The strategic importance of U.S.-ROK policy coordination on the North Korean issue cannot be overstated, particularly in light of the issue’s international security implications. While progressive administrations have traditionally emphasized inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, conservative governments have highlighted the importance of international collaboration. At a moment when the prospect of renewed U.S. engagement with North Korea has emerged with the advent of a second Trump administration, the imperative for close policy coordination between Washington and Seoul appears more urgent than ever. President Donald Trump, notably, has publicly referred to North Korea as a “nuclear power,” while the U.S. State Department continues to assert that the goal of “complete denuclearization” remains intact. These two ostensibly contradictory messages may paradoxically suggest a proactive orientation within the U.S. administration regarding the North Korean issue.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, elected on November 8, 1932, had to wait nearly four months before officially assuming office on March 4, 1933. For a president eager to escape the mire of the Great Depression through the New Deal, such a delay was excessive. Upon his re-election on November 3, 1936, Roosevelt was inaugurated on January 20, 1937, a date advanced due to legal reforms he championed to eliminate the inefficiencies of the transition period. It was during this era that the U.S. media began to emphasize the importance of the so-called “honeymoon” period at the beginning of a presidency—an idea that would come to denote the critical early months of any administration's policy formation.

What, then, can be said about the configuration of North Korea policy under Trump’s second administration? The South Korean government, reportedly unaware of its recent designation as a Sensitive Country Listing (SCL), appears to be excluded from substantial information sharing on U.S. policy toward North Korea. In general, a U.S. presidential honeymoon period lasts four to six months. Given this timeline, the present moment may well be the most pivotal window for deliberating the Korean Peninsula’s security challenges and North Korea policy. It must be underscored that this observation does not cast doubt on the South Korean public’s fervent aspiration for peace, the bipartisan commitment of successive administrations, or the competence of ROK officials working tirelessly in the field.

South Korea, however, is currently mired in acute domestic political instability. Ideological confrontations between conservative and progressive factions have grown particularly pronounced, especially regarding approaches to the North Korean nuclear issue. As North Korea’s irrational behaviors intensify, and as the international security environment grows increasingly volatile and the Trump administration’s North Korea strategy becomes more unpredictable, the urgency of U.S.-ROK policy alignment becomes all the more pronounced. Central to this alignment is the necessity of close, trust-based communication between the presidents of the two countries—a sine qua non for any meaningful progress on the North Korean issue.

Three principal reasons underscore the indispensability of presidential-level coordination:

First, resolution of the North Korean issue in the South Korean context is virtually a presidential prerogative. While the National Assembly and civil society actively engage in policy discourse, the strong executive power accorded by the South Korean presidential system grants the president a central role in shaping North Korea policy. Moreover, under the single five-year presidential term, every South Korean president has sought to be remembered as the leader who achieved peace on the Korean Peninsula. Since democratization in 1987, no president has been immune to this ambition, regardless of partisan affiliation. Although diverse opinions are solicited in the policy process, the president’s philosophy and vision have ultimately proven decisive. This centrality implies that the role of the president in shaping North Korea policy in coordination with the U.S. administration cannot be overstated.

Second, President Trump is widely known for approaching diplomacy as a transactional exchange of interests. He has consistently favored bilateralism over multilateralism and personalized negotiations over adherence to universal norms. This orientation highlights the salience of presidential-level communication and message alignment between Seoul and Washington. Before the Trump administration finalizes its positions on issues such as the North Korean nuclear program, defense cost-sharing, the nature of the U.S.-ROK alliance, and large-scale joint military exercises, the South Korean government must consolidate its policy stances under presidential leadership. Additionally, the North Korea issue is deeply intertwined with U.S.-China strategic competition, whether intentionally or not. In light of the Trump administration’s aggressive stance toward China, effective management of the China variable through U.S.-ROK presidential cooperation becomes essential.

Third, the North Korean issue today transcends the Korean Peninsula and is intricately enmeshed in the broader international security architecture. Of particular note is North Korea’s dispatch of personnel to Russia. Assuming that President Trump’s foremost foreign policy priority lies in ending the war in Ukraine, the North Korea issue—now also connected to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict—emerges as an additional and complex challenge for U.S. diplomacy. The more convoluted the North Korean problem becomes, the greater the responsibility of the South Korean president to untangle it and deliver concrete outcomes through summit-level engagement. Given South Korea’s historical strength in bilateral diplomacy over multilateral formats, the current juncture may indeed present a vital opportunity for the nation to capitalize on its diplomatic advantages.

Regrettably, South Korea is now confronting a constitutional crisis. A fierce debate has erupted over whether President Yoon Suk-yeol’s attempted declaration of martial law on December 3 of last year constituted a violation of constitutional norms. The Constitutional Court bears the primary responsibility for adjudicating this dispute and is expected to render a decision in the near future. Most ROK citizens have indicated their intention to respect the Court’s ruling, and there is widespread hope that Korean society will soon recover its social stability, regardless of the outcome.

Once the debate over impeachment is resolved and the constitutional crisis is settled—regardless of form—the South Korean government must swiftly undertake two strategic measures. First, it should convene a prompt session of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), the most credible deterrent to North Korea’s nuclear threats, in order to reassure the Korean public. The U.S. and South Korea held the fourth NCG working-level meeting this past January, adopting a joint declaration centered on integrated extended deterrence. Since the inauguration of the Trump administration, no NCG meeting has been held, and there is now an urgent need for newly appointed experts from both nations to devise a more concrete framework.

Second, efforts must be made to reestablish direct communication channels between the two presidents. A summit meeting in the near future would reaffirm the shared commitment of the U.S. and South Korea to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and achieving peace on the Korean Peninsula.

While recent events constitute South Korea’s first constitutional crisis since democratization in 1987, history suggests that the Korean people will, once again, confront the challenge with discernment and emerge fortified in their national unity. ■

■ Ihn-hwi PARK is Professor of International Relations and the Dean of Scranton College at Ewha Womans University.

■ Translated and edited by: Chaerin KIM, Research Assistant
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