TRANSCRIPT (SUBTITLES)

Q. North Korea’s Disclosure of Its Uranium Enrichment Facility

On September 13, state media reported that Kim personally inspected the Nuclear Weapons Institute and the weapon-grade nuclear material production facility. During the visit, Kim reportedly said he “felt strong to see the worksite” and expressed “great satisfaction repeatedly over the wonderful technical force of the nuclear power field.”

Though some reports have mentioned it, North Korea has never revealed such facilities before. The only time they showed a uranium enrichment facility was in 2010, at the Yongbyon site, to U.S. expert Siegfried Hecker. Since then, they have not disclosed any further information.

However, both South Korean and U.S. intelligence agencies have mentioned multiple possibilities. It is speculated that the facility revealed this time might be Kangson, near Pyongyang. While intelligence agencies likely have accurate assessments, as a civilian researcher, I cautiously suggest it might not be Yongbyon, since the facility looks very new. Yongbyon is over 30 years old, so it is quite outdated. Additionally, it is reported that the Yongbyon site is somewhat contaminated with radiation. Though it is hard to confirm, it is unlikely that Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s most important leader, would visit a contaminated site. Of course, uranium enrichment facilities have a much lower risk of radiation leaks compared to plutonium facilities. So, no protective gear would be necessary. Still, considering safety factors, Kangson seems more likely than Yongbyon.

The important thing is that, to make nuclear weapons, nuclear materials are needed, and there are two ways to produce them. One way is to reprocess the plutonium that comes from nuclear reactors. The reprocessing of spent fuel rods containing plutonium can produce weapons-grade material. The other way, as North Korea revealed this time, is with uranium. Uranium in its natural state exists in extremely small quantities. So there are two methods for enriching uranium to create weapons-grade materials.

During past nuclear crises, North Korea often referred to reprocessing plutonium from its Yongbyon reactor, but it is known that they operated uranium enrichment facilities even before Dr. Hecker’s visit in 2010. In fact, the existence of highly enriched uranium was a crucial factor in the collapse of the 1994 Geneva Agreement between North Korea and the United States. It is thus confirmed that North Korea operates two types of facilities to produce weapons-grade nuclear material.

Let us examine why North Korea made this announcement. Through this facility, North Korea has revealed its goals. First, it aims to increase nuclear material, which directly correlates to increasing the number of nuclear weapons. This was made very clear in North Korea’s statement. Reports say that Kim Jong Un ordered a focus on producing nuclear material needed for tactical nuclear weapons. He also instructed them to increase the number of centrifuges, enhance their separation capabilities, and introduce new types of centrifuges. This is a clear expression of North Korea’s intent to expand its uranium enrichment facilities to produce even more nuclear material.

Second, North Korea emphasizes the “peculiarity of its revolution that demands constant confrontation with the United States.” North Korea consistently claims that one of the reasons for its nuclear development is that the United States threatens it with nuclear weapons. In this context, North Korea justifies the enhancement, diversification, and mass production of nuclear material as a response to the United States.

Q. Why Reveal It Now?

So why did North Korea make this announcement at this particular moment? First, North Korea is signaling to the U.S. and the international community that it seeks to engage in nuclear arms reduction negotiations in exchange for recognition as a de facto nuclear state. This is no longer a secret, as North Korea has expressed this intent and goal in various ways. I believe showing this uranium enrichment facility is a step in that direction.

There are two things North Korea has been consistently doing this year. One is that it is displaying its full capability to use nuclear weapons against South Korea. Last April, they introduced the Hwasan alarm system as well as Haekbangasoe, and also tested their operational plans for nuclear attacks against South Korea, including the locations of their combat units capable of delivering them, as well as their capabilities. They have tested those capabilities for two consecutive months until May. This signifies that they have the capability to attack South Korea with nuclear weapons, and since this is already institutionalized in their action plans, it also contains a political message that this is irreversible.

DPRK’s decision to reveal the uranium enrichment facility means they will continue producing nuclear material to expand, strengthen, and enhance their nuclear capability to attack ROK. I believe this is a message directed at the United States, saying that if you do not stop us, we will keep moving down this path. If you do not stop us, the number of nuclear warheads will increase, and our capability to attack South Korea will be significantly strengthened. In a way, there is also a message here saying, “Stop us.” In this context, the way to stop North Korea is essentially to accept them as a nuclear state and move towards nuclear arms reduction.

Q. Why did Kim Jong Un reveal it himself?

There also appears to be a significant meaning in why Kim Jong Un personally revealed the uranium enrichment facility. First, it is easy to conceal uranium enrichment facilities, as they do not require large-scale infrastructure. Plutonium facilities like the ones in Yongbyon need a reactor and a cooling tower, making it nearly impossible to hide them. In contrast, highly enriched uranium facilities can operate in very small facilities. By intentionally revealing a facility that could be hidden, North Korea is showing that nuclear disarmament is impossible.

Reports indicate there are four or five more sites like Kangson, and the U.S. is believed to have already identified them, but North Korea’s message is that there are many concealed facilities, and they cannot be eliminated entirely. Thus, the message is that “eventually we must move toward arms reduction,” and “complete denuclearization of North Korea is unrealistic.”

Second, uranium enrichment facilities are, in a way, a kind of trauma for Kim Jong Un. During the DPRK-U.S. summit in Hanoi in February 2019, former President Trump proposed that Kim disclose all nuclear material production facilities, report them, and allow inspections. However, Kim did not respond to that. He did mention the Yongbyon facility, but since he did not provide clear details, Trump walked away from the negotiations. Following that, Kim sent Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui to offer the complete reporting and inspection of the Yongbyon nuclear facility, allowing not only the IAEA but also U.S. inspectors. Yet they still refused to disclose the highly enriched uranium facilities.

Now, with Kim personally revealing what he had kept hidden until now, I believe it holds significant meaning. Even if they negotiate with the U.S. again, they do not intend to give up on these facilities. In essence, the message is, “In 2019, you asked us about it. Yes, it exists. But we have no plan to give it up.” In a way, Kim Jong Un may have felt he was outplayed back then. If we put it that way, there seems to be a political symbolism in showing it now, as if returning the blow.

The third point, which is the most uncomfortable to discuss, is that Kim may believe he has seized a “moment of destiny.” What I mean by this is that there is a growing sentiment in the U.S. that North Korea’s complete denuclearization is unrealistic.

To explain this further, both the Republican and Democratic national conventions were held in July and August, and their party platforms were released. In both platforms, there was no mention of DPRK’s complete denuclearization or the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In the 2016 and 2020 elections, denuclearization of North Korea was clearly included, but it was omitted this time.

Various speculations were offered at the time, but the Democrats gave a clear reason for the omission. Colin H. Kahl, former U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, who was involved in drafting the Democratic platform, explained this in a briefing. He responded that the omission reflects a realistic understanding that is not achievable anytime soon. This means that even key strategists in Washington, from both the Democratic and Republican parties, recognize that DPRK’s complete denuclearization is difficult and unrealistic.

This recognition has even been reflected in the party platforms. However, that does not mean they are accepting North Korea’s nuclear status. In his full briefing, Kahl explained that because complete denuclearization is unrealistic, the focus should be on “deterring” North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. He emphasized that ROK and U.S. should strengthen their extended deterrence. The stronger this capability becomes, the more likely North Korea will come to the negotiation table. But the key point is that they have acknowledged how difficult it is to achieve complete denuclearization of North Korea.

When I mention a “moment of destiny,” this is exactly what Kim Jong Un wants. As he continues to develop nuclear weapons, he is constantly saying that DPRK will not denuclearize, but rather engage in nuclear arms reduction. But if we look at the exact definition of arms reduction, the final stage of it, in academic terms, is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In reality, that has not been achieved. In common terms, nuclear arms reduction means acknowledging the other party’s possession of a certain level of nuclear weapons and then gradually reducing them. So when we talk about nuclear arms reduction, it recognizes North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. For this reason, some argue that we should not use the term “nuclear arms reduction.”

Kim, however, may very well be aiming to enter into arms reduction talks, which in effect would acknowledge DPRK’s nuclear status. In a way, North Korea might see this as an increasing possibility. That is why Kim Jong Un is revealing his highly enriched uranium facilities now, sending a clear message to the U.S. that, "We have these facilities, and we now feel confident enough to show them," and that complete denuclearization of North Korea, as the U.S. wants, is unrealistic.

Q. Will North Korea Conduct Its 7th Nuclear Test Before the U.S. Election?

Now, let me add one more point related to this. The U.S. presidential election is not far off. Will North Korea conduct its 7th nuclear test by then? Based on the logic I just mentioned, I think the possibility is actually decreasing.

Throughout this year, it seems like Kim might be employing a so-called “divide and conquer” strategy. What I mean by this is that DPRK is clearly signaling a hybrid warfare strategy against South Korea. Hybrid warfare refers to combining conventional and nuclear warfare. So, if a war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, DPRK plans to escalate from conventional to nuclear warfare immediately. They are raising the level of tension to that extent.

However, while they are continuously escalating threats against South Korea, the level of threat towards the U.S. is not as high. For example, they tested the Hwasong-18 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) last December but not this year. Hwasong-18 is a missile with a range capable of striking the U.S. mainland. And it is not a liquid-fuel missile but a solid-fuel missile. It is North Korea’s first solid-fuel ICBM, making it more mobile and faster to launch, thus harder to detect. And while not 100% confirmed, there is an analysis suggesting that they are working on a Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV).

However, this year, North Korea has not conducted any ICBM tests that would directly threaten or target the U.S. mainland. This indicates that rather than demonstrating their ability to strike the U.S. mainland, they are focusing on showing their potential capabilities. Highly enriched uranium is a prime example of this. Simply possessing it increases the number of their nuclear warheads. But this does not immediately demonstrate a direct means of attacking the U.S. mainland.

