TRANSCRIPT (Subtitles)

Today, I would like to talk about North Korean military affairs.

On August 5th, as many of you may have seen in the news, North Korea showcased 250 nuclear-capable missile launchers on TV. Kim Jong Un and Kim Ju Ae both appeared on screen. They held an event where all 250 launchers were displayed together. This event drew significant attention, particularly because it was held during the time of flooding.

This missile, a short-range ballistic missile, was first showcased and test-launched in April 2022. North Korea has named it Hwasong-11Ra, and it is known to be capable of carrying a low-yield tactical nuclear warhead. The launchers shown this time have six wheels and are mounted on vehicles. They have four tubes that can launch four missiles in quick succession, though not simultaneously. So with 250 launchers, they are demonstrating the capability to launch about 1,000 short-range ballistic missiles with minimal delay.

Q. Skepticism Surrounding the 250 New Tactical Ballistic Missile Launchers

Of course, there are several issues with this.

(1) I believe this may be coming from the government, but some suggest that part of the 250 launchers are fake.

(2) There is also considerable skepticism about whether North Korea can actually secure that many missiles. Especially regarding the missiles, as I just mentioned, if they claim to be able to equip 1,000 with low-yield nuclear warheads, two things must be possible. Securing 1,000 missiles? As you know, DPRK is under sanctions. It would be extremely difficult to continuously procure enough missile components to build 1,000 under sanctions.

Another challenge is that they need to produce two types of nuclear warheads to equip them with low-yield tactical warheads. One is highly enriched uranium, and the other is plutonium. Can they produce enough of these materials? They also need to standardize and mass-produce them. Kim Jong Un personally stated that they have this capability, but I am skeptical about whether it is feasible. The more important question we should consider, despite these doubts, is why North Korea is pursuing this course of action.

Q. 2 Hidden Motives Behind the Showcasing of Launchers Deployed to the Front Line

There seem to be two key intentions.

(1) If North Korea continues to produces missiles, and especially if it claims to have built 250 launchers, the cost for ROK and U.S. to respond will increase. Especially if these missiles can carry tactical nuclear warheads as North Korea claims, then in the event of a DPRK invasion, ROK and U.S. would need to detect, identify, and target an increasing number of strategic sites.

In the event of war, we would naturally target DPRK’s major command posts. In addition, there is a pre-identified list of other targets that South Korea and U.S. would need to strike. But if that list keeps growing, ROK and U.S. would need to secure more military assets, whether missiles or air force capabilities, leading to higher costs for both countries. North Korea is very deliberately diversifying its nuclear delivery systems, including missiles. In the past, they’ve demonstrated the capability to launch from various platforms, including railways, atop trains, from lakes, and at sea with SLBMs. These various platforms, along with the 250 launchers, add to the cost burden for the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command. This will require greater effort on our part, which seems to be one of North Korea’s intentions.

(2) The other intention seems to be a persistent message for the world to recognize North Korea as a nuclear power. Kim Jong Un’s primary goal is to have the U.S. recognize North Korea as a de facto nuclear state. As shown this time, they are signaling that they possess significant nuclear capabilities and have 250 launchers to deploy them, making the notion of complete denuclearization unrealistic. This demonstration was likely another part of their effort to showcase their capabilities.

I would like to revisit this in the broader context of the various actions Kim Jong Un has taken this year. As you know, late last year and early this year, Kim Jong Un declared his intent to “go to war” with South Korea. He characterized inter-Korean relations as “two hostile states at war” and, in his February speech for the founding anniversary of the KPA, clearly stated that DPRK is “entitled to strike and annihilate” ROK.

Since March, they have continuously demonstrated their capability and will to attack ROK.

The display of the 250 launchers and the on-site visits have shown North Korea’s general invasion scenario for South Korea.

Q. DPRK’s ROK Invasion Scenario as Viewed Through its Nuclear Alarm and Management Systems

I will cover a few key points of invasion scenario against South Korea. Last April, DPRK mentioned the “Hwasanpalryong” system and the “Haekbangashoe” system for the first time. The “Hwasanpalryong” system is a “nuclear crisis alarm” that is activated when there are signs of an impending ROK-U.S. attack on the DPRK. The “Haekbangashoe” is the name of their “nuclear weapon combined management system” that operates in response to the alarm. In other words, they have an alarm system to assess the level of threat during a conflict, and once this alarm is triggered, they have a comprehensive management system in place for the use of nuclear weapons.

They introduced these two concepts in April, and then in late May, Kim Jong Un appeared personally to demonstrate the specifics of this system. North Korea has, in fact, revealed in detail how the system operates.

(1) First is the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea. This is the institution that makes the most crucial military decisions within the North Korean system. So, if the “Hwasanpalryong” system is activated and the “Haekbangashoe” process begins, Kim Jong Un, along with the members of the Central Committee, will first decide on the use of nuclear weapons. (2) The second step is for the Central Committee to send the passcode for the nuclear launch to the designated unit. (3) Then, that unit, upon receiving the passcode, prepares for the launch, and then (4) launches the nuclear weapon.

In fact, North Korea has disclosed all the steps and processes involved. At that time, they demonstrated the launch of 18 KN-25 600mm multiple launch rocket systems, firing them one by one. The 250 launchers also seem to be part of this same strategy.

The most critical scenario for North Korea to use nuclear weapons is when Kim Jong Un's safety is challenged or threatened. In September 2022, North Korea passed a law on nuclear forces policy during the Supreme People’s Assembly. This law states that if Kim Jong Un himself is endangered by an enemy attack, a nuclear strike would be carried out immediately and automatically. So, in this context, North Korea’s actions, including the unveiling of the two systems in April, seem intended to assert that they are capable of carrying out these measures.

Q. Why is North Korea’s Assessment Flawed?

Now, I will talk about North Korea’s limitations or potential misjudgments.

First of all, has DPRK truly established a system for tactical nuclear use, and will they continue to develop it? They will face significant limitations. To conduct an automatic, immediate nuclear strike, a nearly flawless system must be in place, and as North Korea has mentioned, the authority to use nuclear weapons would need to be partially delegated to frontline units. This is what “automatic” implies. If Kim Jong Un is in danger and unable to make a decision, the delegated units must be able to launch the nuclear weapons. Is this feasible for North Korea? I believe it is impossible within their regime structure. What if a unit with delegated nuclear authority doesn't follow orders during a war, or worse, uses the weapons against Pyongyang even before the war starts? In a one-man rule system like North Korea's, where the leader's safety is paramount and constantly under threat, nuclear weapons must be 100% under Kim Jong Un’s control. I find it impossible to delegate even partial control.

Even outside that regime, implementing a system that allows for automatic and immediate nuclear launches would require an extremely sophisticated system. In the case of the United States, once the President makes a decision, frontline units act on it. However, the entire process must be extremely precise, highly secure, and fully protected from external threats. I have serious doubts about whether North Korea can establish such an advanced system. This means that even if DPRK manages to establish such a system, there is likely that ROK and U.S. intelligence agencies would detect, assess, and anticipate it during the process.

Another issue is whether North Korea could actually launch a tactical nuclear attack if war breaks out. I have significant doubts about this as well. The fundamental assumption is that the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces will not launch a preemptive strike against the DPRK. And as I mentioned earlier, when North Korea talks about "territorial integrity," they are essentially saying they intend to invade the South. So if war breaks out, they would need to use the 250 launchers or other delivery systems to attack South Korea and strike Seoul. If they attack ROK with tactical nuclear weapons, then how could they proceed with their invasion afterward? If radiation spreads and the area is contaminated, would DPRK forces advance south? This would effectively block their own invasion route. This is why such a scenario is militarily unrealistic.

Another point is whether ROK and the U.S. would remain passive if DPRK used nuclear weapons, and whether there are countermeasures. Indeed, there are. As I mentioned, while it may increase costs, if North Korea truly uses nuclear weapons in this way, we have a wide range of equipment to identify the threat and a numerous response capabilities, far surpassing those of North Korea. So DPRK will not be able to freely launch their 250 launchers or a thousand missiles as they might believe.

Another critical point is that if North Korea uses nuclear weapons against South Korea in any form, it will inevitably lead to a full-scale war. If a few missiles successfully strike South Korea, especially Seoul, it would cause massive damage. However, our missile defense systems can intercept a significant portion of these missiles before they reach their targets. We have the capability for early detection and various means of interception. But if DPRK somehow reaches the targets, there will inevitably be significant casualties.

In that case, ROK and the U.S. would employ all available strike capabilities to eliminate North Korea’s key leadership as a first response. This includes the "three-axis system" that involves F-35A stealth fighters and the Hyunmoo series of missiles. The U.S., in particular, has tactical nuclear weapons, such as the W76-2 submarine-launched missile equipped with low-yield nuclear warheads. All these would be mobilized to eliminate the DPRK leadership. Eliminating the key leadership at the outset of a war is a common operational plan worldwide. This is because removing the leadership is essential to gaining the upper hand in the war and bringing it to a swift conclusion.

Moreover, in a one-man regime like North Korea’s, eliminating the key leadership is especially crucial. Some refer to this as a "leadership decapitation," but I believe that term is highly inappropriate. The term "decapitation" is more accurately used for acts of terror by extremist religious groups. The correct term, in English, is the removal of a High-Value Target, which refers to key leadership.

I believe that Kim Jong Un understands all of this better than anyone and that he is the least willing to take such risks. In a sense, I think Kim Jong Un is the richest man on the Korean Peninsula. This means that if he is attacked, he stands to lose more than anyone else. So would it really be possible to launch 250 tactical nuclear strikes against South Korea?

On another note, the nuclear deterrence capabilities being developed by ROK, U.S., and Japan are on a different level than before. An example is the recent ROK-U.S.-Japan Freedom Edge joint exercise. This exercise was the first trilateral joint drill to apply a multi-domain approach.

North Korea emphasized the number 250 in its announcement, but they are still focused on numerical concepts. In contrast, South Korea, the U.S., and Japan are responding with a conceptual approach that transcends mere numbers. So, no matter how many weapons North Korea possesses, we are preparing in a different way, a strategy called integrated deterrence. With such a response, no matter how many nuclear weapons North Korea has, or how much their arsenal grows, it ultimately becomes meaningless.

Q. Are the 250 Launchers a Genuine Threat?

Let me conclude.

North Korea showcased the number 250, but is this numerical concept militarily significant? I don’t think so.

On the contrary, the more DPRK continues to display such aggression, the more momentum ROK, U.S., and Japan gain in strengthening their integrated deterrence. Therefore, what North Korea envisions and intends cannot be achieved. Instead, I emphasize once again that the integrated deterrence, which will extend to NATO as well, will only strengthen, resulting in an increasingly robust nuclear deterrence against North Korea.

Thank you for watching.

■ Won Gon PARK is the Chair of EAI Center for North Korea Studies and a Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ Typeset by: Jisoo Park, Research Associate
    For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr