TRANSCRIPT (Subtitles)

Today, we will discuss Elbridge Colby, the nominee for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, a topic that may already be of interest to some of you.

I will not focus on the individual story. Additionally, it should be noted that as of today, when I am filming, the nomination has not yet been confirmed. However, during the Committee on Armed Services hearing, scheduled to consider his nomination, Colby outlined his approach to leading the national defense strategy for the new administration.

He submitted a rather lengthy 76-page written response document, which outlines the national defense policy for the second Trump administration.This includes alliance strategies and discussions on North Korea, areas that Colby will play a key role in shaping. These topics are of great importance, so I will focus on addressing them.

Some of you may be wondering why it is important to understand Colby.

This is because Colby appears to be the best strategist in the second Trump administration. This differs from the previous Biden administration, which included Kurt Campbell, the deputy secretary of state. He gained prominence for leading key national security strategies during the four years of the Biden administration, including those related to the Indo-Pacific.

Aside from him, individuals such as Jake Sullivan, the former National Security Advisor, and Antony Blinken, the former Secretary of State, also played key roles in shaping foreign policy, offering a broad perspective and demonstrating significant capabilities in crafting strategic approaches. In contrast, as frequently analyzed, the second Trump administration has a limited number of key figures capable of demonstrating those strategic capabilities.

For instance, Michael Waltz, the current National Security Advisor, was previously a congressman; Pete Hegseth, the current Secretary of Defense, comes from a broadcasting background, and while Marco Rubio may offer more insight than others, he still lacks the experience necessary to shape national security strategies.

That is why Elbridge Colby, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, is gaining attention. Considering Elbridge Colby’s career, he receives a certain level of recognition as an expert in national defense policies.

While it may be challenging to position him on the same level as Kurt Campbell, it is important to note that he served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development from 2017 to 2018 during the first term of the Trump administration.

He also led the development of the United States’ 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). This achievement suggests that he possesses the capability to picture U.S. defense policies, having a considerable level of experience and established precedents. .

Additionally, he has authored several notable works. For instance, his 2013 book Strategic Stability: Contending Interpretations offers an analysis of differing perspectives on strategic stability. His 2021 publication, The Strategy of Denial, is likely more widely recognized. This work was officially translated in Korean and published in 2023. These publications have been gaining increasing attention and recognition.

Particularly following Colby’s appointment as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the strategies in his books are increasingly analyzed by policy circles and academic fields. Additionally, it is important to consider the responsibilities associated with the position. The role involves developing national defense strategies, as well as overseeing their drafting and presentation, including the NDS—in other words, shaping the strategic direction of U.S. defense policy. Other than that, they are responsible for developing strategies, emergency response and operational plans. Additionally, as we will discuss further later, aren't American forces deployed on the front lines across the globe to ensure global defense readiness?

Here, the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) is also included. Though the implementation may differ, formulating defense strategies and determining force allocation are key responsibilities of the Under Secretary of Defense. Assessing major threats to US national security and global stability, as well as alliance policies and strategies, is also a role of the Under Secretary of Defense. Therefore, what he discussed in the Senate Confirmation hearing and his written responses in the 76-page document are very important for us.

Colby’s “Strategy of Denial” and His Perceptions in International Affairs

Before diving into this, I'll discuss the main ideas from the book Colby wrote in 2021. The main point can be construed to reflect his very strong convictions or strategic objectives.

I'll discuss this more later, but one key idea from The Strategy of Denial is that the US should focus more on the China threat while also highlighting the role of allies and their burden sharing. However, it is not limited to South Korea. To counter China, America's key allies in the Indo-Pacific are Japan, Australia, India, along with Taiwan—though not a formal ally, as an important 'friend' and direct stakeholder. If conflict with China occurs in the Indo-Pacific, it would likely be in the Taiwan Strait, which is why America sees those countries as key partners.

South Korea is relatively undermentioned. One main reason is that South Korea primarily focuses on North Korea. While the US aims to contain China, South Korea has traditionally focused on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, I have noticed a shift in Colby’s attitude towards South Korea since 2021 when the book was published. Compared to 2021, based on his answers in the Senate Confirmation Hearing, which I'll discuss shortly, South Korea's strategic importance has increased. For over a year, due to the U.S. presidential election, many researchers, including those in the ROK government, have closely monitored who will handle national defense and security strategies during the Trump administration.

