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Abstract

The military must be prepared by anticipating worst-case scenarios. This article explores the possibility of simultaneous wars involving a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and a Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) preemptive strike in Northeast Asia, while assessing the need for a warfighting systern led by the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea).

Under bilateral agreements (U.S. Department of Defense and ROK Ministry of National Defense 2018), the South Korean and U.S. militaries are restructuring their Combined Forces Command (CFC) into the ROK-U.S. post-Operational Control (OPCON) transition CFC, in which a South Korean General or Admiral, appointed by South Korean national authorities, will serve as commander. The national authorities of the U.S. are to appoint a General or an Admiral to serve as the deputy commander of the post-OPCON transition CFC, thereby facilitating the transition of wartime operational control. With the inauguration of the second Trump administration, the OPCON transition is expected to gain renewed momentum. The administration's commitment is reflected in the U.S. Department of Defense's Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance and remarks by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby, who emphasized the delegation of greater authority to capable and willing allies such as the ROK (Washington Post 2025).

Preparing for OPCON transition in anticipation of regional conflict is not merely a defense policy adjustment—it is a vital national interest that demands unified national resolve.

Comprehensive preparations across four dimensions—citizenry, government, military, and the alliance—are essential to successfully transition wartime operational control. The South Korean citizenry must embrace the imperative of autonomous national defense, shifting away from excessive reliance on the alliance and toward a posture rooted in the defense of liberal democratic values. The government must reinforce the authority of the National Security Council and institutionalize a Wartime Guidance systern. On the military front, South Korean Armed Forces must establish a Joint Forces Command to unify peacetime and wartime command, while simultaneously advancing warfighting capabilities in war command, strategic planning, intelligence assessment, operational plans, operational sustainment, along with strengthening a military proficient in modern warfare.

At the alliance level, delineating the roles and relationships among the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), United Nations Command (UNC), Combined Forces Command (CFC), and United States Forces Korea (USFK) is essential. The Military Committee—composed of South Korean and U.S. JCS chairmen—should provide strategic directives and operational guidance to the CFC. The ROK JCS should lead readiness posture and counter-provocation operations. The UNC should maintain oversight of the armistice agreement and provide forces of its member states in the event of war. The CFC should continue to refine operational plans, conduct combined exercises, and, in wartime, assume operational control over South Korean forces, USFK and U.S. augmented forces, while exercising tactical control over UNC combat units. USFK, in turn, should maintain combined readiness and execute wartime missions under the CFC commander's operational control.

This article proposes the establishment of a ROK-U.S.-Japan Military Cooperation Task Force, composed of strategic planning personnel and security experts from the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, and the Japanese Joint Operations Command, to coordinate joint responses to regional challenges, provocations, and threats across Northeast Asia.

I. Introduction

The military must remain prepared for the worst-case scenario at all times. This article explores the necessity of establishing a warfighting command structure led by the Republic of Korea (ROK) military by analyzing a potential scenario in which the People's Republic of China (PRC or China) invades Taiwan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) launches a preemptive strike, leading to a simultaneous conflict in Northeast Asia.

A hypothetical scenario is as follows: "In 2027, on the centennial of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), China invades Taiwan under the pretext of securing maritime hegemony and achieving national unification. Seizing the opportunity, Kim Jong-un, who categorically defines inter-Korean relations not as kinship but as those between hostile states, initiates a full-scale armed invasion of the ROK. Wars erupt simultaneously on two fronts: the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula. The United States diverts significant military assets, including portions of U.S. Forces Korea, to the Taiwan theater, and Japan lends support to the Taiwan front. As a result, the ROK is left to independently repel the DPRK's invasion (Chung and Zmire 2024)."

At the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) plenary session in December 2023, North Korea asserted the doctrine of "two hostile states" (KCNA 12/31/2023). It has since encouraged their domestic population to brace for a major upheaval in the name of territorial unification, while simultaneously mobilizing tactical nuclear units and conducting full-scale maneuver training for its commanding officers aimed at occupying South Korea (KBS 8/31/2023; JoongAng Ilbob 4/23). Alongside the continual enhancement of its nuclear capabilities, North Korea has sustained frequent test launches of short-range missiles, intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

Missiles launched from North Korea's territory have dropped on impact zone in the East and West Seas as well as beyond the Japanese archipelago. Should the flight trajectories of these missiles be redirected from their current impact zones of the firing positions, their targets would include strategic nodes or high-value targets such as the ROK Presidential Office in Yongsan, the Ministry of National Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Osan, Pyeongtaek, and Gyeryongdae. U.S. military bases positioned in the region—including Yokosuka, Kadena, Sasebo, and Okinawa—as well as assets on Guam and Hawaii, also fall squarely within range. These patterns suggest that the North is undertaking a rehearsal for full-scale war.

Meanwhile, Beijing has made it clear that the use of force remains an option in its pursuit of unification with Taiwan. On May 23, 2024, coinciding with the inauguration of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te, the PRC executed encirclement exercises surrounding Taiwan. In October 2024, following Lai's National Day address that referenced the "two states" theory[1] (Kyunghyang Shinmun 2024), China once again mobilized aircraft carriers and hundreds of fighter jets to conduct a major show of force. On April 1, 2025, the PLA commenced joint army-navy-air force-rocket force drills in a coordinated formation encircling Taiwan. According to a spokesperson for the PLA Eastern Theater Command, these exercises constituted "a stern warning to separatist forces advocating Taiwanese independence and a powerful act of deterrence," further claiming they were "legitimate and necessary actions to defend national sovereignty and pursue national unification (No Cut News 2025)."

It would be imprudent to rule out the possibility of coordinated two-front wars collaborated by Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un. In such a scenario, U.S. defense analysts contend that American forces based in Japan, Guam, and even the ROK would likely be redeployed to Taiwan, forcing the ROK to face a multifront conflict unaided (VOA 2024). Given the geographic separation between Taiwan and China's Northern Theater Command (NTC), PLA forces stationed there are likely to commit NTC forces into the Korean Theater Operations (KTO). Moreover, aircraft carrier strike groups based in Dalian and Qingdao would likely seek to assert control over the West Sea, or the Yellow Sea through an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) strategy, thereby securing maritime supremacy across the first island chain.

Per their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, Russia may also intervene: the Russian Pacific Fleet could deploy into the East and South Seas from Vladivostok, while the Eastern Military District Command in Khabarovsk may commit its ground forces into the KTO. In contrast, under the most adverse circumstances—absent allied support—the ROK military could be left to face a joint invasion by North Korea, Chinese, and Russian forces on its own. The critical question, then, is whether the ROK is truly prepared to withstand and prevail in such a catastrophic scenario.

With this strategic awareness in mind, this article examines why the transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) is not merely desirable but imperative. It will first address the objectives and strategic rationale for OPCON transition, then consider implementation strategies at the levels of the citizenry, the government, the military, and the alliance. Finally, the article makes policy recommendations and visualizes what the post-transition of wartime operational control command structures may look like.

II. The U.S.-led ROK–U.S. Combined Defense systern and North Korea's Derisive Perception of South Korea

Despite the ROK-U.S. alliance and the Combined Defense systern established under the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty having decisively deterred full-scale conflict on the Korean Peninsula for over seven decades, they have consistently failed to prevent low-intensity provocations by North Korea. Since the armistice, North Korea has perpetrated 3,121 violations of the armistice agreement, comprising 2,002 infiltration attempts and 1,119 local provocations (ROK Ministry of National Defense 2022). Notable incidents include the January 21 Blue House raid, the USS Pueblo incident, and the Samcheok-Uljin armed infiltration in 1968, the Panmunjom axe murder incident in 1976, the bombing at the Aung San Mausoleum in 1983, the Korean Air Flight 858 bombing in 1987, and the armed agent infiltration via Gangneung in 1996.

The ROK's inability to execute meaningful retaliation was evident following the North Korean torpedo strike on the ROK Navy corvette Cheonan near Baengnyeong Island on March 26, 2010, which resulted in 46 sailor fatalities. Similarly, during the November 23, 2010, daylight artillery bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island that devastated ROK territory, the military response was limited to K9 self-propelled howitzer counter-fire. KF-16 and F-15K fighters, though scrambled, returned to base without conducting counterstrikes, constrained by the United Nations Command's Armistice Rules of Engagement (AROE).

Moreover, North Korea conducted 3,097 waves of balloon attacks over six months between May 24 and November 28, 2024, deploying 8,870 garbage-filled balloons targeting high-value targets within the ROK (Cha and Lim 2024). The balloon operations are estimated to have been attempted to gather data for potential future biological or chemical warfare.

This series of inaction raises pertinent questions: Why has the ROK military remained passive in the face of such hostile actions? Is this passivity driven by escalation concerns? What truly prevents the ROK military from prompt and decisive retaliation to deter future aggression? Why does it repeatedly absorb these provocations? What factors have contributed to this situation?

Under the AROE, responses must adhere to proportionality principles—only equivalent weapons systerns may be employed. When North Korea utilizes high-lethality weapons, response authorization must be elevated through higher command echelons, often resulting in critical delays that forfeit effective retaliation opportunities.

During peacetime, operational control over the ROK forces resides with the Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, upon elevation of the Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON), operational control transitions to the Commander of the ROK-U.S. CFC. This bifurcated command structure between peacetime and wartime operations virtually precludes the comprehensive employment of ROK military power.

Although peacetime operational control was transitioned to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff on December 1, 1994, the CFC commander retains Combined Delegation Authority (CODA), encompassing responsibilities for intelligence management for early warning, crisis management, wartime OPLAN development, plan and execution of combined and joint exercises, combined development of doctrine, and C4I interoperability. Meanwhile, the ROK military's authority is constrained to vigilance operations, unit management, training, and disaster relief operations. In reality, core military functions remain under the CFC commander's authority.

During the September 25-26, 2000 inter-Korean defense ministerial talks held in Jeju, Kim Il-chol, then-Minister of the DPRK People's Armed Forces, asserted, "Even if the two Koreas engage in military talks, they are meaningless if the real master—the United States—intervenes. Since the southern military lacks sovereignty, military issues should be discussed directly between the DPRK and the U.S. (Moon 2018)." Kim Jong-un echoed this dismissive stance in a letter to President Donald Trump dated August 7, 2019, stating that "South Korean forces are matchless with [inferior to] the DPRK People's Army (Woodward 2020)." These derisive remarks epitomize the North Korean perception, fundamentally rooted in arrogance, that the South Korean army is not their equal.

Upon the transition of wartime OPCON, the ROK military will regain unified command authority across both peacetime and wartime contexts, thereby restoring complete operational autonomy. The ROK will then possess the capacity to respond decisively and immediately to North Korean provocations, not only striking the attack's firing positions but also targeting command and support infrastructure with determination. In the event of a full-scale invasion, the ROK military, operating under indigenous leadership, will be positioned to retaliate promptly, transition early counter-offensive operations, and ultimately secure war victory.

III. Justification and Resolve for the Transition of Wartime Operational Control to the ROK Military

1) Justification for OPCON Transition

The ROK and the United States are pursuing the transition of wartime OPCON through a restructured command model for the future CFC, wherein a ROK General would serve as commander and a U.S. General as deputy commander. Nevertheless, however, under the current U.S.-led combined defense systern, operational authority over military assets remains significantly constrained. The fundamental responsibilities of defending national territory and protecting citizens' lives inherently necessitate autonomous employment of military power.

In the scenario of simultaneous wars involving Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula, substantial vulnerabilities are anticipated within the current CFC structure, which positions the United States at the helm of Korean theater operations. Warfare transcends mere contests of weaponry; it demands clarity of strategic objectives, comprehensive sensing of adversarial strategies and tactics, profound insight into the opponent's strengths and weaknesses, and intimate familiarity with the operational terrain and conditions. Furthermore, a warfighting commander requires operational art and the capacity to coordinate allied capability and reconstitution, along with personal and material mobilization. It is therefore reasonable to question whether a CFC commander who has served for merely one or two years, and who faces the potential redeployment of significant U.S. forces to the Taiwan theater while commanding a predominantly ROK military force, can genuinely exercise competent operational control over such a complex conflict.

2) The Pershing Principle and its Fallacy of U.S. Subordination

The so-called Pershing Principle, which asserts that U.S. forces have never served under foreign operational control, is frequently invoked to oppose the transition of OPCON to the ROK military. This perspective fundamentally contradicts the 2018 bilateral agreement between the ROK Defense Minister and U.S. Secretary of Defense—specifically, the "Guiding Principles Following the Transition of Wartime Operational Control (U.S. Embassy Seoul 2018), which explicitly calls for establishing a future CFC led by a ROK General (Chung 2023).

However, the assertion that the United States has never operated under foreign command authority is historically inaccurate, as evidenced by three significant historical precedents (Chung 2017a).

The first occurred during World War I, particularly during the late 1918 Second Battle of the Marne. General John J. Pershing commanded 1.2 million U.S. troops, who operated alongside the comparatively smaller forces under French General Philippe Pétain and British Field Marshal Douglas Haig against German forces commanded by General Erich Ludendorff. Despite France's significantly depleted military strength following the German invasion, it was French General Ferdinand Foch—appointed as Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces—who exercised operational control over American, British, and French troops, ultimately leading them to victory (Korea Military Academy 2007, Liddel Hart 1991). This command arrangement was justified primarily by Foch's superior familiarity with both the theater of operations and the enemy forces.

The second case emerges from the 2005 United Nations endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. On March 19, 2011, the UN Security Council passed a military sanctions resolution against Libya, resulting in a NATO-led intervention that included substantial U.S. participation. Despite contributing more than three times the military force of other participating NATO nations, the United States willingly delegated operational control to Italy, acknowledging Italy's colonial history in the region and superior familiarity with local conditions. This mission culminated in the successful removal of Muammar Gaddafi's regime on October 20, 2011.

The third example derives from the 2007 Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG) military exercise. During the second phase of this exercise, U.S. Combined Forces Command Commander B. B. Bell transitioned full operational control to ROK Deputy Commander General Kim Byung-kwan. The exercise under ROK command demonstrated greater operational effectiveness than in the previous year, when Bell himself had directed the exercise (Interview with General Kim Byung-kwan, 2007, Chung Kyung-young 2023. National security and The Transition of Operational Control, 90).

In addressing concerns about U.S. forces operating under ROK Generals, former USFK Commander Vincent K. Brooks clarified during testimony before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee (February 14, 2018) that a "U.S. General officer will change roles to serve as the Deputy Commander of the post-OPCON CFC and remain as commander of the UNC and USFK, U.S. forces will continue to operate under U.S. national authorities" (House Armed Services Committee 2018). Similarly, former CFC Commander General Robert B. Abrams stated at a Korea-U.S. Alliance Foundation forum (July 1, 2020) that the United States is "firmly committed to the successful execution of this alliance plan that will ultimately result in a Republic of Korea four-star leading the Combined Forces Command" (The Korea Herald 2020).

These statements made by those in authority reflect the U.S. government's clear determination to reorganize the Combined Forces Command's hierarchical structure and transitioned operational control to the ROK military (Nishizuka 2018).

3) The Need for Resolve in Transitioning Wartime OPCON

This begs the question: Can the ROK military truly confront a nuclear-armed North Korea? How can the ROK overcome a military that has concentrated the entirety of its national resources to build up a force of 1.28 million troops?

There remains a persistent aversion toward the idea of the ROK exercising wartime operational control. Since the transition of ROK military command authority to General Douglas MacArthur at the outbreak of the Korean War, the ROK has never once held OPCON in over seventy years. This long-standing absence may explain why some harbor unease at the prospect of reclaiming it. It is a textbook example of path dependence, whereby it no longer feels unusual that a foreign General exercises operational control over ROK forces. Some even express concern that the transition of OPCON could provide justification for the withdrawal of U.S. Forces Korea or trigger the dissolution of the ROK-U.S. alliance.

[Table 1] Comparison of National Power Between the ROK and the DPRK

Source: ROK Ministry of National Defense 2022; CIA 2024; Global Firepower 2025; IISS 2024; South Korea’s 2025 defense expenditure is KRW 61 trillion, 587.8 billion won (USD 44 billion).

Yet, as illustrated in [Table 1] comparing the national power of the two Koreas, the ROK has overwhelmingly prevailed in the systernic competition of the past eighty years, thanks to the dedication and innovation of its people. Even in military terms, the ROK ranks fifth globally, while North Korea ranks thirty-fourth. Why should we fear? We are confident that we will assume wartime operational control over our forces.

The goal is not to dismantle the CFC, but to restructure it by preserving its existing framework while establishing a ROK-led combined defense systern with a ROK General as the commander and a U.S. General serving as deputy. The 2018 agreement between the ROK Defense Minister and U.S. Secretary of Defense on OPCON transition represents a pivotal milestone for ROK defense. It signifies that the world's most powerful military will operate under ROK operational control, reflecting strong U.S. trust in its ally and a clear commitment to alliance responsibilities.

There is no reason the ROK military should be considered unfit to exercise wartime operational control. Its record speaks for itself: this is the same military that demonstrated remarkable valor in the Vietnam War (1965-1973), valiantly sank a DPRK patrol corvette that crossed the NLL in the First Battle of Yeonpyeong (June 15, 1999), brilliantly rescued the Samho Jewelry from Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden (January 15, 2011), and forced North Korea to back down at the Operation August 20. After South Korean soldiers were wounded by wooden mines planted by the Korea People's Army (KPA), South Korean forces resumed loudspeaker as Psychological Operations, which was then followed by a KPA rocket launching fire on August 20, 2020. Consequently, ROK forces conducted retaliation counter-fire by over thirty rounds of heavy artillery against the North.

We must recognize why North Korea responds to OPCON transition with alarm comparable to its reaction to the ROK's potential nuclear armament: because a confident, capable ROK military destabilizes its strategic assumptions.

IV. Objectives and Strategic Pathways for OPCON Transition

1. The Significance of Establishing a ROK-led Combined Defense systern

The objective of the transition of wartime OPCON is to establish a combined defense systern under ROK leadership, embodying a firm commitment to autonomous national defense whereby the ROK protects its territory by its strength and responds to aggression with decisive force (Park 1972).

No sovereign nation in the world delegates operational control over its military to a foreign commander. Even Japan, a former defeated power in the Pacific War, has not relinquished OPCON of its Self-Defense Forces. The U.S.-Japan alliance operates under a parallel command structure comparable in strength to the ROK-U.S. alliance. NATO, as a collective defense organization—not a bilateral alliance—delegates only about 30% of its member states' forces to the NATO commander; the remaining two-thirds remain under national command (NATO n.d.). The reclaiming of OPCON is, in essence, a prerequisite to becoming a 'normal state.'

Exercising wartime operational control over the national military symbolizes the restoration of defense identity and operational autonomy. It would enable more resolute responses to North Korean military provocations, bolster morale within the armed forces, and elevate national pride. OPCON transition is also essential for implementing a coherent strategy for unification in both peacetime and wartime. During peacetime, the two Koreas could establish military confidence-building measures and arms control to achieve lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. In the event of war, under ROK-led counteroffensives, China would have diminished justification to intervene, increasing the likelihood of victory.

Ultimately, the transition would elevate the ROK-U.S. alliance to a paradigmatic partnership that transcends not only economic prosperity but also political democratization, culminating in an autonomous security apparatus. This transition would augment the ROK's diplomatic flexibility, galvanizing the nation's international gravitas and geopolitical efficacy. Furthermore, it would catalyze the cultivation of military doctrine specifically tailored to Peninsula exigencies, precipitate the creation of weapons systerns optimized for indigenous forces, and engender a more formidable martial readiness. These developments would concomitantly invigorate the defense industry through the fostering of vocational proliferation, and advancement of multifarious national prerogatives (Chung 2017b).

2. Reviewing the OPCON Transition Process and the Trump Administration's Commitment to the Transition of OPCON

As of April 17, 2012, the transition of wartime OPCON agreed by the ROK-U.S. governments was postponed to December 1, 2015, due to North Korea's nuclear test, along with the Korean public protest. In May 2013, the ROK side expressed trepidation that the previously agreed-upon OPCON transition date—December 1, 2015—could provoke miscalculation by North Korea, given the ROK military's insufficient readiness. It therefore proposed a reassessment of the transition timeline.

In October 2014, during the 46th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), the ROK and U.S. defense ministers agreed to adopt a Conditions-based Operational Control Transition Plan (COTP). The three conditions were: (1) the ROK military's acquisition of necessary capabilities to lead the combined defense; (2) the alliance's comprehensive ability to counter North Korea's nuclear and missile threats; and (3) a stable security environment on the Peninsula and in the region to support the transition (ROK Ministry of National Defense 2025; ROK Policy Briefing 2014).

The evaluation of the post-OPCON CFC's capabilities was structured in three phases: Initial Operational Capability (IOC), Full Operational Capability (FOC), and Full Mission Capability (FMC) (ROK Ministry of Defense; ROK Government 2014). On June 9, 2019, the ROK and U.S. defense ministers agreed to relocate the CFC headquarters from the Ministry of National Defense compound which was initially relocated from CFC at Yongsan Garrison, to Camp Humphreys, which was completed in October 2022. On May 21, 2021, President Moon Jae-in and U.S. President Joe Biden reaffirmed their "firm commitment" to a conditions-based OPCON transition at the bilateral summit (ROK MOFA 2021).

Following verification of IOC during the second half of 2019 through Combined Command Post Training (CCPT), the 53rd SCM on December 2, 2021, acknowledged incremental progress in COTP. In 2023, the two sides conducted an FOC evaluation of the post-OPCON CFC and agreed at the 54th SCM to jointly assess both the ROK's core military capabilities and the alliance's capacity to counter North Korea's nuclear and missile threats (Lee 2023).

It is lamentable that the OPCON transition was not achieved under the Moon Jae-in administration, which had expeditiously pledged an accelerated transition. Despite the agreed preservation of the CFC structure, the administration continued to pursue a COTP framework that had originally been premised on the dismantling of the CFC under the Park Geun-hye government.

Questions also remain as to whether sufficient political volition was mobilized beyond the military. For instance, following the June 2018 U.S.-DPRK summit in Singapore, President Trump abruptly announced a halt to combined exercises. Amid a delicate inter-Korean climate, concerns about triggering backlash may have inhibited the deployment of U.S. strategic assets, further constraining the ability to evaluate FOC. COVID-19 restrictions, which limited large-scale drills, and the U.S. priority toward strategic competition with China also played a role in stalling momentum.

President Yoon Suk-yeol, who took office on May 10, 2022, reaffirmed his commitment to the OPCON transition during a summit with President Joe Biden on May 21, 2022, pledging to strengthen deterrence through enhanced combined readiness (ROK Government 2024).

The Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) exercise resumed in 2022, reversing the previous trend of suspension and diminution. During the 2023 large-scale ROK-U.S. combined maneuver exercise involving the deployment of U.S. strategic assets, the FOC evaluation was completed. In testimony before the U.S. Congress in March 2024, then-CFC Commander Paul LaCamera stated, "OPCON transition is not delayed; it is conditions-based and remains on track (VOA 2024)." Yet in practice, the Yoon administration appeared largely disinterested in advancing the transition.

In the meantime, in Project 2025, a policy platform authored by former Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher C. Miller during the Trump administration, the document explicitly states: " Enable South Korea to take the lead in its conventional defense against North Korea (Miller 2025)." In an interview with local media, Miller further noted that "Starting with OPCON transition, the ROK-U.S. relationship can evolve into a stronger and more equal partnership (Dong-A Ilbo 2024)," and "If war breaks out again on the Peninsula, we want a ROK General or an Admiral to command their forces (SBS 2024)." Miller's remarks directly endorse the notion of a ROK-led CFC. Pete Hegseth, projected to become Secretary of Defense in Trump's second term, has stated in the Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance that the United States will prioritize deterring a PRC invasion of Taiwan and defending the homeland, while pressuring allies to "take on the bulk" of most deterrence role against threats from North Korea (Washington Post 2025). Elbridge Colby, nominated as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, stated during his confirmation hearing on March 4, 2025, that "President Trump's foreign policy vision involves empowering capable and committed allies like South Korea (The Korea Times 2025)."

With the conditions aligning, the likelihood of an accelerated OPCON transition has become increasingly salient. Going forward, revising and executing a transition timeline that accounts for shifting strategic realities will be essential.

V. Strategic Approach to Advancing OPCON Transition

The transition of wartime operational control must transcend a nominal shift in command from a U.S. to a ROK General at the head of the Combined Forces Command. Rather, it should function as a strategic inflection point for overhauling the Republic of Korea's national security architecture. Realizing this vision requires the construction of a self-reliant warfighting systern across four critical domains: the citizenry, the government, the military, and the alliance.

1. Autonomous Defense and Values-Based Security

First, the Korean people must embrace the ethos of self-reliant defense and values-based security, liberating themselves from excessive dependence on the alliance. This means cultivating a national resolve to defend the country by our strength and a commitment to safeguarding liberal democracy.

2. The Establishing of War Guidance systern

At the governmental level, the National Security Council must be strengthened, and a state-level War Guidance systern institutionalized to enhance the ROK's national security posture. In the event of a crisis that threatens national security or endangers civilian lives, the president should convene an emergency meeting without delay. Regular bimonthly sessions of the National Security Council, chaired by the president, alongside monthly standing committee meetings led by the National Security Advisor, should be formalized. To ensure depth and rigor in policy formulation, ministers and domain-specific experts from relevant agencies should be included as necessary.

Comprehensive exercises such as the Ulchi Freedom Shield, which mobilize the full spectrum of national institutions and civilian participation, must be leveraged to institutionalize a War Guidance systern capable of securing victory. Operational excellence and military readiness serve not only as a deterrent to war, but also as the most direct path to success should war occur.

'War Guidance' refers to the exercise of national command authority aimed at deterring war in peacetime and securing victory in wartime. It entails the integration, coordination, and direction of both national and military strategy to mobilize the full spectrum of national capabilities. The president exercises supreme command authority, supported by the Minister of National Defense. In peacetime, this authority is delegated to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; in wartime, it is exercised through the ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting and the Military Committee, which provide strategic directives and operational guidance to the CFC commander.

As the lead civilian defense authority, the Prime Minister coordinates ministries, such as the Ministry of the Interior and Safety, to oversee the civilian population during wartime. For wartime economic mobilization, the Deputy Prime Minister for Economy directs all economic-related ministries to ensure comprehensive financial and logistical support for the war effort.

From an operational perspective, warfare can be divided into three sequential phases: initiation, conduct, and conclusion. During the initiation phase, the War Guidance systern is activated, national war aims and objectives are articulated, public support is consolidated, strategic resources are mobilized, allied augmentation is arranged, and international political and material support is secured. In the conduct phase, the adversary's strategic and operational centers of gravity are neutralized, third-party intervention is deterred, and the national borders are secured early. During the conclusion phase, war termination strategies and timelines are determined, post-conflict settlement is negotiated, and national efforts are directed toward establishing a unified, democratic Korea.

Exercises such as Ulchi Freedom Shield must be employed to validate the functionality and cohesion of this comprehensive War Guidance systern. The defense budget should be increased from the current 2.6% to a minimum of 3% of GDP. Defense innovation aimed at building autonomous capabilities is not a discretionary policy choice—it is a national imperative. Substantial fiscal investment will be indispensable to achieve this transformation.

History offers sobering lessons: when national unity has faltered—whether due to factionalism, internal conflict, or pacifist delusions—external aggression has swiftly followed. During the Imjin War (1592-1598), infighting among the four factions led to massive civilian casualties and widespread devastation. The Qing invasion of Joseon (1636-1637) occurred soon after, precipitated by elite disdain for military preparedness. In the wake of the Donghak Peasant Movement (1894-1895), Korea failed to resolve its internal strife, instead inviting foreign intervention that broke out in the Sino-Japanese War on Korean soil. Following liberation, ideological polarization once again opened the door to aggression, resulting in North Korea's invasion in June 1950. The Korean War ultimately cost 4.46 million lives, as illustrated in [Table 2].

Amid today's deepening political volatility, the imperative is unequivocal: the Republic of Korea must swiftly reestablish stability through a politics rooted in integration, mutual coexistence, and cooperative governance.

[Table 2] Korean War Casualties

Source: Park 2014.

3. Strategic Talks for a Stable Security Environment

To cultivate a security environment conducive to the transition of wartime operational control, it is imperative to prevent inter-Korean relations from devolving into mutual brinkmanship or tit for tat. Political and military talks between the ROK and DPRK, as well as the ROK, the DPRK, and the United States, must be actively and continuously pursued. At the regional level, trilateral strategic dialogue among the ROK, the United States, and China as well as the two Koreas, the U.S. and China should be initiated to manage peace on the Korean Peninsula and improve the broader Northeast Asian security architecture. To build trust through multilateral security cooperation, a Northeast Asia Security Cooperation Regime—comprising the ROK, DPRK, the United States, Japan, China, Russia, and Mongolia—should be institutionalized.

A rapid response mechanism should also be established to coordinate disaster relief and humanitarian assistance across the region. A Northeast Asia Rapid Response Force, composed of military units, medical corps, and non-governmental organizations, should be created to respond swiftly to regional disaster through Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA & DR) operations (Chung 2005).

The Camp David Trilateral Summit held on August 18, 2023, concluded with an agreement among the ROK, the United States, and Japan to jointly respond to regional challenges, provocations, and threats (The White House 2023). To operationalize the Spirit of Camp David, a ROK-U.S.-Japan a ROK-U.S.-Japan Military Cooperation Task Force should be established, comprising strategic planners and security experts from the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, and the Japanese Joint Operations Command.

4. ROK Military: Reform of the Higher Command Structure

At the military level, ensuring the coherence and effectiveness of the OPCON transition requires reforming the upper command hierarchy. Joint Forces Command must be established to unify operational control across peacetime and wartime. Following the OPCON transition, it is critical to avoid a bifurcation in command structure by ensuring that a ROK General exercises both peacetime and wartime operational control, serving as Joint Forces Command Commander in peacetime and transitioning to commander of the Combined Forces Command during wartime.

This structural integration would allow the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff to fully concentrate on their principal responsibilities: advising national command authorities, formulating military strategy, overseeing force development, and conducting military diplomacy (Shim 2021).

The ROK military must simultaneously adopt an offensive strategic posture and enhance its capabilities across war command, intelligence analysis, operational planning, and sustainment. In parallel, the ROK forces must build robust capacities for cyber, space, electronic, and information warfare. A future-oriented, AI-enabled force—proficient in emerging technologies and strategic operations—must be cultivated to secure operational superiority in 21st-century warfare.

5. Alliance: Clarifying the Mutual Relationships among JCS, CFC, UNC, and USFK

At the alliance level, the transition of wartime operational control necessitates the development of a warfighting structure led by the ROK. This requires clearly defining the roles and interrelationships among the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, the UNC, the CFC, and USFK.

The National Command Authority, Security Consultative Meeting, and Military Committee—composed of the ROK and U.S. JCS chairmen—should provide strategic directive and operational guidance to the CFC commander. The ROK JCS should maintain responsibility for readiness posture and respond to local provocations. The UNC must continue to manage the armistice structure and, in the event of contingencies, serve as a force provider. The CFC should develop and refine wartime operational plans, oversee combined exercises, exercise operational control over ROK forces, USFK and U.S. augmented forces, while exercising tactical control (TACCON) over UNC combat units during wartime. USFK, for its part, must maintain combined readiness and operate under the CFC commander during wartime contingencies.

To ensure a seamless transition, the ROK must restructure its military command architecture by establishing a Joint Forces Command, reforming the CFC command hierarchy, and activating the newly established Strategic Command. These institutional reforms should be codified in Strategic Directive No. 3 upon the execution of the OPCON transition.

VI. Policy Proposals and the Post-OPCON Transition Landscape

The security situation encompassing the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan has reached unprecedented acuity. Should both crises be mismanaged, Northeast Asia risks experiencing two concomitant wars.

The ROK must comprehensively establish a posture, preparing the nation for total war. This entails not only consolidating the War Guidance systern under presidential authority but also constructing a ROK-led warfighting architecture. Realistic and rigorous training—fostering operational proficiency in strategy, operational art, and tactics—must be institutionalized alongside realistic reserve mobilization and civil defense drills. Such efforts are essential not only to deter war but, if necessary, to achieve victory with minimal casualties and realize a free and unified Korea. It is proposed that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, convene periodic 'OPCON Transition Steering Committee.' These should include the National Assembly's Defense and Foreign Affairs & Unification Committee Chairs, Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister for Economy, National Security Advisor, Ministers of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Interior & Safety, senior military leadership, and national security experts. The committee should evaluate the current state of the OPCON transition and formulate the post-OPCON security strategy.

The ROK-verified IOC in 2019 and assessed FOC during the 2024 Freedom Shield exercise under the deployment of U.S. strategic assets. The ROK military is now regarded as possessing sufficient capabilities in intelligence, operations, logistics, and communications to lead combined and theater operations. Moreover, the alliance's deterrence capacity against North Korea's nuclear and missile threats has reached an acceptable threshold through the Washington Declaration and Conventional Nuclear Integration (CNC) and the establishment of the ROK Strategic Command.

An updated, conditions-based timeline must now be advanced to complete the transition. During the second half of 2025, a Pre-Full Mission Capability (Pre-FMC) evaluation should be conducted during a combined ROK-U.S. exercise involving U.S. strategic assets. This will identify remaining deficiencies and facilitate a final FMC evaluation in 2026. SCM will endorse it and ROK Minister of Defense and U.S. Secretary of Defense will make policy recommendation to ROK-U.S. Presidents for implementing the transition of wartime operational control.

Concurrently, initiatives must be undertaken to ameliorate the regional security environment by facilitating inter-Korean political and military dialogue and U.S.-China strategic communication. Once FMC is validated, the ROK and U.S. defense ministers may jointly approve the transition during the SCM and recommend formal transition of wartime operational control to each President.

Concerning strategic flexibility, the ROK and the U.S. must establish antecedent agreements on conditions for the redeployment (flow-out) of U.S. forces based in Korea to other theaters. Contingency measures must ensure that any withdrawal is preceded or accompanied by the deployment of replacement forces. In parallel, U.S. forces deployed globally must be able to flow into the Korean Theater Operations in times of crisis, reinforcing the ROK-U.S. combined defense posture. To jointly respond to regional provocations, the proposed ROK-U.S.-Japan Military Cooperation Task Force must be operationalized expeditiously. War games could be conducted to develop and elucidate the roles and responsibilities of each party under scenarios involving a Taiwan war, a Korean Peninsula war, or simultaneous wars on both fronts.

Once wartime operational control is fully transitioned, the ROK will finally be free from the self-effacing posture that has long accompanied external reliance on national security. In its place, the nation will recover a renewed sense of self-respect and witness a corresponding elevation in its international standing. Most importantly, the ROK Armed Forces will undergo a fundamental transformation, emerging as a sovereign and capable military force prepared not only to defend the homeland but also to secure victory in armed conflict.

The United States will rightly offer commendation to an ally that fully assumes its strategic responsibilities with competence and resolve. For North Korea, this moment will serve as a critical turning point that dismantles its arrogance toward the South and removes any space for strategic misjudgment. The international community will come to regard South Korea with profound respect, not only as a liberal democracy, a digital innovator, and a cultural powerhouse, but also as a committed guardian of peace on the Korean Peninsula and a principled defender of the liberal international order.■

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[1]The “two states” theory (liangguo lun, 兩國論) was first introduced in 1999 by former President Lee Teng-hui, a native of Taiwan and a Kuomintang (KMT) politician with roots in mainland China, during an interview with Deutsche Welle. The theory asserts that China and Taiwan are two distinct and separate sovereign states.

■ Kyung-young CHUNG is Professor at Hanyang University, Graduate School of International Studies.

■ Translated by Chaerin KIM, Research Assistant; Edited by Kyung-young CHUNG and Chaerin KIM
    For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | crkim@eai.or.kr