TRANSCRIPT

Chaesung Chun: Today we are joined by Dr. Andrew Yeo, a senior researcher at the Brookings Institution who is very famous both in South Korea and in the United States. He is a specialist in East Asian relations and also alliance issue, as well as North Korean politics and security issues.

1. 2024 U.S. Election Review

Let me start by asking a very general question. Now that we are a couple of weeks past the 2024 U.S. presidential election where former President Donald Trump was elected, I want to ask you about the general atmosphere and reaction in the United States among the political experts and also from the public—how they respond to Trump's return to the White House and your own view of the election results and what they may signal for the next four years.

Andrew Yeo: Thanks, Professor Chun, for that question. It is a pleasure to be back to talk to you about the elections. As you mentioned, it was a historic election in some ways. The dust is now settling, but things are moving at a very fast pace.

As President-elect Donald Trump selects his Cabinet officials, let me just say a few positive things.

It was a free and fair election. We saw that turnout was high—it was above 60 percent. So whether you're among the half of the country that's very upset or half of the country that's elated that Trump was elected, you can say that democracy is working. At least electoral democracy is, but democracy and liberalism don't necessarily coincide all the time. So that's where there are some concerns.

The other positive thing—and this is a very low bar—is that there wasn’t any violence. I kid you not, near the White House, some of the buildings, some of the businesses, had boarded up their windows because they were preparing for possible violence. But that didn't happen, and the Democrats conceded. And so that leads to the surprise for most Americans—at least for those who had supported Harris. It was how convincingly President-elect Trump had won.

I didn't think the election would be called until at least a day or two later. But by midnight on election night, it was pretty clear where things were heading. And, of course, in the end, Trump won 312 electoral votes to Harris's 216. Even in the popular vote, Trump had about three million more votes than Harris. The real surprising thing was in the swing states. You’d assume Harris would win two or three [states], but all of them went to the Republican candidate, Donald Trump. That was a big surprise.

Now, I'll let the domestic political experts continue analyzing why the vote swung so much in favor of Trump. Of course, a lot of it, they say, is about inflation and general dissatisfaction with the Biden administration. But whatever the reasons, I think there are real implications, both domestically and in terms of U.S. foreign policy—and those things are interrelated.

I mentioned concerns about democracy in the U.S., or rather the shift toward more illiberal practices, partly because Trump has repeatedly said he would go after opponents, people who don’t appear loyal, or people who have criticized or investigated him. And when you think about the United States as an example of democracy, we see the pendulum swinging back. This leads to real questions about U.S. leadership on the global stage. If our internal politics is a mess, and if democracy is made a mockery by President Trump, then how does that affect the United States’ ability to lead on the global stage? That might not even be a question for Trump. At times, he seems to not really care about what is happening in other parts of the world. He'll say he’d leave it to the countries in the region to figure things out. And so there's that connection between domestic politics and foreign policy.

2. Trump’s Approach to Ukraine and the Middle East

Let me start with some broad implications for foreign policy and then move our way towards the Indo-Pacific, because I know many of the followers of this program are interested in North Korea and the region.

There's a paradox with Trump. On one hand, we actually do know him. He has been clear and consistent on certain positions like tariffs, immigration, deregulation, and climate. We've seen his first administration and we've followed him; he was always in the news even during the Biden administration. So, we have a pretty good sense of who he is and what kind of policy positions he takes. We also know that he's very transactional in his thinking. It's always about give-and-take or striking some kind of bargain.

But there is also a lot of uncertainty—that's the paradox—because he also acts on a whim. He often contradicts himself, which leads to anxiety and uncertainty. In international politics, certainty is really important. For [effective] global governance, we need to have transparency, and that's something that Trump doesn't necessarily give.

So when we turn to some of the key foreign policy issues, what might that look like? In the first year of the Trump administration, he is going to inherit two major conflicts. One between Ukraine and Russia and the other in the Middle East with Israel and Hamas. My sense is that Ukraine will be his biggest focus, just because he has mentioned it so much. He repeatedly said that he's going to end the war in 24 hours. I think he will make an effort to try to mediate between Zelenskyy and Putin. He'll probably try to get Zelenskyy to come to the negotiating table to stop the fighting. How successful will he be? That's really hard to say.

My own sense is that he's going to run into a lot of trouble because I think Putin is very committed to fighting this war. [Putin controls] about one-fifth of Ukraine, but I'm not sure if he really wants to stop there [especially] if he sees a clear military advantage. And certainly, if he can't sustain what he gained, [that raises further questions.] From the 2022 invasion, Putin's going to really lose his face [if he doesn’t secure tangible gains.] So, he has to take some territory from Ukraine. But for Zelenskyy, his goal is to not lose any territory. But I think that goal is going to be very difficult to meet.

And so, I don't see how Trump is going to persuade either party to come to negotiations. Now he could say, well, if Ukraine gives up some of its territory to Russia, but [in return], they guarantee Ukraine's security by allowing NATO membership, maybe that might be one possibility. But that's also not something that Putin would permit.

So the issue here is: can Trump make a deal? [And if he does,] is it a deal that's going to leave a lasting peace? I'm afraid that if some deal is struck, it won't be one that anyone is really satisfied with, and there could be another war that erupts down the road. So, that's Ukraine. I think he'll try to end the war, but I'm skeptical about how successful he can be.

On the Middle East, I'm actually more optimistic, in part because I think Trump has more influence over Israel and Netanyahu than Biden does. And if you're Hamas, you’d be worried if Trump comes in because he is probably going to give Israel more weapons, political support, and cover than Biden has. But Trump also has very good relations with a lot of Arab countries—Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar. He doesn't like Iran, so that's also bad news for Hamas.

But because he might be able to work with some of the Arab countries, he could be able to strike a deal. If Hamas realizes that its position is not going to look any better [than now], there might be some resolution. My assumption is that Israel will push very hard [militarily] before Trump comes into office, and then maybe allow Trump to come in and take the credit for some kind of deal.

3. Trump’s Strategy in the Indo-Pacific

That leaves us with the Indo-Pacific. I think that's where a lot of interest lies for the listeners here.

Of all the regions, I would say that Trump will likely be most consistent with Biden, largely because of his hawkish views on China. And this is not just Trump—it is much of the Republican Party. We see this with some of his cabinet picks, like the Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Advisor Mike Waltz. Both are known to be pretty hawkish when it comes to China. They also advocate for human rights, especially Rubio, on the Xinjiang issue. If that's the direction that Trump is going to take, then I do think he will look at the longer-term game in the Indo-Pacific.

But Trump cannot make America great and sustain American power in the region without alliances or supply chain network that includes South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. He probably will try to impose tariffs. He hasn't really said that much about economic security, but it has mostly been about tariffs, and that is going to create friction with alliances. But in the broader picture, his concerns about China mean that, to some degree, he will need U.S. force presence [in the region] and he will need to work with allies to, to coordinate export controls and other measures to slow down China's technology growth. He is going to need cooperation. So, it may look messy because of his transnational nature, but I bet there's going to be more consistency with alliances in Asia than in other parts of the world.

4. Decoding the Paradox in Trump’s Strategic Narrative

Chaesung Chun: Okay, great—you covered a lot of issues. Can I go back to the Ukraine and Middle East issue? When President Trump talks about “peace through strength,” it seems to me that he implies some kind of global leadership–some kind of internationalism backed by military power. But he also adopts the rhetoric of isolationism, [creating] great confusion between illiberal hegemony or global leadership versus isolationism. Since you are an expert about strategic narrative, could you share some analysis on that?

Andrew Yeo: This is, I think, the paradox that Trump [carries]. At times, he sounds like Reagan in some sense. In fact, there is a book [where] Matt Kroenig tries to make the case that Trump is more like Reagan than you’d think. “Peace through strength” [is about having] a strong, powerful military.

Most likely, the defense budget is going to go up under Trump. But at other times, he tells allies to fend for themselves. He doesn't want to support NATO, or he tells NATO countries to fork up their own resources. That's the uncertainty, because he has these two different narratives. One day he may look like a Reagan-style conservative internationalist advocate, and the next day, he might sound like an isolationist, wanting to focus inward and deal with the immigration problem, not with global issues.

On Ukraine, I think he's been more consistent. He's been saying over and over, “Why should we support Ukraine?” It's not because he dislikes Zelenskyy or Ukraine necessarily, but he just thinks that NATO needs to do more, that this is really in Europe's theater, and it is Europe that is facing the largest threat from Russia. Even the NATO Secretary General has conceded that the European NATO members can contribute more. Of course, Europe doesn't want the U.S. to pull back—they want the U.S. to continue contributing as NATO steps up. But [Trump seems like he] doesn't necessarily want to be leading from the center when it comes to Ukraine.

The Middle East may be different. A lot of it is about business deals with the Saudis or the UAE, like getting energy deals in place. We saw [this] in the first Trump administration with the Abraham Accords. He was close to getting a deal between the Saudis and the Israelis. The Arab countries—Saudi Arabia in particular—they don't have any issues with him being illiberal. So I think he could actually get along quite well. So, I think Trump will be involved, but not in the sense of putting a lot of troops and American power into the Middle East. I think he is going to play more of a broker role.

5. Trump’s Perspective on China

But then it is the Indo Pacific, where, in some ways, there are more questions. I think he recognizes China as a threat [and sees] long-term competition. And like I said, many of the [established] leaders in his party— kind of the mainstream Republicans—it looks like he [Trump] is shying away from those in the first administration such as Matt Pottinger. [He] already passed over Mike Pompeo for any role, and [Trump] said Pompeo's not going to have any role - his second Secretary of State in his first administration. These were all people who had conservative internationalist positions.

Now Rubio and Waltz, I think, will come off as much more hawkish, but I don't know if that's what Trump would necessarily agree to. And Trump, at some point, may want to make some kind of deal with Xi Jinping. So, in some ways, I think the Indo-Pacific is the region that matters most in the long term, but it's the one where we may not have as much clarity because he talks about tariffs and reducing troops on the Korean Peninsula. But then he mentions that we need to defeat China. That's where we have these inconsistencies.

Chaesung Chun: That's a very important point. I am not sure if President Trump will approach the China issue from a purely economic nationalist perspective or from a more hegemonic, military pacing threat perspective. If it is the latter, then there should be a comprehensive approach to China, putting more emphasis on alliances and multilateral mechanisms that the Biden administration has pursued, such as Quad and AUKUS. But if he doesn't have that comprehensive view about hegemonic competition, he will not think about economic security in general but [focus on] trade surpluses.

Andrew Yeo: That is a very good way of framing [the question]. The narratives on China—whether it is about economic nationalism, focusing on tariffs, trade deficits, or [the idea] that China is stealing American jobs—[could] dominate. Or is it one about hegemonic competition, where the U.S. has to stay on top? That's where you go back to the Reagan view of global politics, and you do see U.S. leadership and military power, peace through strength, coming through.

I don't want to give Trump too much credit, but is there a way where he can thread the needle and have both? Can there be a consistent position where he looks more nativist, talking about economic nationalism—which wouldn't work well for our allies—but then [also pushes] peace through strength? He pushes allies to do more, whether it's through minilaterals or bilateral alliances.

But that will be very hard to thread because even if you look at South Korea, they want to be a good alliance partner too. But if they are getting slapped with 10, 20 percent tariffs and they're losing money, it doesn't make South Korea that willing [to be a partner]. I'm not sure if Yoon [Suk Yeol] would be as keen to work with the U.S., and that's where I wonder if China has an opening to try to pick off some of the [U.S.] allies if the allies become upset with U.S. policy because of economic nationalism. If Xi Jinping decides to do a charm offensive and reach out [to U.S. allies], that might be a problem. But it's something to look for—this economic nationalism versus hegemonic militarism.

6. Analyzing Trump’s Cabinet Picks

Chaesung Chun: Outside of the U.S., there is a perception that despite political polarization in the United States, there is consensus on view about China between the two parties or inside a party. President Trump is selecting high-ranking foreign policy officials based on their loyalty to him. But that doesn't mean loyalty will guarantee a coherent perspective on China among the officials. There might be some different views. Like in the first term, there was the so-called “group of adults” in the White House. So, could there be any balancing political forces inside the executive branch, or from Congress, that will drive Trump into a more rational way of making foreign policy? The selection of the officials will be important. What do you think?

Andrew Yeo: Yes, who has Trump's ear will be very important. On the first day or so when Senator Marco Rubio was tapped to be the Secretary of State, people were actually happy because he's a hawk, but he's respected among Republican colleagues and has experience. He's served on the Foreign Affairs Committee, and for those who follow North Korea, he's championed North Korean human rights. He's a Cuban immigrant himself. So he has this anti-communist view that shapes his anti-China and anti-North Korea positions. And it was the same for Representative Waltz for National Security Advisor, as they [both] have experience and are respected by colleagues.

[However,] for Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth—a Fox News personality—has no real experience on the strategic front. He served in the U.S. Army as a junior officer, but that doesn't really give him the strategic picture to make decisions. That's what [I find] troubling. The rumor with Hegseth [is that] Trump thought there were insiders and some Cabinet officials that stonewalled him [during his first term], trying to prevent him from implementing what he really wanted to do. To avoid that, he is now picking loyalists who may not necessarily have experience or committed views. That could be a problem.

There aren't any guard rails, and there isn't any way to restrain [Trump] if he makes decisions. [This] really undermines not only the U.S. national interests, but also the global or regional security.

So yes, we do have to look very closely to see who fills the Cabinet positions. But I do want to remind everyone that just because Trump appoints people doesn't mean that they will get approved [by the Senate]. Some positions like the National Security Advisor, don't require [Senate] confirmation, so that would be a concern.

Chaesung Chun: That is very helpful in understanding what's happening at the early stage of the selection of some important positions.

■ Andrew YEO is a senior fellow and the SK-Korea Foundation Chair at the Brookings Institution’s Center for Asia Policy Studies. He is also a professor of politics at The Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C.

■ Edited by: Jisoo Park, Research Associate
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