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I. The Destabilization of the Liberal International Order and North Korea's Counter-Discourse

The Trump administration is seeking to build a new international order, emphasizing the critical awareness that the liberal international order, upheld for the past 80 years, has undermined U.S. national interests. In this process, while the administration poses a fundamental challenge to existing international norms, it has failed to articulate a clear vision for an alternative order. At the same time, strategic choices that do not shy away from conflict with allies are causing significant confusion and uncertainty throughout the international community. These moves by the U.S., which prioritize its own interests and shake the foundations of the existing order, are not merely a problem for the U.S. but carry significant implications for other nations as well. This is because as common norms and consensus on the international order weaken, a situation arises in which each country increasingly advances competing discourses on international order to justify its own interests.

Since the post-Cold War era, North Korea has intermittently employed discursive resistance against the U.S.-led unipolar system. More recently, as the relative decline of the U.S. has become more visible and U.S.-China strategic competition has intensified, and North Korea had adopted a more expansive discourse on international order. Major international shocks, such as the war in Ukraine, have further reinforced this shift.

The core concepts North Korea advances are “multipolarization” and the “New Cold War.” It had already demonstrated an awareness of the possibility of multipolarization in the international order at the turn of the 21st century, and in the 2020s, it has shown attempts to define the current international situation as a “New Cold War.” Recently, discussions on such multipolarization have appeared more frequently and systematically.[1]

In this context, North Korea's discourse on multipolarization can be understood as an attempt to redefine its position and strategy within the changing international order, beyond mere rhetoric. Analyzing the nature of the multipolar international order as perceived by North Korea—and the political and strategic significance of that discourse—provides important implications for understanding the future situation on the Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asian international politics, and broader shifts in the global order.

II. The Evolution of North Korea's Perception of International Order: The Formation of Multipolarization and New Cold War Discourses

In recent years, North Korea has redefined the international order in the language of "the collapse of the unipolar system and the advent of multipolarization." This concept, which appears repeatedly in the Rodong Sinmun and official party and state discourses, goes beyond a the dimension of simple perception of the international situation. It functions more as a discourse on order designed to justify North Korea's diplomatic and military lines within the changing international environment and to institutionally solidify them.

This perception is explicitly documented in the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty signed between North Korea and Russia. The preamble of the treaty criticizes hegemonic attempts to impose a unipolar world order, emphasizing the need to establish a multipolar international system based on the primacy of international law in international relations. This can be interpreted as an effort to explicitly declare a rejection of the existing U.S.-centric order while simultaneously presenting the normative principles of an alternative order. Article 6, which refers to "establishment of a just and multipolar new world order," shows that the multipolarization discourse is being codified and institutionalized through a formal legal agreement between states. In North Korean discourse, multipolarization is not merely a prospect or hope, but is establishing itself as a strategic concept to define the ongoing changes in the international order and to actively intervene in them.

The concept of multipolarization began to appear intermittently in North Korea's official discourse starting in the 21st century. In the early 2000s, North Korea perceived the international order as a structure of confrontation between the U.S.-led unipolar system and forces oriented toward multipolarity opposing it. In particular, it pointed to the U.S. establishment of a missile defense system and its strategy for world domination as key examples of unipolarization, claiming that cooperation among major powers centered on China and Russia, and solidarity among regional countries, were forming an objective trend transitioning toward multipolarization. During this period, multipolarization was presented as an "inevitable historical imperative" and a historical trend forecasting changes in the future international strategic structure.[2]

Since the mid-2000s, North Korea's discourse on multipolarization has unfolded more specifically around actors and institutions. The strengthening of cooperation among China, Russia, and India, the growth of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the European Union's pursuit of independent security capabilities, and the collective solidarity of developing countries are all presented as examples substantially driving the multipolarization of the world. North Korea evaluated that these trends were operating in a direction that checks U.S. unilateralism and coercion, and promotes the democratization of international relations, defining multipolarization as the key pathway to realizing a fair international order and an independent world.[3]

Since 2008, the discourse on multipolarization has gone beyond criticism of the international order to gradually take on the character of an alternative order theory. North Korea defines multipolarization as a historical trend accelerating the weakening of the U.S.-centric order and its international isolation, while claiming that regional integration and cooperation among states are changing the global strategic structure itself. In particular, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, and solidarity movements in Africa and Latin America are presented as key driving forces constituting the new international order, as multipolarization is explained not—merely as a prospect or possibility—but as a structural transformation of the international order that is already in progress.[4]

Along with the discourse on multipolarization, North Korea has increasingly presented the concept of a New Cold War since the late 2000s. Even as the international community sought to avoid a repetition of the Cold War, North Korea identified the source of growing concern over a "new Cold War" in the conflict and contradiction between multipolar and unipolar forces. More specifically, it articulated the logic in which the collapse of the post-Cold war balance of power allowed continued U.S. coercion, while growing backlash and countervailing pressures strengthened forces favoring multipolarization. In this view, the collision between efforts to sustain unipolarity and the advance of multipolarization has generated discussion of a "new Cold War."[5]

Subsequently, North Korea connected the possibility of the creation of a New Cold War at the Northeast Asian level to more direct military structural issues. It argues that U.S. moves to strengthen military cooperation and alliance structures and maintain a long-term military system— ostensibly in cooperation with Japan and South Korea—serve to maintain and reinforce a Cold War-style structure in Northeast Asia. Furthermore, defining the trilateral military cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan as the formation of a new military bloc, advances the argument that the legacy of the Cold War must be dismantled for regional peace and security. At this time, the New Cold War functions—not simply as a diagnosis of the international situation—but as a concept justifying vigilance and response to alliance reorganization and military deployment.[6]

Chairman Kim Jong Un explicitly used the concept of a New Cold War himself, officially codifying North Korea's perception of the international order at the supreme leader level. Through the policy speech at the Supreme People's Assembly in September 2021, the term New Cold War became firmly established. Here, the core change in the structure of international relations was defined as a transition to a New Cold War, and at the 6th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea in December 2022, it was diagnosed that the structure of international relations had "clearly transitioned to a New Cold War system and that the trend of multipolarization is accelerating."[7]

III. An Undefined Multipolar World: The Structural Ambiguity of North Korea’s Discourse

North Korea currently uses the concept of a multipolar world more frequently than the concept of a New Cold War. The concept of a New Cold War assumes a clear bloc confrontation and implies the inevitability of confrontation between the U.S. and China. Since China and Russia also use the concept of a multipolar order but do not pursue hostile confrontation or bloc formation with the U.S., it appears difficult for North Korea to rely on the concept of a New Cold War alone.[8]

The issue lies in how North Korea conceptualizes multipolarity. North Korea frequently employs the term “multipolarization,” employing the concept of a multipolar world, and also uses the adjective “multipolar.” However, it does not use related international political concepts such as a multipolar system, a concert of great powers, or spheres of influence. While multipolarization is characterized more by its transitional nature—a shift away from unipolarity rather than a clearly defined static concept—it is noteworthy that North Korea offers no clear conceptual definition of the kind of international order that will arrive after the transition period of multipolarization. It is a characteristic of North Korean discourse that the nature of its post-transition order is unclear—whether a cooperative system among multiple great powers or a confrontational system will be established, whether it will be viewed as a competition of multiple spheres of influence, or whether a stable multipolar system among multiple poles is possible once multipolarization is achieved.

The multipolar world presented by North Korea is not a simple state of balance of power, but a new normative order intended to replace the West-led international order. Thus, multipolarization seems to mean not simply a phenomenon where the number of great powers increases, but a transition of the international order where the independence and sovereignty of each country are substantially restored. In North Korean discourse, multipolarization entails the dismantling of the "rules-based international order" led by the U.S. and the West. As an alternative, it advances the logic that the establishment of a world order based on international law, respect for sovereignty, and political equality is necessary. At this time, multipolarization is defined not as an end in itself, but as a transition mechanism aimed at ending imperialism and domination. North Korea ultimately envisions an international order of "global independence (Jaju)," which refers to a post-imperialist international system where all countries and nations choose their own development paths without external coercion or subjugation.

North Korea emphasizes that such multipolarization is a historical inevitability. It views that "no matter how aggressively imperialist forces behave, they ultimately cannot suppress the aspiration and struggle of progressive humanity to establish an independent new world and a multipolar global order," showing the conviction that "it is an unstoppable law of historical development that the old perishes and the new triumphs."[9]

North Korea's discourse on international order starts from a fundamental negation of the existing order; North Korea combines “Western decline” and “the rise of multipolarization” into a single historical law, thereby justifying its strategic choices. The multipolar world presented by North Korea is defined not as a simple state of power dispersion, but as a transition stage of a new normative order forming amidst the historical transition period in which the West-centric unipolar order collapses. The premise is that the collapse of Western imperialism leads to multipolarization, asserting that "as long as humanity aspires to anti-imperialist independence, a fair and just new world will certainly be built," with "anti-imperialist independence portrayed as a powerful force capable of weakening the imperialist domination system and transforming the world order."[10]

Here, the concept of multipolarization is constructed in a manner quite different from the balance of power among great powers or competition among multiple poles discussed in international relations theory. The core fault line in multipolarization is framed not as the U.S. versus China and Russia, but as the West versus the non-West, or more precisely, hegemonic states versus the “Global Majority” of independent states. In this narrative, China and Russia certainly appear as important actors; China is described as an emerging power shifting the central axis of the global economy, and Russia as a powerful resistance state neutralizing the military and strategic superiority of the West. However, in North Korean discourse, there are few cases where these countries are explicitly described as poles equal to the U.S. China and Russia are presented as drivers and facilitators of multipolarization, but they are not framed as central axes organizing and managing the multipolar world.

In North Korea's concept of multipolarization, precise comparisons of national power or analyses of power distribution structures rarely appear. Pole distinctions based on objective indicators such as China's GDP, Russia's military power, and U.S. technological prowess are marginalized in North Korean discourse. Instead, moral language such as "global majority," "justice," "historical trend," and "decline of imperialism" serves as the primary basis for justifying multipolarization. Multipolarization is constructed through a moral and political rejection of Western hegemony rather than through scientific analysis of power distribution.

If North Korea understood the multipolar order as a tripolar system of the U.S., China, and Russia, it would naturally be relegated to a subordinate status under one of them, that is, falling within the sphere of influence of China or Russia. However, North Korean discourse explicitly rejects such a reorganization of order centered on great powers. Instead, North Korea redefines multipolarization as the collective rise of independent states, describing it as a loose coalition structure of various non-Western countries, including China and Russia.

Of course, North Korea's concept of a multipolar world shares some discourse with China and Russia; all three countries criticize the West-centric normative order, particularly the 'rules-based international order,' as a tool of hegemony applied hypocritically and selectively. However, China perceives multipolarization as a matter of orderly management rather than disorder, approaching it as a project to expand its influence by redesigning and institutionalizing rules rather than denying them. Russia uses multipolarization as strategic language to justify resistance against Western norms and the relocation of geopolitical power, attempting to realize this through military conflict and non-Western solidarity. Even under the same term of multipolarization, North Korea centers on the logic of ideology and survival, China on institutions and management, and Russia on force and conflict; these differences in perception may act as factors deepening the instability and complexity of the multipolar order itself.

In this context, structural uncertainty is inherent in North Korea's multipolarization discourse: if China and Russia are clear poles, North Korea's line of independence immediately collides with the problem of subordination to great powers. North Korea reconciles this contradiction by redefining the subjects of multipolarization not as great powers but as a set of independent states.

This discourse structure is also connected to the fundamental distrust North Korea holds toward the great power concert system or the sphere of influence order. Historically, North Korea has perceived a system in which a few great powers manage the world as a form of imperialist collusion. Therefore, a structure in which the U.S., China, and Russia implicitly divide and manage the world cannot be recognized as a legitimate multipolar order in North Korea's independence discourse.

What North Korea seeks is not a balance among great powers, but a structure that constrains the coercion of great powers themselves. Thus, North Korea positions itself not alongside China or Russia, but as part of in an identity community with the Third World, the Global South, and weak states. North Korea explains that "multilateral cooperation mechanisms such as BRICS are accelerating the process of global multipolarization," asserting that "even the Western world has been forced to admit that BRICS has confidently emerged as an independent and powerful pole driving the establishment of a new international economic order and the construction of a multipolar world."

This logic differs from simply emphasizing the emergence of other great powers such as China and Russia, to the exclusion of the U.S. The language of imperialism, neocolonialism, and subordination through aid—terms that repeatedly appear in North Korean discourse—operates as a universal critical logic targeting not only the West but potentially any great power. This serves as a criterion that can potentially be applied to the expansion of economic and military influence by China and Russia as well, providing a theoretical shield for North Korea to reject pressure or conditional support from these countries in the future.[11]

The multipolar order raised by North Korea has a dual discourse structure designed to justify strategic cooperation with China and Russia while simultaneously guarding against their becoming great powers (hegemons). However, precisely because of this duality, North Korea's multipolarization fails to present a concrete image of the future order. Questions regarding who constitutes the poles, what the rules between poles are, and how the independence of weak states is institutionally guaranteed are left intentionally unanswered. This uncertainty is not a simple theoretical defect but can be seen as a form of strategic ambiguity chosen by North Korea to maintain diplomatic flexibility. Multipolarization should thus be understood for North Korea not as a bond or subordination to a specific great power, but as a discursive device to secure political space to neutralize U.S. pressure.

The multipolar world raised by North Korea appears on the surface to be a consistent worldview; narratives of the decline of Western hegemony, the rise of the non-Western world, the emergence of anti-Western great powers like China and Russia, the collective resistance of independent states, and the formation of a new international order are presented as a single historical process. However, when theoretically deconstructed, the three core concepts forming its foundation—independence (Jaju), anti-Westernism, and multipolarization—reveal contradictions rather than coherence.

First, the subject North Korea values, namely the line of independence, is essentially based on the Westphalian concept of sovereignty. It is the principle that every country has the right to choose its own system and development method without external interference. Here, tension arises between independence and multipolarization: while the principle of independence presupposes equal sovereignty of all nations, multipolarization implies an order in which a few great powers structurally occupy superiority. If a multipolar order is dominated by a few poles, including China and Russia, the independence of weak states like North Korea is inevitably bound to be limited. This explains why North Korea redefines the poles of multipolarization as a set of independent states, without explicitly defining them.

The tension between independence and anti-Westernism is also distinct; independence is principally a neutral concept—whether a country forms an alliance with the U.S. or cooperates with China, it should be that country's sovereign choice. However, North Korea's anti-Western discourse includes a moral judgment defining cooperation with the West itself as submission or servitude. At this moment, independence degenerates from a universal sovereignty principle into a conditional value recognized only when belonging to a specific camp—the anti-Western camp. This results in North Korea limiting the concept of independence itself.

The combination of multipolarization and anti-Westernism is also theoretically unstable; multipolarization is an analytical concept regarding the distribution of power, whereas anti-Westernism is a matter of historical responsibility and moral legitimacy. North Korea combines the two to create a narrative of Western decline and the rise of a just majority, while overlooking the possibility that multipolarization will intensify competition among great powers and struggles for regional hegemony in the future.

Such conceptual tensions are also revealed in how North Korea perceives the great power concert system or sphere of influence order. While North Korean discourse superficially criticizes U.S. hegemony, underlying it is a distrust of the system itself where a few great powers manage the world. A structure in which the U.S., China, and Russia implicitly divide and manage the world is merely a new form of imperialism to North Korea. Thus, North Korea reinterprets multipolarization not as a concert of great powers, but as collective resistance of independent states. However, this reinterpretation is highly likely to show increasing disparity with the reality of existing power structures.

North Korea's emphasis on unity with the Third World and the Global South is also a strategy to reconcile these contradictions. North Korea positions itself not as part of the socialist camp or the China-Russia bloc, but within the historical solidarity of weak states that have fought against imperialism. Criticism of imperialism, neocolonialism, and subordination through aid is a normative criterion targeting the West while simultaneously framed as a general standard applicable to all. This provides a theoretical basis to define any future economic or military pressure from China and Russia as an infringement on independence.

Ultimately, North Korea's multipolarization discourse has a dual character: it is a shield to protect independence and a tool to justify reliance on great powers. This contradiction is not a simple theoretical inconsistency but a structural dilemma of North Korean diplomacy. As it approaches China and Russia to avoid U.S. pressure, the possibility of a clash with their great power interests also increases. Multipolarization serves as a discursive device to preemptively resolve this clash, but over the long term, it may itself transform into a new constraint.

IV. The Deployment and Prospects of North Korea's Multipolarization Strategy

The reason North Korea has brought the multipolarization discourse to the forefront in recent years is less a simple interpretation of the international situation than an effort to expand its strategic space amidst a changing environment. Multipolarization can be seen as functioning for North Korea not as a consistent vision of order, but as strategic rhetoric to counter U.S. pressure, coordinate relations with China and Russia, and simultaneously maintain independence. Through the multipolarization discourse, North Korea seeks to challenge the structure in which nuclear possession and regime survival are defined as abnormal which the U.S.-centric unipolar order, and to reframe nuclear possession as a legitimate security guarantee for an independent state. This aligns with efforts to define denuclearization as an anachronistic demand and to codify nuclear forces into the constitution; at the same time, North Korea emphasizes the legitimacy of the multipolarization discourse while criticizing the Trump administration's "America First" policy. North Korea criticizes, "The more the current U.S. administration pursues a unilateral policy based on 'America First' which absolutizes exclusive U.S. interests, the more the global trend of multipolarization will accelerate, leading to the total downfall of the U.S., the empire of evil and hub of imperialism."[12]

At the same time, multipolarization operates as a negotiation card toward China and Russia, pursuing a strategy of guarding against subordination to great powers by placing independence and solidarity of weak states at the forefront while emphasizing anti-Western solidarity. This perception is highly likely to lead to a strategy of advancing nuclear capabilities while sustaining long-term confrontation and limited negotiations with the U.S., alongside maintaining strategic closeness and structural vigilance in relations with China and Russia. Ultimately, the multipolarization discourse functions both as an ideological asset to defend independence in North Korean diplomacy and as a practical tool to widen strategic options among great powers, reflecting both the core implication of North Korea's foreign strategy and its structural limitations.

These changes pose important policy challenges for South Korea. First, South Korea must formulate an independent discourse on how it perceives the changing international order and articulate its vision for a desirable future order. In a situation where the future discourse of the international order advanced by the U.S. becomes increasingly unsettled, a view of order is needed that protects South Korea's national interests, is morally justifiable, and is effective in resetting relations with North Korea. If discourses such as nuclear non-proliferation norms advanced by the U.S. or the West are fundamentally undermined and this shift is rationalized through multipolarization discourse, South Korea will face great difficulties in maintaining the rules-based order as well as its nuclear deterrence strategy in the future.

Second, South Korea must closely consider the fact that North Korea's multipolarization discourse does not automatically stabilize relations with China and Russia. North Korea maintains fundamental distrust of dependence on great powers, meaning that its relations with China and Russia may expose tensions and fissures at any time over the long term. In this process, South Korean diplomacy needs to present a new dialogue framework that integrates sovereignty, regional security, and the future of the Korean Peninsula together.

Third, there exists a possibility that South Korea's position could become structurally vulnerable in an environment where the multipolarization discourse is spreading. If the U.S., China, and Russia attempt to rearrange the Korean Peninsula around their respective strategic interests, North Korea is likely to seek direct participation at the negotiation table as an independent state, while South Korea may find itself in a difficult position amidst competition among great powers. Maintaining an alliance with the U.S. amidst shifts in U.S. alliance policy, while also resetting relations with China and Russia are urgent tasks. South Korea must actively articulate the rules and principles that should govern stability and sovereignty on the Korean Peninsula within the changing international order. Furthermore, in its relations with North Korea, South Korea must move beyond simply managing confrontation and breakdown, and instead secure greater discursive influence in debates surrounding order and sovereignty.

[1] Seok, Sang Hun. 2025. “Crafting a Multipolar World: Pyongyang's Evolving Narratives,” The RUSI Journal 170(3): 74–82.

[2] “The multipolarization of the world is an inevitable demand of the times,” Rodong Sinmun, September 5, 2000.

[3] “The trend toward a multipolar world is unstoppable,” Rodong Sinmun, March 4, 2006.

[4] “The multipolarization of the world is an unstoppable international trend,” Rodong Sinmun, February 22, 2008.

[5] “Background to the Emergence of the ‘New Cold War’ Theory,” Korean Central News Agency, June 7, 2008.

[6] “The Cold War Structure Must Be Eliminated in Northeast Asia,” Korean Central News Agency, March 10, 2011.

[7] Park Won Gon, “The New Cold War World Envisioned by North Korea,” East Asia Institute, Commentary Issue Briefing, March 9, 2023.

[8] Lee Dong-ryul, “China's Perception and Calculations Regarding North Korea's ‘New Cold War Theory’,” East Asia Institute, Commentary Issue Briefing, February 27, 2023; Jang Se-ho, “Russia's Position on North Korea's New Cold War Perception,” East Asia Institute, Commentary Issue Briefing, March 23, 2023.

[9] “What Does the War Threat Abhorred by the West Teach Us?” Rodong Sinmun, August 24, 2025

[10] “A new world of justice lies in unwavering anti-imperialist independence,” Rodong Sinmun, June 8, 2025.

[11] “The Increasingly Elevated Orientation Toward Multipolarity,” Rodong Sinmun, May 10, 2025.

[12] “America First policy, which places absolute priority on U.S. exclusive interests, will actively promote multipolarity worldwide.” Rodong Sinmun. March 15, 2025.

■ Chaesung Chun is President of EAI and Professor of International Relations as Seoul National University.

■ Translated and edited by Inhwan OH, EAI Senior Research Fellow; Sangjun LEE, EAI Research Associate; Justin Chiyoon Chung, EAI Intern
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