Colby was one of the emerging figures, with widespread speculation that he would play a key role in Trump 2.0, both through his recommendations and direct involvement. If Korean researchers went to D.C., Colby was a must-meet figure, and he also visited the ROK quite often.

Last April, I briefly saw him at a seminar, and I believe his general understanding of South Korea has grown from his frequent visits to South Korea. In other words, he understands South Korea's situation and challenges, having had the chance to see things from South Korea's perspective, particularly in terms of alliance frameworks. In conclusion, he hasn't shown an overly hostile stance toward the ROK.

Colby’s Perception of “America First” and “Peace through Strength”

From now on, I'll speak more specifically. The main issue Colby sees in national defense strategy is the “Lippmann Gap.” Lippmann refers to an actual person, Walter Lippmann, an American political commentator and journalist. “Gap” means a difference. In short, this concept refers to “a perilous mismatch between what we [the state] have been trying to achieve in the world, on the one hand, and the resources and political will we [the state] have to match those aspirations on the other.” To put it simply, a country has a goal it wants to achieve. 

To do this, it needs military, economic, and political support. However, currently, the gap between these resources and the U.S. goals remains substantial. This is the basic concept of Lippmann, and Colby uses it to diagnose America's current situation Colby argues that there is a big gap between what America wants to achieve internationally and the resources and political will to make it happen.

Therefore, he calls for aligning these factors. To describe the current global landscape, he uses the term “multi-front,” where we face multi-dimensional conflicts. For Colby, the U.S. has not been addressing these issues appropriately, as reflected in the Lippmann Gap. The biggest threat to this is China, followed by Iran, North Korea, and terrorism.

The analysis is that, while the U.S. faces multiple threats simultaneously, Washington has failed to respond to them appropriately. This is why Colby advocates for isolationism, where the U.S. stops intervening in global issues, a topic that will be discussed further. He explains that isolationism doesn't mean a complete withdrawal from world affairs, which aligns with the core of Trump's argument. That is, to solve this problem through the America First or Peace through Strength policy. For Colby, the key factor is China. He agrees with the 2018 and 2022 National Defense Strategy reports, which state that China is the greatest challenge for the U.S. Department of Defense.

2018 makes sense since it was during Trump 1.0, and the national defense strategies were crafted by Colby himself. However, 2022 is different because it was during the Biden administration. This shows a bipartisan consensus between Republicans and Democrats on their view of the “China threat.” As such, China has been recognized as the most urgent, important, and essential issue in American national defense strategy. Also, Colby speaks with great specificity, as shown by his statement that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) will start a war over Taiwan in 2027. Since the PLA may gain the ability to take over Taiwan, the most urgent scenario the DoD would face is preventing China from occupying Taiwan through force.

Here, the role of Taiwan needs to be highlighted. As it is the stakeholder. Since the Trump administration, there has been controversy over Taiwan. Many reporters directly asked the President if the U.S. feels responsible for defending Taiwan, but President Trump never gave a clear answer. The same applies to Colby. A number of Senators asked Colby this question during the Senate hearing, but he didn't provide an answer. In his written answer, he stresses the importance of preventing Taiwan's invasion and containing China, but he also states that Taiwan must strengthen its own military defense.

This suggests that Taiwan must take more steps for self-defense, and with this, it is important to achieve a strategy of denial, or denial defense. Colby doesn't say, “The U.S. will protect Taiwan.” As some of you may know, President Trump has proposed increasing Taiwan's defense spending to 10% of its GDP. In a broader sense, Colby seems to suggest the same: Taiwan is primarily responsible for its own defense and must develop much greater military capabilities than it currently has. Recently, TSMC announced a major investment in the U.S. While it's cautious to say, it's likely that the Trump administration would view such investments purely as economic transactions, and Taiwan should handle its own defense.

Another key factor is Russia. The ongoing war in Ukraine, with North Korea involved on the battlefield, will significantly impact the Korean Peninsula. Specifically, Trump’s recent stance on including Russia has raised concerns, challenging traditional security norms—especially regarding territorial integrity. Colby clearly states that Russia is “a serious threat to Eastern Europe and NATO.” He also calls for deterrence, while emphasizing that Europe must take responsibility for it. European allies must lead security assistance for Ukraine while preventing further Russian aggression. This issue was a major point of discussion during the Senate hearing, with Democratic lawmakers repeatedly pressing for answers on the subject.