Another point I want to make is that on September 8, Kim Jong Un inspected a defense industry factory where they showcased an ICBM launch vehicle. This vehicle had 12 axles, whereas the previous ones had a maximum of 11. This suggests that the 12-axle vehicle is designed for a missile that has not yet been revealed. I believe this hints at the existence of a new missile. They may have upgraded the solid-fuel Hwasong-18 into a larger version. Without directly showing the missile, by revealing the launch vehicle, they are demonstrating that they continue to develop the capability to strike the U.S. mainland with ICBMs.

In summary, what is the “divide and conquer” strategy? Against ROK, North Korea is showing blatant and direct threats of attack, while against the U.S., they are only displaying their potential capabilities. In this way, it seems Kim Jong Un is controlling the level of threat towards the U.S. to some extent. If my analysis is correct, I think North Korea is acting very cleverly. Kim likely understands public opinion in the U.S., and if tensions escalate further, it could backfire on North Korea. If they conduct a 7th nuclear test or an ICBM test, the Democrats will attack Trump during the U.S. presidential campaign. They will argue that it makes no sense to talk about friendly relations with a leader who threatens the U.S. mainland. Trump would then be on the defensive, and public criticism of Kim would increase. This would reduce the argument that North Korea’s complete denuclearization is unrealistic and could shift U.S. policy toward tougher measures, like stronger sanctions. That is why I cautiously speculate that North Korea is being careful and calculated in its actions.

Of course, North Korea might still decide to conduct an ICBM test, but if they do, I believe it would be a strategic mistake for the reasons I mentioned earlier. If they refrain, it suggests they are approaching this with a high level of sophistication.

Q. North Korea’s Efforts to Avoid the “China Responsibility” Narrative

Another reason I believe North Korea is hesitant about conducting a 7th nuclear test is because of China. ROK and U.S. intelligence agencies have speculated the possibility of a 7th nuclear test for over two years now, but North Korea has yet to carry it out. There should be many reasons for this, but one of them could be the China factor. Tensions between North Korea and China have become too evident to hide.

Also, this year marks the 75th anniversary of their diplomatic relations, and with September having passed, I think it is unlikely that a Kim Jong Un-Xi Jinping summit would occur this year. With the Supreme People’s Assembly scheduled for October and the subsequent internal reviews in November, I doubt that such a meeting will happen. If no meaningful event happens between DPRK and China this year, it would clearly indicate a potential rift in the bilateral relations. In this context, if North Korea conducts its 7th nuclear test, it would further damage its relationship with China.

After the Biden-Xi summit last November, both countries, including the U.S., seem to have agreed to “manage” their relationship for at least the duration of the U.S. presidential election. China is also facing internal challenges, with its economy struggling, so engaging in a full-blown economic or strategic competition with the U.S. is a burden.That is why China is focusing on stabilizing its relationship with the U.S., including reciprocal high-level visits and the re-establishment of hotlines.

If North Korea proceeds with a 7th nuclear test, there will be discussions within the U.S. that the North Korean nuclear issue is China’s fault. The argument would be that China holds enough influence over North Korea but has failed to stop them, meaning that China is accountable for the nuclear test. Both Democrats and Republicans will continue to criticize China during the election campaigns. Although the parties have different policies and intensities regarding China, both have already established tough stances. In such a situation, if the responsibility for the 7th nuclear test is placed on China, it could lead to even harsher actions against China, which is something Beijing does not want to see. For this reason, I predict the chances of a 7th nuclear test to be quite low.

To conclude, does DPRK truly believe this strategy is leading to an advantageous position for them? As I mentioned earlier, I do not believe this is North Korea’s “moment of destiny.”

Instead, it is more likely to be a miscalculation by North Korea. If they were to actually use nuclear weapons against ROK, it would mean the end of the regime. For this reason, Kim cannot use nuclear weapons against ROK, and the same applies to the U.S.

There are also limits to the use of nuclear coercion as a diplomatic tool. This is because ROK and the U.S. can deter North Korea through their extended deterrence capabilities. They possess the ability to launch decisive strikes against Kim Jong Un. Calling this a decapitation operation is very misleading. In modern warfare, when a war breaks out, the key command structures of the enemy are always targeted. This is know as the High-Value Target strategy, focusing on eliminating the key leadership. Kim knows better than anyone else that ROK and the U.S. have exceptional capabilities in this area. Given this, I have doubts about how effective North Korea’s nuclear coercion will be.

And as for the argument that the U.S., whether led by Republicans or Democrats, will move towards nuclear arms reduction, I see significant limitations there as well. Entering into arms reduction would undermine the NPT regime established since 1968, which includes not only the U.S. but also China, Russia, and the five major nuclear powers. Would they really make such a choice? Despite the many things Trump and his inner circle say, Trump is not an isolationist. He believes in America First nationalism. This means he does not intend to deny all the advantages that the current international order offers the U.S. All in all, the important point is that things will not go the way Kim Jong Un hopes.

Thank you for watching.

■ Won Gon PARK is the Chair of EAI Center for North Korea Studies and a Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ Translated and edited by: Jisoo Park, Research Associate
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