I. China’s Reaction to Strengthened North Korea-Russia Cooperation

In June 2024, North Korea (DPRK) and Russia signed a Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership stipulating that, in the event of an armed invasion against one party, the other would swiftly provide military and other forms of assistance. China (PRC)’s official reaction to this development was principled and noncommittal. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) framed it as a matter of sovereignty between North Korea and Russia, maintaining a position of relative detachment.

On June 19, 2024, MFA spokesperson Lin Jian stated that DPRK and Russia are “friendly and close neighbors” whose “relevant high-level engagement is the bilateral arrangement between two sovereign states” (MFA 2024a). When asked during a June 20 press briefing about China’s stance on the establishment of the DPRK-Russia “comprehensive strategic partnership” and military alliance, its potential impact on peace in the Korean Peninsula and Eurasia, North Korea-Russia military cooperation, and Vladimir Putin’s request to amend UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea, Lin stated, “Cooperation between Russia and the DPRK is a matter between two sovereign states. I have no comment on it. Upholding peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and advancing the political settlement … serves the common interests of all parties.” He added that “blindly imposing sanctions and pressure will not solve the problem,” and that “political settlement is the only viable way out” (MFA 2024b). In response to questions about North Korean troop deployment to Russia, Lin remarked, “China does not have information on that” (MFA 2024c).

In contrast, at a commemorative event marking the 32nd anniversary of China-ROK diplomatic relations held in Beijing on October 22, former Chinese Ambassador to South Korea (ROK) Qiu Guohong described the possibility of North Korean troop deployments to Russia as “unlikely to be true,” adding that Beijing views North Korea-Russia military cooperation “very seriously” because it may provide an excuse for the United States to strengthen the ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral military cooperation (Kyunghyang Shinmun 2024). When compared to remarks made in 2019 by then-MFA spokesperson who positively assessed the strengthening of DPRK-Russia cooperation as contributing to regional peace and stability, recent Chinese positions seem more reserved and less optimistic.

Major Chinese media outlets largely refrained from publishing opinion pieces on the enhanced cooperation and bilateral treaty between North Korea and Russia, opting instead to feature reports from foreign media sources or present developments through straightforward, factual reporting. Even the Global Times (Huanqiu Shibao), known for its assertive and candid editorials, adopted a cautious tone regarding the development of North Korea-Russia relations. In 2023, it published a column criticizing the interpretation of strengthened DPRK-China-Russia cooperation as indicative of a bloc confrontation in Northeast Asia, claiming that China did not desire such a structure. The editorial argued that bilateral cooperation within the so-called “DPRK-China-Russia” bloc was unrelated to a new Cold War framework and instead suggested that the South Korea-U.S.-Japan trilateral cooperative bloc was responsible for fostering such a dynamic.

In short, China appears wary that closer North Korea-Russia ties may reinforce a “North Korea-China-Russia” bloc against the “ROK-U.S.-Japan” bloc, prompting Beijing to maintain a deliberately cautious stance.

II. Historical Cases of Strengthened North Korea-Russia Cooperation

Historically, there have been three notable periods of strengthened cooperation between the Soviet Union (USSR) and North Korea.

1. Post-World War II to the Mid-1950s

From the Soviet Union’s perspective, North Korea held significant geopolitical importance during this period, both as a means of managing its sphere of influence and as a strategic foothold for potential expansion into the Asia-Pacific region. For North Korea, Soviet support was crucial in establishing its government and aiding reconstruction efforts during and after the Korean War.

Despite this, however, bilateral cooperation could not be sustained beyond the 2nd Plenary Meeting of the 3rd Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea in 1956. During the “Sectarian Incidents” period, China and Soviet’s strategic interests diverged sharply. From China’s point of view, North Korea’s value as a buffer zone outweighed any need to intervene deeply in its internal affairs. Conversely, the USSR, with an eye toward regional expansion, sought to lease North Korean ports, which required the formation of a pro-Soviet faction within North Korea. Nevertheless, with Kim Il Sung’s consolidation of power and his subsequent emphasis on the Juche (self-reliance) ideology ultimately eroded the significance of DPRK-USSR cooperation.

