, and society in guiding youth development.

While the early sections focus largely on the importance and safeguarding of youth roles, a notable aspect of North Korean youth behavior is highlighted in Article 34 of Chapter 4. In the context of combating “immoral phenomena,” the Act states that if “youth exhibit immoral or uncultured behavior on the streets or in public places, they must not be ignored or tolerated; immediate action should be taken to ensure they cannot endure the resulting social criticism and pressure.” This provision implies that such behaviors are common and visibly present in public spaces, suggesting a degree of boldness in youth actions that may often evade scrutiny.

Chapter 5, “Establishing the Socialist Way of Life,” offers additional insights into youth conduct. This chapter enumerates “prohibited activities for youth” (Article 41) and “prohibited activities for institutions, enterprises, organizations, and citizens” (Article 42), indirectly exposing the actual behaviors occurring among youth, institutions, enterprises, organizations, and the general public. The subsequent section then specifies actions prohibited for youth.

1. Committing violent crimes, including murder, robbery, and rape.

2. Engaging in sexual misconduct, indecent behavior, prostitution, and gambling.

3. Participating in religious and superstitious activities.

4. Importing, producing, copying, storing, distributing, or watching impure publications and propaganda.

5. Manufacturing, trafficking, storing, or using narcotics.

6. Stealing, seizing, embezzling, or otherwise illegally taking state or personal property.

7. Engaging in beating, assault, or fighting, which disrupts social order.

8. Forming or organizing groups or gangs.

9. Avoiding military service by using family circumstances or health as an excuse, entering into early marriages, unfairly receiving physical examinations and life evaluations, inflicting injuries on oneself, or escaping, thus failing to participate sincerely in military mobilization.

10. Leading a jobless, vagrant lifestyle or drifting away from organized social activities.

11. Distorting our national songs or dancing in non-traditional styles.

12. Using an unusual style of speech or writing that is not in accordance with our customs.

13. Engaging in divorce, early marriage, or cohabitation without being married.

14. Wearing unusual attire and having grooming habits that are not in accordance with our customs and disrupting the healthy social atmosphere with unconventional wedding ceremonies.

15. Behaving in a vulgar and irrational manner that undermines social stability and order.

16. Other actions that violate the laws of the republic (MOU 2024a).

According to the 16 prohibited activities for youth outlined in Article 41 of Chapter 5, these violations can be broadly categorized into acts of violence and property-related crimes, moral and sexual misconduct, ideological and cultural violations, and evasion of military or state duties. Notably, Clause 9—“avoiding military service by using family circumstances or health as an excuse, entering into early marriages, unfairly receiving physical examinations and life evaluations, inflicting injuries on oneself, or escaping”—reveals instances of unlawful behavior aimed at evading mandatory military service. This provision aligns with Article 12 (“Defense of the Motherland”) under Chapter 2, Socialist Construction Struggle, which emphasizes military service as an “indispensable duty in the pursuit of socialism and the most sacred obligation for patriotic youth.” It mandates that youth to enthusiastically volunteer for the army, serve with dedication, and fully engage in civilian-military training. Collectively, these provisions provide insights into contemporary youth attitudes and responses to military service in North Korea.

These behaviors are broadly perceived as threats to social order due to their deviation from state-approved lifestyles. The prohibited activities underscore multiple facets of social control, encompassing criminal law, moral discipline, ideological conformity, public order, and loyalty to the state. Restrictions on dress, marriage, and individual freedoms highlight the state’s control over personal expression and private life. Furthermore, institutions, enterprises, organizations, and citizens are expected to aid youth in adhering to these regulations, positioning them as responsible parties subject to enforcement in cases of non-compliance.

III. Law on Protecting the Pyongyang Cultural Language (2023)

The Law on Protecting the Pyongyang Cultural Language, enacted on January 18, 2023, comprises five chapters and 65 articles. Article 5 of Chapter 1, addressing the principle of a “nationwide struggle to completely eliminate remnants of the puppet language,” describes this struggle as a “serious political and class struggle that affects the very fate of our socialist system and the very existence of our people and future generations” (Daily NK 2023b). That the infiltration of the South Korean language is equated with a threat to the survival of the socialist system, along with the well-being of the populace and future generations, showcases the perceived gravity of language within North Korean society.

