TRANSCRIPT (Subtitles)

Today, we will discuss the outlook of North Korea’s external relations. As you may be aware, significant developments are expected this year.

Particularly, uncertainty has intensified with the second Trump administration commencing on January 20th. Trump 1.0 we experienced from 2016 to 2020 was marked by significant events, including the three unprecedented summits between Kim and Trump. Thus, many are interested in the future of DPRK-U.S. relations under Trump 2.0.

Moreover, it should be noted that there are now some situational changes compared to the past. The U.S.-China tension has intensified, while the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, with North Korean soldiers deployed to the battlefield, presents a stark contrast to the peace process on the Korean Peninsula that happened in 2018 and 2019.

I will offer a careful prediction of how the world will evolve in 2025 and how North Korea will respond to these changes, including the strategies it may employ.

Since the first party plenary meeting of 2020, North Korea has convened plenary meetings every year, assessing the previous year's performance and outlining plans for the upcoming year. The Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) is sometimes held in January, where Kim Jong Un delivers a speech. Since I haven’t watched this year’s SPA speech yet, I will exclude that part.

The plenary session held last year, with various circumstances, demonstrated a notable contrast to the one in November 2023. At that time, highly specific contents were delivered, with the famous “two hostile states” rhetoric introduced.

However, in the last December’s plenary meeting, there were considerably fewer discussions. It appears that Pyongyang intentionally adopted an ambiguous approach, refraining itself from specifying its position due to the sensitive political situations in Seoul.

Q. The Unchanged Worldview

Nevertheless, the most crucial point to note is that DPRK’s fundamental perspective towards the global order hasn’t changed. For instance, during the late last year’s plenary meeting, Kim made a speech regarding “independent forces vs. supremacy-seeking forces.”

Kim does not use the term a “New Cold War.” He first employed the term in 2021 and continued using it until 2022. However, Kim’s speeches no longer entail the word since 2023. This is because it has been repeatedly confirmed China feels discomfort about the term.

China, officially and unofficially, continues to assert its opposition to the concept of the New Cold War that seeks to divide the world into blocs. Such an opposition to this rhetoric has emerged as Biden, who pursued values-based diplomacy, sought to categorize China as a Communist state or an authoritarian regime.

With this China situation in mind, Kim does not explicitly use the Cold War analogy. However, it is evident that his ultimate goal is to establish “blocs” reminiscent of the Cold War. Such blocs would enable North Korea to forge a strong coalition with China, Russia, and even Iran, positioning itself as a key player within the alliance—rather than remaining isolated or labeled as a "rogue state." This is clearly why North Korea would desire to build blocs.

Thus, although the words were not explicitly delivered, Kim's speeches highlight the importance of bloc-based alignment. This leads to a question whether North Korea, even if not equivalent to the Cold War, would be able to build its own blocs in a way it desires. I would argue that it appears infeasible.

Q. Variables for DPRK's 2025 Foreign Relations (1) U.S.-China Tensions

The key to constructing this type of the new Cold War fundamentally lies in U.S.-China relations. Particularly given that Trump has already warned China of hardline actions and policies, I believe that U.S.-China relations during the Trump 2.0 will play a decisive role in determining whether new blocs will be formed.

Currently, U.S.-China relations can be predicted in one or two way(s). One is Trump's so-called Ideology War, which began at the end of his first administration. The then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo described China as a "bankrupt, totalitarian" state, referring to Xi as “General Secretary” rather than "President,” initiating an ideological conflict. This conflict unfolded, officially with decoupling, the U.S. effort to sever economic ties with China, including supply chains. Therefore, we can predict the ideology war may still be on the road with Trump returning to the office.

Another prediction concerns the significant U.S. trade deficit with China, a central issue Trump has emphasized since his first term. The trade imbalance resulted in tariff war, pressuring China to purchase a substantial amount of American products to mitigate the trade deficit. Trump approaches all matters as transactions, aiming to enhance the interests of the U.S.

However, we must be cautious about the extent, scope, and intensity of these changes before linking them to a sudden change in North Korea. Let me briefly mention North Korea's leadership system. A characteristic of DPRK’s system is its one-man rule. One of the phenomena of a one-man dictatorial regime is a significant level of alignment between the leader and the elite. Especially if an internal sudden change in North Korea were to occur, there must be an alternative to Kim Jong Un's regime. The elite must have alternative options beyond Kim Jong Un's supreme leadership available to them. In this regard, regardless of China being heavily targeted, ideological conflicts may be avoided if Beijing preserves some U.S. economic interests.

Trump is a businessman who calculates transactional costs, and this is why these two predictions have been addressed. Circumspectly, I weigh on the transactional-cost-based conflict analysis. This is because, regardless of its willingness, China must create a bloc, with North Korea and Russia included, enabling Pyongyang to operate more expansively. Otherwise, Washington and Beijing would manage to establish a more stable dynamic, making it difficult for North Korea to build the coalition it desires. It has been confirmed that the DPRK-China relations remain strained in many forms similar to the last two years.

Despite last year marking the 75th anniversary of DPRK-China ties, no substantial developments occurred. For example, compared to last June when Putin visited Pyongyang to commemorate the 75th anniversary of DPRK-Russia relations, the level of celebration between Beijing and Pyongyang remained notably subdued, reaffirming the uneasiness of their relations of their relations.

To China, North Korea’s sending troops to Ukraine presents a source of discomfort. China hopes to maintain strong relations with European countries to build a coalition that would be advantageous when competing with the U.S. Consequently, Beijing wants to distance itself from Pyongyang, which has threated the European security by being involved in the Ukraine war. Additionally, China harbors discomfort towards Kim's calls for New Cold War bloc-based alignment.

Albeit cautiously, it is likely that this year may also witness a continuation of such relations. Even though the Russia-Ukraine war seems to have some changes, significant shifts will not be made swiftly.

My first prediction is that while U.S.-China tensions will persist, they will make a more controlled, transactional form. Therefore, North Korea is unlikely to gain the space it hopes for through bloc formation.

Q. Variables for DPRK's 2025 Foreign Relations (2) Russia-Ukraine War

Second, the war in Ukraine. I believe this is very crucial. Given that North Korea deployed its soldiers, it is impossible to separate the Russia-Ukraine war from the Korean Peninsula.

One of the significant election pledges by the then-President-elect Trump was to end the war within 24 hours, a promise widely regarded as unrealistic. However, he is making significant efforts to address it as a central component of his foreign policy agenda.

Under this circumstance, the critical factors will be how and where North Korea would operate. I personally think ending the Russia-Ukraine war is highly unlikely, while a ceasefire or armistice may be possible.

Recently, discussions regarding a frozen conflict have become increasingly prevalent, with the possibility of an armistice based on the territories currently occupied by Russia and Ukraine. This does not mean that Ukraine is in a favorable position. Recent reports indicate that a significant portion of the Kursk region previously occupied by Ukraine has now been reclaimed by Russia with support from North Korea. However, I doubt whether DPRK has received the compensation it expected.

Let me discuss this in a broader context. It has been confirmed that Russia, as a nation, has exhibited a decline in its national power by initiating the war. It is likely that the defense budget will exceed 40% of its GDP this year. Given that Russia is already experiencing inflation rates above 9%, it is anticipated that the country will face even more severe inflation, presenting a domestic economic challenge.

Notably, Russia’s scale of economy, previous to the invasion of Ukraine, does not significantly differ from that of South Korea. The current defense budget, while much higher due to the war, is approximately twice that of South Korea, which is exceptional. Considering Russia's military and economic capabilities, it remains uncertain whether the country can remain as a global superpower.

Russia is undoubtedly a strong military power with its nuclear capabilities, but I doubt whether possessing nuclear weapons alone can qualify the country as an international superpower. Particularly, there is a significant likelihood that Russia will lose Europe, its largest economic partner and market, by the time the Ukraine war ends. Europe has already ceased using Russian products, including natural gas, for an extended period. Gazprom, the Russian state-owned company, accounts for a significant portion of the natural gas and crude oil produced in Russia's northern region. However, its overall revenue has decreased by more than 40%, with profits drastically dropping to 50% between 2020 and 2023. This suggests that Russia's economic capacity will likely to shrink even after the war, as its relationship with Europe is unlikely to be restored.

As President Obama asserted, I believe Russia will remain a regional power rather than a global superpower, and this trend is likely to accelerate. Then, the question is whether Pyongyang will achieve its objectives by closely collaborating with Moscow, sending young men to the battlefield, and whether Russia possesses the capacity to provide what North Korea seeks.

In particular, from DPRK's perspective, the most crucial asset to obtain from Russia is nuclear technologies, which I believe Pyongyang has yet to fully acquire.

As President Obama asserted, I believe Russia will remain a regional power rather than a global superpower, and this trend is likely to accelerate. Then, the question is whether Pyongyang will achieve its objectives by closely collaborating with Moscow, sending young men to the battlefield, and whether Russia possesses the capacity to provide what North Korea seeks. North Korea would seek technologies for ICBM reentry, MIRVs, and nuclear submarines, whch were the key components of its five-year defense development plan announced at the 8th Party Congress in 2021. Yet, I believe the likelihood of Russia providing them is very low. Since the Soviet era, Russia has not transferred such sensitive technologies to its allies.

As President Obama asserted, I believe Russia will remain a regional power rather than a global superpower, and this trend is likely to accelerate. Then, the question is whether Pyongyang will achieve its objectives by closely collaborating with Moscow, sending young men to the battlefield, and whether Russia possesses the capacity to provide what North Korea seeks. North Korea would seek technologies for ICBM reentry, MIRVs, and nuclear submarines, whch were the key components of its five-year defense development plan announced at the 8th Party Congress in 2021. Yet, I believe the likelihood of Russia providing them is very low. Since the Soviet era, Russia has not transferred such sensitive technologies to its allies.

Furthermore, with Trump seeking to end the Russia-Ukraine war, Russia providing such technology would enable North Korea to strike the U.S. mainland, posing a serious threat to the United States. In that case, the U.S. would have to antagonize Russia again, making such a choice highly unlikely for Putin.

So, what exactly can North Korea gain in return? It may receive crude oil, food, and fertilizer. Sending troops could also bring some cash. However, this this falls far short of the economic development or military success North Korea seeks.

Instead of escaping isolation, its ties with Russia are only exacerbating its global illegitimacy. This is why I believe Kim's alignment with Russia is a significant miscalculation.

Q. Variables for DPRK's 2025 Foreign Relations (3) DPRK-U.S. Relations

The last point is whether Trump will meet Kim Jong Un, in other words, the possibility of U.S.-DPRK negotiations. However, I firmly believe the meeting will not happen so easily. This is because the most pressing concerns for Trump are resolving the Ukraine war and the crisis in the Middle East. These issues, as reflected in the Republican Party Platform and reinforced by Trump's statements, clearly represent the top priorities of Trump 2.0.

In comparison, North Korea is not a top priority. However, the challenge now is that North Korea has been more deeply entangled in the Ukraine conflict than ever.

To end the war and reach a ceasefire, addressing DPRK troop deployment is essential. Therefore, as proposed during his election campaign, Trump may seek to restore dialogue channels.

Appointing Richard Grenell, the former U.S. ambassador to Germany, or Alex Wong, can be interpreted as an effort to maintain these dialogue channels. However, restoring those channels is fundamentally different from holding a summit, dedicating all his time, efforts, and political resources as he did in 2018.

I believe Trump will initially prioritize preventing North Korea from acting as an obstacle to resolving the war in Ukraine. Additionally, I find it less likely that Kim would willingly meet Trump. It is because Kim already experienced humiliation at the Hanoi Summit. Would he return to talks without preconditions, like he did in 2018?

I don't think so. North Korea has analyzed its miscalculations in 2018 and 2019, and likely concluded that its primary reason for the mistake was the insufficient advancement of its nuclear capabilities. This was addressed in the 2020 plenary meeting, declaring “frontal breakthrough.”

In this context, Pyongyang has made considerable efforts to advance its nuclear capabilities over the past few years, increasing the likelihood of establishing preconditions for dialogue this time.

One concern is that regarding precondition, North Korea always demands the suspension of ROK-U.S. joint military exercises and the deployment of strategic assets. The problem is, Trump also holds a very skeptical view on these issues. Since the 2018 U.S.-DPRK Singapore Summit, these topics have been addressed, as Trump, being sensitive to financial costs, views them costly and provocative. This may lead to a consensus between Washington and Pyongyang at the outset of their dialogues.

It is likely that a moratorium, or a "dual suspension" by China, could be set up at the beginning, with DPRK halting ICBM and nuclear tests in exchange for U.S. suspending joint military exercises and strategic asset deployments. This alone could present a significant challenge to the South Korean security.

Joint military exercises between the U.S. and ROK have changed in nature since the late last year. The deployment of strategic assets has also evolved into more concrete responses to DPRK’s nuclear capabilities. For the first time, the Ulchi Freedom Shield, which began last August, included training on how to respond to North Korea’s nuclear weapons, while addressing nuclear deterrence. Accordingly, the types of strategic assets deployed by the U.S. to ROK have changed.

