TRANSCRIPT (Subtitles)

At this point, with Trump's second term beginning, I think it's necessary to revisit Trump's first term once again. This is because President Trump has mentioned several times that he had a good relationship with Chairman Kim Jong-un of North Korea and that Kim would welcome Trump's return. According to some reports, there's even a possibility that some level of communication has already taken place. While it may not happen immediately, it seems possible that negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea could resume as early as the latter half of this year or next year. 

When making a comprehensive judgment, revisiting what happened between the U.S. and North Korea from 2017 to 2020 during President Trump's term becomes a very important guideline for forecasting future U.S.-North Korea negotiations.

Also, one of the characteristics of the Trump administration's first term is that if we want to know exactly what happened between the U.S. and North Korea, there's something called the "30-year rule." That is, most classified documents issued or written by the government are reviewed and declassified after 30 years. For people majoring in diplomatic history or history, the Trump administration is quite unique among U.S. administrations when it comes to reconstructing what happened at that time after 30 years.

This is because, while of course more detailed information will be known for certain after 30 years, much of what happened was actually disclosed as the Trump administration's first term progressed. As you probably know, most of the high-ranking officials in the Trump administration were fired by Trump. When someone is fired or steps down from their position, they typically publish their memoirs after the administration ends. But in the case of many key figures in the Trump administration, they published their memoirs while Trump's first-term administration was still ongoing.

Also, as you probably know, journalists like Bob Woodward conducted direct interviews with Trump and had access to the White House, publishing very detailed information, the so-called "behind the scenes." So when all these materials are combined, while we cannot perfectly know how Trump made all these decisions, I think we can understand a significant portion. I've written many related papers and articles. 

Today, as the first part, I will talk about the first summit between the United States and North Korea that took place on June 12, 2018, the Singapore Agreement. If U.S.-North Korea summit meetings start again, there is a very high possibility that North Korea will bring up this Singapore Agreement. In that respect, I think it's important for U.S. to reexamine how this was drafted and what its contents mean.

Maximum Pressure and Engagement: Trump 1.0's North Korea Policy

Let's go back to 2017 first. Throughout 2017, the Korean Peninsula was in a very serious crisis. At that time, one of the questions I received most often both domestically and internationally was whether war would break out. It was a period when both North Korea and the Trump administration staged strong confrontation without backing down. At that time, the Trump administration talked about something called "maximum pressure and engagement" as a principle of North Korea policy, not just North Korea policy but foreign policy. This was applied to North Korea as well. Since North Korea was not responding to dialogue, a considerable amount of pressure was applied. However, concurrent engagement was also part of the Trump administration's North Korea policy in 2017.

First, let me talk about the "engagement." Because tensions were so high in 2017, I think many people missed whether the Trump administration made efforts to engage, but they did try to engage to a considerable extent. What they said was officially stated by the Trump administration as a policy principle. First, they would exclude military options from North Korea policy and resolve the North Korean nuclear issue through peaceful diplomatic means. This was announced several times as a very important principle. At that time, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson went a step further and announced specific "four nos," four things they wouldn't do.

What were these four things? First, they wouldn't seek North Korean regime change. Second, they wouldn't pursue the collapse of the North Korean regime. Third, they wouldn't accelerate efforts for Korean reunification. The last one is the most important. They wouldn't advance or march militarily north of the 38th parallel. These "four nos," regardless of whether they're genuine or not, are the key factors that North Korea always cites as threats to them. North Korea possesses a so-called "siege mentality," where they claim that they are always surrounded. This was best exemplified through these four security concerns. Secretary of State Tillerson, in effect, officially stated that they would not do any of these things. I think this was largely a measure for engagement.

This wasn't all they did. They applied maximum military pressure, particularly through shows of force. these military demonstrations, the Trump administration, including President Trump himself and high-ranking policy officials, issued continuous and extremely strong warnings to North Korea. A representative example is President Trump's "fire and fury" statement in August 2017. "North Korea would eventually face fire and fury." It was a very strong warning. Before that, in July 2017, Mike Pompeo, who later became Secretary of State but was CIA Director at the time, said, "The North Korean people would also want Kim Jong-un to disappear." This was stated in a public speech. This represented extremely strong rhetoric effectively calling for Kim Jong-un's removal.

In addition to this, on September 19, 2017, Trump said through a UN speech that to protect itself and its allies, the United States would have no choice but to "totally destroy" North Korea. This was extraordinarily provocative rhetoric. I believe this represented pressure applied at its absolute maximum intensity. The critical question here is how North Korea was interpreting this rhetoric. There are a few facts we can confirm about this as well.

It was September 2017. North Korea invited American journalists to the U.S. Studies Institute under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs located in Pyongyang. And the first question asked was from a person named Park Sung Il under the U.S. Studies Institute, who asked American journalists this question. Since these are all statements that appeared in the New York Times, I'll read them as they are. "Trump is either irrational or perhaps too smart. It's so difficult to figure out where he's going now, what he's doing, and what his next move will be." That's what he said. This actually reflected the concerns of Pyongyang and the North Korean government and regime. Trump was making such strong statements, and Trump's unpredictability, which we still see today, significantly put North Korea on edge. Additionally, among the demonstrations the United States had conducted on the Korean Peninsula, the maximum show of force took place.

It was November 11, 2017. Three U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups came to the East Sea and conducted joint exercises with South Korea. For the United States to operate three aircraft carrier strike groups means it's a force used when starting a war or opening hostilities. For example, when invading Iraq, they utilized three aircraft carrier strike groups. This can be seen as the maximum demonstration of force. In addition, large-scale combined exercises between South Korea and the U.S. called "Vigilant ACE" were also conducted. South Korean air force fighters, U.S. strategic bombers, and fighters gathered together for training. In particular, there is one of the U.S. strategic bombers, the B-1B, which continues to fly in even recently. It's a strategic bomber with significant combat capabilities. Usually, when a B-1B flies in, it comes toward the East Sea like this.

It comes to the East Sea and follows the south of the Military Demarcation Line and then exits through the West Sea. But this is bound to make North Korea very tense because of how it would operate during an actual operation. So it enters through the East Sea, follows the Military Demarcation Line, and since Pyongyang is to the west, it would cross over like this and directly bomb Pyongyang. Regarding this, North Korea has neither the capability to detect and identify it nor any ability to intercept a B-1B. Therefore, B-1Bs were quite active at that time, and I believe this was a situation where North Korea could not help but feel a great threat.

I think one of the biggest factors that led Kim Jong-un of North Korea to participate in the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics, then make the Singapore Agreement in June as I mentioned, and then meet Trump two more times to start the so-called Korean Peninsula peace process was precisely this maximum pressure from the Trump administration. Let me give you another basis.

In response to the American strategy of maximum pressure, Kim Jong-un declared the completion of nuclear forces on November 29, 2017. At that time, he fired the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile and said this. "The outstanding achievements won by our party, state, and people last year have accomplished the historic cause of completing the state nuclear forces." We need to use the term "nuclear forces" carefully. If we simply use the expression "nuclear forces" as North Korea uses it, this would legitimize North Korea's nuclear weapons, so it's correct to use "nuclear capability." But what's important anyway is that they did not complete their nuclear capability. This can be seen even in the current situation.

If the Hwasong-15 had truly completed their nuclear capabilities, then consider what North Korea has launched since then. Most recently, in late October last year, they fired an intercontinental ballistic missile called the Hwasong-19, which they described as the culmination of their intercontinental ballistic missile development. So there was a period of seven years from 2017 to 2024, and during that time, there was still a need for the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Although they did fire the Hwasong-19, there are still various judgments about whether North Korea has truly acquired the capability to strike the U.S. mainland with an intercontinental ballistic missile.

There are still many unconfirmed facts, such as whether they have re-entry technology, whether they have launched at a normal angle, or whether they have secured the multiple warhead capability that North Korea claims. But the important thing is that the completion of nuclear capabilities declared by North Korea in November 2017 was not achieved. I think this demonstrates the pressure that North Korea was receiving from the Trump administration. To explain it in more detail, it's like this.

From Kim Jong-un's perspective, who felt a sense of crisis due to severe pressure and military demonstrations, he needed to create some justification to come to the dialogue table. North Korea always creates justification by claiming they have achieved something themselves. Here, they claimed they had achieved their nuclear capability. They were declaring that now, as an equal nuclear power, North Korea and the United States could start negotiations from an equal position. But I repeat, this was an announcement made in a situation where they had not actually completed their nuclear capability. I think this shows how significantly the U.S. pressure was working.

The 2018 Singapore Agreement: Washington's Complete Concession to North Korean Terms

Moving on to the next stage, I will talk about the first U.S.-North Korea summit, the Singapore summit, which took place on June 12, 2018. In fact, as a researcher, I have a lot of personal thoughts about the Singapore summit. I couldn't predict it at all. What I couldn't predict was the content of the joint statement. How I expected it was that this negotiation between the U.S. and North Korea would be very different from the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework or the 2005 September 19 Joint Statement, or several other agreements that followed, even the agreement on the last day of February 2012, in that it would truly aim for North Korea's denuclearization and would produce an agreement that could be achieved in a short period of time, with various conditions attached, such as a timeline.

The Singapore Agreement was on June 12, but the day before, on June 11, Secretary of State Pompeo voluntarily held a press conference in Singapore. And what he said was about the definition of denuclearization. He stated it clearly: "The only outcome the U.S. government can accept is complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization." In English, this is CVID. Nothing short of CVID would be acceptable. While defining denuclearization in these terms, he particularly emphasized the "V"—Verifiable—identifying verification as the most critical element of the entire framework.

There have been various agreements through the U.S.-North Korea and Six-Party Talks, but in the process of those agreements breaking down, the core issue was that North Korea ultimately did not accept verification. Of course, there were various complex factors such as the U.S. compensation measures, the U.S. hostile policy toward North Korea, but in the process, it is a fact that the agreement broke down because verification was rejected. Therefore, Pompeo clearly emphasized verification as very important and said that verification would definitely be achieved.

And regarding the timing of denuclearization, he said that the two leaders would definitely discuss a denuclearization timeline. At that time, there was talk about completing North Korea's denuclearization within one or two years. This is because North Korea always tries to extend the denuclearization timeline as much as possible. Using what's called a salami tactic, they slice up the process and drag it on and on, which has led to the assessment that the North Koreans have no actual intention to denuclearize. Since Pompeo and the Trump administration understood this, they said they would make a precise and detailed timeline to ensure that the timeline for the final goal of North Korea's denuclearization could be achieved in a short period.

And they said they would clearly write out the denuclearization plan, the measures North Korea should take, and the compensation conditions for what would be given to North Korea would be fundamentally different from the past and unique. This part has not precisely revealed yet, but it is true that they clearly had a denuclearization plan. So this denuclearization strategy genuinely targeted North Korea's nuclear dismantlement through an approach fundamentally distinct from all previous efforts.

I therefore had genuine optimism. I truly believed that this time would be different, that we would finally witness North Korea's complete denuclearization through a fundamentally new approach. But when the announcement finally came on June 12th, what emerged was a reality shockingly at odds with everything I had anticipated. To be a little personal, I didn't go to Singapore at the time and was in Korea. Still, many Korean journalists who were there reached out to me.

They asked me to evaluate what this joint statement meant. It came in English first. After reading it and talking with that journalist, my first reaction was, "Please give me the next document." The journalist was visibly stunned. "This is all," they said. So I said, "That can't be right." "I've been watching the Singapore summit all day and saw Trump and Kim Jong-un signing numerous documents." "This can't be the main document. There must be a more detailed document that elaborates on these points."

As a researcher, I should exclude emotions as much as possible when speaking, but when I heard that, I was so dumbfounded that my reaction was to say, "this is the scam of the century." 

I explained that this appeared to be nothing more than the United States transcribing North Korea's dictation, making it impossible to view as the result of any genuine negotiation. I say this because if you look at the joint statement, I initially read the joint statement in English. The content seemed strikingly familiar to me.

So I immediately checked North Korea's Rodong Sinmun newspaper, and in the June 11 issue, the day before, there was content about the "DPRK-U.S. Summit Meeting" in their terminology. It was about the upcoming North Korea-U.S. summit and had listed what North Korea wanted from the U.S. Essentially a wishlist of what they believed should be achieved. But remarkably, what appeared in the North Korean Rodong Sinmun and the June 12 Singapore agreement's joint statement were identical. Not a single word or order was different. This means the U.S. accepted 100% of what North Korea wanted. Let me show you.

The first item on the Joint Statement released on June 12 reads as "establish a new DPRK-U.S. relationship," and in the North Korean Rodong Sinmun, the first point is identically "establishing a new DPRK-U.S. relationship." Looking at the second point, the Singapore agreement states "lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula," and the June 11 North Korean Rodong Sinmun also states identically "permanent and durable peace-keeping mechanism." Then third, "complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," and in the Rodong Sinmun also, "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." And another problem is that they're numbered 1, 2, 3.

I couldn't understand this at all when I first saw it. I couldn't help but react like that. Let me elaborate a bit more on each point. What is problematic about this is, first, normally when making such agreements, numbers are not assigned. It's just 1. 1. 1. Numbering means assigning priority. So how to interpret this is that North Korea interpreted it this way. And the issue on hand is not even North Korea's denuclearization.

It puts the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula third, with the first being establishing a new DPRK-U.S. relationship, and the second being the progress of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, so there are two preconditions attached in front. For the third point, it's not 'North Korea's' denuclearization, I emphasize this, but rather that the denuclearization of the 'Korean Peninsula' may be 'considered.' It means the third point would only be fulfilled if the two preconditions are met first.

This is fundamentally at odds with Secretary Pompeo's definition of North Korean denuclearization that I just described. And second, as I mentioned, the fact that the order and expressions from the Rodong Sinmun were directly incorporated into the joint statement means North Korea's demands were accepted 100%. Third, which I'll discuss more later, is this concept of "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." It's not North Korea's denuclearization but the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula or, as North Korea calls it, the "Joseon Peninsula," which opens up a very different interpretation than the North Korean denuclearization we understand. From North Korea's perspective, they're talking about something completely different from what we understand as North Korea's denuclearization.

Therefore, I consider this kind of agreement a victory for North Korean diplomacy. Even afterward, North Korea continued to reference the Singapore Agreement until a few years ago (though not recently), emphasizing its importance and that it should be respected - precisely because it was an agreement constructed 100% in their favor.

Trump's First-Term Blunder: U.S. Diplomatic Failures and North Korea's Asymmetric Leverage

So why on earth did Trump make such an agreement? This has also been revealed. During the U.S.-North Korea negotiations, North Korea absolutely refused to make any concessions. So Secretary Pompeo reportedly rushed to President Trump. He explained that North Korea was not agreeing to anything at all and was not accepting any U.S. demands. Trump apparently became angry.

Trump reportedly said, "This kind of summit is just for show. So just sign a meaningless agreement, take photos, and declare victory." That's what he allegedly said. So that's how this came about, and another factor was that President Trump reportedly did no preparation whatsoever before the summit. Reports were continuously provided about what North Korea's concept of denuclearization meant and its implications, but President Trump allegedly didn't properly listen to those briefings.

So Trump just ordered that they issue an agreement in any form. Since he couldn't just go to Singapore and come back empty-handed, he ordered them to just announce some agreement. That's what he reportedly said. This was a major blunder for the United States. I believe the starting point for why President Trump stormed out of the negotiations at the Hanoi summit, which I'll show you later, lies right here. He himself realized it later. He came to recognize that this had been a seriously flawed agreement. That's why at the Hanoi summit, his approach was completely different. e consistently maintained U.S. demands, and when they weren't met, he broke off the talks and walked out.

Here's another shocking situation. I still vividly remember being extremely disappointed about the Singapore agreement when President Trump gathered foreign journalists, mostly American journalists, in Singapore and held a press conference for over an hour. American journalists persistently raised critical questions to President Trump, but he didn't flinch at all and talked for over an hour about how successful the Singapore agreement was.

But even more importantly, a truly shocking statement emerged here. President Trump referred to the South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises and strategic asset deployment as "expensive, provocative war games." He used the exact expression "expensive, provocative war game" in English. And he stated that he would suspend joint exercises and strategic asset deployments.

What made this so shocking was that U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis, U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson, and even his closest advisors had no prior knowledge of this, and the South Korean government was also completely unaware. What happened was that in all subsequent meetings with Trump, Kim Jong-un consistently raised issues about the joint military exercises. He undoubtedly raised this during the Singapore summit, and from President Trump's perspective, he accepted Kim Jong-un's characterization of these joint exercises, and since Trump is highly sensitive to costs and was always concerned about the expense of these exercises, these factors combined to produce the extremely negative perception expressed here.

