TRANSCRIPT (Subtitles)

Hello, today, I would like to explain the U.S. defense strategy document, commonly referred to as the National Defense Strategy, published on January 23, 2026, local time. As you may be aware, this document is typically released every four years. Consequently, the previous iteration was published during the Biden administration in 2022. In fact, the overarching document preceding this is the National Security Strategy (NSS), which was published in November 2025, and serves as the foundational framework for its composition. Therefore, it outlines the defense priorities and strategic directions of the U.S. The version released this time is the unclassified version. Thus, the entire content is relatively brief, comprising approximately 20 pages. It is known that the classified version contains critical details, including confidential information. As some of you may know, I recorded a related video last year, particularly during the first half of the year. This is because, in March of last year, a 9-page interim national defense strategic guidance was obtained and published by the Washington Post, and in May of last year, the broad outlines of the overarching National Defense Strategy guidelines were established through U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth's speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue. To begin with the main takeaway, there is a substantial disparity between what was announced at that time and the contents released on the 23rd. In particular, the contents pertaining to China exhibit significant differences. I will now present my comprehensive analysis and interpretation.

Perspectives on the International Order

The document commences with a critique of the previous administration's security and defense policies. Of course, this is characteristic of President Trump himself, as well as documents produced by his administration, which persistently criticize the preceding government. It exhibits a tendency to criticize not merely the preceding Biden Democratic administration but also prior Republican administrations. In particular, it is voicing criticism against the security and defense policies of the previous administration.

While doing so, it criticizes the Rule-based International Order (RBO), which the U.S. has traditionally valued most highly. It criticizes this by stating that it only speaks of ambiguous concepts such as a rule-based international order. One of the most prominent characteristics of the Trump administration is its approach to the liberal international order—or what is also referred to as the rule-based international order—that the U.S. has been constructing, developing, and striving to maintain since 1945. The Trump administration has demonstrated a posture of heavily criticizing and undermining this order rather than respecting it anymore, and this can be seen as having formalized that stance once again. The rule-based international order encompasses elements such as free trade, respect for sovereignty, opposition to changing the status quo by force, the rule of law, and freedom of navigation, but have we not already witnessed much of this? Just yesterday (January 27, 2026), President Trump announced his intention to reinstate a 25% tariff on South Korea, causing South Korean society to become destabilized and fraught with tension; in this manner, I believe we have been observing since last year, following Trump's emergence, that he is roughly undermining fundamental free trade principles through mechanisms like tariffs. However, they state very officially and publicly that they will no longer discuss ambiguous concepts like a rule-based international order. After criticizing the previous administration earlier, the subsequent narrative asserts that Trump is different. In doing so, it mentions several things that will not be pursued, each of which holds highly significant implications. It employs the expression "Endless War," indicating a refusal to be drawn into endless wars or to engage in conflicts involving the deployment of ground troops. "We will engage only in a highly deliberate and calibrated manner where core national interests are at stake." This posture is also evident in their approach to Venezuela. It clearly implies conducting only operations where they can enter and guarantee victory; the third point asserts that they will not engage in practices like Regime Change. Even prior to assuming the presidency, Trump had voiced strong criticism regarding interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. He remarked, "That is a very expensive and foolish endeavor. Why go to another country and try to change its system? The very effort to convert an authoritarian or theocratic system into a democratic one is exceedingly foolish." This time as well, it was officially stated that they would not undertake anything akin to regime change. Among the subsequent points, it also discusses nation-building. Nation Building is also connected to regime change and was an attempt made in the case of Afghanistan. The same applies to Iraq. They state they will no longer engage in activities like nation-building. Instead, it asserts, "We will prioritize the pursuit of pragmatic and clear interests for the American people." This expression "pragmatic and clear interests" appears continuously moving forward. It is one of the core keywords permeating the entire text; and they state this is the core concept of what the Trump administration calls "peace through strength." While adding this, they clarify that it is not isolationism. Thus, they term it "flexible and practical realism." This is also one of the core keywords.

It appears they are establishing their ideological framework. From the realistic perspective discussed in academia, being flexible and practical does not appear to represent a specific faction of realism or anything similar. In any case, they have announced this time that they will refer to it as flexible and practical realism.

U.S. Priorities

The next point discussed demonstrates the assignment of priorities. The document is structured in this sequence, starting from the introduction, proceeding to the security environment, and finally to policy proposals, which in a way represents the priorities as perceived by the U.S. The first priority is the U.S. homeland and the Western Hemisphere, which has consistently appeared in the National Security Strategy (NSS) document produced in November of last year, indicating that the U.S. now encompasses the Western Hemisphere, South America, North America, and even Greenland. It states that the highest priority will be placed on the Western Hemisphere. The second is China. It states that it will deter China from completely dominating the Indo-Pacific region, while demonstrating a very different approach toward China. "This is not a confrontation with China." It articulates this stance. Therefore, while forging a relationship with China is important, it means they will not engage in confrontation or treat them as an adversary. Nevertheless, significant emphasis is put on the Indo-Pacific region. The third is relevant to South Korea. Increase the responsibilities and costs of allies; this is a continuous and highly critical assertion of the NDS (National Defense Strategy). Lastly, the fourth priority is to rebuild the U.S. defense industry. To reiterate the order, the U.S. homeland and the Western Hemisphere are the foremost priority. The second is the issue of China in the Indo-Pacific region, the third is the responsibilities and costs of allies, and the fourth is the rebuilding of the U.S. defense industry. After presenting this outline, a detailed explanation is provided in the introduction. I will briefly explain only the important points that require our attention.

The first point discusses the importance of defending the U.S. homeland and the Western Hemisphere, introducing the concept of the Golden Dome.

This refers to a missile defense system; Trump stated that by creating the Golden Dome, in his own words, he would build a defense network 100 times superior to Israel's defense network. He stated that the Golden Dome would be constructed to protect the U.S. homeland and the Western Hemisphere, serving as one mechanism, while the analogy of a spear and a shield is introduced, with the Golden Dome acting as the shield. As the spear, a robust and modern nuclear deterrence will be maintained. In other words, the modernization of nuclear weapons. This has been a highly significant initiative consistently pursued since the first term of the Trump administration. In reality, the reinforcement of the spear and the shield is directly related to our own security. This is because effectively securing the U.S. homeland primarily, and maintaining not only the shield known as the Golden Dome but also a powerful and modern nuclear deterrent, means that the U.S. capabilities concerning nuclear deterrence against North Korea can be significantly enhanced.

Consequently, the utility of North Korea's nuclear weapons may relatively diminish. Although the primary reason for the U.S. undertaking such measures was not explicitly disclosed, it is naturally aimed at checking China. The U.S. is responding to China's modernization, advancement, and mass production of nuclear weapons. I reiterate, but the utility of North Korea's nuclear weapons is bound to decrease. Furthermore, when discussing the Western Hemisphere region, it specifically identifies the areas where core interests lie. President Trump continuously asserts the intention to possess the Panama Canal, and the region referred to as the Gulf of Mexico, which they call the Gulf of America, as well as Greenland, are included. They designate the Panama Canal, the Gulf of America, and Greenland as core strategic bases of the American continent and state that U.S. military and commercial access will be guaranteed here. It reconfirms the extent of the importance being attached to this region. At the same time, all of this is referred to using the expression "the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine." This is known as the Donroe Doctrine, a doctrine encompassing both Monroe and Trump. The Monroe Doctrine was declared in the 19th century by President Monroe; because U.S. national power was not strong at the time, it proclaimed that the Americas were under the U.S. sphere of influence in order to deter European nations from exerting influence over the American continent. The term Donroe Doctrine implies that Trump is speaking from within that tradition. This was reaffirmed in the current NDS. Fundamentally, the expression "Corollary" translates into our language as means a conclusion or a natural consequence, meaning it is a conclusion that naturally follows from a certain principle or proposition. Thus, Trump's corollary signifies that "it naturally follows as a supplementary principle to the Monroe Doctrine." To interpret and explain this further, it is a sort of Trump-style interpretation that if U.S. interests are threatened in the Western Hemisphere, the U.S. possesses the right and obligation to take coercive measures, unequivocally including direct military means. Simply put, the explicit possibility of the U.S. utilizing force in the Western Hemisphere, was clearly incorporated into this strategic guidance.