2. The 1960s: Sino-Soviet Disputes and the Vietnam War

The second period of enhanced cooperation occurred during the overlapping Sino-Soviet disputes and the Vietnam War, which proved to be closely intertwined. From the early 1960s, Nikita Khrushchev sought to bring China under Soviet influence by supporting Ho Chi Minh’s offensive against South Vietnam, thereby provoking U.S. military intervention in Vietnam and involving China in a situation similar to the Korean War (Westad 2005). However, unlike the Korean War, U.S. forces did not cross the 17th parallel in Vietnam.

By the mid-1960s, escalating Sino-Soviet border disputes prompted the Soviet Union to strengthen ties with China’s neighbors, including Vietnam, North Korea, and India, as a means of pressuring China. During this period, the USSR provided North Korea with MiG-21 fighter jets, a decision motivated by the strategic consideration that North Korea’s proximity to Beijing could significantly burden China.

From North Korea’s perspective, its cooperation with the Soviet Union stemmed not only from its desire to acquire weapons but also from growing doubts about China’s support in the event of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula. A key issue in the Sino-Soviet dispute in 1966 was Mao Zedong’s opposition to the USSR’s approach to the Vietnam War. Soviet aid to Vietnam had to transit through China, creating a dilemma for Beijing: balancing its commitment to the communist bloc against the risk of exposing sensitive domestic matters to the Soviets. Additionally, Mao viewed Vietnam’s unification as contrary to China’s national interests, prompting him to withhold active support for Vietnam’s unification efforts. This Chinese stance fostered distrust in North Korea, ultimately driving it to deepen ties with the USSR. However, aside from this period, Soviet support for North Korea remained largely constrained.

3. The 1980s: Reagan Administration’s Anti-Soviet Containment Policy

The Reagan administration’s comprehensive containment strategy against the Soviet marked the third period of intensified DPRK-USSR cooperation. Reviving a hardline approach aimed at the Soviet Union’s collapse, the administration drove a significant deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations between 1983 and 1986. This period was characterized by an accelerated arms race and initiatives such as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), designed to counter Soviet expansion.

In response to the hawkish policies, the Soviet Union sought to bolster its sphere of influence by strengthening relations with North Korea (Garthoff 1994), providing aircrafts like the MiG-23, Su-25, and MiG-29. North Korea, in turn, allowed Soviet aircrafts to fly over its airspace.

Ⅲ. Recent DPRK-China-Russia Relations: DPRK-Russian Efforts to Mitigate Asymmetry with China

Russia’s diminished national power since the end of the Cold War has limited its ability and decreased the likelihood of actively pursuing power expansion in Northeast Asia. Moreover, it is implausible to suggest that the United States, deeply engaged in strategic competition with China, would pursue a containment policy against Russia aimed at its collapse. While the U.S. has identified both China and Russia as primary threats, its strategic priority remains focused on China. Consequently, applying the contexts of the first and third historical cases to understand the current DPRK-Russia relations would be inappropriate. However, the second case—Russia strengthening ties with China’s neighboring countries to bolster leverage against China—offers a valid framework for explaining the current intimacy between DPRK and Russia.

Beijing and Moscow, while valuing their mutual relationship, are carefully regulating the extent of their cooperation. Since the 2014 Crimea incident and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, which have brought severe sanctions against Russia, their economic interdependence—particularly in energy and raw materials—has deepened. Russia has rapidly become a key food supplier to China, transforming into a major food exporter since 2014. Additionally, Russia’s energy exports to China have increased nearly fivefold over the past decade (Zuenko 2024). From China’s perspective, diversifying sources of strategic materials aligns with its goal of establishing a stable strategic environment. However, it maintains a firm stance in price negotiations, ensuring its strategic upper hand in bilateral relations.

