TRANSCRIPT (Subtitles)

Today, I would like to talk about the possibility of a “sudden change” in North Korea. So what does a “sudden change” mean? There are a number of definitions for this, but the most commonly accepted one is a situation in which a critical moment leads to the collapse of the regime or the state as a whole.

Then what kind of regime will take over? There are several possibilities. One big scenario is that DPRK will still exist, and the other is that there is no DPRK at all. This is something we saw many times during post-Cold War when the Soviet Union collapsed and Russia emerged, and many Eastern European socialist states collapsed and new statehood emerged.

So the “sudden change” in North Korea refers to both of these scenarios. What I want to talk about today is whether or not this could actually happen.

Q. Past Theories of Sudden Change in North Korea

As I say this, there is heated debate on the Internet about North Korea’s sudden change, or in other words, North Korea’s collapse. So I can only address the extent to which this is relevant today from an academic perspective, based on theories. One reason is because there have been at least four instances where discussions on sudden change or collapse in North Korea were prevalent. However, all these predictions turned out to be incorrect.

The first instance was in the mid to late 1990s, right after the death of Kim Il Sung and the rise of Kim Jong Il. Many of you know this period as the "Arduous March," an extremely severe famine where the North Korean rationing system collapsed, leading to economic issues that resulted in the deaths of between 300,000 to 2 million people from starvation. At that time, many predicted that North Korea could not continue. A notable study by Robert Collins discussed this as the "Seven Stages of Collapse," which is still somewhat mentioned today.

The second instance was in the early to mid-2000s, where it was less about a serious collapse and more about the possibility of North Korea choosing reform and opening up like China. Various scenarios were discussed following the end of the Arduous March as the country was rebuilding its state system, with the sudden change theory being one of them.

The third instance was in 2008, when Kim Jong Il suddenly fell ill. Kim Jong Il had long been designated as the successor during Kim Il Sung's time, providing some stability even after his death. However, in 2008, Kim Jong Un had not yet appeared, and the succession was uncertain, leading to discussions of a sudden change scenario again. Especially at that time, there were doubts about the possibility of an unprecedented third-generation succession.

Then, the fourth instance was in 2012 with the rise of Kim Jong Un's regime. That was also the time of the Arab Spring. At that time, numerous long-standing authoritarian regimes in the Arab world had collapsed, and dictators had stepped down, some meeting tragic ends, raising considerable speculation about the prospects for democratization worldwide. So there were quite a few studies discussing whether North Korea might experience its own version of the Arab Spring.

As I mentioned at the beginning, none of these four instances resulted in a sudden change or collapse of North Korea, which ultimately shows that the predictions in studies on North Korean sudden change scenarios have not been accurate.

Q. Recent Re-emergence of Sudden Change Theory

However, there are now some reasons to revisit this discussion. Firstly, there is an increase in defections among North Korea's elite. This is a fact, as we can discuss it with precise numbers.

According to the Unification Ministry’s data released in August, during Kim Jong Il's era (1997-2011), there were 54 elite defections. This elite is defined as those who receive special management in South Korea when they defect, referring to those who were in high positions in North Korea. But since Kim Jong Un's regime began, there have been 134, which is a significant increase.

More importantly, while the total number of defectors during Kim Jong Il's era was 23,027, with the elite making up 0.23%, during Kim Jong Un's era, out of 10,985 defectors, the elite ratio has increased to 1.22%, which is a 5.3 times increase. North Korea itself has acknowledged this issue.

At the 8th Party Congress in 2021, the regime argued that establishing revolutionary discipline within the party was very important.

Subsequently, a Discipline Inspection Department and a judicial department were established. This indicated a strong intention to control the party, particularly the elite. And in January 2024, the first workshop of the Discipline Inspection Department was held. Regulation of the cadres was necessary, and internal control needed to be strengthened. This demonstrates North Korea's own measures to firmly hold onto the elite more than before and the need to keep them in check.

Serious disturbances within the elite class can definitely impact the stability of the regime.

However, we must be cautious about the extent, scope, and intensity of these changes before linking them to a sudden change in North Korea. Let me briefly mention North Korea's leadership system. A characteristic of DPRK’s system is its one-man rule. One of the phenomena of a one-man dictatorial regime is a significant level of alignment between the leader and the elite. Especially if an internal sudden change in North Korea were to occur, there must be an alternative to Kim Jong Un's regime. The elite must have alternative options beyond Kim Jong Un's supreme leadership available to them.

Secondly, if they don't choose those options, a massive defection like what we are seeing must occur, but then there must be assurances about their life after defection. If that's uncertain, the elite must carefully consider whether to give up their privileges under Kim Jong Un's regime.

