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Summary and Preface

North Korea's nuclear strategy can be seen as applying the Russian doctrine of "Strategic Deterrence". Currently, the two pillars of North Korea's nuclear strategy are the 2022 Nuclear Forces Policy Law and the "Hostile Two-State Theory" formalized in 2023. These two are inextricably linked; when integrated, they reveal a strategic concept in which North Korea intends to dominate the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and become its master through the threat of preemptive nuclear attacks and the instigation of nuclear war. This strategic concept is based on the background that North Korea's strategic status has risen to its highest level in decades. In response to this North Korea, South Korea and the United States are pursuing a policy of conflict-crisis avoidance. This shows that South Korea and the US have internalized North Korea's increased capabilities and threats, responding with self-deterrence.

Victory Theory of North Korea's Nuclear Strategy: Winning not through Warfighting but through Coercive Threat

North Korea's nuclear strategy can be summarized in three stages:

1. North Korea vividly and realistically exaggerates its nuclear capabilities and its will to actually use them.

2. Through this, it exerts a psychological and intellectual influence on the decision-making of the opponent's leadership.

3. Consequently, the opponent's leadership voluntarily acts cautiously toward North Korea, behaves as North Korea wishes, or accepts North Korea's demands.

This nuclear strategy is not necessarily a policy intended to start an actual nuclear war, but rather a policy that uses the threat that North Korea could risk starting a nuclear war through preemptive use as a means of coercion. If North Korea were to intentionally decide to start a nuclear war via preemptive use, it would ultimately mean choosing self-destruction. Therefore, this is not a rational judgment for North Korea. However, if the opponent realizes that North Korea's capability and will regarding preemptive nuclear provocation are a bluff, North Korea's nuclear strategy collapses.

To prevent the collapse of its strategy, North Korea must exaggerate its nuclear capability level and will for actual use even more realistically, vividly, and dangerously. However, as North Korea excessively displays its will to risk nuclear war and engages in overacting to politically subdue the opponent, tensions rise due to proportional or excessive counter-responses. In this process, an accidental actual nuclear war could occur due to misjudgment by one or both sides, regardless of their actual intentions.

North Korea's most effective threat is to make the opponent clearly understand that North Korea's tolerance for risk in a competition of nuclear war risk-taking is much higher than that of the opponent. In other words, North Korea aims to secure superiority in risk-taking competition and escalation control, thereby politically suppressing the opponent and forcing them to accept transactions favorable to North Korea. Since North Korea would inevitably lose in a competition surrounding the performance and quantity of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, it seeks victory by changing the conflict structure into a competition of risk-taking regarding the (accidental) outbreak of nuclear war.

This strategy can be summarized as aiming to win without fighting by leveraging increased nuclear capabilities. Through the threat of starting a nuclear war via preemptive use, North Korea forces the opponent's leadership and/or general public to internalize the fear of nuclear war risks. Due to this internalized fear, the opponent becomes cautious, avoids conflict, gives up resistance to threats, and increases their willingness to voluntarily and preemptively accept North Korea's demands.

North Korean Application of the Russian 'Strategic Deterrence' Concept

The concept of 'Strategic Deterrence' was established by Russia around 2014-15. Although North Korea does not explicitly use this term, analyzing its nuclear strategy through the lens of the policy discourse supporting this concept makes it much easier to understand.

According to the Russian Ministry of Defense's military encyclopedia, Strategic Deterrence is defined as a coordinated system of military and non-military (political, diplomatic, legal, economic, ideological, scientific-technical, etc.) measures. These measures are taken sequentially or simultaneously to deter military actions damaging to the state... aiming to stabilize the military-political situation. Its purpose is to influence the adversary nation... The targets of influence are the military-political leadership and the citizens of the potential enemy state.

The objectives of Strategic Deterrence are fourfold:

1. Discourage aggression or coercive pressure.

2. Prevent threats from being created.

3. Manage escalation if conflict begins.

4. Ensure the conflict ends on favorable terms.

Strategic Deterrence is achieved through Cross-Domain Pressure, consisting of three key pillars:

1. Nuclear Capabilities: The core pillar. A solid nuclear shadow expands the space for other means.

2. Conventional Capabilities: Precision strikes, long-range missiles, and air/missile defense are crucial.

3. Non-Conventional/Non-Military Tools: Cyber, information warfare, diplomatic/ideological means, and economic leverage. Especially important is manipulating/controlling the perception of the opposing camp favorably.

Strategic Deterrence mixes these three to influence the adversary leadership's perception of cost, risk, and escalation, thereby constraining their thoughts and actions.

Advantages of Strategic Deterrence:

• Reduces reliance on nuclear weapons by including non-nuclear/non-military means.

• Aims to constrain behavior or force desired actions through coercion rather than destruction.

• Reflects a consistent and integrated coercion logic across national levels.

Disadvantages (Instability):

• Justifies offensive coercion as defense.

• Ignores how the adversary perceives one's actions.

• Blurs the line between peace and war by requiring high-level proactive coercion even in peacetime.

• Ignores the possibility of unintended escalation by assuming all adversary actions are deliberate.

Application to North Korea: When linking the Russian theory to North Korea's "Victory Theory," North Korea is pursuing "Strategic Deterrence" with the threat of nuclear war via preemptive strike as its main tool. It seeks to maximize fear to induce self-deterrence in the opponent, thereby achieving a victory (restructuring the security structure in its favor) through threats alone, without actual fighting or total destruction.

This is the political essence of North Korea's recent stance. The 2022 "Nuclear Forces Policy" and the 2023 "Hostile Two-State Theory" (threatening to scorch and annex South Korea) are political propaganda materials carefully crafted to influence the opponent's situational awareness and fear levels. Integrating these logics, North Korea threatens that if it judges a threat to its leadership or regime is "imminent," it will launch a preemptive nuclear strike to scorch and annex South Korea.

This narrative serves North Korea's goals in two ways:

1. Arbitrary Judgment: The determination of "imminency of threat" is entirely up to North Korea. It creates room to interpret routine US-ROK drills as imminent threats, allowing North Korea to declare readiness for preemptive nuclear strikes at will. This aims to shrink US-ROK military activities.

2. Internalized Fear: It aims to subconsciously implant nuclear war fear in South Korea's leadership and public. By repeatedly creating crisis situations, North Korea intends to imprint the horror of nuclear destruction, eventually influencing policy decisions. If successful, South Korean policy and public opinion will succumb to threats, accepting negotiations on terms structurally favorable to North Korea or freezing hostility at current levels to avoid further conflict. This allows North Korea to win without war or accumulate small victories, meaning North Korea takes the lead in determining the stability of the peninsula.

North Korea's Strategic Concept for the Future

According to the US DIA's 2025 report, North Korea has risen to its most advantageous position in decades, backed by increased nuclear/missile capabilities and the favorbale international environment (strengthened DPRK-Russia cooperation). The 2022 Nuclear Law and 2023 Two-State Theory reflect this position.

These strategies signal North Korea's future direction:

1. Self-Guaranteed Security: North Korea's security is now guaranteed by its own nuclear forces; it no longer needs security assurances from the US or others.

2. Rejection of Past Models: Given the solidified confrontation between the US-led West and the anti-American authoritarian bloc, improving relations based on denuclearization or establishing a peace regime is impossible. The necessary condition for those projects to be successful is the consolidation of great power rapproachement in the region. This would not happen in the near future. North Korea no longer pursues those goals.

3. New Options: North Korea's choice is to either coercively force recognition as a nuclear state or maintain a permanent hostile relationship.

4. Global Anti-American Bloc: North Korea has emerged as a major player alongside China and Russia in the global anti-American authoritarian solidarity. This was symbolized by Kim Jong-un standing alongside Xi Jinping and Putin at the 2025 parade. North Korea is now a strategic asset to China and Russia.

The "Hostile Two-State Theory": This is the future strategic vision synthesizing the above conditions.

• North Korea is in an arms race with the ROK-US-Japan alliance, which is disadvantageous given its weaker national power.

• However, by relieving the burden on China and Russia in Northeast Asia and supporting Russia in Ukraine, North Korea receives support.

• To maintain its value as an asset, North Korea must continue its military buildup and adventurous foreign policy to disperse and weaken ROK-US-Japan capabilities.

• Internally, the "Hostile Two-State Theory" justifies permanent arms buildup, a quasi-state of war, economic austerity, and political control.

• It completely rejects the South Korean paradigm of "denuclearization and exchange/cooperation" and enforces the North Korean paradigm of "two most hostile states at war".

• Combined with the Nuclear Forces Policy, it provides a means to control US-ROK forces via threats and neutralize South Korea's overall national power superiority.

• It elevates North Korea to the level of China and Russia and opens a path for direct dealings with the US, excluding South Korea.

Conclusion: South Korea and the US's Self-Deterrence

Current South Korean and US policies reflect North Korea's elevated status. The focus of their internal perception framework is shifting from the old principle of "adhering to denuclearization and risking conflict/punishment" to a new principle of "avoiding conflict/crisis through appeasement".

• United States: Since Trump's first term, preventing nuclear attacks on the US and forming a new relationship with North Korea (as a de facto nuclear state) have become key considerations. In Trump's second term, the policy goal appears to be crisis avoidance based on appeasing North Korea.

• South Korea: The current government aims to improve relations and resume cooperation by avoiding conflict. Based on the "any peace is better than war" theory, avoiding conflict and keeping peace is the top priority, with denuclearization relegated to a later stage after exchange/normalization.

This indicates that South Korea and the US are partially accepting what North Korea has long demanded. It means North Korea's nuclear coercion has penetrated the perception structures of South Korea and the US, partially changing the basic framework of policy making. This can be termed the "Self-Deterrence" of South Korea and the United States.

■ Hyeong Jung PARK is an Independent Researcher on North Korea.

■ Edited by Sangjun LEE, EAI Research Associate
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