I. Restoring North Korea-China Relations since the Launch of Trump’s Second Term?

To commemorate the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) declared 2024 as the “Year of Friendship.” However, compared to the relationship between North Korea and Russia that has grown closer, the ties between North Korea and China have not seen significant high-level exchanges, leading some observers to interpret a weakening of their bilateral relationship as exemplified by China’s demand for the repatriation of North Korean workers. Nevertheless, following the onset of the second Trump administration, there has been a noticeable shift toward improving relations between Pyongyang and Beijing, which has drawn renewed attention. For instance, on February 18, 2025, North Korea’s Vice Foreign Minister, Park Myung Ho, made an infrequent visit to the Chinese embassy in Pyongyang. During this visit, he expressed a desire to enhance relations with China, stating, “We expect the continued construction of socialism between North Korea and China to achieve new and greater accomplishments. We hope the two countries will strengthen exchanges and cooperation to elevate our relationship to a higher level” (驻朝鲜民主主义人民共和国大使馆 2025a). Furthermore, Chinese media outlets that had withdrawn from North Korea due to the COVID-19 pandemic resumed operations, and Chinese Ambassador Wang Yajun met with them, remarking that “DPRK-China relations are entering a new stage of development.” Significantly, construction activity was observed near the New Yalu River Bridge, which connects Dandong, China, and Sinuiju, North Korea, marking the first such developments in five years. This suggests a potential reopening of the bridge, a symbolic point of connection between the two countries (Zwirko 2025).

While the level of exchange between North Korea and China remains relatively low, North Korea has demonstrated a more proactive stance in seeking to improve bilateral relations. This shift suggests that North Korea is more responsive to the changes in geopolitical dynamics resulting from the second Trump administration than China is. The remarks made by Ambassador Wang Yajun during his meeting with Vice Minister Park Myung Ho, including “strengthening strategic communication and deepening practical cooperation,” encapsulate both the current state of DPRK-China relations and China’s intentions toward engaging with Pyongyang. In summary, China appears to recognize the need to stabilize and strengthen relations with North Korea, particularly in light of increasing U.S. tariff pressures and the intensification of confrontational dynamics following the inauguration of the second Trump administration

At the same time, China seeks to manage the situation cautiously, enhancing strategic communication and gradually resuming limited practical cooperation with North Korea, amidst the prevailing uncertainties and instability. In short, it seems that both countries are closely monitoring the evolving situation, while deliberating on the optimal timing and scope for restoring and advancing their bilateral relationship. Therefore, the state of North Korea-China relations remains fluid, influenced by a range of complex factors tied to developments surrounding the second term of the Trump administration.

II. New Variables in North Korea-China Relations

1. A Trump variable

The relationship between North Korea and China has traditionally been encapsulated by the Chinese idiom, “Without the lips, the teeth feel the cold (脣亡齒寒),” which signifies a deep interdependence—a dynamic that continues to persist today. While the foundational aspects of this traditional special relationship have gradually weakened since the advent of Xi Jinping’s leadership, this shift has made the relationship more susceptible to the influence of exogenous variables. Under the Xi-Kim leadership, the regular summits that once symbolized the unique nature of DPRK-PRC relations have become less frequent, marking a break in this longstanding diplomatic tradition. Despite this, relations between the two countries are evolving into a new, dynamic pattern, increasingly influenced by external factors such as the United States and, more recently, Russia, owing to growing ties between Pyongyang and Moscow.

For both China and North Korea, establishing a diplomatic rapport with the unpredictable Trump administration is of paramount importance. Both nations must navigate the uncertainty of their interactions with the U.S., adopting reactive strategies in response to the administration’s policies. President Trump has already exerted pressure on China through tariffs, while simultaneously leaving open the possibility for dialogue with President Xi. Moreover, President Trump has hinted at potential talks with Kim Jong-un, although it remains unclear whether North Korea is a top priority for the Trump administration.

Both China and North Korea have previous experience with President Trump’s unpredictable actions, which have left them cautious in their responses. Notably, China was taken aback by Trump’s sudden push for a summit with North Korea in 2018, while Kim Jong-un has also not forgotten the bad memories of the “Hanoi No Deal.” Consequently, both countries approach the Trump administration with skepticism regarding its strategic intentions, opting for a measured and cautious response. In this context, close strategic communication and cooperation between Beijing and Pyongyang are essential, as both countries seek to mitigate the potential risks posed by the Trump administration and avoid exacerbating bilateral tensions in a time of heightened uncertainty.