The second point discusses China. Like a sub-title, it states that China will be deterred in the Indo-Pacific through strength rather than confrontation. This part is the most crucial, as it discusses China utilizing restrained language that is markedly different from before. "President Trump has pursued stable peace, fair trade, and a relationship with China based on mutual respect. To achieve these goals, he has also demonstrated a willingness to communicate directly with President Xi Jinping." It articulates such statements. This is quite different. The reason is that during Trump's first term, he referred to China as a "bankrupt communist state," and even regarding Xi Jinping—whom previous U.S. administrations addressed as 'President'—Trump argued that given Xi's actual role as the head of the Communist Party, the U.S. should explicitly refer to him as 'General Secretary' instead. If the previous stance highlighted China as a communist nation to that extent, there is no such rhetoric in the current NDS (National Defense Strategy), and it indicates an intention to ensure amicable relations with China. Alongside this, such expressions also appear. Our objective does not lie in dominating China. Nor does it lie in pressuring or humiliating China. Declaring that "the goal of the U.S. is simple," which is also considerably restrained language, it states the goal is to prevent anyone, including China, from dominating the U.S. or its allies in the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, there is a recurring expression. It asserts that achieving a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region to enable the enjoyment of a "Decent Peace" is the most core objective of deterring China. Therefore, taking it as a whole, it conveys a vastly different narrative. Just this past March, the interim national defense strategic guidance reported in the Washington Post referred to China as a Pacing Threat. Regarding the threat in the Taiwan Strait, it was referred to as a Pacing Scenario. Meaning that a Pacing Threat serves as a foundational or benchmark threat, thereby indicating it as the most critical threat, even utilizing the word "only." The position articulated at that time was that the threat from China constitutes the most vital threat to the U.S., and that to counter it, everything must be done, including military means, whereas now the tone has been significantly softened. The perspective and awareness regarding China, and the level of deterrence, have emerged in a much more restrained format compared to what was released in March or Pete Hegseth's remarks in May. It is an extension of the NSS (National Security Strategy) released last year. The NSS also did not label China as an enemy or a threat. At the same time, it states that China is a counterpart with whom negotiations are possible and peace can be achieved. It appears that the NDS (National Defense Strategy) has undergone substantial revisions by directly adopting that premise. It is reported that the NDS was completed around August of last year. Consequently, there were speculations that the NDS might be released then, but ultimately, it appears to have been postponed because it was deemed more appropriate to release it after the overarching NSS (National Security Strategy) guidelines were issued. It is highly probable that this NDS was also rewritten following the NSS. It is considerably different from the interim national defense strategic guidance in March or Hegseth's speech in May. Particularly concerning China, numerous differing details are included. Nonetheless, the U.S. guideline that has been consistently maintained since then until now, encompassing the NSS, is the strategic guideline. It is also a defense guideline. The First Island Chain. Some of you may already know, but South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan are included therein. Establishing a robust denial-based defense along the First Island Chain is articulated as the core of the U.S. defense strategy, especially in deterring China within the Indo-Pacific region. The intention is to prevent China from advancing downward in this direction. Concurrently, it notes that "the U.S. will not do this alone, but major regional allies and partners must assume greater roles." Put simply, it is a message directing South Korea and Japan to shoulder significantly more responsibility and costs regarding the Taiwan issue than they do presently. South Korea and Japan do not appear very transparently and explicitly in the current NDS. However, they do appear in the NSS. Hence, while there is a discrepancy in that aspect, it seems clear that it places high importance on the roles of South Korea and Japan. Another characteristic I consider the most significant in this NDS is the absence of any direct mention of Taiwan. Remarkably, despite multiple reviews and keyword searches, Taiwan is entirely absent from the text. There is no mention of the Taiwan Strait. Compared to the interim national defense strategic guidance from March, which emphasized the necessity of protecting Taiwan by citing the Taiwan Strait crisis as a Pacing Scenario and the "only baseline scenario" the U.S. must address, the fact that even the word Taiwan does not appear suggests that President Trump's perspectives have been incorporated. Since taking office, President Trump has faced numerous inquiries from journalists regarding "a crisis erupting in the Taiwan Strait"—ultimately referring to a scenario where China utilizes military force—yet he has never once stated that he would respond using military force. This constitutes a stark contrast to President Biden. President Biden has declared on at least three occasions that he would respond with all available means possessed by the U.S., including military force. For those involved in security, the Taiwan issue is exceptionally crucial, so it is often discussed at a level even higher than the nuclear threat from North Korea; thus, while the U.S. NDS addresses it indirectly via the aforementioned concept of the First Island Chain, the absence of any direct mention of the word “Taiwan” itself is an astonishing situation, yet one that can be comprehended. To be clear, understanding this rationale does not equate to endorsing it; rather, it reflects logical consistency within the Trump administration's strategic paradigm.

Demands for Increased Burden-Sharing by Allies

The third point is to expand the burden-sharing among U.S. allies and partner nations. This is a U.S. demand that we have adequately observed over the past year. It asserts that allied nations have historically been excessively dependent on the U.S. In particular, although explicit mentions of countries like South Korea or Japan do not appear regarding the Indo-Pacific region, it repeatedly emphasizes that allies and partners must make decisive contributions to deterring China and maintaining balance. Additionally, it discusses defense expenditures. Korea has also decided to increase its defense spending to 3.5% by 2035, and the same is true for NATO. For NATO, while it was nominally 5%, the actual defense expenditure was decided at 3.5% of the Gross Domestic Product. European nations arrived at this decision due to U.S. pressure, while in our case, it is not because of U.S. pressure but rather that, without external pressure, Korea’s defense spending is projected to rise to 3.5% by around 2035. Considering the annual growth rate of defense spending, based on 2025 figures, it is a situation where expenditures inevitably increase because we cannot reduce defense spending while exposed to the existential threat from North Korea, and defense personnel resources are also diminishing. However, the important point is that the NDS uses the expression that 3.5% is the new global standard. It dictates that allocating 3.5% for defense expenditures is something the U.S. will demand of all its allies moving forward. It asserts this to be the proper course. This naturally raises critical questions regarding Japan's future strategic posture. Japan stated it would align with 2%, and I believe an increase to 3.5% by Japan holds profound significance. Therefore, I believe there is a possibility that this will also impose a considerable amount of pressure on Japan concerning "how will Japan proceed." This concludes the section derived from the introduction. Moving forward, I will address the subsequent parts briefly, as much of the content is reiterated. Thirdly, the security environment is presented in the same sequence, and the details discussed previously regarding China are repeated. Mentions of Taiwan are completely absent from the security environment section as well. Following that is a discussion on Russia, fourth is Iran, and fifth is North Korea. Relatively speaking, compared to the topics covered earlier, it is brief, comprising only about four or five paragraphs.

South Korea and North Korea

It states that North Korea poses a military danger to the Republic of Korea and Japan, which are U.S. allies. However, it notes that a substantial portion of North Korea's large-scale conventional forces are obsolete and in a state of poor maintenance. Nevertheless, it cautions that South Korea must not relax its vigilance against the threat of a North Korean invasion. Regarding North Korea's missile forces, it assesses that "they are equipped with nuclear weapons in addition to conventional ones. Thus, they possess the capability to strike targets in Japan and South Korea." Furthermore, it asserts that North Korea's nuclear forces are increasingly acquiring the capability to threaten the U.S. mainland. This is a crucial distinction; it does not definitively state that North Korea has already attained the capability to strike the U.S. homeland. It states they are acquiring the capability to pose a threat. Yet, simultaneously, it characterizes such a North Korean threat as a clear and present danger to the U.S. homeland. To reiterate, the North Korean nuclear threat against South Korea & Japan also taking shape against the U.S. I will explain this in comparison to the 2022 NDS. First, the prioritization of threat perception has shifted. In 2022, China and Russia were the utmost strategic challenges, followed by North Korea. However, in the 2026 NDS, North Korea's sequence has been relatively downgraded, falling behind China, Russia, and Iran. Regarding the deterrence role, the U.S.-led Extended Deterrence was emphasized in the 2022 NDS, but there is no mention of extended deterrence whatsoever in the current NDS. It posits that South Korea plays a leading role while the U.S. provides limited support; of course, explicit discussion on nuclear matters is omitted, though Elbridge Colby stated during a recent visit and speech that "(extended deterrence) concerning nuclear weapons is deemed important." He also made similar statements during a Senate hearing last March, and if you refer back to the first half of last year, you will find videos where I analyzed this aspect in detail. I believe it would be beneficial for your reference to view them. Elbridge Colby did state verbally during his visit to South Korea that "the U.S. will continue to provide extended deterrence concerning nuclear weapons." However, it was not included in the document. I consider this to be the divergence from 2022. Examining the subsequent content, it discusses the burden-sharing of allied nations. It underscores its importance and asserts that tolerating reliance will no longer be acceptable. While some intriguing expressions emerge here, it notes that, with some exceptions, certain U.S. allies are making sufficient investments. It acknowledges that they are expending on defense and fulfilling their roles, but voices criticism by stating, "With a few exceptions, many allies are cutting defense spending and investing in public welfare or other domestic programs." Yet, listening to the remarks Colby made previously regarding the exceptions, he mentioned three countries. Poland and Germany in Europe, and South Korea. During the Senate hearing in March of last year, he also cited South Korea, Poland, and Israel as nations adequately managing defense expenditures and fulfilling their roles. In the NDS, and particularly from Elbridge Colby's perspective, it appears accurate that South Korea is viewed as an "exemplary ally." In conjunction with this, mentions of South Korea appear again. "Since January 2025, we have been witnessing allied nations, particularly in Europe and South Korea, gradually expanding their roles." Thus, South Korea is mentioned. I believe it is inscribed in the NDS as well that South Korea is once again an "exemplary ally." What follows is a comprehensive emphasis on responsibilities and burdens, containing directives to "fulfill your role in the Indo-Pacific region." Towards the conclusion, there are explanations regarding how to proceed with this policy. There is a section titled Strategic Approach, which includes discussion regarding the Korean Peninsula. It is not written extensively, but to introduce it, "The Republic of Korea is critical but should deter North Korea based on limited U.S. support." This is continuously emphasized. This is not directed solely at South Korea but is addressed to all U.S. allies. It uses the phrase "critical but limited." It signifies that while the U.S. will support its allies in responding to threats, it will provide considerably limited support moving forward. Because of this, the expression "primary responsibility" for threats emerges, stating that the principal responsibility must be borne by the respective nation. For Europe, it references Russia, and states, "South Korea must bear the primary responsibility concerning the North Korean threat. And U.S. support will be limited." However, it affirms that South Korea possesses both the will and the capability to execute such a role. "Such a shift in burden-sharing aligns with the U.S. interests to adjust and modernize the U.S. force posture on the Korean Peninsula." This is the so-called alliance modernization.

Alliance Modernization and Its Implications

Although it uses the term “modernization,” it implies that, while not written explicitly here, ultimately, "The role of the USFK (United States Forces Korea), and the role of the U.S. within the ROK-U.S. alliance, will shift towards deterring China." This is something USFK Commander Xavier Brunson has stated on multiple occasions in public settings. For example, "The role of the USFK does not focus solely on defeating North Korea. To maintain peace through strength, we must occasionally move to other regions." He is referring to China. This is also linked to the transition of wartime operational control (OPCON). Among the remarks made by Colby is the following statement. Regarding OPCON transition, "We must approach it with a highly pragmatic perspective, and not an ideological one." He stated it "must be conducted in a responsible and measured way." It is difficult to ascertain precisely what this signifies. This is because Colby himself, just last year, was advocating for the necessity of an early OPCON transition. The rationale was that retaining South Korea's OPCON is not advantageous for deterring China. The underlying thought was that if OPCON is transferred to South Korea, South Korea would assume the responsibility for defending the Korean Peninsula, while the U.S. role in the USFK and the ROK-U.S. alliance could be expanded regionally. However, since the latter half of last year, the discourse emanating from Washington has shifted to a cautious stance regarding OPCON transition. In particular, Commander Xavier Brunson has been emphasizing the importance of a conditions-based OPCON transition. Of course, while I believe one of the underlying reasons for such statements includes the concern that his position as a four-star Army general might be undermined upon OPCON transition, there are multiple indications overall suggesting that U.S. policies and strategies have been somewhat modified. I believe this necessitates further observation moving forward. I will state the conclusion. This NDS presented a stance quite different from what was anticipated, particularly concerning China. Nevertheless, it remains indisputable that it emphasizes the responsibilities and costs of allies, including South Korea. It was a document that evoked a sense of burden, indicating that our responsibilities have expanded commensurately, and it reflected the U.S. policy directives. Thank you all for watching. ■

■ Won Gon PARK is the Chair of EAI Center for North Korea Studies and a Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ Translated and edited by: Sangjun LEE, EAI Research Associate; Inhwan OH, EAI Senior Research Fellow  
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