What is deeply concerning is that President Trump still maintains these views about joint exercises and strategic asset deployment. This presents a significant challenge to South Korea's security. Let me summarize. What does the June 12 agreement really mean? I believe I've explained it thoroughly, and what I've just interpreted is immediately confirmed. How is it confirmed? After the Singapore agreement in June, Secretary Pompeo visited North Korea. This was his third visit to North Korea, from July 5 to 7. During this visit, he couldn't meet with Kim Jong-un.

Previously, he had always met with Kim Jong-un. This revealed that the Trump administration had fundamentally misunderstood the situation. The Singapore agreement had points 1 and 2, but Pompeo went to Pyongyang to discuss specific measures for North Korean denuclearization (point 3) while skipping points 1 and 2. Naturally, North Korea responded with, "What are you talking about?" They publicly criticized Pompeo, saying that in the three-point framework, points 1 and 2 must precede point 3, so why was he coming to discuss point 3 directly?

This was a painful moment for Secretary Pompeo. On July 7, after concluding his visit, he came to Osan Air Base in South Korea and held a brief press conference claiming "there was tremendous progress." Shortly thereafter, with some time difference, a statement from North Korea's Foreign Ministry spokesperson was released, which I'll quote verbatim. "Contrary to the spirit of the Singapore summit meeting and talks, the US side came up only with its unilateral and gangster-like demand for denuclearisation just calling for CVID, declaration and verification." This was a direct criticism of Secretary Pompeo and the Trump administration.

The explanation in the latter part was precisely what I mentioned earlier. DPRK-U.S. relations must improve, then a peace regime must be established, and only then can denuclearization measures be considered. This is how the Foreign Ministry spokesperson's statement came out. After that, what went wrong was... There's more to the story, but Pompeo himself reportedly didn't clearly understand why this happened. He reportedly consulted with officials from the U.S. State Department and those who had long experience with the North Korean nuclear issue. When he asked what was going on, they explained it to him, and only then did he understand. Even at that time, I believe the Trump administration was truly unprepared for these negotiations.

The Reality of "Korean Peninsula Denuclearization": North Korea's Framing of 'Denuclearization' vs. U.S. Assumptions

Finally, let me explain what problem exists with the "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" that appears as the third point in the Singapore agreement, which I briefly mentioned earlier. The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, or Joseon Peninsula as North Korea calls it, is very different from North Korea's denuclearization. Let me quote the North Korean announcement directly. 

On December 20, 2018, through a commentary in the Korean Central News Agency, North Korea very kindly and in detail explained what the "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" that they agreed to in the Singapore agreement means. I'll read it exactly as written: "The proper definition of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is completely eliminating the American nuclear threat to North Korea before eliminating our nuclear capability."

Isn't this self-explanatory? The "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" as North Korea defines it is not about eliminating the nuclear weapons that North Korea has developed and possesses, but rather about first eliminating the nuclear umbrella extended deterrence that the United States provides to South Korea. 

So, what meaning can the three points of the Singapore agreement possibly have? Is this really 'North Korean denuclearization'? Going further, regarding the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, North Korea issued a government spokesperson statement in July 2016 outlining five conditions for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

I won't list all the conditions, but let me start from the third one. The United States must guarantee that it will never again introduce nuclear strike means to the Korean Peninsula. This means: do not deploy strategic assets. Fourth, guarantee that nuclear weapons will not be used against our republic, and fifth, declare the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea who hold the right to use nuclear weapons. This is what North Korea means by "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."

Therefore, the "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" that appeared in the Singapore agreement is a completely different concept from the North Korean denuclearization that the Trump administration had in mind. I'll conclude here today. I've explained how the Trump administration approached the Singapore agreement and what meaning it has. 

Of course, after this, the Trump administration learned from its mistakes. And President Trump himself later established a clearer concept of North Korean denuclearization. However, the Singapore agreement itself represents a major failure of U.S. diplomacy. From another perspective, it can be judged as a victory for North Korean diplomacy. Thank you for watching.

■ Won Gon PARK is the Chair of EAI Center for North Korea Studies and a Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ Translated and edited by: Chaerin KIM, Research Associate 
    For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | crkim@eai.or.kr