Historically, China has been highly sensitive to efforts by the United States to expand its influence in the region, particularly when the U.S. engages with North Korea in ways that exclude China. This includes the October 1994 Geneva Agreement between the U.S. and North Korea, when Chinese leadership, including President Jiang Zemin and all first, second, and third-ranked Chinese protocol officials, responded by visiting South Korea in an unprecedented manner. Similarly, in 2018, when the first Trump administration initiated talks with North Korea with the notion of “China passing” raised, China swiftly resumed high-level summits with North Korea after a seven-year hiatus. Additionally, Kim Jong-un held five leader-level summits, including four extraordinary trips to China between March 2018 and June 2019. These actions underscore China’s intent to assert its influence over the evolving dynamics of North Korea-U.S. relations, while moderating the rapid progress of diplomatic engagement between the two countries.

North Korea’s true intentions are always subject to various interpretations. Nevertheless, it is widely acknowledged that during the Cold War, its official strategy aimed to address asymmetries and establish a Korean Peninsula-centered post-Cold War order through bandwagoning. This approach is reflected in agreements such as the Geneva Agreed Framework, the North Korea-U.S. Joint Communiqué, and the September 19 Joint Statement, all of which involved exchanges of denuclearization commitments for security guarantees and improved relations.

In summary, China has been particularly sensitive to the U.S. expanding its influence beyond South Korea to North Korea, especially in a context where it finds itself at odds with the United States. As a result, China anticipates the possibility of direct negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea, potentially excluding China once again under the second Trump administration. In response, China deems it essential to manage its relations with North Korea in a stable manner, repeatedly urging North Korea to prioritize strengthening strategic communication.

Similarly, Pyongyang remains wary of the possibility that the U.S. and China might reach a compromise on North Korean issues. Despite tensions between the U.S. and China, the two countries have historically found common ground on the objective of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. For instance, after North Korea’s sixth nuclear test in 2017, both countries swiftly coordinated a UN Security Council Resolution 2375 that have severely impacted North Korea’s economy until now. While a U.S.-China rapprochement on North Korea issues remains unlikely under the Trump administration, Pyongyang cannot firmly conclude that it cannot happen. North Korea needs to be mindful of the need to strengthen its ties with China as a strategic hedge, particularly if negotiations with the U.S. prove unfruitful. The series of summits between North Korea and China since 2018, though largely driven by China, reflect the strategic considerations of both countries. For North Korea, engaging with China not only serves to solidify its position ahead of U.S. negotiations but also serves as a counterbalance in its diplomatic dealings with Washington.

However, it remains uncertain whether strengthening relations with China will ultimately prove beneficial or detrimental in the context of North Korea’s negotiations with Trump. Both countries face significant uncertainty regarding the policies and pressures that the second Trump administration will impose on them. Given this complexity, the ongoing efforts to enhance North Korea-China relations are unlikely to produce rapid results. The strategies and policies developed by Pyongyang and Beijing in relation to one another will remain fluid, heavily influenced by their respective interactions with Washington, thus contributing to the instability of DPRK-China relations as well.

2. A Russia Variable with the War in Ukraine

In the future, if the war in Ukraine concludes swiftly through Russia-U.S. negotiations, as President Trump envisions, leading to improved relations between Moscow and Washington, it will have both direct and indirect implications for DPRK-PRC relations. In response to U.S. pressure, both China and North Korea have been cooperating with Russia. However, with Presidents Trump and Putin working closely together, discussing the prospect of an early end to the Russia-Ukraine war as one of Trump’s primary diplomatic objectives since his inauguration, both China and North Korea will face a new challenge: the potential for improved relations between the U.S. and Russia.

In particular, this could pose a significant challenge for North Korea, which has been actively seeking military cooperation with Russia, emphasizing the DPRK-PRC-Russia solidarity and using the “New Cold War” analogy to counter the United States. First and foremost, if the war in Ukraine ends and Moscow’s relations with Washington improve, Russia would lose its motivation and justification to continue military cooperation with Pyongyang. In such a scenario, China would become Pyongyang’s primary partner, compelling North Korea to restore and strengthen its relations with Beijing.

Notwithstanding, North Korea is also forced to consider the possibility that strengthening its ties with China could antagonize the Trump administration, thereby undermining opportunities for potential DPRK-U.S. dialogue. In short, while China may serve as a safety valve and a reliable ally for Pyongyang, the United States remains a significant prospect, offering DPRK potential future benefits. This dynamic intensifies Pyongyang’s concerns, complicating its strategic decision-making.

China has also strengthened its cooperation with Russia to counter the U.S. However, China has not fully provided the support Moscow expected in the Ukraine war, shouldering some burden in its relationship with Russia. Given this, China’s diplomatic challenges with Russia may diminish with the conclusion of the war in Ukraine. Conversely, improved Russia-U.S. relations are likely to present a significant challenge for Beijing. As a result, China must be concerned about the possibility of Russia collaborating with the U.S., as this would weaken the cooperation with its strong ally, especially in the face of mounting pressure from the Trump administration.

