TRANSCRIPT (Subtitles)

Hello. Today, we will address the North Korean nuclear issue and inter-Korean relations, which are central to South Korea's security. At the recent UN General Assembly held every September, President Lee Jae Myung, Trump, and Xi Jinping all delivered speeches. Then, on September 22nd, at the Supreme People's Assembly, North Korea's Chairman Kim Jong Un detailed his policies toward South Korea and the United States. With the APEC summit scheduled from late October to early November, where the U.S. and Chinese leaders will meet, I believe the Korean Peninsula is likely to experience significant turbulence until then. Among these, today I would like to focus on discussing the Lee Jae Myung administration's North Korea policy, denuclearization policy, inter-Korean relations, and North Korea's stance on these matters. To date, both South Korea and the U.S. have yet to release official positions on their North Korea, denuclearization, and unification policies. On August 25th, President Lee Jae Myung shared several points discussed during the summit meeting with President Trump. These primarily concerned the denuclearization issue, conveying contents which President Lee had relayed to President Trump. Let us analyze this in greater detail.

ROK and U.S.: Different Perspectives on North Korea’s Nuclear Threat

President Lee Jae Myung emphasized three points. First, he mentioned North Korea's weapons capable of striking the U.S. mainland such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). He conveyed to President Trump that North Korea has nearly completed ICBM development. What this means is that “from the U.S. perspective, the likelihood of the mainland being threatened is very high, and since North Korea could soon achieve that capability, the U.S. should negotiate with North Korea quickly.” That's how it's being interpreted. The second point is that he told President Trump “North Korea can produce about 15 to 20 nuclear bombs annually and can proliferate bombs externally.” This is precisely the aspect the U.S. finds most sensitive. If nuclear materials fall into the hands of hostile forces, especially terrorist organizations, it poses an enormous threat, so the U.S. strives to prevent this thoroughly. Ultimately, it can be seen as telling President Trump that if left unchecked, North Korea will continue producing nuclear materials to make bombs, so this must be stopped. Third, bringing the previous points together, the crucial objective is halting North Korea's intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear production capabilities. Achieving this alone would yield significant security benefits. President Lee essentially said, “President Trump, you alone possess the capability and will to resolve this issue, so negotiate with North Korea quickly.” I have several concerns about this. While I believe President Trump clearly explained the reasons for negotiating with Kim Jong Un, two critical aspects challenging South Korea's security were omitted. South Korea faces a far more potent nuclear threat from North Korea, yet this was not mentioned. Furthermore, since South Korea lacks nuclear weapons, South Korea's nuclear deterrence relies entirely on the extended deterrence provided by the United States. The omission of commitments to Korea's defense and extended deterrence in his conversation with President Trump is of significant concern to me. While there is debate among experts regarding North Korea's actual capability to strike the U.S. mainland, it is clear that North Korea cannot easily acquire the capability to strike the U.S. mainland. After Trump's election on January 27th, he issued an executive order for an “Iron Dome for America,” later nicknamed the “Golden Dome,” which aims to dramatically strengthen the missile defense system capable of protecting the U.S. mainland. How will this strengthening be achieved? Fundamentally, it involves building next-generation missile defense and interception systems to counter threats from ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles, advanced cruise missiles, and other types. A far more robust defense system will be established, capable of detecting and destroying incoming missiles in advance, in all forms, including those launched from space. This will enable the U.S. to project very strong deterrence, particularly against North Korea. This is because the U.S. is not primarily engaged with North Korea, but with China. China is significantly advancing its nuclear capabilities, and its nuclear strategy doctrine itself is changing. China has stated its intent to achieve nuclear parity with the U.S. Consequently, the U.S. is substantially expanding its capabilities to defend its homeland against this threat. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, it is clear that the U.S. will significantly strengthen its ability to reliably intercept North Korea's nuclear threats—which still lack confirmed capability to strike the U.S. mainland with ICBMs—to a level far exceeding the current baseline. The absence of dialogue and negotiations demonstrates that the U.S. possesses the capability to counter the military threats posed by North Korea. Even under these circumstances, the Trump administration is strengthening its capabilities in its second term. On the other hand, I'm very concerned about South Korea's actual situation. I believe May 2019 was a critical juncture, when North Korea began developing the KN-23, often called the North Korean version of the Iskander missile. With a range of about 690 km, it naturally covers the entire Korean Peninsula. It's a missile capable of carrying low-yield nuclear or tactical nuclear warheads. This missile is being used extensively in the Russia-Ukraine War. According to international intelligence, while its accuracy was initially poor that it often missed its target by over 2 km, it later demonstrated a considerable level of precision. A May 2025 U.S. Congressional investigation report concluded that North Korea has sufficiently tested the Iskander KN-23 missile on the Russia-Ukraine battlefield and deployed it operationally, judging it capable of attacking South Korea. To summarize: while the threat to the U.S. mainland is a possibility, the threat to South Korea is a real, present danger. Regardless of whether President Trump meets Kim Jong Un or engages in dialogue, the most crucial factor throughout this entire process is South Korea's security. Unfortunately, this issue was not discussed, and I have significant concerns about this. Furthermore, negotiations must have clear objectives and a defined subject matter. Giving meaning to the mere act of meeting is not the way to improve our security.

Three-Step Initiative to Denuclearization and the Issue of Freezing

Second, the government is discussing a three-step initiative to denuclearization. However, these vocabularies keep changing. Initially, they spoke of “freeze, reduction, and dismantlement.” The term “freeze” was used. Recently, in a Times interview, the terms changed to “stop, disarmament, and complete denuclearization.” Then, in the recent UN speech, the terms reverted back to “stop, reduction, and dismantlement.” What concerns me here is that the what is referred to as “freeze” and “stop” are fundamentally different concepts. I mention this because the Presidential Security Advisor Wi Sung-lak stated regarding the terminology, “The term ‘stop’ is a more accurate expression. The crucial point is how we verify this from now on.” However, when the international community uses the term “denuclearization,” the vocabulary generally used is “freeze.” “Freeze” is not merely declarative. When a state developing or possessing nuclear weapons declares it will “freeze” its nuclear and missile capabilities, it must specifically identify the exact locations, facilities, and weapon systems involved. Verification must follow. This verification requires an internationally credible third party. The concept of “stop” however, is ambiguous. This is because it is not terminology formally used in denuclearization. For example, if North Korea simply declares one day: “We stop the production of ICBMs and nuclear materials,” that alone would suffice. If North Korea just makes a declaration, how can we verify whether they are actually doing it or not? President Lee Jae Myung mentioned this in his Times interview. The part that worries me most is that he said even just a “stop” or “halt” has sufficient meaning, so corresponding measures could be provided. If there is a genuine “freeze,” facilities will be identified, verification conducted, and then corresponding measures will take place. However, if we take measures based solely on a North Korean declaration without any verification, that itself is a serious problem. If we proceed in that direction, it inevitably becomes a process of effectively recognizing North Korea as a de facto nuclear power. Even the UN Institute for Disarmament Research uses the official terms: “freeze and verify.” The word “stop” does not appear. The 1994 Agreed Framework at Geneva also uses the term “freeze.” Because these are areas posing significant security threats to us, I believe precise concepts and terminology must be strictly adhered to. Finally, I'd like to add one more point. The so-called E.N.D. stands for: E, Exchange, meaning interaction. N is for Normalization, meaning the normalization of relations. D is for Denuclearization. I believe our government did well in announcing E.N.D. within the broader framework. Why was it good? Because denuclearization was included. Denuclearization must be included in some form. The current prevailing view in the U.S. is that the complete denuclearization of North Korea is impossible and unrealistic. Therefore, the dominant opinion now is that we shouldn't even bring up the term “denuclearization” itself. The South Korean government must firmly establish and consistently emphasize the goal of North Korea's denuclearization. If that goal is abandoned, North Korea effectively becomes a nuclear-armed state, leaving only military options rather than diplomatic or negotiation-based approaches. In that sense, I think it was very well done to include the term denuclearization. However, issues arise when examining the sequence of E.N.D. or delving into specific details. Looking at E.N.D. itself, it involves exchange, normalization of relations, and then denuclearization. We must recognize there is a sequence. After all, exchange must occur before relations can be normalized. Regarding this point, Director Wi Sung-lak stated during a briefing to reporters that this principle was emphasized in the 2018 Singapore Joint Statement between North Korea and the U.S. The three agreements reached in Singapore in 2018 are key here. First is improving U.S.-North Korea relations, second is the Korean Peninsula peace process—ultimately improving inter-Korean relations—and the third is denuclearization. Of course, the U.S. claims there is no specific order here. However, if you look at the Singapore agreement, it is written as 1, 2, 3, 4. In December 2018, North Korea stated its official position: their denuclearization is the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the preconditions are the improvement of U.S.-North Korea relations followed by the Korean Peninsula peace process. That is North Korea's position. Therefore, I do not find the South Korean government's position that these three elements are part of a single process without any inherent priority or sequence particularly persuasive. It means denuclearization is being delayed until the very end. While I don't insist that denuclearization must come first before dialogue, my argument is that there should be no hierarchical relationship between them.

Normalization of Relations and the “Two Hostile States Doctrine” 

This aspect is also a concern in terms of inter-Korean relations. I believe the English expression used in E.N.D, specifically the term “normalization of relations,” is problematic. In diplomatic circles, the term “normalization” is used precisely when two countries that have not formally established diplomatic relations do so. Currently, South Korea and North Korea have not formally established diplomatic relations. They are not in a relationship where both recognize each other as normal states. According to the 1991 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, inter-Korean relations are described as follows: “The South and the North recognize that their relationship is not one between separate countries, but a special relationship formed provisionally in the process of pursuing unification.” Article 3 of the Constitution clearly states, “The territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean Peninsula and its adjacent islands.” Therefore, we cannot view North Korea as an independent, sovereign state. The more decisive issue is that in December 2023, through the 8th Plenary Meeting of the 9th Central Committee, Kim Jong Un delivered the “two hostile states” doctrine. This doctrine of two states does not refer to two states coexisting on the Korean Peninsula, but rather to two hostile states where South Korea is the supreme enemy. That very position was reaffirmed in his speech at the Supreme People's Assembly on September 22nd. I will read Kim Jong Un's words verbatim. “We will never sit down with South Korea. We will not share anything with them. We will not deal with them in any way.” “The reality is that South Korea's ambition to collapse our system and regime, which wore the mask of conservatism while professing democracy, has never been at ease.” This is their policy line. Without a change in policy, the doctrine of two hostile states will persist even under the monolithic leadership system. Another concern is that the statements by Director Wi Sung-lac and Unification Minister Chung Dong-young appear to contradict each other. Director Wi Sung-lac stated that North Korea's claim of two hostile states is not recognized. Minister Chung Dong-young, however, said, “The North and South are de facto two states. They are already two states. They are two states under international law.” Different interpretations and voices are emerging within the government. In this situation, it is inevitable to raise the reasonable suspicion that this amounts to recognizing North Korea. North Korea has clearly rejected the phased denuclearization initiative mentioned earlier. They maintain that “the so-called three-step denuclearization involving stop and reduction amounts to disarmament, which is unacceptable.” This position continues to be expressed by North Korea. Regarding the United States, Kim Jong Un stated in his September 22 speech: “Personally, I still have good memories of the current U.S. President Trump.” A similar sentiment appeared in Kim Yo-jong's statement on July 29: “I do not wish to deny the fact that the personal relationship between our state leader and the current U.S. president is not bad.” This implies a willingness to meet. However, it's not just about meeting. Borrowing Kim Yo-jong's words, she called for a new way of thinking. Kim Jong Un also spoke at great length, but the core message was calling for a nuclear reduction negotiation, not denuclearization.

ROK-U.S. Coordination and North Korea's Denuclearization

To summarize and conclude, the South Korean government must first formalize its North Korea policy, unification policy, and denuclearization policy. The government must clearly articulate these concepts and, when necessary, produce explanatory materials to formally state our position. More crucial than this is consulting with the United States first. Despite facing an existential nuclear threat, aren't we only a mere participant in denuclearization negotiations? With the U.S. as the main actor? And as I mentioned, Kim Jong Un and Trump will meet. The denuclearization strategy must converge on complete denuclearization through coordination with the U.S. The U.S. has yet to release its official North Korea policy or denuclearization policy. President Trump has not spoken about this, but the official U.S. position is the complete denuclearization of North Korea. A trilateral meeting between the foreign ministers of South Korea, the U.S., and Japan took place recently. According to South Korea's official statement, the focus is on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. This must be aligned first. Only then can South Korea avoid being excluded from future U.S.-North Korea negotiations and ensure its position is reflected. North Korea is already attempting to completely bypass South Korea with “Korea passing.” The Trump administration is similar. Precisely at times like this, it is crucial that South Korea and the U.S. achieve thorough coordination to align their North Korea policies, unification policies, and above all, denuclearization policies, maintaining a unified stance. This is my sincere advice. I hope you will keep this firmly in mind and implement it. Thank you.

■ Won Gon PARK is the Chair of EAI Center for North Korea Studies and a Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ Translated and edited by: Sangjun LEE, EAI Research Associate 
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