The prolonged war in Ukraine has exacerbated the strategic vacuum in the Far East, leading Russia to accept China’s broader involvement in regional development projects. Russia lacks both the population and resources necessary to independently develop and utilize the area’s vast natural wealth. Meanwhile, China, with its 1.4 billion people, has a pressing need for essential resources and raw materials, including water and energy, which are abundant in the region. Historically, Moscow sought to balance its collaboration with Beijing in this region with its relations with Seoul (Lukin and Pugacheva 2022). However, as the ROK strengthens its ties with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and adopts a more overtly anti-Russia stance, Russia has been forced to seek alternative partners.

In the case of North Korea, its nuclearization for its own needs (or what it perceives as its own needs) has changed the geopolitical nature of North Korea's role as a Chinese ‘buffer zone’ - that is its nuclearization has had the effect of completely blocking the traditional route of foreign aggression into China. This shift has undermined North Korea’s leverage over China, contrary to its goal of reducing dependence on major powers and bolstering regime stability. Instead, it has resulted in greater strategic isolation and economic dependence, potentially increasing China’s control over the DPRK in the long term. In an effort to counterbalance this dependence, Pyongyang has sought to deepen its ties with Russia.

Against this backdrop, there are three major evidence indicating DPRK and Russia’s efforts to mitigate asymmetry with China and strengthen their leverage:

1. The Announcement of DPRK-Russia Tumen River Estuary Bridge Construction Plan

The China-Russia summit in May 2024 resulted in a joint statement committing both parties to engage in “constructive dialogue” with North Korea regarding the navigation of Chinese vessels to the sea via the lower Tumen River. However, at the North Korea-Russia summit in June, an agreement was announced between DPRK Minister of Land and Environmental Protection and Russia’s Minister of Transport to construct a new bridge over the Tumen River (Lee 2024). This would connect North Korea’s Tumen River Station with Russia’s Khasan Station, serving as a supplement to the existing “Friendship Bridge.” The lower Tumen River remains unmaintained, with sediment accumulation, while the existing railroad bridge, standing at 7 meters, prevents the passage of large vessels. As such, the proposal to construct a new bridge can be seen as a coordinated effort by Pyongyang and Moscow to restrict Beijing’s maritime access to the East Sea.

The Tumen River issue represents a critical component of China’s grand strategy in the Asia-Pacific, reflecting its intent to alter the status quo and pursue its Arctic ambitions. This explains Beijing’s swift and sensitive reaction to North Korea and Russia’s bridge construction announcement. In response, China promptly built additional roads extending eastward from the Fangchuan (防川) observation platform and installed several ambiguous structures along these routes. Additionally, a new vessel facility was constructed just 800 meters from the observation platform (VOA 2024). The Tumen River estuary serves as a key indicator of DPRK-China-Russia trilateral partnership, while the recent bridge construction announcement highlights North Korea-Russia bilateral efforts to secure leverage and negotiation power vis-à-vis China.

2. Putin’s Diplomatic Maneuvers

Russia’s recent diplomatic efforts bear similarities to its strategies in the 1960s to counterbalance China by strengthening ties with neighboring countries. Following the June summit with Kim Jong Un, Putin traveled to Vietnam for a summit with its president. During the Cold War, Vietnam, facing strategic isolation after its invasion of Cambodia, heavily depended on the Soviet Union. Today, it continues to rely on Russian military equipment and partners with Russian oil companies in South China Sea exploration. While maintaining friendly relations with Ukraine, Vietnam has consistently abstained from supporting UN resolutions sanctioning Russia over the war in Ukraine. This approach underscores Hanoi’s strategy to maximize its strategic flexibility between the U.S. and China, while leveraging its partnership with Moscow to gain an upper hand in its relations with Beijing.

Following his visit to Vietnam, Putin invited Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Russia for a joint summit in July. India, a longstanding importer of Russian arms since the Soviet era, has become a major buyer of Russian crude oil since the outbreak of war in Ukraine, further strengthening economic ties. This increased energy trade has propelled bilateral trade volumes to $65 billion, a 76% year-on-year surge. While India publicly calls for an end to the war, it has consistently abstained from UN resolutions condemning Russia’s actions. Amid ongoing territorial disputes in the Himalayas and competition with Beijing for influence in the Indian Ocean, India regards its relationship with Russia as a vital component of its broader strategy to counterbalance China.

3. Leaked Russian Confidential Military Documents (2024)

Confidential documents leaked in 2024 disclosed Russia’s criteria for nuclear weapon deployment, tactical nuclear weapons training scenarios simulating early-stage conflicts with major powers, as well as war scenarios and naval training plans developed between 2008 and 2014 (Seddon and Cook 2024). A particularly notable aspect is the scenario involving a potential Chinese invasion. Despite the agreement between Russia and China since 2001 on the No First Use policy and the strengthening of their bilateral relations, Moscow appears to have consistently conducted military exercises in preparation for a possible conflict with Beijing. Its nuclear strategy in such contingencies adheres to an “escalate to de-escalate” approach, employing tactical nuclear weapons with the objective of achieving an early termination of conflicts. The scenario specifically outlines the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a Chinese invasion or significant damage to Russia’s critical tactical assets. Particularly, if China were to deploy additional large-scale military forces, the scenario stipulates that Russia could counter the Chinese advance through a nuclear strike.

Whether these documents were released intentionally or not remains unclear; however, they carry significant implications for Russia’s relationship with China. By revealing the locations of Russian nuclear arsenals deployed near the border, including in the Far East, Moscow signals a warning against any potential attempts by Beijing to exploit the strategic vacuum in the region. This not only underscores Russia’s view of nuclear weapons as vital components of its strategic defense but also highlights its profound concern over maintaining stability and control in the Eastern Siberia.

China is acutely aware that both the DPRK and Russia are strengthening their bilateral relations in an effort to mitigate their respective asymmetries in power relative to Beijing. As evidenced by China’s repeated responses, it is apprehensive about the potential for being labeled alongside the two states as “authoritarian regimes,” facing the pressure to assume a more active role, or being perceived as a threat that exacerbates regional tensions within the context of U.S.-China strategic competition. However, from a broader perspective, the strengthening of DPRK-Russia relations—characterized by their increasing opposition to the U.S.-led international order and the perceived weakening of U.S. influence—relatively balances China’s need to actively intervene or disrupt its relations with these actors. Ultimately, the relationships among North Korea, China, and Russia are sustained within this strategic framework.

Moreover, North Korea aims not only to expand its strategic space between the United States and China but also to establish an independent strategic position within the China-Russia dynamic. Notably, while there have been no in-person summits between North Korean and Chinese leaders since 2019, Kim Jong Un and Putin have convened for two summits in the past year. This suggests North Korea’s strategic prioritization of Russia as a means to reduce its reliance on China and assert greater autonomy within the framework of China-Russia relations.

Ⅳ. Prospect of North Korea-China-Russia Relations

At the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, Khrushchev introduced peaceful coexistence as the central policy toward the United States, creating friction with China. While this policy did not immediately enhance U.S.-Soviet relations, China grew apprehensive about its potential isolation in the U.S.-Soviet-China relationship (Party Literature Research Office 2013). Tensions further escalated with the Taiwan Strait crisis and China-India border clashes in the late 1950s, exposing divergent geopolitical perspectives between China and the USSR. In 1959, the Soviets halted their support for China’s nuclear weapons program, aiming to place China under its nuclear umbrella ahead of the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Despite these mounting tensions, China’s economic difficulties and the USSR’s diplomatic deadlock with the U.S. kept the Sino-Soviet relationship in a state of soft competition rather than outright confrontation. During this period, both nations competed for influence by providing aid to other communist states. China maintained significant support for North Korea, recognizing its important role in the founding of the Chinese Communist Party history and its importance as a buffer against U.S. forces stationed in South Korea.

This complex security environment provided North Korea with significant opportunities. By adopting a strategy of strategic ambiguity and refraining from aligning fully with either side in the Sino-Soviet rivalry, North Korea secured alliances with both parties in 1961. These asymmetric alliances allowed North Korea to navigate the “security-autonomy exchange” dilemma effectively, minimizing the risk of abandonment by either power. This approach enabled North Korea to carve out strategic space through a policy of equidistant diplomacy, leveraging its position to maintain autonomy while benefiting from the support of both allies.

However, the security environment North Korea faces today differs significantly from the past. Unlike earlier periods, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program was developed independently, driven by its own strategic priorities rather than at China’s behest. This has reinforced North Korea’s position as a buffer state for China on the Korean Peninsula, yet paradoxically diminished China’s incentive to provide substantial support. Moreover, North Korea’s attempts to break its strategic isolation—such as improving relations with South Korea and seeking normalization with the U.S. starting in 2019—ultimately faltered. North Korea has sought to lessen its dependence on China by strengthening ties with Russia. However, the structural depth of the Sino-Russian relationship, with China maintaining a strategic upper hand, complicates these efforts. Even if North Korea successfully improves its relations with Russia, it is unlikely to fundamentally address its dependency on China, as the strategic alignment between Beijing and Moscow limits Pyongyang’s ability to create meaningful space between the two powers.

Some argue that North Korea’s military support for Russia in the Russia-Ukraine war is primarily an economic decision aimed at clearing debts (Cha 2022). However, this rationale appears less persuasive given that Russia forgave 90% of North Korea’s debt in 2014, with the remaining 10% set for repayment in manageable installments over 20 years (Yonhap News 2015). While economic considerations cannot be entirely dismissed, they are unlikely to be the primary driver behind North Korea’s actions. Instead, North Korea may perceive strengthening ties with Russia as part of a broader strategic calculus. Recognizing the limited gains of improved relations with Russia alone, Pyongyang may view this partnership as a stepping stone in a larger effort to diversify its diplomatic and strategic options.

In other words, North Korea’s strategic decisions may have been influenced by its anticipation of potential changes in the international order, including the recalibration of U.S.-Russia relations and shifts in the dynamics among the U.S., China, and Russia, in connection with the exit strategy of the Russia-Ukraine war. North Korea likely pursued stronger ties with Russia as an initial step in linking the end phase of the Russia-Ukraine war to its strategic positioning. This is because the manner in which the Russia-Ukraine war concludes is likely to be perceived as an indicator of the future trajectory of U.S.-China competition and could potentially stimulate the emergence of an alternative international order. From North Korea's perspective, integration into the international economic system has thus far been synonymous with establishing relations with the United States. However, this scenario presents an opportunity for North Korea to explore integration into an alternative economic system, moving beyond the setbacks experienced in Hanoi.

North Korea, China, and Russia operate within a framework shaped by international politics and geopolitics, crafting strategies that involve leveraging or balancing one another, all while anchoring their actions around the central axis of U.S.-China rivalry. The structure of their interactions reveals a clear hierarchy: at the apex lies the strategic competition between the U.S. and China, followed by the Sino-Russian relationship in the secondary tier, and relations with North Korea at the base.

From this perspective, the likelihood of Russia providing advanced military support to North Korea warrants consideration. Historically, Russia has supplied advanced military technologies, such as fighter jets, to North Korea only during periods of heightened U.S.-Soviet rivalry. These instances occurred between 1966 and 1969 amid the Sino-Soviet conflict and in the mid-1980s during the U.S.-Soviet standoff—times when the Soviet Union perceived existential threats from either China or U.S. containment efforts. Outside of these critical junctures, the Soviet Union generally refrained from supplying advanced military equipment to North Korea.

Today, Russia lacks both the capacity and strategic motivation to use North Korea as a means of expanding its influence. With the U.S. prioritizing its strategic focus on China rather than Russia, it is improbable that Moscow would offer advanced weapons such as stealth fighter jets or submarines to North Korea in exchange for Pyongyang’s military aid in the current geopolitical context.