On the other hand, China may have the opportunity to incentivize North Korea to collaborate with it. However, there are concerns that if China hastily strengthens its relations with North Korea while Trump’s strategy toward China remains unclear, it could provoke a stronger U.S. offensive. In short, while both DPRK and PRC are motivated to improve their relations, a rapid and drastic improvement is unlikely, as it requires careful strategic calculations. Instead, due to the new variables introduced since the start of Trump 2.0, relations between Pyongyang and Beijing are expected to evolve in a complex and unstable manner.

3. The 2025 APEC Leaders’ Meeting: Opportunities and Challenges for South Korea

Another significant factor in the DPRK-PRC relationship is the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Meeting, scheduled for late October in Gyeongju, Republic of Korea (ROK). Pyongyang is closely monitoring the ROK-PRC relationship, just as it does the U.S.-PRC relationship. On the day of the ninth ROK-Japan-China summit in May 2024, North Korea unexpectedly announced its plan to launch a spy satellite, carrying out the launch shortly after the summit concluded. Additionally, Pyongyang reacted strongly and unusually to discussions on its denuclearization at the summit, labeling them as a “direct challenge to sovereignty and violent interference in domestic affairs.” Pyongyang also expressed dissatisfaction with China for its passive stance on DPRK-China-Russia solidarity, especially while Beijing sought to improve its relations with Seoul by participating in the summit (Lee 2024).

Given the current strained state of DPRK-China relations, if President Xi visits South Korea and holds a ROK-PRC summit, even if it is in the context of the APEC meeting, North Korea is likely to react with stronger and more intense opposition than it did during the ROK-China-Japan summit, thereby escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula. China has traditionally sought to stabilize the peninsula by maintaining a balance between the two Koreas through its “two-Korea policy.” As such, China must acknowledge DPRK’s criticisms and proactively manage its opposition. For example, if President Xi plans to attend the APEC meeting and conduct a ROK-China leaders’ summit, it is likely he will take steps to improve relations with Pyongyang beforehand, such as holding a summit or high-level meeting—something that has not occurred in the past five years. In this context, the APEC summit may present an opportunity to restore DPRK-China relations. From South Korea’s perspective, which is hosting the summit and planning a ROK-PRC leaders’ summit, it is important to prepare for the potential of a DPRK-PRC summit taking place first, leading to improved relations between the two countries.

In 2025, South Korea is likely to navigate successive waves of challenges on the Korean Peninsula, shaped by shifting geopolitical dynamics and ongoing domestic political uncertainties. The interaction of complex variables, including U.S.-PRC relations, U.S.-Russia relations, and DPRK-China relations, could lead to a series of unpredictable and fluctuating developments. It will be crucial for Seoul to closely monitor changes in the international situation, prepare for rapid responses, and demonstrate heightened adaptability and flexibility in navigating these challenges.

If South Korea’s leadership vacuum persists, the worst-case scenario could materialize, where both the U.S. and China effectively bypass Seoul, diminishing its influence over the Korean Peninsula. In recent years, there has been a notable decline in the number of official Chinese statements regarding the Korean Peninsula. At the 2025 press conference of the 3rd Session of the 14th National People’s Congress, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi did not address the Korean Peninsula at all (中华人民共和国外交部 2025).

It is critical for South Korea to prepare for the APEC Leaders Meeting not only as the host but also as an opportunity to assert its leadership on the global stage. In addition to strengthening collaboration with Japan and the U.S., Seoul must capitalize on this moment to enhance its strategic positioning. This includes proactively restoring and strengthening communication channels with key counterparts, such as China, Russia, North Korea, and the Global South, in order to prepare for a range of potential strategic responses. ■

References

Lee, Dong Ryul. 2024. “China’s Perceptions and Strategies towards the ROK-Japan-China Collaboration.” EAI Issue Briefing, May 29. https://www.eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=22510&board=kor_issuebriefing&keyword_option=&keyword=&more=.

Zwirko, Colin. 2025. “North Korea resumes huge China border bridge project in sign of trade boost plan.” NK Pro, March 07. https://www.nknews.org/pro/north-korea-esumes-huge-china-border-ridge-project-in-sign-of-trade-boost-plan/

中华人民共和国外交部. 2025. “中共中央政治局委员、外交部长王毅就中国外交政策和对外关系回答中外记者提问.” March 7. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/wjbzhd/202503/t20250307_11570443.shtml

驻朝鲜民主主义人民共和国大使馆. 2025a. “王亚军会见朝鲜外务省副相朴明浩.” February 19. http://kp.china-embassy.gov.cn/zxxx/202502/t20250219_11558670.htm

______. 2025b. “王亚军会见疫情后首批入朝央媒记者.” February 28. http://kp.china-embassy.gov.cn/zxxx/202502/t20250228_11566152.htm

■ Dong Ryul LEE is Chair of EAI’s Center for China Research and Professor of Chinese Studies at Dongduk Women’s University.

■ Translated and edited by: Sheewon MIN, Research Associate
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