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I. Introduction

 

The international community now finds itself in an era defined by complex multiple crises, where traditional and emerging security threats increasingly intersect. In addition to challenges such as pandemics, climate change, cyber threats, and economic security, the outbreak of war between Russia and Ukraine in 2022, the escalation of hostilities between Hamas and Israel, renewed tensions between India and Pakistan, and ongoing conflicts in Ethiopia, the Sahel, and Myanmar illustrate the simultaneous convergence of conventional and non-traditional security concerns. Numerous potential flashpoints, such as the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula, remain in a state of latent volatility.

 

Among these multifaceted threats, the reemergence of nuclear weapons as a central and potentially catastrophic force in international relations stands out as particularly alarming. During the Cold War, nuclear arms epitomized existential danger, with the specter of a third world war erupting from the strategic rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. Following the Cold War, significant reductions in nuclear arsenals appeared to relegate such fears to the past, as nuclear weapons were increasingly overshadowed by emergent non-traditional security threats such as ethnic conflicts, terrorism, and climate change. Although the Second Nuclear Age has been marked by enduring concerns over the nuclear competition between India and Pakistan and the proliferation efforts of states such as North Korea and Iran, the level of threat has not approached the intensity of the first nuclear age, which was defined by the relentless and totalizing confrontation between the two Cold War superpowers.

 

Nonetheless, nuclear weapons have recently reemerged as a central theme in International Security discourse. The most consequential catalyst for this resurgence was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s use of military force under the protection of its nuclear arsenal sent shockwaves through the international community. At multiple points during the conflict, President Putin and senior Russian officials invoked the possibility of nuclear use in response to unfavorable battlefield developments, thereby heightening global anxiety and strategic uncertainty. Simultaneously, China has begun accelerating the expansion and modernization of its nuclear forces. Having adhered for decades to a relatively restrained nuclear doctrine and maintained a limited arsenal since its first nuclear test in 1964, Beijing’s shift toward rapid and qualitative growth marks a significant departure. This transformation has imposed a substantial strategic burden on the United States, which now faces the imperative of deterring two major nuclear powers. The result is an intensification of nuclear competition among great powers and a fundamental recalibration of the global deterrence environment.

 

The inception of the second Trump administration and his subsequent pro-Russian approach to brokering a ceasefire in the Russia-Ukraine war raised profound alarm in America’s European and Asian allies, thus necessitating a fundamental reassessment of the extended deterrence framework that had served as the foundation of U.S. alliance-based security strategy for decades. Several technologically advanced and economically capable states began to express, with increasing openness, the perceived necessity of pursuing indigenous nuclear capabilities (Panda, Narang, and Vaddi 2025). South Korea, where public opinion has consistently favored nuclear acquisition, is now frequently cited as the most likely next nuclear-armed state.

 

Moreover, the rapid advancement of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, space systems, and quantum computing has brought about revolutionary changes in the military domain. At the same time, these developments have amplified negative externalities, including increased complexity in command and control, the risk of misperception, and the heightened potential for rapid escalation. As the strategic relevance of nuclear weapons reasserts itself in contemporary security discourse, the international community appears to be entering what may be described as a Third Nuclear Age. This new era is marked by the renewed horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as a significantly increased probability of nuclear use stemming from the potential for direct conflict among nuclear-armed states (Panda 2025; Wolfsthal, Kristensen, and Korda 2025; Rose 2025).

 

Meanwhile, in South Asia, which many experts have long regarded as the region with the highest risk of nuclear conflict, military hostilities between India and Pakistan reemerged after a period of relative tranquility. In April 2025, a terrorist attack occurred in Pahalgam, located in Indian-administered Kashmir. The Modi government strongly condemned Pakistan as the perpetrator behind the attack and launched a retaliatory strike on May 7. Pakistan, which firmly denied any connection to the terrorist organization, responded with a counterattack, leading to a short but intense military clash that lasted until a ceasefire was reached on May 10.

 

Although the confrontation followed a familiar pattern of Indian retaliation followed by a Pakistani counterstrike, the conflict exhibited a marked escalation in both the types of weapon systems deployed and the geographic distribution of targeted military objectives. This qualitative shift in the character of the hostilities signaled a higher threshold of military engagement than in previous incidents, thereby heightening anxiety within the international community regarding the growing potential for crisis instability and nuclear escalation in the region.

 

In the current phase of the Third Nuclear Age, the sustained military confrontation and recurring nuclear crises between India and Pakistan under the nuclear shadow offer critical implications for the Korean Peninsula, where North and South Korea remain in a state of enduring hostility. In South Korea, public support for nuclear armament has consistently exceeded 60 to 70 percent. As North Korea’s nuclear capabilities continue to advance and confidence in extended deterrence has weakened, particularly under the second Trump administration, domestic interest in the pursuit of an indigenous nuclear capability has grown considerably. Nuclear acquisition is increasingly framed as the most effective deterrent not only against North Korea but also in response to the broader strategic challenge posed by China.

 

Under these circumstances, the South Asian case, shaped by more than seventy years of territorial division and adversarial coexistence, provides instructive lessons for the Korean Peninsula. Has the possession of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan made the two states more secure? Despite repeated crises and military clashes, the fact that conflict has not escalated to the level of nuclear use raises the question of whether strategic stability has been maintained between them. Alternatively, would military confrontations have been less frequent or less intense had neither side acquired nuclear weapons? This paper analyzes the development of nuclear capabilities and subsequent military confrontations between India and Pakistan in order to assess the lessons the case may offer for South Korea’s ongoing nuclear armament debate.

 

It first examines the motivations behind each state’s pursuit of indigenous nuclear weapons, followed by an exploration of how their respective nuclear command and control systems, doctrines, and postures have evolved in pursuit of security objectives. Most critically, the paper assesses how nuclear possession has influenced the frequency, intensity, and character of military confrontations between the two states, with the aim of evaluating whether nuclear weapons have meaningfully contributed to national security in either case. The paper concludes by identifying the practical implications of the India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry for South Korea’s strategic discourse. It does not address the economic sanctions, reputational costs, or diplomatic consequences associated with potential withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Rather, it focuses specifically on evaluating the security-related costs and benefits of nuclear acquisition as they pertain to the South Korean context.

 

II. Nuclear Development and Rivalry Between India and Pakistan

 

1) The Development of Nuclear Weapons

 

India and Pakistan engaged in their first war immediately after their partition and independence from Britain in 1947. Since then, the two countries have fought three additional wars, primarily over Kashmir, and have experienced numerous crises and limited military clashes that defy easy enumeration.

 

India, for its part, suffered a humiliating defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian War, a border conflict that severely escalated tensions with China. Following China’s nuclear test in 1964, demands for indigenous nuclear development began to emerge within India, particularly from opposition figures. However, India’s leadership at the time, including Prime Minister Nehru, who was deeply rooted in a tradition of nonviolent resistance, strongly rejected the development of weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear arms. While atomic energy was actively promoted as part of the national scientific agenda for a poor, newly independent state, its militarization was firmly opposed.

 

Once the necessary nuclear technology had been gradually accumulated, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi shocked the world by conducting a “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974 under the objective of demonstrating Indian autonomy and technological capacity amidst pressure from major powers following the third India-Pakistan War in 1971. Nonetheless, the Indian government continued to express little interest in weaponizing this capability, and the military remained largely uninvolved in nuclear policy. By the 1980s, however, India began accelerating its nuclear weapons development, driven by reports of Pakistan’s determined pursuit of nuclear arms and the ongoing strategic tension with nuclear-armed China. By around 1990, India was widely believed to have acquired operational nuclear capability (Kim 2019, Chapter 4).