Chapter 2, Section 1, titled “Obstructing the Sources of the Spread of the Puppet Language,” indirectly reveals the channels through which the South Korean language enters North Korea. These include customs and border inspection agencies, security activities on the border (Article 8), leaflets (Article 9), garbage in rivers, streams, and seas (Article 10), trade-related projects and international economic activities (Article 11), overseas travel for business or personal reasons (Article 12), published propaganda works (Article 13), electronic and radio wave equipment, which is supervised by the national broadcasting supervision agency and the central information industry (Article 14), the internet (Article 15), and electronic media such as computers and mobile phones (Article 17). Section 2, “Extermination of the Remnants of the Puppet Language,” details specific prohibited behaviors, providing insight into the widespread use of South Korean language in North Korea. Examples include young people referring to unrelated individuals as “oppa” (older brother) or using honorifics like “-nim” after job titles (Article 19), using “puppet writing style or grammar” (Article 21), imitating “puppet style intonation by raising and lengthening their intonation at the end of a phrase in an obsequious, lilting and nauseating way” (Article 22), and giving children South Korean-style names or adopting South Korean-style pseudonyms on mobile phones and computer networks (Article 23) (Daily NK 2023b).

The use of South Korean language is also prohibited in materials like compilations, pictures, or scrolls (Article 24), as well as through text messages and email (Article 25), smuggled goods with South Korean labels (Article 26), published and printed works (Article 27), written documents (Article 28), and prices, menus, instructions, advertisements, and the display items (Article 29). In response, the Act mandates the installation of “puppet language scrubbing programs designated by the State” (Article 30). Furthermore, it calls for “strengthened education and controls over employees and students” (Article 31), stricter oversight of former offenders and individuals deemed problematic, and parental guidance to assist in directing children’s language use.

Article 34 specifies exposure and criticism through printed media, with the Act urging that offenders should be “repressed, ostracized and blamed so they can no longer stand tall with us in the ranks.” Article 35, titled “Education through Public Struggle,” promotes methods such as public exposure, mass struggle meetings, public arrests, public trials, and public executions (Daily NK 2023b). These practices are corroborated by testimonies in the 2024 North Korean Human Rights Report by the South Korean MOU, which documents instances of public executions under the Law on Rejecting Reactionary Thought and Culture for the use of South Korean expressions. This report highlights that violators are punished according to the Law on Protecting the Pyongyang Cultural Language for South Korean language use.

IV. Commonalities of the Three Evil Laws: Influx of Technology Without Content, and Dilemma of Technological Control and Adoption

The three “evil laws” that share the purpose of stringent regulation of the domestic consumption of foreign culture share several key characteristics. First, the primary target of cultural restriction is South Korea, referred to as the “puppet state.” Second, the phrase “regardless of social class or reason” in the principles for punishment suggests that violations occur across all social strata, indicating that foreign culture consumption—deemed illegal by North Korean authorities—is not limited to a particular class but extends to high-ranking officials as well. Third, these laws primarily focus on the younger generation as the main demographic of concern. Chapter 3, Article 26 of the Law on Rejecting Reactionary Thought and Culture, and Chapter 4, Article 30 of the Youth Education Guarantee Law both emphasize the role of parents in the family education of their children. Additionally, Chapter 2, Section 2, Article 33 of the Law on Protecting the Pyongyang Cultural Language stipulates “notification and criticism of parents who fail to properly educate their children,” thus holding parents accountable for their children's illegal behavior. This expansion of responsibility is a notable feature of these laws.

In conclusion, the enactment of these three ideological and cultural laws in North Korea highlights the prevalence of imitation behavior spurred by the influx of foreign information. It also indicates that such information is distributed widely within North Korean society through commonly accessible technology and media.

A notable point here is the dilemma faced by North Korean authorities regarding technological control and adoption. Two key measures can be observed in the regime’s efforts to restrict citizens’ unrestricted use of electronic devices. The first measure involves fixing the broadcast “channels” on electronic devices to limit access to foreign TV and radio signals. The second measure mandates the installation of monitoring and control software on most electronic devices.

From the authorities’ perspective, the majority of electronic devices—including TVs, radios, computers, and mobile phones—are equipped with mandatory programs designed to block external cultural influence and prevent access to foreign information. These programs include the “censorship software that blocks impure propaganda materials” mentioned in Article 37 of the Law on Rejecting Reactionary Thought and Culture (Daily NK 2023a) and the “puppet language scrubbing programs” outlined in Article 30 of the Law on Protecting the Pyongyang Cultural Language.

Conversely, despite these stringent controls, there is evidence that North Korean citizens are circumventing or even removing these programs, either with tacit approval from the authorities or through illegal means. For instance, Article 37 of the Law on Rejecting Reactionary Thought and Culture classifies mobile phones without the “censorship software that blocks impure propaganda materials” as illegal, while Article 35 stipulates that installing unauthorized operating system programs on phones is punishable by three months or more of re-educational labor. North Korea’s technological landscape, therefore, can be divided into a tightly controlled environment orchestrated by the authorities and an underground culture developed by citizens who engage in these illicit modifications.

While North Korean authorities aim to harness technology for citizen control, citizens are increasingly adapting and repurposing technology. When new technologies enter North Korean society, they undergo a recontextualization process shaped both by formal regulatory structures and the informal practices of subcultures. This dynamic suggests that while the state seeks to employ technology for control, the modifications and adaptations by citizens could impede these efforts. Moreover, as technology adoption progresses, digital divides across regions and social classes within North Korea are expected to widen. Although North Korean authorities aim to selectively integrate rapidly advancing international technologies, these selective applications create internal limitations. Consequently, the state may hesitate to further disseminate new technologies, which could, in turn, hinder North Korea’s development and deepen the regime’s technological dilemma.

North Korea’s media infrastructure operates as a highly centralized and controlled system in which the Party regulates the creation, distribution, and consumption of content. In this context, technology serves merely as a vessel. In practice, however, technology is meaningless without content as the two are inseparable; content enables technology to be perceived. However, North Korea attempts to only import technology while strictly rejecting the inflow of content from abroad in its self-isolation. The control and suppression of culture and technology foster subcultures and resistance, leading to long-term instability and ultimately resulting in the weakening of the state, as evidenced by historical cases of authoritarian regimes.

The stringent legislation enacted by North Korean authorities may not effectively protect citizens from foreign cultures or strengthen internal unity; rather, it may incite internal discontent and foster distrust among the populace. There can be no technology without content. This is why the influx of external technology, exclusion of external content, and the enactment of three major evil laws by the North Korean authorities inevitably lead to self-destruction.

V. The Three “Evil Laws” and the Emergence of “Two Koreas” Rhetoric

The origins of Kim Jong Un’s 2023 designation of inter-Korean relations as a “a relationship between two hostile countries” can be traced to the regime’s emphasis on national identity stemming from the “Our State First” principle, as well as the enactment of the three major “evil laws.” In January 2020, North Korea highlighted its cultural sovereignty by establishing the Band of the State Affairs Commission. Later that year, it introduced the ceremony of hoisting its “national flag” during the 75th-anniversary military parade of the Workers’ Party of Korea on October 10 (KCNA 2020). At the Eighth Party Congress in January 2021, Kim Jong Un formally declared the “brilliant era of the our state-first principle” (KCNA 2021). Following this, North Korea established its official state symbols through the National Symbols Act on February 2, 2023. In an official statement on July 11, 2023, Kim Yo Jong, then Deputy Director of the Workers’ Party, indirectly suggested a redefinition of inter-Korean relations, referring to South Korea as the “Republic of Korea” rather than “South Joseon,” thereby implying a shift from a “special relationship” to a formal “state relationship.” This was further emphasized by modifying the lyrics of North Korea’s national anthem —replacing “three thousand li” (a reference to the Korean Peninsula) with “this world” —and by renaming the anthem “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Anthem” in a July 2024 broadcast by Korean Central Television, reinforcing the notion of North Korea as an independent state.

In pursuit of a national identity grounded in the “Our State First” principle, North Korea enacted the first of the three “evil laws,” the Law on Rejecting Reactionary Thought and Culture, in 2020. This law was intended to promote a unified national identity, but it also gave rise to acts of nonconformity among citizens. Established to “uphold socialist thought and safeguard the socialist system,” the law aimed to fortify ideological education, fostering trust in the state and unity around it to achieve recognition as a “universal nation.” These three major laws were introduced to control a range of illegal activities that had previously gone unregulated. Alongside these legislative measures, the physical dismantling of the Gyeongui Line and Donghae Line inter-Korean roads and the construction of physical barriers further showcased that North Korea has chosen complete isolation. However, the more North Korea seeks to sever ties with the outside world to protect its internal structure, the more its internal wounds from external cultural influences are likely to fester. Once embedded, cultural sensitivity does not regress. As illicit activities and derivative subcultures persist within North Korea, these cultural forms will remain embedded, implicitly accepted, and will survive in altered forms, continuing to exist and adapt within the society in various ways.

VI. Strategies for Information Influx into North Korea: State Authorities’ Approach to “Hostile Materials”

Since May 28, 2024, North Korea has been launching trash-filled balloons toward South Korea without authorization. This action follows a statement by Kim Kang Il, Vice Minister of the Ministry of National Defense, released on May 25, which warned of “a tit-for-tat action” in response to South Korean leaflet launches and pledged to release “mounds of wastepaper and filth” (KCNA 2024). In response, the South Korean military has countered with loudspeaker broadcasts directed toward North Korea, to which North Korea has retaliated with its own loudspeaker broadcasts in border areas since late July.

In this context, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, during his August 15 address marking the 79th anniversary of Korea’s Liberation Day, introduced one of the seven core initiatives of his “August 15 Unification Doctrine”—the goal of “increasing access to information for North Korean people (MOU 2024b).” This reflects the South Korean government’s strategy to enhance information inflow to promote freedoms for North Korean citizens. While current strategies primarily focus on physical means of information dissemination, it is crucial to first understand North Korea’s perceptions and regulatory approaches to foreign objects.

On February 2, 2023, North Korea enacted the Law on Handling Enemy Objects, comprising five chapters and 54 articles. This law defines enemy objects as “any items introduced by enemies to undermine our socialist system” and includes “items bearing puppet symbols, images, or texts, as well as puppet currency, items provided by the enemy, and waste entering our territory by land, sea, or air.” The law’s enactment appears to preempt South Korea’s potential response in kind, as North Korea’s waste-balloon launches began on May 28, 2024, following these legislative preparations. Thus, North Korea’s balloon launches can be seen as connected to the leaflet issue, reflecting a preemptive legal basis to anticipate South Korea’s response in kind. Moving forward, strict control and countermeasures against foreign “enemy objects” based on this law can be expected.

Prior to the Law on Handling Enemy Objects, North Korea also amended its Drone Law (originally adopted on January 3, 2020, and revised on March 1, 2022), suggesting active use of drones while preparing countermeasures for potential South Korean drone activity. In response to the escalating tension caused by leaflet launches, South Korea’s Gyeonggi Province has designated Paju, Gimpo, Yeoncheon, and Ganghwa as risk areas, temporarily mitigating inter-Korean tension by restricting the activities of private organizations. However, following the Constitutional Court’s ruling last year that struck down the 2020 law that penalized the sending of propaganda leaflets to North Korea, it appears that leaflet campaigns by private organizations will continue.

The continued state of tension and distress experienced by residents in border areas urgently warrants a fundamental resolution. As the South Korean government develops strategies to enhance information access for North Korean citizens, it should cautiously consider North Korea’s legal framework regarding enemy objects to minimize unnecessary conflicts and devise a realistic response. 

References

Daily NK. 2023a. “Law on Rejecting Reactionary Thought and Culture of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Enacted in December 2020 (Unofficial Translation).” March 21. https://www.dailynk.com/english/daily-nk-acquires-full-text-of-the-anti-reactionary-thought-law/

______. 2023b. “The Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (Unofficial Translation).” March 23. https://www.dailynk.com/english/daily-nk-obtains-full-text-pyongyang-cultural-language-protection-act/

Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). “Military Parade Marks Founding Anniversary of WPK.” October 10. http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2020/202010/news10/20201010-07ee.html

______. 2021. “Congress of Struggle and Advance Which Will Mark Great Watershed in Overall Development of Korean-style Socialism.” January 6. http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2021/202101/news06/20210106-01ee.html

______. 2024. “Press Statement by Vice-Minister of National Defence of DPRK.” May 26. http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2024/202405/news26/20240526-01ee.html

Ministry of Unification (MOU). 2024a. “2024 Report on North Korean Human Rights.” June 28. https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/Publications/ronkhr/

______. 2024b. “August 15 Unification Doctrine: A Unified Korea based on Freedom, Peace, and Prosperity.” August 15. https://www.gov.kr/portal/gvrnPublish/view/H2409000001111563?policyType=G00303&Mcode=11220

National Intelligence Service. n.d. DPRK Statute Book (in Korean). https://www.nis.go.kr/AF/1_2_1.do

■ Seunghee HA is a research professor at the Institute for North Korean Studies of Dongguk University.

■ Translated and edited by: Jisoo Park, Research Associate; Chaerin Kim, Intern
    For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr