TRANSCRIPT

What Are the Different Types of Deterrence?

The U.S. approach to deterrence on the Korean Peninsula derives from concepts the U.S. has developed in response to the reemergence of great power rivalry and nuclear competition between the U.S. on one hand, and Russia and China on the other.

The two main concepts are tailored deterrence and integrated deterrence.

Tailored deterrence basically means that the U.S. should threaten retaliation against whatever the designated adversaries consider to be most valuable, assuming that the U.S. is able to make that judgment. In other words, threaten to hit them where it hurts the most. In the case of North Korea, the U.S. believes that Kim Jong Un thinks his most prized objective is survival of the regime. So the U.S. has vowed, under both Trump and Biden, to destroy the North Korean regime if it uses nuclear weapons against the U.S. or its allies.

Integrated deterrence is the idea that nuclear forces can be supplemented with conventional weapons, including precision-guided munitions, missile defense, cyber operations, and so forth. And in the case of North Korea, the U.S. believes that South Korea's 3K defense including preemptive strikes, missile defense, and conventional retaliation, is an important supplement to the threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation.

The underlying assumption in the United States is that if tailored and integrated deterrence work against countries like Russia and China with large conventional forces and sophisticated nuclear arsenals, they should work against a country like North Korea, with relatively limited conventional capabilities and a small nuclear arsenal.

Of course, the problem with this assumption is that it can't be proven, especially because we don't really know for certain what Kim Jong Un's perceptions and calculations are. In particular, we don't know whether Kim Jong Un is pursuing a development of nuclear and missile capabilities to deter U.S. and ROK attacks and to compensate for North Korea's conventional weakness, or whether Kim Jong Un believes that his advanced nuclear and missile capabilities can provide protection to renew limited conventional attacks against the ROK, as North Korea has committed in the past, at least as recently as 2010 with the Cheonan sinking and the Yeonpyeong Island Shelling.

To add to this uncertainty, the new alliance between the DPRK and Russia has reduced North Korea's political isolation, undercut sanctions, and may give North Korea access to sophisticated military technology—especially capabilities to penetrate U.S. national missile defense and pose a direct threat against the United States, which could undercut the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence.

How Are ROK and U.S. Instiutionalizing Deterrence?

I think that President Biden and President Yoon have recognized that these developments may embolden Kim Jong Un and may undercut the credibility of extended deterrence. So they tried to take measures in order to enhance extended deterrence under the terms of the Washington Declaration in April 2023 and the revised tailored deterrence strategy announced in November 2023.

An important element in these actions is enhanced temporary deployment of U.S. strategic assets in South Korea, including strategic bombers and nuclear armed submarines, and integration of South Korean conventional capabilities and U.S. nuclear operations, such as South Korean fighter escorts for US strategic bombers. These are steps toward NATO-style nuclear sharing, which would involve U.S. permanent deployment of nuclear forces in South Korea and arrangements to authorize ROK dual-capable fighters to use nuclear weapons in a crisis.

As of now, the Biden administration does not support NATO-style nuclear sharing, but they haven't ruled it out in the event that the security situation on the Korean Peninsula becomes worse.

How Will U.S. Presidential Election Affect ROK-U.S. Integrated Deterrence?

So let me conclude with just a few comments about the U.S. elections, which could be critical for the future of the alliance and security on the Korean Peninsula.

If Biden wins, I would expect the continuity in terms of U.S. policy to strengthen extended deterrence, seek denuclearization of North Korea, and enhance security on the Peninsula.

If Trump wins, I think there's great uncertainty. On one hand, the current U.S. policy is supported by Congress, the U.S. military, and the U.S. foreign policy establishment. On the other hand, if Trump [becomes] president, he will have great authority to change policies and may appoint senior policy advisers who will agree or not oppose these changes in policy. In the worst-case scenario, Trump may seek to resume summitry with Kim Jong Un and seek an agreement that would abandon long-standing U.S. efforts to denuclearize North Korea. [He might] accept limits on North Korea's nuclear and missile programs in exchange for lifting economic sanctions and perhaps weakening the U.S.-ROK alliance, including limits on joint exercises and even reduction or removal of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula. If Trump carries out these policies, I think it increases the likelihood that South Korea will decide to pursue its own nuclear weapons program, which would have profound consequences for East Asian security.

So I can't predict the future. I can't predict who's going to win the U.S. election, but I think the outcome of the election could have very substantial consequences for the future of deterrence on the Korean Peninsula.

Thank you very much.

■ Gary SAMORE is a Professor of the Practice of Politics at Brandeis University.

■ Typeset by: Jisoo Park, Research Associate
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