Q. Possibility of Sudden Change Examined Through Four Theories

In this context, the first theory explaining a sudden change is the Golden Parachute theory. It means that in order to bring about or signal the collapse of a dictatorial regime, it's necessary to encourage defections among the elite. This requires measures that provide financial compensation to these elites if they oppose the regime, without holding them accountable. Thus, the term "golden parachute" is used to describe this approach.

The need for substantial compensation reflects the high level of alignment between the elite and the leadership, especially in a one-man rule system, as we've seen historically and theoretically. Current elite defections could fundamentally undermine the durability of the North Korean regime and potentially lead to sudden changes, or they might merely indicate a consolidation of power within the cadre as they work to control the general populace. We need to approach this with caution.

Second is the Winning Coalition theory. It is based on the Selectorate Theory proposed by American scholars Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, detailed in their book The Dictator's Handbook. This theory states that a dictator's country is driven by the dictator and their core followers, the key elites, forming a winning coalition. Therefore, the majority of the populace who are not part of this winning coalition, live under its control. For a dictatorship to continue, the dictator needs only maintain the support of these elite members of the winning coalition.

This theory has been extensively researched and discussed, and it holds significant validity because it is based on numerous cases from many dictatorships. It is also actively debated within South Korea. The critical point here is that the winning coalition is usually very small, so the majority of the populace does not receive sufficient economic incentives. This is based on the rationale that "a hungry man has no strength to overthrow a leader."

Hence, it is beneficial for the general populace to be kept in economic hardship or at a level below prosperity, as they could potentially challenge the leadership if their conditions were improved. This is indeed a very troubling theory, but it is highly applicable to North Korea and has been widely used in many studies.

Assuming it applies, the size of the key elite forming the winning coalition in North Korea's current situation is crucial. If this group is small, as discussed, defections at this level could potentially damage the foundation of the winning coalition. However, there is a challenge here. It is very hard to determine the exact number of the elite and the so-called winning coalition with Kim Jong Un inside North Korea. Estimates range from as few as 300 to thousands or even tens of thousands. This uncertainty stems from the opacity and closed nature of the regime. Determining whether the winning coalition has been damaged to a significant extent is not easy. If it is not a significant damage, the ongoing defections of the North Korean elite could merely be an “escape.”

This leads us to the third theory, based on the classic Exit, Voice, and Loyalty written by Albert Hirschman in the 1970s. This theory states that individuals dissatisfied with a regime (dictatorship, authoritarianism, etc.) have three options. One is Exit, choosing to leave because of dissatisfaction.

Another is Voice, attempting to resolve dissatisfaction directly within the system. Loyalty means conforming despite dissatisfaction, deciding to “go with the flow.” Therefore, for the defections of the current elite to fundamentally challenge the North Korean regime, both Exit and Voice must occur together, and their scale must be sufficient to damage the foundation of the winning coalition. However, what I can say with relative certainty is that while we see signs of Exit, we do not hear the Voice from within. Thus, careful prediction and analysis are required to determine whether this winning coalition is indeed being damaged.

Q. Is There an Alternative to the Current DPRK Leadership System?

Another related point is that for the winning coalition to be damaged or dismantled, as mentioned, the elite must have an alternative to the one leader system. Regardless of whether it truly exists, if I were among North Korea's elite, I’d certainly contemplate what other favorable alternatives there might be to the current system.

One such alternative is the “collective leadership system.” It is in fact difficult to call North Korea a true socialist state because of its a very unique form of leadership system. But a typical characteristic of socialist states is a collective leadership represented by the Politburo Standing Committee. From the perspective of the elite, such a collective leadership system is advantageous.

It existed in the Soviet Union after Stalin and in China before Xi Jinping's era, prior to the unconventional policy change allowing Xi’s three consecutive terms.

Essentially, the core elite group, centered around the Politburo Standing Committee, would govern the country. This system would indeed be more appealing to North Korea's elites than the current system that concentrates all power in one person. This means the leader can arbitrarily act outside established systems at any time. In North Korea, although a constitution exists, it is subordinate to the Workers' Party regulations, which, in turn, are subordinate to the directives of the leader. This grants the leader omnipotent power beyond any institutionalized legal constraints. So, from an elite's perspective, would they prefer a system where their safety could be threatened at any whim of the leader, or would they prefer a collective leadership system where power is distributed among several people, allowing them also to have a voice? Naturally, the latter would be preferable.

If such a form of collective leadership were established, elite cohesion could potentially weaken.

From this derives the ongoing discussions within South Korea about “Suryong [leader]” as a human figure or as a reforming monarch, which I think are practically impossible. Because, as I mentioned, the Suryong system operates with all power concentrated at the apex. It is not feasible to divide that power or to use it to initiate reforms or opening up. If North Korea were to transform into a normal socialist state, a fundamental precondition would be the dismantlement of the current Suryong system. Therefore, any transformation of the existing system under the current regime appears impossible.

A more serious issue relates to North Korea's hereditary succession. The possibility of a fourth-generation succession is being discussed because of the Suryong system. Because the system holds absolute power, it allows the Suryong to inherit the legitimacy from previous generations. If this system were abolished, the fourth-generation succession would face significant challenges. So as long as the Suryong system persists, it is difficult for the elite to find a viable alternative.

Q. Current Size of Opposition Forces within North Korea

Let me mention another related notion, which is the Critical Mass theory. Studies on the collapse and fundamental changes in dictatorial states indicate that the emergence of a certain level of critical mass is necessary. This means that a small group or a minority cannot bring about the collapse or fundamental change of a regime. Once a certain threshold is crossed, a large-scale opposition forms, often manifesting as a popular uprising, and this mass movement is what can ultimately transform the regime.

Discussions on scenarios of sudden changes in North Korea inevitably involve this concept. But whether such a critical mass can emerge within North Korea is a difficult question. For a critical mass to form, certain conditions must be met, and in North Korea, these conditions are very challenging to achieve. This is because North Korea has severe punitive measures even for minor offenses. For instance, watching a South Korean drama could result in a sentence of 5 to 15 years. This indicates that the initial cost of opposing the North Korean regime is extremely high—essentially, one cannot oppose without risking their life.

The problem is, if I were to oppose and end up being the only one, it would be meaningless. If I pioneer in opposition, there need to be comrades who agree and join, but rallying these comrades is very difficult. The North Korean regime persistently restricts communication among citizens through coercive methods. As commonly said in North Korea, if three people gather, one is likely affiliated with the secret police. This severely suppresses any emergent voices against the regime among the populace. Thus, organizing any form of resistance is not easy.

Another aspect is the need for a leadership to drive resistance. Reflecting on history of the collapse of dictatorial regimes, a leading force capable of mobilizing the masses has been necessary. Whether North Korea can produce such leadership remains a question. Therefore, even if small-scale dissent occurs, the majority of the population may choose to wait and see, which is a theoretical consideration.

However, we must be cautious here. Despite the limitations I've just described, has critical mass never emerged? There have been instances where critical mass has formed, and many dictatorial states have collapsed as a result. This is why the theory is still relevant and evolving.

In essence, the weakening of violent control significantly raises the possibility. As mentioned, strong coercive control prevents communication among citizens, making collective action difficult. So if the violent coercion mechanisms weaken, the likelihood of a critical mass forming would increase.

Another point that is becoming less controversial is whether the majority of North Koreans truly believe in the Juche ideology promoted by North Korea, or in the people-first and love-for-people principles spoken of by Kim Jong Un. I don't think so. According to the Unification Ministry’s report on perception of DPRK’s economic and social conditions, which surveyed about 5,000 North Korean residents, it is confirmed that this is not the case. Therefore, rather than voluntary compliance, North Koreans are controlled through coercive mechanisms. If these coercive mechanisms start to show cracks, then the likelihood of a critical mass emerging increases.

I must mention a cautious possibility here: since 2020, North Korea has enacted what are called the "three evil laws," aimed at eradicating non-socialist and anti-socialist behaviors. These include the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Act (2020), the Youth Education Guarantee Act (2021), and the Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act (2023). These laws, in my view, show gaps in control. If control had been effective, there would have been no need for such laws. The content of these laws shows that despite North Korea's efforts to block so-called “puppet culture” from South Korea, they have failed. Therefore, they had to create legal controls with very severe punitive measures. This indicates visible flaws in North Korea's oppressive and violent control.

Another point I made earlier was the importance of communication among citizens. I believe that by enacting these three laws, North Korea has, in a way, facilitated communication among its residents. From the residents' perspective, they quietly watched South Korean dramas and movies, but with the passage of these laws, they realized, "It's not just me watching these; others around me are watching them too, and that's why the regime is creating these laws to prohibit them." This is very important. If these thoughts become commonly shared among North Korean residents, it enhances the possibility that this could lead to a common goal among the population.

To summarize, although the content is complex, it is not easy to assert that the possibility of a sudden change in North Korea has visibly emerged in the current situation. However, it is also difficult to say that such possibilities are completely non-existent. My position may seem ambiguous because this is a matter of the future. Therefore, it is necessary to keep monitoring, but it is also important to approach claims of an imminent collapse of North Korea with caution.

Thank you for watching.

■ Won Gon PARK is the Chair of EAI Center for North Korea Studies and a Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ Translated and edited by: Jisoo Park, Research Associate
    For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr