I. Trump’s “America First” Policy on North Korea

The emergence of a second Trump administration signals the return of the “America First” foreign policy in international relations. President Trump is expected to extend this approach to his North Korea policy as well. But what exactly does Trump’s “America First” stance mean for North Korea? In the rapidly changing global landscape, following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and Hamas’s attack on Israel in 2023, North Korea has largely faded from U.S. strategic priorities. The Biden administration initially declared a “calibrated and practical” approach toward North Korea. However, it provided no concrete details about what this entailed and, in practice, took little action on the issue. This inaction led many to describe Biden’s foreign policy as “strategic patience 2.0.”

The concept of “strategic patience” originated during the Obama administration. It is based on the premise that negotiations with North Korea are ineffective unless Pyongyang first undergoes a fundamental shift in its national strategy. Essentially, waiting for North Korea to change its behavior is seen as a strategy in itself. The U.S. views North Korea as a rogue state threatening peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. While Washington has attempted engagement policies in the past, Pyongyang’s authoritarian regime and persistent military provocations have made meaningful engagement nearly impossible. Multiple attempts at rapprochement have been made, such as the 1994 Agreed Framework, the 2005 Six-Party Talks Joint Statement, and the 2012 Leap Day Agreement. Yet North Korea has consistently deceived and reneged on its commitments. Given this track record, Washington has little incentive to prioritize the North Korean issue. Despite Pyongyang’s nuclear program, it does not pose an immediate, existential threat to the United States. Consequently, Washington believes it still has time to address the issue while waiting for North Korea to alter its national strategy and international behavior. While China holds significant leverage over North Korea, it has refrained from using it. If Beijing were to exert pressure, the North Korean issue could be swiftly resolved. Therefore, the U.S. has long sought to persuade China to take the lead on the matter. This was the core logic behind Obama’s eight-year-long policy of strategic patience.

Obama had previously expressed a willingness to engage adversarial states if they demonstrated meaningful change. This approach was evident in the normalization of diplomatic relations with Myanmar in 2012 and Cuba in 2015, as well as the signing of the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) in 2015. He extended a similar offer to North Korea. However, when Obama declared his vision of a “world without nuclear weapons” in April 2009, North Korea responded by launching a long-range ballistic missile. For Obama, this reaffirmed that North Korea itself was the problem. Like other rogue states, Pyongyang needed to change before Washington could engage with it. Biden followed this approach throughout his tenure, effectively replicating Obama’s strategic patience. In contrast, Trump’s “America First” policy toward North Korea appears to diverge significantly from this precedent.

II. Trump’s Failed Diplomacy with North Korea

Many had hoped that Trump would take a different approach from Obama and Biden. After all, he was the first U.S. president to hold a summit with a North Korean leader, meeting Kim Jong Un in Singapore in June 2018. He met Kim again in Hanoi in February 2019 and at the Panmunjom in the Korean Demilitarized Zone in June of the same year. These high-profile summits fueled expectations for a novel North Korea policy under Trump. However, it remains questionable whether Trump’s approach has yielded different results compared to his predecessors. The Hanoi summit collapsed without an agreement, and the Panmunjom meeting failed to revive negotiations. Following these setbacks, Trump’s attention has drifted away from North Korea for the remainder of his term.

Would a second Trump administration adopt a different approach? Currently, Trump seems preoccupied with ending the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, leaving little room for North Korea on his foreign policy agenda. Even if circumstances shift in these regions, it remains uncertain whether U.S.-DPRK relations would see a breakthrough. Trump’s North Korea policy increasingly resembles the inaction of Obama and Biden. Moreover, there is growing concern that Trump might display unstrategic impatience, an impulsive policy devoid of coherent strategic consideration. Trump’s foreign policy has always been rooted in his “America First” doctrine. But what does this entail for North Korea? He has repeatedly expressed a willingness to hold another summit with Kim Jong Un and appointed Alex Wong, a key official in his previous North Korea negotiations, as Deputy National Security Advisor. Trump has even described North Korea as a “nuclear power,” seemingly granting it a level of legitimacy. However, with Kim Jong Un firmly rejecting further negotiations and condemning U.S. hostility, it remains unclear what strategy Trump intends to pursue. There is growing concern that Trump may not only follow the policy of inaction, but also exhibit unstrategic impatience.

Trump is currently focused on domestic issues such as immigration and the economy, while also seeking to reshape the global order through his handling of the Ukraine and Gaza conflicts. He has criticized NATO allies, praised Russia, and engaged in unilateral negotiations on Ukraine without involving Kyiv. Simultaneously, Trump seeks to secure mineral agreements beneficial to the United States, such as acquiring stakes in Ukraine’s national resources, in exchange for military aid. It remains unclear whether Trump is genuinely interested in ending the war in Ukraine or if his primary concern is extracting strategic benefits for the U.S. The recent clash between Ukrainian President Zelensky and President Trump over ceasefire negotiations at the White House gave a glimpse into what Trump’s second-term foreign policy might look like. This unorthodox diplomatic approach could very well be repeated in North Korea and the broader Korean Peninsula. While some hold high hopes for a renewed U.S.-DPRK relationship and a transformative policy toward the peninsula under Trump’s second term, such hopes may ultimately be wishful thinking.

How will Trump handle Russia in the context of the North Korean issue? Just as he sought to placate Russia in the Ukraine war, will he engage in direct negotiations with Moscow over North Korea while sidelining South Korea? How does he plan to distance North Korea from Russia, given Pyongyang’s significant troop deployment in support of Moscow’s war efforts? Will he criticize South Korea—just as he did NATO allies—while pursuing unilateral negotiations with North Korea? In fact, Trump exhibited such tendencies during his first term. Rather than adhering to the democratic values and principles traditionally emphasized by the U.S., he has defined American interests through a transactional lens, based on costs and benefits. He is not a leader bound by past U.S. principles or values. If it serves his self-defined vision of American interests, he is willing to abandon allies and befriend adversaries. Regardless of the historically hostile U.S.-DPRK relationship or the U.S.-ROK alliance, Trump could suddenly decide to pursue direct engagement with North Korea. At the June 2018 Singapore Summit press conference, Trump stated, “The past does not have to define the future. Yesterday’s conflict does not have to be tomorrow’s war. And as history has proven over and over again, adversaries can indeed become friends.” This suggested that although North Korea and the U.S. were adversaries at the time, they could become friends in the future. Trump has also expressed a desire to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea, claiming that “war games” were too costly and should be halted. He made these remarks about the U.S.-ROK alliance without consulting the South Korean government, while discussing North Korea.

However, in retrospect, U.S.-DPRK relations did not change significantly during Trump’s first term. While his meetings with Kim Jong Un in Singapore and Hanoi attracted massive media attention, they yielded no substantial results. Was it because Kim Jong Un failed to align with Trump’s vision of U.S. interests? Or was it because the interests of the U.S., as defined by Trump, could not be reconciled with those of North Korea? If U.S. and North Korean interests didn’t align during Trump’s first term, could they in a second? Has Trump ever clearly defined how North Korea could serve U.S. interests? Just as he once floated the idea of developing Gaza’s coastline, does he envision developing North Korea’s Kalma coastal tourist zone in Wonsan as part of his vision for American interests? Will he imagine himself relaxing at a Kalma resort with Kim Jong Un, just as he envisions lounging by the beach in Gaza with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu?

Indeed, Trump may consider a summit with Kim Jong Un once other global conflicts subside. However, it remains unclear what principles and approach Trump would use in engaging with Kim. To satisfy Kim, Trump would likely have to accept the proposal he rejected in Hanoi in February 2019. But has Trump even considered this? Kim is likely to demand far greater concessions than he proposed in Hanoi. Does the Trump administration even have a roadmap for this? What would Kim think after observing how Trump handles Ukraine? And what would Trump demand in return from Kim? Looking at Trump’s recent foreign policy, it seems that there are more questions than answers.

III. Trump’s Unstrategic Impatience toward North Korea

The recent confusion surrounding the Trump administration’s North Korea policy became apparent during trilateral talks with its East Asian allies, South Korea and Japan. A look at the outcomes of the foreign ministers’ meeting in Munich on February 15 highlights the continuing disarray in the administration’s approach to North Korea. One striking detail is the joint statement’s reference to the complete denuclearization of the “DPRK” rather than the “Korean Peninsula,” a departure from the longstanding norm. Since the 1990s, almost all agreements and joint statements have used the term “Korean Peninsula” when discussing denuclearization. Even the 1994 Geneva Agreement between the U.S. and North Korea, the 2005 Six-Party Talks Joint Statement, and several UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea have consistently referred to the “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Even the 2018 Singapore joint statement between Trump and Kim used this term. The phrase “denuclearization of DPRK” has occasionally appeared in specific U.S.-ROK and U.S.-Japan documents to signal pressure. While the goal in practice has always been to pursue the denuclearization of North Korea, the use of “DPRK” in the joint statement might signal a shift toward a more hardline stance by the Trump administration—a surprising development given that Trump has frequently emphasized his meetings with Kim Jong Un.

This raises several questions: Was the U.S. State Department not in consultation with Trump? Or, perhaps, did Trump not even read the joint statement? North Korea is unlikely to accept the term “the complete denuclearization of DPRK” in any agreement, which suggests that Trump would avoid using such language in negotiations with Kim Jong Un. Should Trump become more directly involved in North Korea policy, the language and strategies used are likely to change. The joint statement also emphasized democracy, sovereignty, and the rule of law, as well as the idea of “like-minded partners.” However, given Trump’s preference for bilateral pressure and deal-making—and his frequent conflicts with allies—it’s doubtful he would seek a unified response from these partners. Is the State Department still clinging to a Biden-era mindset? The reality of Trump’s second term seems to be at odds with this, creating further confusion. Trump would likely want to take the lead in handling North Korea, making it unlikely he would approach the issue through a trilateral lens with South Korea and Japan. This raises the question of whether Trump is even aware of the details of the trilateral foreign ministers’ joint statement. There seems to be a disconnect between the White House and the State Department on this issue.

Should the relationship between the U.S. and North Korea improve, and if the North Korean nuclear issue is resolved during Trump’s second term, it would be an alluring prospect. However, two months into his second term, there is growing pessimism about the likelihood of such a development, with the prospect of a renewed crisis on the Korean Peninsula still looming. Trump appears to have little interest in addressing the North Korean issue for now. He is not yet ready to engage Kim Jong Un. Even if Trump were to shift his focus to North Korea, it is likely to happen after the middle of his second term, by which point he may have lost the necessary momentum. Moreover, there appears to be no clear principles or strategies guiding his approach. Trump does not seem to have a well-defined plan for dealing with North Korea. In any case, the fact that Trump wants to hold another summit with Kim Jong Un could become a major variable in the future. This has led to concerns that he may adopt an impulsive policy without consistent strategy, and without consulting South Korea.

IV. Let’s Get Back to the Basics

The more difficult the times are, the more we should return to the basics. The overall foreign policy strategy of the Trump administration, as well as its North Korea strategy, is wavering and unpredictable, which is an unavoidable reality for South Korea. It is uncertain whether the North Korean issue will be pushed to the back burner due to Trump’s other priorities or whether he will hastily push for another summit. The potential lack of strategic planning in Trump’s policies, as well as the possibility that the North Korean issue may become secondary, could pose a significant burden for the South Korean government.

In such a difficult situation, the South Korean government must get back to the basics and prepare for all possible scenarios. The small deal that was discussed at the 2019 Hanoi summit could become a reality, and there is also the possibility that Russia could mediate and facilitate negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea. In this process, there is a risk that South Korea could be sidelined. To prepare for this uncertainty, the South Korean government should prioritize restoring the lost channels with North Korea, among others, to regain leverage. Given that Kim Jong Un has abandoned North Korea’s longstanding unification policy and has set the inter-Korean relationship into an adversarial one between two belligerent states earlier last year, this is not an easy task. Second, since U.S.-DPRK relations are an unfinished mission from Trump’s first term, the South Korean government must operate under the assumption that Trump will eventually resume contact with North Korea. In this process, it must be made clear that the U.S. cannot bypass South Korea but must rely on its assistance. Third, considering recent Russia-DPRK relations, Russia may attempt to intervene in some way, but it must be made clear that Russia will have a role that is no more significant than a veto power. The South Korean government should prepare a roadmap in advance for such scenarios. Finally, although Trump has referred to North Korea as a nuclear power, it must be emphasized that the ultimate goal of both South Korea and the U.S. is the denuclearization of North Korea, and that this aligns with America’s interests, in line with Trump’s America First approach. ■

■ Jihwan HWANG is Professor in the Department of International Relations at the University of Seoul.

■ Edited by: Sheewon MIN, Research Associate
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