Regarding who started the Ukraine war or bears the main responsibility, the U.S. government's initial stance under the Biden administration was clearly that it was an unlawful invasion by Russia. Senators asked the same questions, expecting the same answer from Colby. However, he responded, “I think there is a very delicate diplomatic process going on where the President is rightfully trying to resuscitate the peace process, and I don't think it would be appropriate for me to weigh in on the specific case.” In this way, he avoided addressing the topic.

Democrats believe that President Trump somewhat supports Putin, and want to hear an opposing view from Colby. However, he doesn’t provide one. Still, the general perception is that Russia poses a threat to national security, and therefore, there should be a clear policy for Europe to counter the threats from Russia. This makes Ukraine important again. Regarding Ukraine, Colby says that even after the war, it’s crucial for Ukraine to arm itself for self-defense. The key point is that when asked who would provide arms, he clearly states that the U.S. would no longer continue to do so.

I'll read out loud exactly what Colby stated, as I don't want my opinion to interfere with the text. This is what Colby wrote. “The United States has already contributed a very great deal to Ukraine’s defense, and the United States has urgent and major priorities elsewhere, especially the threat from China and securing our own territorial integrity.” The meaning is clear and understandable: The responsibility for Ukraine's protection lies with Europe. He’s stating that the U.S. has fulfilled its role in the defense spending. He also clarifies that Europe taking a leading role is the solution. This aligns with what we had already predicted, as Trump also mentioned: the Ukraine issue is Europe's problem, so NATO countries and European allies should take responsibility. Colby is echoing this same message.

What does NATO have to say about this? Some believe that since Trump is aligning with Russia in the peace talks, he may withdraw from NATO. They are concerned about a potential breach of Article 5 of the collective defense, although he does not mention this explicitly, instead stating that NATO is still important.

As I’ve mentioned before, Colby is echoing Trump’s criticisms of NATO. He believes that America’s substantial contributions to NATO are unfair. He argues that China should be the top priority in national defense strategy, with the U.S. dedicating all its state resources and defense posture to addressing this threat.

Therefore, the solution, according to Colby, is that Europe should take a larger role in defense. Given its strong economy, he advocates for a defense spending target of 5% of GDP. Europe should provide large-scale conventional forces independently. In summary, Colby’s stance on Europe and NATO largely mirrors what we’ve seen from the Trump administration thus far. As the Ukraine war draws to a close, the responsibility for Ukraine's protection lies with Europe, and they should also bear the associated costs. As for NATO, while it’s unlikely the U.S. will withdraw or deny its security commitments, it is clearly reaffirmed that the U.S. opposes taking a leading role in cost-sharing.

We’ll have a clearer picture once Trump’s security strategy is released, likely starting with the military strategy. However, it’s highly probable that these messages will be included.

“Demand for Greater Role from Allies” and ROK’s Contribution

We have several interesting points here, including how Colby views the Russia-China-Iran-DPRK cooperation. To this question, Colby answers that such cooperation increases the likelihood of a “multi-front war.” However, he states that the U.S. lacks the role and capacity to address such concurrent, multiregional conflicts. In making this point, he blames the allies for their lack of preparedness. This reaffirms that the role of allies will become more pronounced in conflict preparedness, rather than relying solely on the U.S.

He also discusses strategies for allies. They are interconnected. In a broader framework, Colby believes that allies are crucial components. Much like Trump, he states that “alliances [must be put] on a more realistic and businesslike foundation.” He points out that allies have not fulfilled their roles or shared defense costs to the same extent that the U.S. has for them. One thing he clearly states is that there has been a significant imbalance in the level of contribution among allies.

The reason I believe Colby’s understanding of the ROK improved last year is that he includes South Korea alongside countries like Israel and Poland as key contributors to the alliance framework. He states that there are exceptional countries such as Israel, Poland, and South Korea. Among the three countries that Colby recognizes as contributors to the alliance is South Korea, which is meaningful.

While Trump has criticized South Korea for not contributing enough, Colby, who would actually lead the defense strategy, has recognized South Korea's contribution. While I don't think Trump would overlook South Korea's burden-sharing issue, at least Colby, a key member of the core policy circle in Washington, understands that Seoul is making sufficient contributions. To sum up, Colby’s main point is that allies should take greater responsibility for their own defense.

If necessary, it seems like he might resort to coercion, based on what I’m sensing here. China might instigate war — he’s not saying he will respond by fighting back, but he will take multiple preemptive measures to prevent such conflicts from happening.

One way of doing that is expanding conflict preparedness in countries like Taiwan, essentially achieving peace through strength, by deterring adversaries with superior force. The exact expression delivered by him was: "Engaging with our potential adversaries to avoid unnecessary conflict, exploit wedges where possible, and enable a peace through strength outcome.” Some have speculated that Trump's efforts to improve relations with Russia may be part of a broader strategy to counter China. As you may know, China and Russia are close partners. It would be more advantageous for the U.S. to drive a wedge between them.

Here, it suggests that creating a beneficial rift—essentially, driving a wedge between China and Russia—could serve as a core mechanism within the military defense strategy.

Before we shift our focus to South Korea, let's briefly discuss Japan. Colby mentions two key points about Japan. The first point appears to be more of a requirement. South Korea and the U.S. form a U.S.-ROK combined force, which represents the highest level of institutionalized military cooperation. He states that there is a need to advance military cooperation with Japan, similar to the integrated model established between ROK and the U.S.

I’ll explain this in more detail later, but Japan is technically moving in that direction. They have already been in discussions with the U.S. about it, but with Colby joining, there is a possibility that the process will accelerate.

Second, the burden sharing issue. So far, Japan has committed to a 2% increase in defense spending until 2027. However, Colby argues that this is insufficient and that Japan should aim for a 3% increase instead.

The Korean Peninsula Policy: ROK Army for Peninsula Security, USFK for Countering China?

Finally, let's move on to the most anticipated issue: South Korea. The most important point here is how Colby discusses South Korea, including the North Korea issue, from a comprehensive perspective that incorporates strategy, alliances, and threat perception. There were specific questions regarding South Korea. I will address each question individually.

One of the questions asked was how the U.S. evaluates the value of the US-ROK alliance in terms of its national security interests. This is a crucial question. Since the Trump administration has been criticized for undermining the value of allies, Colby addresses the US-ROK alliance by stating, “The U.S.-ROK alliance is critical for U.S. interests, and a foundation stone of the U.S. geopolitical position in Asia.”

This is how Colby described the US-ROK alliance, and it aligns closely with his description of the US-Japan alliance, emphasizing its principal importance. Now, moving on to the second question.

How do you assess the threat posed by North Korea to regional and global security? This is, once again, an important question. His evaluation and perception of the threat can be interpreted as reflecting his view on the significance of the U.S.-ROK alliance. Colby answers, “North Korea poses a severe direct military threat to South Korea on multiple levels. It also poses a direct nuclear, missile, and unconventional threat to the United States, Japan, and other allies.” He acknowledges the significant threats posed by North Korea.

The third question pertains to the wartime operational control (OPCON) control, specifically whether it should be conditional, and if so, what conditions he would recommend. He adopts an ambivalent stance on this issue. I’ll read it for you. “I believe that President Trump’s vision of foreign policy involves empowering capable and willing allies like South Korea, and thus, I support efforts to bolster South Korea’s role in the alliance.”

This doesn’t really answer the question. The inquiry specifically asks whether the U.S. intends to transfer OPCON, and if so, what the conditions would be. However, his answer focuses on empowering allies like South Korea and enhancing their role within the alliance, rather than addressing the OPCON transfer and its associated conditions. So what I hear is, he ultimately supports the transfer of OPCON. By transferring wartime operational control, the U.S. would be able to leverage the USFK for countering China, while South Korea would assume primary responsibility for its own self-defense.

Colby’s views align closely with Trump’s stance on alliance policies. The transfer of wartime operational control would result in increased responsibilities for South Korea. Additionally, there have been some press releases regarding the ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral cooperation. Colby also addressed the trilateral cooperation, but he expressed an ambivalent stance on the matter.

Instead, he focused on missile defense. When asked about how the U.S. and its allies would defend against North Korea's missile capabilities, including through trilateral cooperation between the U.S., South Korea, and Japan, Colby primarily discussed the missile defense initiative, without addressing the significance of the trilateral cooperation itself.