 

In the case of Pakistan, persistent hostility and recurring conflict with its larger neighbor India since the early years of independence compelled the country to pursue alliances with major powers as a matter of existential necessity. The United States, whose relationship with non-aligned India remained distant, became a key strategic partner; following the Sino-Indian War, Pakistan additionally cultivated close ties with China.

 

During the third India-Pakistan War in 1971, however, Pakistan suffered a decisive defeat that led to the secession of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh. Even in the face of this humiliating loss, neither the United States nor China provided meaningful assistance. Although debates over nuclear development had already emerged in the 1960s in response to India’s superior conventional forces and overall national power, it was the perceived betrayal by trusted great powers and the resulting loss of territory and population that crystallized Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions. In the aftermath of the war, both the leadership and the broader public reached a consensus that, in the absence of reliable allies and given the enduring asymmetry in conventional capabilities, the only viable path to national security lay in the pursuit of an indigenous nuclear deterrent (Kim 2019, Chapter 5).

 

As both India and Pakistan committed themselves fully to the pursuit of nuclear weapons, the dynamics of their bilateral rivalry increasingly came to revolve around nuclear considerations. In the early 1980s, both states, drawing lessons from Israel’s successful airstrike on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear facility, considered the possibility of launching preventive strikes against each other’s nuclear infrastructure, leading to heightened crisis instability. At the time, the Reagan administration, focused on countering the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, chose to overlook Pakistan’s nuclear program despite being aware of its progress (Ahmed 1999, 187-188), and approved the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Islamabad.

 

From India’s perspective, the introduction of F-16s significantly amplified concerns regarding a potential Pakistani preventive strike, while Pakistani intelligence also frequently reported the possibility of an Indian preemptive attack (Akhtar and Neog 2024, 3). The Indira Gandhi administration in India, at one point, planned a joint operation with Israel to bomb Pakistan’s centrifuge facility in Kahuta. However, the operation was abandoned under pressure from the United States, which had uncovered the plan in advance. Washington further assured Pakistan that it would provide immediate notification in the event of an impending Indian strike (FH Khan 2012, 219-220).

 

Both India and Pakistan navigated a prolonged period of mutual strategic anxiety, marked by serious contemplation of preventive strikes on each other’s nuclear facilities. Ultimately, recognizing the catastrophic consequences such actions could entail, the two countries reached an agreement in 1988 prohibiting attacks on nuclear infrastructure. Despite this accord, bilateral tensions remained high. The 1987 Brasstacks crisis was triggered by India’s large-scale military exercises; in response, Pakistan revealed key elements of its nuclear program in an effort to deter India. When widespread resistance erupted in Indian-administered Kashmir in 1990, the confrontation intensified, prompting Pakistan to openly invoke the threat of nuclear retaliation. This maneuver not only served as a direct warning to India but also succeeded in drawing the United States into a forceful mediating role (Ahmed 1999, 189).

 

By the early 1990s, both states were widely recognized as de facto nuclear powers. In May 1998, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, only recently returned to office, conducted a series of nuclear tests that caught the world by surprise. Despite vigorous diplomatic efforts by the United States, including both incentives and threats, Pakistan responded in kind within three weeks, conducting its own nuclear tests and shocking the international community. The tests prompted swift economic sanctions against both countries. Although these sanctions were lifted within roughly eighteen months, they imposed considerable hardship on populations already grappling with economic instability.

 

2) India-Pakistan Nuclear Confrontation After Nuclear Development

 

Less than a year after Pakistan conducted its nuclear tests, the two countries once again clashed in the Kargil region of Kashmir due to adventurist actions by the Pakistani military. The outbreak of the Kargil War, often described as the second war between nuclear-armed states, raised grave international concerns about the potential for escalation to nuclear use. Although both sides exercised restraint with regard to weapons deployment and violations of the Line of Control, Pakistan was reportedly prepared to consider the use of nuclear weapons under certain conditions. The resolution of the conflict was largely facilitated by the firm mediation efforts of U.S. President Bill Clinton (Rej 2019; Tellis, Fair, and Medby 2001).

 

As emerging nuclear powers, both India and Pakistan were compelled to clarify the purpose of their nuclear arsenals by developing coherent doctrines, establishing credible postures, and reinforcing command and control systems. For India, its nuclear doctrine, first articulated in 1999 and reaffirmed in 2003, is anchored in the principles of credible minimum deterrence and a declared no-first-use policy. India adopts an assured retaliation posture, positioning its nuclear arsenal as a last-resort instrument designed to deter adversaries by threatening overwhelming retaliation in the event of a nuclear strike.

 

Pakistan, by contrast, has not formally released an official nuclear doctrine. Though it nominally claims to pursue credible minimum deterrence, it is yet to pledge a no-first-use policy like India. Instead, it relies on strategic ambiguity to maximize deterrent effect. Initially, Pakistan employed a catalytic posture that aimed to provoke third-party intervention, particularly from the United States, during crises. As trust in such external mediation declined, Islamabad shifted toward an asymmetric escalation posture. This approach signaled a willingness to employ nuclear weapons even in response to conventional threats, thereby seeking to arrest escalation at an early stage and deter further advances by the adversary (Narang 2017, Chapters 3 and 4).

 

The strategic competition between India and Pakistan over nuclear doctrine, posture, and delivery systems has evolved through a sustained action-reaction dynamic. Following the December 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament by a Pakistan-based militant group, India launched Operation Parakram, deploying a large number of troops to the border. Pakistan responded in kind, leading to a protracted military standoff that lasted over ten months.

 

The lack of tangible outcomes from this mobilization spurred domestic debate within India about the efficacy of its military strategy, with the Cold Start doctrine being proposed as a consequence. This concept envisioned rapid mobilization of integrated battle groups capable of launching swift punitive incursions into Pakistani territory, followed by immediate withdrawal before Pakistan could contemplate a nuclear response. Although the doctrine sparked controversy within India regarding its feasibility and strategic prudence, it nonetheless marked a shift toward a more proactive posture.

 

In response, Pakistan, lacking sufficient conventional defenses against a potential Indian first strike, declared a shift in its nuclear doctrine toward full-spectrum deterrence. This approach emphasized the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons even in response to limited conventional incursions. To operationalize this strategy, Pakistan tested and subsequently deployed the Nasr missile in 2011, a short-range battlefield nuclear weapon with a range of approximately 60 kilometers (Ahmed, Hashmi, and Kausar 2019).

 

Meanwhile, the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, which resulted in significant casualties including foreign nationals, provoked widespread public outrage in India. The Indian government, however, ultimately opted for strategic restraint and refrained from military retaliation. The decision drew criticism from segments of the Indian public, particularly supporters of a more assertive national security policy. Narendra Modi, representing the radically Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), capitalized on this sentiment during the 2014 general election and was elected Prime Minister on a platform that promised a stronger response to cross-border threats.

 

In September 2016, following a terrorist attack on an army base in Uri, located in Indian-administered Kashmir, resulted in the deaths of 19 soldiers. Prime Minister Narendra Modi subsequently ordered a surgical strike employing special forces against militant training camps situated across the Line of Control in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Regardless of the operational impact of the strike itself, this action marked a significant departure from India’s traditional policy of strategic restraint, signaling a willingness to engage in calibrated military retaliation. A more pronounced escalation occurred in February 2019, when a suicide bombing carried out by a member of a Pakistan-based militant group in Pulwama killed 40 members of India’s Central Reserve Police Force. In response, India launched an airstrike using fighter aircraft to target a militant camp in Balakot, located not merely across the Line of Control but within the territorial boundaries of Pakistan proper. By choosing to escalate both vertically and horizontally, India sought to convey its resolve and redefine the threshold of acceptable Pakistani provocation. Pakistan retaliated the following day by striking Indian targets across the Line of Control, which resulted in the first aerial dogfight between the two countries since the 1971 war. During the confrontation, an Indian MiG-21 was shot down, and its pilot was captured and subsequently returned.

 

Although the crisis did not spiral into broader military escalation, both sides demonstrated a willingness to push the boundaries of conventional confrontation. During the standoff, Pakistan convened its National Command Authority, an act accompanied by a pointed media campaign intended to remind observers of the nuclear dimension underlying the conflict. Simultaneously, Prime Minister Modi, then in the midst of a national election campaign, publicly warned that if the Indian pilot were not safely returned, his government would consider retributive force, deeming the scenario as a “night of murder.” Former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo later claimed in his memoir that decisive American diplomatic intervention played a critical role in de-escalating the crisis and preventing a potential nuclear conflict.

 

The responses and counter-responses of both countries during the crisis marked a departure from previous patterns, as each side deliberately pursued escalation, heightening tensions across the international community. India officially justified its actions as a preemptive strike against non-military terrorist infrastructure based on credible intelligence. However, by launching attacks within Pakistani territory, it also signaled a willingness to engage in strategic and political escalation. Pakistan's air force responded in kind, with a deliberate escalation of its own, resulting in a situation where both sides actively sought to raise the stakes. The severity of the crisis was such that many experts later assessed its resolution as a matter of sheer luck rather than strategic control. Following de-escalation, both states claimed victory and defended the legitimacy of their respective actions (Pehahi 2019; Dalton 2019; Rej 2019).

 

The Modi administration’s hardline response to the Pulwama terror attack played a significant role in securing the BJP’s sweeping victory in the general election. Already advancing a Hindu nationalist agenda characterized by anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan policies, the government capitalized on its electoral mandate to revoke Article 370 of the Indian Constitution in August. This move effectively abolished the autonomous status that had been promised to Jammu and Kashmir at the time of its accession to India in 1947.

 

Jammu and Kashmir, historically the only Muslim-majority state within India, was subsequently divided into two administrative units: Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh. Both were incorporated as union territories under direct central governance. The abrogation of autonomy provoked widespread outrage among Kashmiris. Pakistan also issued a formal protest, arguing that the measure constituted a violation of the 1972 Simla Agreement.

 

To preempt unrest, the Modi administration deployed police and military forces to suppress dissent and imposed strict controls on media and internet access. At the same time, it sought to pacify local grievances through infrastructure development and investment in tourism. Although tourism numbers rose, resentment toward the central government persisted. This was due in large part to restrictions on political autonomy and high unemployment rates among the youth.

 

Escalating tensions along the border with China further complicated the situation. A significant number of Indian troops were redeployed to the Sino-Indian frontier, weakening the state's domestic security presence. Public dissatisfaction with the federal government deepened throughout 2024. Armed attacks by militant groups increased markedly during this period (Ganguly 2024). The rollback of benefits in housing and education that had previously been reserved for local residents, along with policies encouraging migration into the region from other parts of India, heightened demographic anxiety and social unrest. These developments raised alarm about the growing risk of renewed militant activity in the near future (Bhasin 2024).

 

What particularly alarmed experts was the significantly heightened risk of escalation in the event that another militant attack triggers a crisis between India and Pakistan. This concern stems from the likelihood that both countries may have drawn dangerously flawed conclusions from the Pulwama attack and the subsequent Balakot airstrike. Specifically, each side may now believe that crossing the other’s red lines will not provoke serious retaliation and that escalation can be managed without excessive risk. Such misperceptions undermine deterrence, making it increasingly difficult for either side to accurately anticipate the trajectory or resolution of future conflicts. The next crisis may not be as forgiving; it cannot be assumed that fortune will intervene again.

 

In addition, Prime Minister Modi gained considerable domestic political capital from his administration’s assertive military response, which contributed directly to the BJP’s electoral victory. This success has placed him in a potential commitment trap, in which he may face immense pressure from his political base to retaliate even more forcefully during any future confrontation. The Indian army was met with negligible results in the Balakot strike, and a subsequently limited impact in deterrence against Pakistan, despite a brazen show of military resolve. In contrast, Pakistan’s swift deployment of fighter jets and the downing of an Indian aircraft in the immediate aftermath of the Balakot strike may embolden it to act even more audaciously in the future.

 

Moreover, the fact that both countries reportedly undertook nuclear preparations during the crisis portends that the deployment and mobilization of nuclear forces could occur more rapidly in any future confrontation, thus implicating a significantly diminished capacity for deterrence regarding the adversary’s subsequent actions in a future crisis. Consequently, the erosion of crisis stability may substantially hinder both states' ability to calibrate and contain escalation in subsequent conflicts Pegahi 2019; Dalton 2019; Narang 2019; Lalwani 2020).

 

3) The Pahalgam Terrorist Attack and India-Pakistan Clashes

 

On April 22, 2025, a terrorist attack in Pahalgam shattered the illusion of a peaceful and economically prosperous Kashmir that Prime Minister Modi had been striving to project (Ganguly 2025). The attack, which took place in one of the most popular tourist destinations in Indian-administered Kashmir, involved the targeted killing of 26 Indian tourists—specifically Hindu men—by a militant group. The brutality of the incident provoked national outrage and amplified calls among the Indian public for a forceful retaliatory response.

 

The Indian government was swift to directly attribute responsibility to Pakistan and pledge retaliation. Pakistan, in turn, adamantly denied any connection to the militant group and declared that it would respond decisively to any Indian military action (Sharp 2025). Both countries rapidly adopted a series of adversarial measures, including the closure of borders, expulsion of diplomats, suspension of visa services, and termination of bilateral trade relations, leading to a precipitous deterioration in diplomatic ties.

 

Tensions escalated further when India announced its withdrawal from the Indus Waters Treaty, a long-standing agreement brokered by the World Bank in 1960 that had withstood decades of hostility and armed conflict. By implying the potential restriction of water flows to Pakistan, whose dependence on the Indus River system exceeds 80 percent, India introduced a grave new dimension to the standoff. Pakistan responded by warning that any unilateral interference with Indus water allocations would be treated as an act of war (Hamza 2025). Islamabad also declared its intention to nullify the Simla Agreement, which had been established after the 1972 war to institutionalize recognition of the Line of Control and to promote peaceful resolution of disputes over Kashmir.

 

Simultaneously, reports of skirmishes between Indian and Pakistani forces near the Line of Control began to surface with increasing frequency. Both governments engaged in aggressive diplomacy, seeking to solidify their positions on the global stage. Prime Minister Modi, invoking a narrative of national resilience, announced that the Indian military would be granted full operational latitude in responding to Pakistani provocations. Senior Pakistani officials, in turn, issued warnings of impending Indian strikes and vowed to mount a forceful counterresponse.

 

Given Modi’s previous domestic political gains following assertive responses to the 2016 and 2019 terrorist attacks, few doubted that he would pursue a similarly aggressive course amid a renewed wave of nationalist sentiment. Yet this growing confidence in India’s presumed escalation superiority appeared increasingly precarious. A number of experts raised alarm over the potential for a severe and uncontrolled crisis. Concerns centered on the questionable strategic utility of military retaliation, the destabilizing role of advancing military technologies, the structural risks associated with both countries’ offensive doctrines, and the diminishing likelihood of timely third-party mediation, particularly by the United States, which had historically played a key role in crisis de-escalation (Singh 2025a; Shapoo 2025; Altaf and Javed 2025).

 

Against the backdrop of escalating verbal threats and retaliatory measures, India launched Operation Sindoor in the early hours of May 7. According to official announcements, Indian air force assets deployed surface-to-air missiles to destroy nine terrorist camps located within Pakistani territory and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, resulting in the deaths of numerous militants (Patil and Rawat 2025; Gupta 2025). Pakistan, in turn, condemned the strike, claiming that the Indian offensive had targeted residential areas and mosques, causing significant civilian casualties. Islamabad also asserted that its air defense systems had successfully downed five Indian aircraft.

 

Tensions were further exacerbated on May 10 when India conducted missile and drone strikes targeting military and administrative installations near Rawalpindi, including the strategically significant Nur Khan airbase located close to the capital, Islamabad. Hours later, Pakistan retaliated by initiating Operation Bunyan-um-Marsoos, deploying fighter jets, missiles, and drones to strike Indian military assets, including BrahMos cruise missile facilities and S-400 air defense systems. The reciprocal strikes marked a dangerous escalation, as both countries resorted to direct attacks on each other’s military airfields and critical infrastructure. Casualties and material losses mounted rapidly.

 

This round of hostilities far surpassed the scale and intensity of India's military responses following the terrorist incidents of 2016 and 2019. The severity of the confrontation fueled heightened concerns about further escalation and, critically, the risk of nuclear use. Initially, the United States, previously renowned as a key mediator in South Asian, adopted a position of detachment. Vice President Vance publicly dismissed the conflict as “none of our business,” signaling a shift toward non-intervention. However, Pakistan’s convening of its National Security Council and its accompanying nuclear signaling prompted a reversal in Washington’s stance. Faced with the possibility of catastrophic escalation, the United States and other international actors had no choice but to re-engage diplomatically. As a result of external mediation, both India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire on May 10, thereby averting further immediate escalation. Similar to the post-crisis narrative in 2019, both sides proclaimed victory and attempted to frame the outcome as a strategic success. Nevertheless, the situation yet remains volatile, and the possibility of renewed confrontation cannot be discounted (Clary 2025).

 

This recent military confrontation also marked the first instance in which artificial intelligence-enabled drone systems were extensively employed in a conflict between India and Pakistan. The Indian Armed Forces utilized Israeli-imported IAI Searcher and Heron drones for reconnaissance purposes. Additionally, India deployed Israeli-made Harpy and Harop loitering munitions during its aerial strikes. Notably, Harop drones were reportedly used to target Pakistani military installations, while Harpy drones were employed in suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) operations. Collaborative drone systems developed jointly by India and Israel were also used in the early stages of the campaign to strike infrastructure linked to terrorist organizations.

 

Pakistan, in response, is believed to have launched hundreds of drones acquired from China and Türkiye, as well as those developed domestically or through joint ventures. These were reportedly deployed in coordinated swarms to maximize their impact. Given their ability to conduct precision strikes from a distance, minimize personnel risk, and present relatively lower escalation thresholds, drones are likely to become increasingly prominent in future India-Pakistan confrontations. However, their widespread use may exacerbate the stability-instability paradox, as the perception of lower political cost can paradoxically incentivize risk-taking behavior.

 

Moreover, how drones are deployed and how such deployments are interpreted by the adversary can significantly influence crisis dynamics. Far from offering a stabilizing influence, the pervasive use of drones may undermine escalation control. As such, reliance on unmanned systems in conflicts involving nuclear-armed states, particularly under the guise of reducing risk, may in fact precipitate unintended escalation (Haltiwanger 2025; Basrur 2025; Dass and Basit 2025).

 

Above all, there remains considerable concern that future military confrontations between India and Pakistan may recur at any time and, if they do, will likely escalate to higher rungs of the escalation ladder, potentially increasing the risk of both deliberate or inadvertent nuclear use. In this most recent episode, India sought to demonstrate its military superiority through forceful retaliation against Pakistan. According to Indian authorities, the operation successfully destroyed intended targets such as terrorist training camps and airbases used by the Pakistani military, while Pakistani counterattacks were largely neutralized by India’s air defense systems, including the S-400. However, India did not categorically deny Pakistan’s claim that five Indian fighter jets had been shot down, which is indicative of the usual discrepancies in wartime claims regarding operational outcomes.

 

Following the ceasefire, Prime Minister Modi announced a “new normal,” declaring that any future terrorist attack would be attributed directly to Pakistan and that retaliatory strikes could legitimately target locations deep within Pakistani territory. This policy aims to impose significant costs on Pakistan by holding it accountable for terrorist activity, thereby deterring future attacks (Tarapore 2025; Vohra 2025a). Nevertheless, as evidenced by the retaliatory operations of 2016 and 2019, which failed to deter subsequent attacks, many analysts remain skeptical that the latest round of military action will have a meaningful impact on preventing future incidents of terrorism.

 

Prime Minister Modi also declared that India would not succumb to nuclear blackmail in response to Pakistan’s convening of the National Command Authority (NCA) during the crisis and its accompanying nuclear signaling. He emphasized that India would carry out any necessary military action regardless of such threats. This stance, however, may represent a perilous precedent. Should similar circumstances arise in the future, India’s resolve to conduct retaliatory strikes at an even higher threshold could bring it dangerously close to Pakistan’s nuclear use threshold. Both countries emerged from the conflict convinced of their own strategic success, which could further embolden their willingness to escalate in future crises. With each side increasingly confident in its ability to manage escalation and deter the other, the likelihood of even more forceful military engagements than those witnessed in May 2025 becomes significantly greater.

 

Of particular concern is that despite the high rung of the escalation ladder reached during this conflict, characterized by the extensive use of advanced weapon systems, the confrontation was contained well before a full-scale ground war unfolded. This outcome may foster misplaced confidence and entrench both governments further into a commitment trap, wherein domestic political dynamics compel hardline leadership to respond to the next crisis with even greater force. As technological advancements continue to shorten the time required for weapon systems to reach their targets, and as ultranationalist media and public sentiment demand swift and decisive action, political leaders will face intensifying pressure to act rapidly. These conditions may severely undermine their capacity to maintain escalation control (Mallah 2025; Shah 2025; Tarapore 2025; Cervasio and Wheeler 2025; Singh 2025b).

 

Although Pakistan officially claimed military victory, it reportedly suffered considerable damage due to India’s exploitation of vulnerabilities in Pakistan’s quid pro quo plus doctrine. Consequently, there is a strong likelihood that Pakistan will seek to refine and reinforce this doctrine in anticipation of future contingencies (Syed 2025).

 

Beyond the magnitude of military losses, Pakistan assessed its performance during the crisis as politically and socially advantageous, asserting that it had secured meaningful gains by demonstrating steadfast resistance against a militarily superior adversary. Despite enduring profound political fragmentation, economic hardship severe enough to necessitate International Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance, and pervasive domestic unrest driven by terrorism, separatist violence, and insecurity, the confrontation with India temporarily galvanized public sentiment. This surge in national unity reinforced the authority of Chief of Army Staff General Munir, who rose to prominence as a central figure throughout the crisis. In recognition of his leadership, he was elevated to the rank of Field Marshal, marking the first time in Pakistan’s history that this title was conferred.

 

Many analysts have remarked that Pakistan’s strategic posture has grown more emboldened in the aftermath of the conflict (Jamal 2025a). The episode enabled the military to restore its public image and reassert its foundational role within the state, particularly among a population increasingly disenchanted with the political elite. According to post-ceasefire surveys, 96 percent of respondents believed that Pakistan had emerged victorious, while 93 percent expressed favorable views toward the military. These figures illustrate the dramatic resurgence of the army’s domestic legitimacy (Jamal 2025b).

 

General Munir, who had faced widespread criticism for invoking the ideological tenets of the “Two Nations Theory” just one week prior to the terrorist attack, provoked controversy by framing the incorporation of Indian-administered Kashmir into Pakistan as both historically and religiously justified. Unlike his more moderate predecessor, he directed the conflict with overt religio-nationalist overtones and mobilized these narratives to consolidate popular support. As a result, his leadership was perceived as both assertive and ideologically resonant (Vohra 2025b; Fair 2025).

 

Given these developments, it appears improbable that Pakistan’s military will abandon its asymmetric strategy involving proxy militant groups in response to Indian expectations. Rather, the institutional incentives and public endorsement accumulated during the recent crisis are likely to reinforce Pakistan’s continued reliance on irregular warfare as a central component of its deterrence posture.

 

III. Lessons for the Korean Peninsula from the India-Pakistan Rivalry

 

Drawing parallels between the nuclear trajectories of India and Pakistan and the current situation on the Korean Peninsula offers important insights for South Korea, particularly as the country grapples with growing public and strategic interest in acquiring its own nuclear deterrent. North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons and its ongoing qualitative and quantitative enhancement of missile capabilities render such comparative analysis especially pertinent.

 

South Korea must first engage in a critical examination of its objectives in acquiring nuclear weapons. This involves a rigorous assessment of the types of delivery systems required to achieve those objectives and the quantity of warheads necessary to support a credible deterrent. Equally important is the question of how to construct a robust nuclear command and control architecture capable of ensuring both operational reliability and civilian oversight.

 

The India–Pakistan case illustrates that the process of achieving strategic utility through nuclear acquisition entails a prolonged and arduous path. This includes not only the considerable time, financial costs, and technical challenges involved, but also the complex strategic risks and political obstacles that must be confronted.

 

Above all, the Indian and Pakistani experiences caution that nuclear weapons, while symbolically powerful and potentially stabilizing under certain conditions, can also engender heightened insecurity and strategic instability. For South Korea, the core lesson lies in evaluating whether nuclear acquisition would serve as a genuine security enhancer or merely exacerbate regional tensions and invite further proliferation risks.

 

1) The Path to Nuclear Armament

 

A fundamental question for South Korea is whether the objective of nuclear armament would be confined to deterring North Korea alone, or whether it would extend to encompass multiple adversaries, including China. The answer to this question has profound implications for the types of delivery systems required and the overall size of the warhead stockpile. In the case of Pakistan, the rationale for nuclear weapons was narrowly defined from the outset: deterring India. Although never formally declared, Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is widely understood to reflect a posture of credible minimum deterrence. Under this framework, Pakistani officials estimated that a stockpile of approximately 60 to 70 nuclear warheads would be sufficient to deter India effectively (Tasleem 2016).

 

India’s trajectory, by contrast, was shaped by a broader set of strategic calculations. The initial impetus for India’s nuclear program stemmed from its humiliating defeat in the 1962 border war with China, followed by China's successful nuclear test in 1964. Although U.S. diplomatic pressure played a significant role, China's nuclear emergence was also a critical factor behind India’s so-called “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974. During the 1980s and 1990s, India’s nuclear posture continued to evolve in response not only to its strategic rivalry with Pakistan, which featured several near-crisis episodes, but also to the latent threat posed by China.

 

In recent years, the intensification of border tensions and the escalation of strategic competition with Beijing have further accelerated India’s nuclear and conventional force modernization. This includes the development of long-range strategic missiles such as the Agni-5 and the establishment of Integrated Rocket Forces equipped with a diverse arsenal of advanced stand-off conventional missiles (Bommakanti 2023; Das 2024). A 2019 simulation study of an India–Pakistan nuclear conflict even anticipated that India, mindful of the possibility of a two-front confrontation, would withhold a significant portion of its nuclear arsenal from use against Pakistan in order to retain deterrence against China (Robock et al. 2019).

 

How many nuclear warheads would be sufficient for South Korea? Even if South Korea were to pursue a nuclear deterrent aimed solely at countering North Korea, it would likely require a stockpile of at least 50 warheads, which corresponds to current estimates of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal as of 2025 (Kristensen et al. 2025). If the scope of deterrence were to expand to include China, the required number would increase substantially. The critical challenge lies in the time, resources, and sustained effort necessary to reach such a threshold.

 

India and Pakistan, both of which are generally believed to have attained operational nuclear capabilities around the early 1990s, conducted reciprocal nuclear tests in May 1998. Despite incrementally expanding their arsenals in the years since—indeed, even when measured from the 1998 tests—it has taken over 27 years for each country to amass approximately 170 to 180 warheads by 2025 (Kristensen et al. 2025). This trajectory illustrates the protracted nature of nuclear force development, even under conditions of sustained political will and strategic urgency.

 

For South Korea, the timeline to achieve even a 50-warhead threshold could be considerable. The absence of domestic uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities, coupled with the challenge of securing sufficient fissile material, would pose significant technical and logistical barriers. Even under an accelerated and highly committed effort, the development of an indigenous nuclear arsenal would demand extensive time and resources.

 

One of the most pressing concerns for South Korea in the process of acquiring nuclear weapons is the heightened risk of preventive attacks or strategic coercion by neighboring adversaries, particularly during the period when its nuclear capabilities remain underdeveloped. This “window of vulnerability” could invite aggressive countermeasures from North Korea or China, both of which would be difficult to deter unilaterally (Dalton and Perkovich 2024).

 

Debs and Monteiro argue that even when a state possesses the technical and economic capacity, as well as strategic motivation, to pursue nuclear weapons, its success largely depends on its ability to overcome external interference. In this context, the support of allies plays a decisive role (Debs and Monteiro 2016, 37–45). It remains uncertain, however, whether the United States would be willing to assume the risks of shielding South Korea from Chinese or North Korean retaliation during its nuclear breakout phase.

 

Paradoxically, one of the primary motivations behind South Korea’s consideration of an independent nuclear deterrent stems from growing distrust in the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and persistent fears of abandonment. If nuclear armament were to render the alliance less essential in Seoul’s strategic calculus, it is unclear whether Washington would incur the costs and risks of defending a partner that appears to be shifting away from its security dependence (Dalton and Perkovich 2024).

 

2) Post-Nuclear and the Establishment of Command and Control

 

Even if South Korea were to overcome significant obstacles and successfully develop and deploy nuclear weapons, it remains unlikely that the Korean Peninsula would enter a stable balance of terror grounded in assured second-strike capability, akin to the Cold War-era U.S.–Soviet relationship. During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union possessed several thousand nuclear warheads, ensuring credible second-strike capabilities. Their vast geographic separation and absence of territorial disputes further contributed to strategic stability. Moreover, direct conflicts between the two superpowers were largely confined to peripheral regions and took the form of proxy wars, rather than existential confrontations.

 

In contrast, a nuclear-armed Korean Peninsula would more closely resemble the strategic environment of contemporary South Asia. Both the Korean Peninsula and the Indian subcontinent share a historical legacy of unified political entities that were divided in the aftermath of World War II. This has led to protracted border disputes and persistent confrontations over territorial sovereignty. In the South Asian context, nuclear weapons emerged as a central strategic variable beginning in the 1990s. Following their reciprocal nuclear tests in 1998, India and Pakistan formalized their nuclear status and gradually developed their respective doctrines, force postures, and command-and-control systems.

 

However, the recurrence of military crises has driven a reactive dynamic between the two, in which action prompts counteraction. This cyclical escalation has pushed both states toward increasingly offensive doctrines. As previously noted, in the years following the Kargil War and the 2001 Indian Parliament attack, India began to articulate the Cold Start doctrine, which envisioned rapid conventional strikes below the nuclear threshold. Pakistan responded by expanding its doctrine toward full-spectrum deterrence, including the development and deployment of the Nasr short-range tactical nuclear missile and the public articulation of a deliberately ambiguous yet low nuclear use threshold.

 

In response, India has considered revising its no-first-use policy and has invested in enhancing counterforce capabilities, despite its declaratory policy of assured retaliation. These developments have eroded crisis stability and strategic predictability between the two states, suggesting a continued deterioration of deterrence equilibrium.

 

Should South Korea choose to acquire nuclear weapons, a fundamental question arises regarding the type of nuclear doctrine, force posture, and command and control system it would need to establish and refine. Given the regional security environment and resource constraints, South Korea would likely adopt a doctrine of credible minimum deterrence, much like India and Pakistan.

 

Under such a doctrine, force posture becomes a critical concern. As with other nuclear-armed states possessing relatively small arsenals, South Korea would need to prioritize the survivability of its nuclear forces from the outset. This would entail not only increasing the number of warheads over time but also carefully selecting appropriate delivery platforms. In a geographically compressed theater such as the Korean Peninsula, where operational depth is severely limited and land-based ballistic missile systems are vulnerable due to their fixed deployments, the risk of preemptive attack is significantly heightened. To enhance second-strike capability and ensure survivability, the development of a submarine-based nuclear deterrent, such as submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), would likely become a strategic priority (Dalton and Perkovich 2024).

 

However, the development of a credible sea-based deterrent would require both considerable time and significant investment. In particular, maintaining a sufficient number of nuclear-powered submarines capable of carrying SLBMs poses a formidable challenge. Beyond logistical and technical constraints, such a posture would inevitably raise questions concerning the delegation of nuclear command authority. For a state with a limited arsenal, the emphasis may shift away from negative control, which ensures safety and preventing unauthorized launch, toward positive control, which guarantees that nuclear weapons can be effectively employed if deterrence fails. In the context of deterring North Korea, the pressure to demonstrate operational readiness and retaliatory certainty may lead to incentives for pre-delegation of launch authority to field commanders. Such a shift would, by design, increase the probability of nuclear use in a crisis or conflict scenario.

 

As North Korea already possesses a relatively large nuclear arsenal and South Korea would be pursuing a catch-up strategy, Seoul would be forced, at least for a considerable period, to rely on a small number of warheads in attempting to deter Pyongyang. Compounding this challenge is the fact that, in the event of conflict, North Korean nuclear missiles could reach key South Korean targets within minutes. As a result, South Korea’s limited arsenal would likely have to remain in a state of near-constant readiness that may implode by a hair trigger, potentially under a launch-on-warning (LOW) posture that requires extremely rapid decision-making and execution. States with small nuclear stockpiles are acutely vulnerable to the “use it or lose it” dilemma. This creates intense pressure on national command authorities and places extraordinary demands on the stability and reliability of command and control systems.

 

Given these constraints, South Korea may have little choice but to adopt an asymmetric escalation posture, particularly in the early phases of its nuclear development. This approach does not depend on parity in warhead numbers or a robust second-strike capability. Instead, it relies on the threat of early nuclear use in response to aggression, in order to signal resolve and deter further escalation. Although the precise nature of North Korea’s nuclear posture remains contested, many analysts argue that it too follows an asymmetric escalation model. If both states maintain offensive postures of this kind, the resulting deterrence environment would be highly unstable.

 

Until South Korea reaches a level of nuclear capability that it considers sufficient, crisis stability is likely to remain fragile. To uphold the credibility of its deterrent during this period, South Korea might feel compelled to adopt an ambiguous but low nuclear-use threshold. This would support a strategy of escalate-to-deescalate. However, such a posture would further erode strategic stability and significantly increase the likelihood of escalation during periods of tension.

 

3) The Stability-Instability Paradox

 

The concept of the stability-instability paradox, first articulated in the early to mid-1960s during the height of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear rivalry, describes a counterintuitive dynamic. When two opposing nuclear powers both possess credible second-strike capabilities, strategic-level stability may actually increase the likelihood of lower-level instability. In such circumstances, while the risk of full-scale war or nuclear exchange may be reduced, the probability of limited conflicts and recurring crises tends to rise.

 

South Asia has often been cited as a real-world example of this paradox. Shortly after both India and Pakistan acquired nuclear capabilities, the Kargil War erupted in 1999 following a Pakistani incursion. In the years that followed, multiple terrorist attacks were carried out by Pakistan-backed militant groups, yet none escalated into full-scale war. These incidents appeared to demonstrate how nuclear deterrence at the strategic level can coexist with persistent low-intensity confrontations.

 

More recently, however, India has responded to such provocations with escalating levels of retaliation, signaling a shift away from its prior posture of strategic restraint. In response to the 2016 terrorist attacks, India launched localized strikes using special operations forces. Following the 2019 attacks, the Indian Air Force conducted airstrikes within Pakistani territory. In 2025, India employed a wide array of standoff systems including cruise missiles and loitering munitions, escalating its response while refraining from deploying ground forces across the border. Although India avoided crossing certain escalation thresholds, its choice of weapon systems and target selection reflected a deliberate move up the escalation ladder (Stimson Center 2025). Statements from Prime Minister Modi and other senior officials conveyed strong confidence that such actions would not lead to further escalation. However, this confidence rests on a precarious assumption. Should the next crisis begin at a higher level of intensity than the 2025 incident, there is no guarantee that escalation can be effectively contained. Moreover, despite India’s more forceful responses, it remains unclear whether its efforts have succeeded in restoring deterrence. Pakistan, for its part, has emerged from recent confrontations with a heightened sense of confidence, further complicating any claim of strategic restoration on India’s part.

 

How might the stability–instability paradox manifest on the Korean Peninsula? Until now, the nuclear standoff on the peninsula has been defined by the confrontation between North Korea and the United States. In South Asia, the United States plays the role of a powerful third party capable of mediating and restraining conflict between India and Pakistan. On the Korean Peninsula, however, the United States is itself a direct participant in the nuclear confrontation. As such, clear instances of the stability–instability paradox have been difficult to identify in the Korean context. While North Korea's missile tests and cyber operations are certainly provocative, the type of "instability" typically envisioned in the paradox refers to kinetic actions that cause casualties. From this perspective, the Korean Peninsula has not been a region where the paradox has been strongly evident (Kim Taehyung 2024, 30–35).

 

However, this assessment may change significantly if South Korea becomes a direct nuclear adversary to North Korea. In contrast to India, which must divide its military capabilities to account for both Pakistan and China and thus maintains near parity with Pakistan in their shared border regions, South Korea holds a significant conventional superiority over North Korea. Due to this asymmetry, in the event of military conflict, North Korea would likely suffer disproportionately greater damage.

 

In the event of retaliatory strikes against North Korean provocations, South Korea may attempt to respond from a relatively high rung on the escalation ladder, as India has done. However, unlike South Asia, where the stability–instability paradox is mutually implemented between two states with comparable nuclear capabilities, South Korea, with significantly weaker nuclear forces, may find it difficult to carry out retaliatory actions beyond a low threshold against a North Korea armed with numerous tactical nuclear weapons. In this context, whether the South Korea–United States relationship remains an alliance after South Korea’s nuclear acquisition becomes a critical factor. North Korea is currently developing and deploying various types and forms of tactical nuclear weapon systems (Kim Taehyung and Kim Bomi 2023, 13–18).

 

It is also necessary to approach with caution the assumption that North Korea's relative inferiority in conventional military capabilities would lead it to exercise greater restraint. As with the Pakistani military establishment, the North Korean leadership may hold a markedly different perception of concepts such as "victory and defeat" or whether a situation is "worth fighting for." This suggests that Pyongyang may be willing to incur considerable losses in order to act decisively, and may claim victory regardless of the actual scale of damage sustained.

 

For South Korea, the tolerance for such losses is far more limited. If North Korea were to violate the Northern Limit Line (NLL) and launch an attack on islands along the western coast, Seoul would be faced with difficult questions. How should it respond, and to what extent? If North Korea retaliates, how far is South Korea prepared to escalate militarily in return? These decisions cannot be based on willpower alone. They require careful and sober analysis of the broader context, including the risks of escalation and the constraints posed by both strategic and political considerations.

 

One of the most critical lessons to be drawn from the India–Pakistan nuclear rivalry, particularly in relation to the stability–instability paradox, is whether the possession of nuclear weapons has actually enhanced the security of either state. Did India and Pakistan, having overcome significant external and internal constraints, succeed in achieving the intended objectives of their nuclear programs? It is impossible to answer this question definitively, since counterfactual speculation—assessing how bilateral conflicts would have unfolded in the absence of nuclear weapons—remains inherently uncertain. Even among scholars, there is considerable debate as to whether the introduction of nuclear weapons has mitigated or exacerbated the frequency and intensity of conflicts between the two countries. Kapur (2007, 27) argues that the period from 1990 to 2002, following the acquisition of nuclear weapons, saw nearly four times as many crises and confrontations as the pre-nuclear period between 1972 and 1989. In contrast, Saira Khan (2005, 162–163) contends that between 1947 and 1986, India and Pakistan experienced three full-scale wars and seven major crises, while only four crises occurred between 1987 and 2004. She thus suggests that nuclearization contributed to war avoidance and greater crisis stability.

 

Despite earlier studies suggesting differing effects of nuclear weapons on conflict dynamics, the post-2000 period, especially the events discussed in previous sections, has seen numerous crises and military confrontations between India and Pakistan. Whether the absence of nuclear weapons would have led these incidents to escalate into full-scale war is an open and difficult question. What is evident, however, is that the possession of nuclear weapons has not prevented the recurrence of military clashes. During the April 2025 conflict, India demonstrated a willingness to employ advanced weapons systems in its retaliation, raising questions about whether the existence of a nuclear shadow facilitated this more aggressive posture.

 

Regardless of whether or not nuclear weapons were involved, armed disputes between the two states have occurred with frequency. Nuclear weapons have appeared largely ineffective in preventing the outbreak of such confrontations. This raises a fundamental question: if nuclear weapons cannot reliably prevent armed conflicts from occurring, is their possession still justified? In an asymmetric situation where only one side possesses nuclear capabilities, does the non-nuclear state automatically face unilateral coercion?

 

The Russia–Ukraine war is often cited in this context. Many argue that if Ukraine had not relinquished its nuclear arsenal in 1994 under the Budapest Memorandum, it might have deterred President Putin from launching the 2022 invasion. Even if a large-scale assault on Kyiv had been avoided, would Russia have refrained from initiating operations in the eastern regions? If such attacks had occurred, would a nuclear-armed Ukraine have considered employing nuclear weapons? More importantly, would the possibility of such use have served as an effective deterrent against Russian aggression?

 

Throughout the war, Russian leaders including President Putin have repeatedly signaled a willingness to use nuclear weapons. However, the nature of the conflict has been defined more by the creative, audacious, and persistent use of conventional forces than by nuclear posturing. NATO and Western responses, while shaped by nuclear considerations, have largely centered on conventional military assistance. Ukraine, in turn, has escalated its military operations without regard for Russian nuclear threats. In May 2025, Ukraine launched Operation Spider’s Web, deploying drones deep into Russian territory and successfully targeting several strategic air bases. These strikes reportedly destroyed a number of Russian strategic bombers capable of delivering nuclear payloads (Avey 2025). Although public pressure within Russia has mounted in favor of nuclear retaliation, the actual response has remained within the bounds of conventional military force (Lanversin 2025). These developments invite a sobering reassessment: in such circumstances, what is the actual role and utility of nuclear weapons?

 

Even after acquiring nuclear weapons, South Korea may find itself engaged in increasingly aggressive and high-intensity clashes with North Korea, as if the presence of nuclear arms had no stabilizing effect at all. As demonstrated in recent conflicts between India and Pakistan, as well as the Russia–Ukraine war, the widespread use of low-cost, effective, and escalation-resilient technologies such as drones has dramatically altered the dynamics of conflict. These systems are difficult to defend against and can be employed offensively at scale. In the case of South Asia, nuclear weapons have not eliminated instability; rather, they appear to have encouraged persistent low-level confrontations under the protection of strategic deterrence.

 

On the Korean Peninsula, aside from notable exceptions such as the 2010 Cheonan sinking and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, direct military confrontations have been relatively rare. However, the introduction of nuclear weapons could alter this equilibrium. Similar to South Asia, mutual nuclear armament may reduce the perceived likelihood of full-scale war or deliberate nuclear use. At the same time, it could usher in a period of frequent low-intensity conflicts that must be endured as a new normal. Each of these incidents would carry the risk of climbing the escalation ladder toward more dangerous thresholds.

 

This would bring the Korean Peninsula perilously close to a state of inadvertent escalation, where the unintended use of nuclear weapons becomes a real possibility. Even if South Korea were to respond decisively and militarily to North Korea’s provocations, the South Asian precedent suggests that such responses would not necessarily restore deterrence or put an end to further aggression. In other words, the hope that nuclear possession might establish a balance of terror that fosters uneasy but stable relations between the two Koreas is likely to remain aspirational at best.

 

While North Korea may be expected to engage in acts of coercion, including preventive strikes or low-level provocations, an equally plausible outcome is the emergence of a more aggressive and emboldened South Korea in the immediate aftermath of nuclear acquisition. As Horowitz (2009) and Bell (2021) have observed, newly nuclear-armed states often exhibit a marked increase in assertiveness and risk tolerance. This pattern raises a sobering question: what happens when both Koreas act assertively under the false belief that escalation can be controlled?

 

If both sides pursue aggressive policies while relying on their respective nuclear capabilities for strategic cover, the security environment on the Korean Peninsula could deteriorate significantly. Even if full-scale war remains unlikely, the recurrence of limited military clashes could become a defining feature of this new equilibrium. In such a scenario, the threshold for armed confrontation would be lower, and the frequency of conflict would likely increase.

 

Historically, North Korea has been framed as the aggressor, the predator, the party responsible for initiating unjustified provocations. South Korea, by contrast, has positioned itself as the defender, where it remained restrained, reactive, and burdened with absorbing the costs of conflict. But can South Korea, once it becomes a nuclear-armed state, truly remain in that role?

 

4) Relations with Neighboring States and Major Powers on the Korean Peninsula

 

In the case of India and Pakistan, the involvement of a third-party actor, specifically the United States, has played an essential role. Although U.S. actions have sometimes produced disappointment and a sense of betrayal, Washington’s engagement became particularly significant once both states had become nuclear powers. During moments of crisis, U.S. mediation has been decisive in alleviating tensions. In the most recent conflict of May 2025, the United States, despite its initially reserved posture, actively intervened following Pakistan’s nuclear signaling and was credited with successfully brokering a ceasefire. For Pakistan, the anticipation of U.S. involvement continues to serve as a catalytic factor in managing nuclear crises.

 

On the Korean Peninsula, however, the United States is not a neutral third party but rather a long-standing stakeholder in the conflict. Even if South Korea were to attain nuclear status and the alliance were to diminish in relevance, it would be difficult to expect the United States to act as a neutral mediator in a future inter-Korean crisis. It is also unlikely that any other country could realistically fulfill such a role. As previously noted, in the event of a nuclear crisis between the two Koreas, numerous variables would affect the extent to which the United States chooses to intervene. If North Korea perceives U.S. involvement as inevitable, it may become less deterred by escalation and could be emboldened to act even more provocatively.

 

Another factor that has contributed to the increasing complexity of the India–Pakistan nuclear rivalry is the evolving strategic competition among major powers in the region. India’s deepening ties with the United States, alongside Pakistan’s increasingly close relationship with China, have linked the bilateral conflict to the broader intensification of U.S.–China rivalry. Additionally, China’s rapid expansion of its nuclear capabilities has created strategic concerns not only for the United States but also for India, which has been compelled to recalibrate its security calculations accordingly.

 

There is a growing body of analysis suggesting that the South Asian nuclear landscape has evolved into a trilemma rather than a dyadic balance (FH Khan 2022; Sood 2022). Just as India’s original motivation for nuclear development stemmed not only from Pakistan but also from concerns regarding China, New Delhi now faces the formidable task of deterring both adversaries simultaneously. India’s current focus on expanding its nuclear capabilities is increasingly oriented toward countering China, which has been accelerating the qualitative enhancement of its own nuclear forces. However, even if India’s intentions are primarily directed toward Beijing, such developments may nonetheless provoke strong reactions from Pakistan.

 

One example is India’s newly established Integrated Rocket Forces (IRF), which are being developed to offset China’s conventional superiority in ballistic missile capabilities. The IRF is currently testing and preparing to deploy a range of short- and medium-range missile systems under its command. Among these, the BM-4 conventional ballistic missile bears a striking resemblance in both appearance and performance to the nuclear-capable Agni-P missile. Regardless of India’s stated intentions, the deployment of such systems is likely to heighten Pakistan’s threat perceptions and trigger reciprocal measures (Haider 2025).

 

If South Korea were to acquire nuclear weapons, the strategic dynamics of the Korean Peninsula could also evolve into a trilemma involving the two Koreas and China. Should the United States be included in this configuration, it would amount to a quadrilemma. Compared to a dyadic nuclear relationship, a trilemma or quadrilemma introduces significantly greater instability, particularly under conditions already marked by deep mistrust and high risk of misperception. Crisis stability would likely be further undermined, and a more intense arms race could ensue, leading to a rapid deterioration of the region’s overall strategic equilibrium.

 

There is already evidence that efforts by the United States and South Korea to strengthen deterrence against North Korea have provoked increasingly assertive responses from China. Should South Korea become an additional nuclear-armed actor within this volatile structure, the security environment in East Asia would likely grow even more precarious. Even without factoring in the nuclear power of Russia or the latent nuclear potential of Japan, a trilemma or quadrilemma would already be highly complex and unstable. As Wolfsthal, Kristensen, and Korda (2025) have lamented, the current interactions among the world’s nine nuclear-armed states have produced what they call a “nine-body problem,” or a strategic configuration so convoluted that neither clear explanation nor resolution appears feasible.

 

South Korean nuclearization could also trigger a similar response from Japan. Although Japan remains the only country to have experienced a nuclear attack and continues to harbor deep public antipathy toward nuclear weapons, it possesses both the fissile material and the technical infrastructure to develop nuclear arms within a short timeframe. A shift in the regional security environment could create political conditions that force such a decision. Would Japanese nuclear armament be advantageous to South Korea’s security? Could nuclear cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo function as a stabilizing mechanism in balancing against the North Korea–China (and possibly Russia) axis?

 

In such a scenario, we would be moving toward not just a five-body problem, but possibly a six-body problem. An increase in the number of nuclear-armed states and in the size of global arsenals would raise the likelihood of miscalculation, misperception, and unintended incidents. Far from enhancing stability, nuclear proliferation in this context could serve to erode the very foundations of crisis management and regional order.

 

IV. Conclusion

 

Given North Korea’s accelerating nuclear and missile capabilities and the growing uncertainty surrounding the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, it is understandable that interest in South Korea’s independent nuclear armament is increasing. However, this rising interest must be met with sober analysis. The belief that nuclear weapons will automatically enhance national security through a presumed balance of terror deserves careful scrutiny. The benefits and costs must be evaluated with clarity and precision.

 

This study has examined the India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry, a case with considerable relevance to the Korean Peninsula, in order to assess the potential strategic consequences of nuclearization. Even when limited to military-security considerations and setting aside economic, legal, and diplomatic constraints, the disadvantages appear to outweigh the prospective gains. While nuclear weapons might deter a large-scale conventional invasion by North Korea, as some argue was the case in South Asia, such deterrence may come at the cost of persistent tensions, recurring crises, and a greater likelihood of miscalculation or accidental escalation. Rather than resolving the security dilemma, nuclear acquisition could exacerbate it.

 

A number of South Asia specialists have warned that South Korea’s consideration of nuclear armament reflects similar risks (Akhtar 2023; O’Donnell 2023; J. Panda 2023; Westmyer and Joshi 2013). In a region marked by short operational depth and continuous military confrontation, mutual nuclear possession is more likely to produce instability than lasting deterrence. The probability that nuclear weapons would fulfill their intended strategic objectives appears exceedingly low.

 

A key lesson from the South Asian case study is the importance of establishing reliable confidence-building mechanisms, even in the absence of formal arms control. During the May 2025 incursion, the military communication channel between India and Pakistan’s Directors General of Military Operations reportedly helped facilitate de-escalation. In contrast, the accidental firing of an Indian BrahMos missile into Pakistani territory in 2022 demonstrated the dangers posed by inadequate crisis communication and the absence of institutional safeguards (Korda 2022). While hostility between adversaries may persist, the ability to prevent crises from escalating into direct conflict is essential.

 

In the Korean context, where even a rudimentary hotline remains nonexistent, the urgent need for basic confidence-building measures cannot be overstated. Efforts to strengthen crisis stability must begin at the foundational level. The Korean Peninsula already suffers from structural vulnerabilities in escalation control and crisis management (Bell and McDonald 2019). Any future attempt to bolster national security, whether through nuclear armament or other strategies, must proceed with a clear recognition of these structural limits. ■

 

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■ Tae-hyung KIM is Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Soongsil University.

 

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■ Translated and edited by Chaerin KIMResearch Assistant
    For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | crkim@eai.or.kr