However, with the emerging North Korea-Russia “alliance” and continued military cooperation, the possibility of some form of military assistance from Russia cannot be ruled out. The extent of this support may fluctuate based on shifts in the security environment and Russia’s strategic calculations. As ROK-Russia relations continue to deteriorate, Russia may increasingly leverage North Korea as a counterweight against South Korea.

The significance of North Korea’s military support for Russia will largely depend on the trajectory of the war and broader changes in the geopolitical landscape. Nevertheless, the scale of military assistance North Korea can offer—such as tanks, ammunition, and manpower—is unlikely to equate to the advanced technologies Russia could provide, such as submarines, satellites, or stealth fighter jets. Moreover, it is difficult to argue that the current state of the war or Pyongyang’s contributions represent “existential benefits” for Moscow.

In fact, Russia has rarely sold tactical nuclear submarines to foreign countries, and even in such cases, it has been limited to geopolitically distant nations like India. These arrangements were typically sales with long-term rentals rather than outright sales. Even when Russia sold diesel submarines to China, key technologies like noise-reduction systems were excluded. Similarly, the 2014 agreement between Beijing and Moscow for the sale of the S-400 defense system was driven by the Crimean crisis and Russia’s transition plan to the more modern S-500 system in 2012(Mezey 2024).

While Pyongyang may express interest in advanced weapon systems that align with its asymmetric strategy, the likelihood of Russia—a fundamentally European power—providing nuclear weapons or advanced missile technologies remains low without a compelling backdrop of existential stakes for major powers. Russia might supply older systems, such as the S-300 defense system or fourth-generation fighter jets, which are generations behind current cutting-edge technologies. From North Korea’s perspective, however, developing the conventional forces using these systems would require significant expertise and substantial financial investment. In the short term, such acquisitions are unlikely to have a meaningful impact on altering the military balance with South Korea.

While economic cooperation between North Korea and Russia is possible, substantial synergy between the two is unlikely. North Korea’s primary exports, such as minerals and seafood, are unlikely to generate significant demand in Russia, and Russia is unlikely to prioritize trade with North Korea over providing unilateral aid. North Korea’s main contributions—labor and military supplies—may also lose relevance when the Russia-Ukraine war ends.

Ultimately, the North Korea-Russia relationship is more likely to strengthen not through tangible, case-by-case synergies but rather through their shared asymmetry in relations with China and their mutual strategic interests in preparing for an increasingly uncertain global order.

Ⅴ. Policy Implications for South Korea

Countries around the world, including North Korea, China, and Russia, continue to pursue their national interests within the framework of international politics and geopolitical dynamics shaped by U.S.-China strategic competition. For South Korea, it is essential to deepen its analysis of how major powers leverage the Korean Peninsula to serve their own objectives and to incorporate these insights into its foreign policy strategies. To prepare for an uncertain future, South Korea must proactively create the most favorable environment possible through flexible and adaptive thinking. At the same time, it should strengthen its logical frameworks and develop leverage to impose inefficiencies and consequences on others if their actions undermine South Korea’s interests, thereby safeguarding its strategic autonomy.

When developing strategies, it is essential to recognize the heightened risk of the Korean Peninsula being instrumentalized within the dynamics of great power politics, including the strategic exploitation of the North Korean nuclear issue. Additionally, it is crucial to understand that the geopolitical frontlines between the U.S. and China today differ significantly from those established during the Cold War.

Policy formulation should be grounded in these two considerations. Foremost, South Korea must prioritize restoring a state of soft balancing with neighboring countries through consistent and meaningful communication, including re-establishing channels of dialogue. This approach will enhance foreign policy leverage and ensure South Korea is better equipped to navigate an increasingly uncertain future. 

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■ Jaewoo JUN is an Associate Research Fellow at the Global Strategy Division of the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA).

■ Translated and edited by: Jisoo Park, Research Associate
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