To analyze this, I don't think he is denying the importance of trilateral cooperation itself. While trilateral cooperation is crucial, its core objective appears to be focused on the development and construction of a missile defense system. IAMD (Integrated Air and Missile Defense) refers to a comprehensive missile defense and attack system. The emphasis on "integrated" highlights that the system not only includes defensive capabilities but also incorporates offensive missile systems, creating a more robust and coordinated defense strategy. We don’t have a clear report on this yet, but based on my understanding, the U.S. is incorporating the IAMD system into its broader strategy. This is a focal point of attention and also a highly controversial aspect of the plan.

The key question is how effectively extended deterrence can prevent attacks from China and North Korea while also curbing further nuclear proliferation. There has been ongoing debate regarding whether Trump will protect South Korea, particularly regarding the maintenance or expansion of extended deterrence assurances.. I, too, often question this, but Colby provides a highly theoretical answer. He said, “We must ensure the strategic posture deterring and defending on our behalf and South Korea’s is credible and stout.”

That’s a tricky statement. "Credible and stout?” Based on credibility, extended deterrence should be strengthened, right? The term "stout" is also vague, as it lacks a clear subject like “extended deterrence,” so it suggests that there might be other ways to build credibility and robustness. I don’t think he answered the question very clearly on this one either.

To add one more point, Colby did not directly mention South Korea's role in containing China. However, he did mention allies such as Taiwan and Japan, urging them to dramatically strengthen their self-defense capabilities in order to counter China. In this regard, although he didn't explicitly mention the ROK, it seems he is indirectly suggesting that South Korea should also join. To implement Colby’s emphasis on “Denial defense,” it is a top priority for allies to develop and maintain sufficient military capabilities.

From this perspective, for South Korea to directly contribute to countering China—or to enable the U.S. military, including USFK and forward-deployed forces in the Indo-Pacific, to strengthen their role in deterring China—it is essential for South Korea to first enhance its defense capabilities against the North Korean threat. That seems clear.

It’s possible that even if Harris had been elected, changes would have occurred in similar ways. The role of the ROK-U.S. alliance and U.S. Forces Korea is no longer limited to deterring North Korea. Rather, the U.S. envisions South Korea taking the lead in responding to North Korea’s conventional warfare and attacks. To that end, the transfer of wartime OPCON is part of the U.S. plan.

There is a possibility that the USFK could be reorganized to better counter China in the Indo-Pacific region, and this shift could occur sooner than anticipated. While Colby does not explicitly state this, it is fairly evident that this strategy is part of his broader approach.

I have one or two additional points related to this, I’m not sure if you’ve heard of Trump’s "golden dome"—a dome made of gold. This refers to the next-generation missile defense system for the U.S. mainland. We are not entirely sure what this specifically entails, but Colby references it.

Golden dome. Ultimately, the U.S. will prioritize strengthening this system to protect its homeland from adversary missile attacks within a concentrated, short timeframe. What does this mean for the Korean Peninsula? As the U.S. strengthens its military defense capabilities, the utility of North Korea's ICBM development will decrease.

I will reiterate that, even though North Korea continues to develop its ICBMs, their effectiveness diminishes as the U.S. strengthens its defense capabilities. This is something that already began during Trump’s first administration. What Colby reaffirmed was the modernization of nuclear capabilities.

He argues that the U.S. must maintain sufficient nuclear capabilities to deter multiple nuclear-armed nations. This began during the first administration and included the development of low-yield nuclear weapons, also known as tactical nuclear weapons. The U.S. will enhance its nuclear capabilities through the modernization process. Clearly, the target is China. However, as the U.S. strengthens its nuclear deterrence in response to China, it is also naturally enhancing its deterrence capabilities against North Korea.

I believe these elements underpin the foundational principles of Colby’s perspectives on U.S. alliances, national security, and strategy. Although it has not been long since Trump's inauguration and many policies are still under revision, as we have explored Colby's perspectives today, the ideas he presented in his works and statements are likely to be reflected in the broader framework of Trump 2.0.

Therefore, based on the points I’ve discussed today, I believe South Korea must effectively address the military, security, and alliance policies that will gradually take shape under the Trump administration. Thank you for watching. ■

■ Won Gon PARK is the Chair of EAI Center for North Korea Studies and a Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ Translated and edited by: Sheewon Min, Research Associate 
    For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | swmin@eai.or.kr