These are considered as the two primary axes of the extended deterrence that the U.S. has provided South Korea. However, if discontinued, I am concerned that the credibility of the extended deterrence could be undermined.

I will stop here. However, it is important to note that even if we assume that dual suspension is achieved, reaching an agreement between the DPRK and the U.S. remains highly uncertain and challenging. Of course, it is not easy to denuclearize North Korea, but it should be noted that the situation today differs from that of 2018 and 2019.

For Trump, the situation varies due to the nuclear production capabilities of North Korea, such as uranium enrichment facilities alongside plutonium production capabilities. The conditions the U.S. demanded at that time included freezing, verifying, and dismantling these capabilities in exchange for lifting sanctions, which are no longer applicable. The minimum condition acceptable to Trump would be restricting DPRK’s capability to target the U.S. mainland, a capacity North Korea has consistently developed.

North Korea has completed the Hwasong-19, the ultimate form of an ICBM, last October, and the Hwasong-18, a solid-fuel ICBM believed to carry multiple warheads. These weapon systems did not exist in 2018 and 2019. Therefore, the optimal approach for Trump when negotiating with Kim would involve either completely eliminating the weapon systems capable of targeting the U.S. mainland or, at the very least, developing roadmaps to reduce them.

Conversely, DPRK's level of confidence in nuclear capabilities has increased, coupled with a substantial ability to target South Korea, Japan, and even Guam. Additionally, their ability to target the U.S. mainland is undergoing significant development.

Given this, for North Korea, denuclearization is no longer a subject of discussion. This is why Pyongyang may seek arms control negotiation as a de facto nuclear state.

In other words, arms control, similar to what the U.S. and Soviet Union did during the Cold War, is what North Korea would demand.

Then, will Trump accept this? Or can Kim give up the ability to target the U.S. mainland?

If Kim concedes, DPRK’s nuclear capabilities will be limited to the Korean Peninsula and its periphery. Can Kim achieve his political and military objectives with only these capabilities? I doubt that.

If North Korea's capabilities remain at this level, the U.S. would likely maintain only a limited form of extended deterrence on South Korea. Since the Biden administration, it has been discussed that if North Korea were to launch even a single missile, it will result in the end of the regime. The U.S. has enough capability to do so.

As long as that is retained, North Korea's nuclear utility would significantly degrade. How could DPRK launch a nuclear missile if it would result in the collapse of its own regime?

To maintain its utility, North Korea still needs to develop the capability to target the U.S. mainland. However, Trump would not likely permit this, making it as the most critical issue. Even if negotiations were to begin, it would be extremely difficult for the U.S. and DPRK to reach an agreement. And it is evident that the U.S. would possess an assured retaliation capability against the North.

Therefore, I assess the utility of DPRK’s nuclear weapons remains substantially limited.

Today, I discussed the three key issues. I don't believe that the 2025 international order would be easy or simple for Kim Jong Un. Kim’s betting on Russia will turn out to be a mistake. Trump's America will not become susceptible, given its consistent deterrence capability regarding nuclear weapons. And the U.S.-China tensions will not reach a level of "bloc confrontation" that would satisfy North Korea. Moreover, Trump, unlike Biden or any other president from the Democratic Party, advocates for peace through strength, which is a highly irregular and unpredictable strategy.

Even with an adversary, a traditional government such as the Biden administration has operated within a norms-based international order. This implies that Washington has adhered to predictable rules even when confronting adversaries. However, Trump’s disregard for norms would increase unpredictability for Pyongyang.

It is also plausible that Trump would request Russia to withdraw the North Korean deployment or to cease close security cooperation with Pyongyang, seeking an armistice in the Ukraine war. Alternatively, he could take a strong stance against China, suddenly raising the North Korean agenda, and demand that Beijing cease its collaboration with Pyongyang. Therefore, while North Korea seeks to establish a North Korea-China-Russia vs. South Korea-Japan-U.S. bloc, it is unlikely to function as before.

In this context, I believe the year 2025 will not be easy for Kim.

Thank you for watching.

■ Won Gon PARK is the Chair of EAI Center for North Korea Studies and a Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ Translated and edited by: Jisoo Park, Research Associate; Sheewon Min, Research Associate
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