Won Gon Park, Chair of the EAI North Korea Studies Center, notes that while there is evidence to suggest an increased likelihood of Kim Ju Ae being a strong candidate for succession, it remains challenging to confirm her as the successor given that North Korea has yet to officially announce her name. Furthermore, Park argues that if the North Korean regime intends to position Kim Ju Ae as the next leader, it would present a significant challenge for Kim Jong Un to seek a new form of legitimacy, as this would require a departure from the Confucian ideology and the guerrilla narrative that have underpinned the regime since its inception.
TRANSCRIPT (SUBTITLES)
Last month, the ROK National Intelligence Service gave a briefing to the National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee about DPRK affairs including Kim Ju Ae. Since our spy agency deals with intelligence, I do believe what the NIS says deserves closer scrutiny. According to the agency’s briefing, Kim Ju Ae is currently considered a probable successor and is undergoing training.
This is, in fact, the first time the NIS has stated that Kim Ju Ae may be the successsor. They have been quite cautious about making such claims so far, but the mention of “successor training” this time warrants our attention. Today, I will discuss the basis for the NIS's claim and explore the challenges and difficulties the DPRK might encounter if Kim Ju Ae is indeed the successor.
Q. On what basis did the NIS determine the likelihood of Kim Ju Ae succeeding in DPRK leadership?
The spy agency’s briefing outlines two aspects that reportedly suggest Kim Ju Ae’s succession. The first point is that Kim Ju Ae’s recent activities have been primarily focused on military affairs. She first appeared in November 2022. Looking at the events she has accompanied Kim Jong Un so far, they have been predominantly military-related.
This is somewhat inevitable, as Kim Jong Un’s on-site appearances are primarily focused on military affairs. His attendance at economic-related events would typically be to showcase accomplishments, but the lack of such appearances suggests that there isn't much to highlight.
In this context, the area where he is bringing Ju Ae along is primarily military. The NIS analyzes that while this used to be around 60% of her appearances in the past, it has recently increased to more than 70%. The key point about her military involvement is that the military remains crucial to the DPRK regime. They continue to prioritize the military above all else. In this context, Kim Ju Ae's significant weaknesses are her gender, youth, and lack of military experience. To address this, Kim Jong Un appears to be building up her resume.
Additionally, it seems he is positioning her in the symbolic effort of "fighting against imperialism." The second point, which I believe is even more significant, is the importance of symbolism in North Korea. I like to refer to the DPRK as a "theater nation" because they imbue their leader with symbolic meaning in various ways to sustain the regime.
Recently, the DPRK has reportedly begun using terms exclusively reserved for the successor or the leader when referring to Ju Ae. One such term is "hyangdo." According to the North Korean dictionary, "hyangdo" means "lighting up the direction of revolutionary struggle." They also use the term "hyangdo-ja," which literally translates to "the person who guides the revolutionary struggle." This term has historically been used only for the highest leaders, including Kim Jong Un, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Il Sung.
In March 2024, Kim Jong Un attended a "commissioning ceremony" for a greenhouse farm. North Korea made a significant report about this event, referring to "the great persons of guidance" in plural. It's not far-fetched to interpret this as including Kim Ju Ae in the term "hyangdo-ja." The NIS reported that this hints at her being the de facto successor, and I agree with this assessment.
As I mentioned earlier, North Korea places great emphasis on symbolic meaning, and the fact that they have now used an adjective traditionally reserved for the leader suggests that the possibility of Ju Ae being the successor has relatively increased. Of course, we can't stop here. It is crucial to monitor the descriptive words used for Kim Ju Ae going forward.
Interestingly, North Korean media has never officially mentioned her name, "Ju Ae," up to this point. Instead, they have referred to her as the "beloved child" or "respected daughter," without ever explicitly stating the name Kim Ju Ae. As a side note, her name first became known to the public through Dennis Rodman, a former NBA player who met with Kim Jong Un and Ri Sol Ju. During that meeting, Ri Sol Ju mentioned to Rodman that she had a daughter named Ju Ae. Rodman later revealed the name during an interview with The Guardian. It's worth noting that Rodman, an American, does not speak Korean. So we can't be entirely sure if Dennis Rodman actually heard the name correctly.
The key thing to watch for is if Kim Jong Un has indeed decided that Ju Ae will be the successor, her real name will eventually be revealed alongside titles that are exclusively used for a leader. At this stage, it's still in progress, and I believe it's appropriate to discuss this as a possibility rather than a certainty.
Q. What challenges does North Korea face regarding Kim Ju Ae’s potential succession?
Then, as previously mentioned, what are the dilemmas the DPRK would need to address if they choose Kim Ju Ae as the successor? The first and most significant challenge is whether a female leader is feasible. North Korea remains one of the most male-dominated countries, heavily influenced by Confucian traditions. There are very few women in high-ranking positions within DPRK. The recent rise of Choe Son-hui, the foreign minister, is more of an exception than the norm. Historically and even today, we don't see many women climbing the ranks of power.
North Korea is often referred to as a "guerilla unit state," a term coined by Professor Haruki Wada of Tokyo University. This concept stems from the 1930s, when Kim Il Sung engaged in guerrilla resistance. It is true that Kim Il Sung fought against Japanese imperialism. While events like the Battle of Pochonbo have been heavily exaggerated, the fact remains that he did engage in resistance. North Korea continues to use Kim Il Sung’s guerrilla resistance narrative from the 1930s today.
The key point of this narrative is that, despite extremely challenging circumstances, Kim Il Sung defeated the Japanese imperialists through guerrilla warfare and secured Korea's independence. Following this, North Korea claims to have inherited this guerrilla tradition, which they say enabled them to fight and win against U.S. imperialists during the Korean War. Even today, two generations later, they are still reproducing and re-educating the people with the narrative that they are fighting against U.S. imperialists and the ROK puppet government.
If you ask whether this makes sense, it indeed does. North Korea held a military parade on February 8, 2023, where the “symbolic” unit of the 7th Regiment, which reenacts the guerrilla resistance, stood at the forefront. They keep emphasizing that they live with the pride of being in a legitimate, authentic country thanks to the guerrilla resistance of the 1930s. While South Korea may be better off economically, they argue that South Koreans live under the control of U.S. imperialists. In contrast, despite facing more economic challenges, North Koreans live with more autonomy and dignity. In this way, the regime continues to educate and indoctrinate the people.
So this is why the 1930s narrative is so important, and the concept rooted in this is that guerrilla resistance is seen as a family endeavor. The entire family sustains itself during guerrilla resistance by participating in military activities, with women and family members playing key roles in supporting these efforts. Because guerrilla units are much weaker than conventional armies, they must constantly be on the move, and the leader plays a critical role in feeding and taking care of the entire group. This is where the term "Fatherly Great Leader" originates. The concept of the "father" who loves, protects, and leads the people remains deeply ingrained in North Korea.
Another significant feature of Confucianism is its traditional emphasis on loyalty and filial piety, which are both crucial to the North Korean regime. Loyalty refers to being devoted to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, while filial piety involves following the leader, who is equated with the state itself.
Another key characteristic of Confucianism is its conservatism, its emphasis on ideals, and its rejection of materialistic practicality. This description perfectly fits North Korea.
In fact, the DPRK still uses these values in its large-scale mass games, with slogans like “Do not expect any changes from me.” This reflects how seriously they adhere to Confucian traditions, signaling that, no matter how the outside world evolves, they intend to follow their own path.
In this context, while the DPRK has inherited the guerrilla spirit and the concept of a "family country," the regime still requires the leader to have his own accomplishments. This is, in a way, the fate of a one-man-led, hereditary regime. Although the legitimacy of the regime originates with Kim Il Sung and is passed down to Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un, each leader needs to establish their own achievements. Without this, it becomes extremely difficult to sustain the regime.
In Kim Jong Il’s case, he is saying he did what he could. While it is true that the DPRK identifies Kim Il Sung as the founder of the country, during Kim Jong Il’s era, socialist countries collapsed following the end of the Cold War. So, North Korea faced a serious threat to its regime, and Kim Jong Il navigated this crisis through the "Songun" policy, which prioritizes "DPRK-style socialism" and the military. By doing so, he enabled the Republic to survive until today. This is Kim Jong Il’s key accomplishment.
As for Kim Jong Un, over the past 10 years, his defining achievement has been the development of nuclear weapons, referred to in their terms as "nuclear force." With nuclear weapons, North Koreans no longer need to exhaust themselves with guerrilla warfare, as they now possess nuclear weapons. These not only protect the DPRK but also ensure the preservation of future generations—an accomplishment that the regime heavily propagandizes. The question now is whether Kim Ju Ae could achieve something of similar magnitude. Could she, as a woman, effectively project the symbolism of military resistance to this level?
Another point is that the "fatherly" image associated with a "family country" is more gender-neutral. In a situation where the concept of “father” has been expanded to “parent,” can she, as a woman, fully embody that symbolism? When combined with the Confucian traditions I mentioned, it raises doubts about whether this would be possible in a male-dominated society.
So if Kim Jong Un truly wants to make Kim Ju Ae his successor, all of these elements I just mentioned would require new interpretations. He would need to incorporate a female role into the guerrilla tradition, integrate a female image into the “fatherly figure,” and possibly abandon significant aspects of their longstanding Confucian traditions. If North Korea were to change even these narratives, which have been the foundation of the regime for over 70 years, it presents Kim with the significant challenge of what will happen to the North Korean system.
Q. Is Kim Jong Un capable of effectively preparing Kim Ju Ae as his successor?
In short, earlier this year, Kim Jong Un declared that the DPRK will abandon the goal of unification. However, even after eight months, the regime has yet to explain the legitimacy and authenticity of this declaration.
Key media outlets like Rodong Sinmun and KCNA typically provide in-depth explanations when the regime announces a policy shift. This serves not only as external propaganda but also as internal education for its people. But there has been nothing of the sort about this.
In the same context, if Ju Ae truly is the successor, the regime would have to reverse the guerrilla tradition, the symbolism of the fatherly figure, and Confucian traditions.
How will they do this? If he makes that choice, Kim Jong Un will inevitably face yet another significant challenge, and it raises fundamental doubts about whether North Korea, as a theater nation, will still be able to properly “screen” that narrative.
■ Won Gon PARK is the Chair of EAI Center for North Korea Studies and a Professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.
■ Translated and Edited by: Jisoo Park, Research Associate
For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr