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This paper pursues two objectives: (1) to identify North Korea's baseline perception of the Trump administration's North Korea policy, and (2) to assess the likely contours of Kim Jong Un's policy toward the United States in light of this perception.

I. North Korea's Perception and Response to U.S. Policy under Trump

On July 23, 2024, just after Trump's acceptance speech for the Republican presidential nomination (July 19), North Korea issued a statement (KCNA 2024), which can be summarized as follows: First, while Trump emphasizes personal rapport between himself and Kim Jong Un, national foreign policy and individual sentiment must be clearly distinguished. Second, Washington's offer of dialogue is, in essence, a disingenuous tactic to mentally and psychologically undermine the North Korean state, thereby perpetuating its hostile policy; such a sham dialogue is unnecessary from the outset. Third, throughout the U.S.-DPRK talks, the United States has repeatedly delayed, broken promises, or reversed commitments depending on administration changes, proving itself to be untrustworthy. Fourth, for the past 80 years, the United States has pursued a hostile policy toward the DPRK, intensifying its outright confrontation against the North. Such a country cannot be trusted when it speaks of dialogue and negotiation.

After Donald Trump's victory in the U.S. presidential election on November 6, 2024, North Korea declared during the 11th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee on December 29 that it would adopt a "strategy of toughest response to the U.S. on behalf of its long-term national interests and security (Rodong Sinmun 2024)." However, the specifics of this strategy were not disclosed. Following President Trump's inauguration on January 20, 2025, the DPRK's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) repeated the phrase three times (Jan. 15 and 26, and March 9), the last of which asserted that the Trump administration's "habitual displays of military power" toward the DPRK only "adds justification to the principle of toughest response to the U.S. (DPRK MOFA 2025)." On March 25, 2025, North Korea taunted the Trump administration for persistently "carrying forward" and "viciously varying" the same American hostile policy toward the DPRK, while simultaneously flippantly revoking the Biden administration's policies in other areas (KCNA 2025).

Statements issued by Pyongyang between 2024 and March 2025 offer insight into the contents of the putative "strategy of toughest response to the U.S." During this period, 54 documents were closely examined, including public statements by Kim Jong Un and Kim Yo Jong, official releases from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and KCNA commentaries, all of which reflect North Korea's perception of the evolving security landscape. North Korea's security perception during this period can be distilled into four core assessments.

First, the formation of a U.S.-ROK nuclear alliance, the strengthening of U.S.-ROK-Japan security cooperation, and the adventurous military posture of Washington and Seoul have exacerbated both current and future security conditions surrounding the DPRK. Second, to proactively manage this deteriorating security environment and maintain peace, Pyongyang must rapidly expand its capabilities to achieve and maintain preponderance in the balance of power. Third, to that end, the DPRK must pursue the unlimited enhancement of its military strength, including nuclear forces, ensure full preparedness for deterrence, defense, and preemptive strike, and demonstrate its resolve to risk war if necessary. Fourth, the mere mention of the North Korean nuclear threat constitutes evidence of a hostile stance toward the DPRK. The concept of the 'complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula' is, both theoretically and practically, already obsolete.

II. Prospects for Kim Jong Un's Policy toward Trump

The relationship between Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump is not merely a bilateral one, but rather is situated within a broader geopolitical context shaped by both countries' strategic calculations vis-à-vis surrounding powers. The Trump administration's unconventional approach to foreign policy introduces a high degree of uncertainty into future interstate relations, and U.S.-DPRK relations are no exception. This analysis adopts a simplified bilateral framework for the purposes of minimal analytical clarity, using North Korea's aforementioned security assessments as a foundational point of reference.

First, North Korea is likely to interpret Trump's push to initiate negotiations as a sign of the United States' 'weakness in power and lack of resolve,' and simultaneously as evidence that Pyongyang's strategy of 'peace through power maximization' has proven effective. This perception incentivizes North Korea to raise its demands and impose its position more rigidly upon the United States. The DPRK will stall for time while probing the extent to which Trump values the optics of compromise with North Korea and what additional unilateral concessions he might offer, beyond those made in 2018 and 2019 such as the suspension of joint ROK-U.S. military exercises. In this regard, Kim Jong Un must have been watching carefully how Putin deals with Trump in the matter of war termination between Ukraine and Russia.

Second, in order to initiate effective negotiations from a structurally advantageous position, North Korea may conclude that another 'overwhelming display of force' and a corresponding crisis are imperative. Drawing on past experience, Pyongyang has observed that substantive negotiations with the United States have only commenced when tensions surrounding the nuclear issue and the risk of war have escalated to a level where Washington is compelled to respond through dialogue. In such circumstances, even a small power like North Korea can secure sufficient leverage to extract, though not lasting, favorable outcomes from a superpower. Absent the replay of a nuclear war crisis between Trump and Kim, it will be exceedingly difficult for two states marked by deep mistrust and divergent objectives to enter any form of productive negotiation. This course of action carries significant risk for Pyongyang as well. Nonetheless, based on experiences from prior interactions, Kim Jong Un likely believes that his chances of prevailing in a renewed brinkmanship in nuclear risk-taking with the United States remain fairly high. In contrast, if Trump's accumulated failures in domestic policy bring him to intractable quagmires, he might consider initiating diversionary wars through the escalation of extant wars in Ukraine and the Middle East and the ignition of a new one in the Korean peninsula.

Third, Kim may pursue engagement with the United States, particularly a summit with Trump, not as a means of addressing the nuclear issue, but as an end in itself. From Pyongyang's perspective, Trump's overtures and the circulation of speculation about progress in bilateral relations enhance Kim's stature both internationally and domestically, while also creating strategic friction between Washington and Seoul. This tactic aligns with Trump's own interests. By publicly describing his relationship with Kim as a "love affair," Trump can divert attention from pressing domestic and international challenges and simultaneously provoke anxiety in China, Russia, Japan, and especially South Korea.

Fourth, the most significant obstacle for Kim Jong Un lies in the Trump administration's "Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance," which reduces the perceived importance of the DPRK in the United States' overall security agenda (The Washington Post 2025). Within this strategic framework, it becomes increasingly difficult for Pyongyang to compel Washington to engage in serious negotiations. Even if North Korea manufactures heightened "crisis noise," the United States is likely to shift the response burden onto regional actors such as South Korea, Japan, and China.

Fifth, Kim Jong Un is unlikely to show interest in any agreement that requires implementation beyond the Trump administration's tenure. Instead, he is expected to focus on maximizing short-term tactical gains while Trump remains in office. At a fundamental level, Kim is not likely to trust the United States, least of all Trump. Conversely, neither the United States nor Trump is expected to place trust in North Korea or Kim himself. The absence of mutual trust, however, does not negate the possibility of nominal negotiations. Under such conditions, both sides are more likely to prioritize opportunistic, one-time advantages over the pursuit of sustainable, long-term agreements.

Sixth, the optimistic expectation that a Trump–Kim summit might be held in Vladivostok under President Vladimir Putin's mediation is highly unrealistic. For this scenario to materialize, Trump would first need to successfully mediate a ceasefire in the Russia–Ukraine war and subsequently drive a wedge between Russia and China, repositioning Russia as a U.S. partner. In effect, this would require Trump's success in the so-called "reverse-Kissinger strategy." Were this to occur, Trump and Putin could jointly commit to containing China and pursue a broader strategic design that incorporates Kim Jong Un. However, the likelihood of such an outcome is exceedingly low.

III. Conclusion

According to its stated policy, North Korea seeks to achieve and maintain dominance in the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula and is pursuing a strategy of nuclear force maximization to this end. The North appears to have already acquired certain capabilities to evade South Korea's preemptive strike system (Kill Chain) and its missile defense network. During Trump's presidency, North Korea may conduct a seventh nuclear test and accelerate efforts to develop a credible second-strike capability against the United States. This suggests the possibility of a fourth North Korean nuclear crisis during Trump's second term.

In light of this perception, South Korea, the United States, and Japan have reaffirmed their commitment to the "complete denuclearization of North Korea" and continue to strengthen military preparedness against the North Korean nuclear threat, maintaining policy continuity with the past. Trump's apparent overtures to resume summit diplomacy with Kim Jong Un may reflect a strategic calculation shaped by this environment. However, his rhetoric and behavior have led significant segments of South Korean public opinion and expert discourse into a state of false optimism. North Korea's strategic ambitions are supported by Russia and effectively tolerated by China. Compounding this, the Trump administration's foreign policy may further undermine the cohesion of the Western alliance system. This evolving international environment, marked by strategic vulnerability and alliance fragmentation, is likely to persist for the foreseeable future—thereby presenting North Korea with continued opportunities to advance its objectives. ■

References

Horton, Alex and Hannah Natanson. 2025. "Secret Pentagon memo on China, homeland has Heritage fingerprints," The Washington Post, March 29.

Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). 2024. "Whether the Second Hand of DPRK-U.S. Confrontation Stops or Not Depends on U.S. Act: KCNA Commentary."  July 23.

____. 2025. "U.S.' 'Strength-almighty Doctrine' Doesn't Work in the DPRK's Security Domain: KCNA Commentary." March 25.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). 2025. "U.S. Random Exercise of Strength Will Result in an Aggravated Security Crisis: Press Statement by the Department of Press and Information." March 10.

Rodong Sinmun. 2024. "Report on the Enlarged Meeting of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea." December 29.

■ Hyeong Jung PARK is Emeritus Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU).

■ Translated and edited by: Chaerin KIM, Research Assistant
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