The debate surrounding the potential collapse of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has reignited. While some argue that the power of Kim Jong Un, General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), has in fact been strengthened by the deepening DPRK-Russia cooperation, the shifting international dynamics—often described as a New Cold War—along with Pyongyang’s advancing nuclear capabilities, others remain skeptical, doubting the long-term sustainability of the DPRK system.

The debate regarding the potential collapse of North Korea remains subtle. Some scholars point to the rapid transformations of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc from the late 1980s to the early 1990s as a framework for understanding North Korea’s potential collapse. The potential collapse of North Korea can be categorized into three distinct but interconnected concepts.

First, leadership collapse refers to the incapacitation of the ruling elites, such as the supreme leader and key government officials, thereby undermining the state’s governance. In the context of the DPRK, this would occur if Kim and the members of the Politburo Committee were to collapse.

Second, regime collapse denotes the breakdown of the core principles, systems of control, and mechanisms of power projection that underpin the regime. In North Korea’s case, this would signify the collapse of the regime under the guidance of the Suryong rooted in the Juche ideology.

Lastly, state collapse involves the seizure of power by unofficial political and social networks, leading to the paralysis of the state’s governing authority. In extreme instances, this may result in a situation where political control is exercised by private means, public safety is dictated by force, and the state’s authority is entirely obliterated. These forms of collapse are neither mutually exclusive nor necessarily sequential; they can be interrelated and occur simultaneously or in varying chronological order. For example, both regime and state collapse could transpire concurrently.

This paper explores the potential collapse of the DPRK, with a particular focus on leadership collapse. While regime collapse, often equated with regime change, has been anticipated at least three times since the end of the Cold War—following the death of Kim Il Sung, the North Korean famine (known as the Arduous March) in the mid to late 1990s, and the ascension of Kim Jong Un in 2012—it has yet to materialize. Moreover, the contemporary debate surrounding North Korea’s collapse increasingly emphasizes that any crisis is more likely to stem from challenges to Kim Jong Un’s leadership, rather than from a rapid regime change. In light of this, the aim of this commentary is to identify the challenges the Kim regime has encountered and to assess whether these challenges may lead to the leadership collapse.

I. Three Major Challenges to the North Korean Regime

The discussion surrounding the potential collapse of the DPRK has been revitalized by three factors that have emerged under Kim Jong Un’s leadership, which makes the current situation distinct from those observed under previous leaders.

First, the expansion of North Korea’s marketization, particularly the spread of the Jangmadang economy, and the consequent social changes. The expansion of private economic activities within the Jangmadang appears to be an irreversible phenomenon. Since the Arduous March in the mid-1990s, the state distribution system has virtually collapsed, and North Koreans have increasingly turned to economic activities through the Jangmadang to sustain themselves. While the North Korean income structure remains twofold, with individuals earning through both private economic ventures and formal occupations, it is evident that the proportion of income derived from the private sector is growing. According to the “Report on North Korea’s Economy and Society,” which covers the period from 2016 to 2020 under Kim Jong Un’s rule, the proportion of workers in the private sector (37%) surpassed those employed in the state sector (23.5%), while informal income (69.4%) far exceeded official wages (23.8%). Longitudinal studies over the past decade further confirm this steady rise in private economic activity and informal wages (Ministry of Unification (MOU) 2024, 55-56). Another study reveals that only 24.4% of North Koreans rely on the state’s official food distribution channels, while 60% procure food through markets (Kim 2022). Similarly, only 13% acquire consumer goods through formal venues, while 67% rely on informal routes (Kim 2022). These findings suggest that the majority of North Korean households sustain themselves through unofficial economic activities.

The rise of the Jangmadang economy has led to various social changes, significantly impacting the state’s control system. The traditional class hierarchy, based on Songbun (social classification), has been eroded by the emergence of a new bourgeois class, exacerbating social disparities not only in terms of power but also in wealth. The intertwining of power and wealth has, in turn, fostered widespread corruption, contributing to moral decay and a breakdown in societal cohesion (Kim 2022).

A second significant challenge to the regime is the weakening of ideological control. In socialist systems, particularly in North Korea, ideology plays a pivotal role in fostering voluntary compliance through internalization. It has been instrumental in supporting the monolithic leadership system of the party, with the ‘revolutionary Suryong (Supreme Leader) doctrine’ and the ‘theory of the socio-political organism’ at its core. These ideological frameworks have been central to legitimizing hereditary succession (Yoon 2023, 75-76). Yet, under Kim Jong Un’s leadership, skepticism regarding the legitimacy of the Baekdu bloodline has become more pronounced. According to the “Report on North Korea’s Economy and Society,” among defectors who fled before 2011, the majority supported the system. However, after Kim Jong Un assumed power in 2011, negative perceptions began to outweigh positive ones. Specifically, between 2011 and 2015, negative views (42.6%) surpassed positive opinions (38.3%), despite a margin of error. Over time, this trend intensified, with negative perceptions rising to 54.9% and positive views dropping to 29.4% between 2016 and 2020.

A generational divide is also apparent. Among respondents in their 20s, more than half (54.9%) expressed skepticism towards the legitimacy of the Baekdu bloodline’s rule, while those in their 30s and 40s were evenly divided. Individuals over 50, however, remained more supportive (47.4% positive vs. 35.4% negative). Given that this survey predates the emergence of Kim Ju Ae in November 2022, when discourse surrounding the potential for a fourth hereditary leadership was revived, skepticism towards hereditary succession may have deepened further, in light of the ongoing trend and the inherent limitations surrounding Kim Ju Ae’s potential leadership.

In connection with this, the spread of external influences that further accelerate the loosening of ideological control within North Korea has been on the rise. The report indicates that the proportion of North Koreans consuming foreign content rose from 67.6% between 2006 and 2010 to 83% after Kim Jong Un assumed power. Moreover, 60.6% of respondents reported that such exposure reinforced their negative perceptions of the regime (MOU 2024, 232-233). In response, the North Korean government has enacted a series of laws aimed at countering anti-socialist and non-socialist activities, including the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Act (December 2020), the Youth Education Guarantee Law (September 2021), and the Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act (January 2023). These measures, coupled with the establishment of the Disciplinary Investigation Department and the Justice Department to bolster the legal system, serve as further evidence of ideological erosion within the country.

Historically, the North Korean regime has controlled its population through strict monopolization of information, bypassing governance through formal legal frameworks. Typically, when laws are promulgated in North Korea, detailed provisions regarding violations and penalties are not disclosed. However, the publication of these three laws with explicitly defined legal provisions represents a notable exception, implying the government imparted a common knowledge to all DPRK citizens, acknowledging the permeation of foreign culture within society (Han 2023, 280-281). The Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act, for example, specifically prohibits the use of the term “oppa” to refer to one’s husband, implicitly acknowledging the extensive proliferation of the language of South Korea, an adversarial state, which contrasts to the Kim regime’s stringent control over South Korean cultural influence. Given the regime’s consistent efforts to restrict horizontal communication among the North Korean population, viewed as a key factor in fostering anti-regime activities, these legislative measures reflect a heightened sense of crisis regarding the influence of foreign ideologies.

A third significant challenge to the regime is DPRK’s fundamental shift in its policy toward the Republic of Korea (ROK), marked by the official abandonment of reunification and the designation of South Korea as an arch enemy. This policy change was announced in December 2023 during the 8th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the WPK, yet the regime has not to provide a public justification for this shift. Despite Kim Jong Un’s directive in January 2024 to remove unification-related clauses from the North Korean constitution, it remains unclear whether these amendments have been formally enacted. Traditionally, when North Korea introduced major policy changes, it sought to justify them through ideological discourse in official outlets such as Rodong Sinmun (the official newspaper of the WPK) and Kulloja (a theoretical publication of the party). However, no such discourse has accompanied this policy change regarding the ROK. The principle of Liberating South Joseon from colonial rule and achieving the unification of the Korean Peninsula has long been a core tenet of the WPK and a central pillar of the regime’s identity. North Koreans have been indoctrinated with this unification education from an early age, internalizing it as a fundamental part of ideology. Consequently, Kim Jong Un’s declaration of abandoning unification can be interpreted as a voluntary decision to relinquish a central justification and narrative that has been deeply ingrained in the North Korean populace for over seventy years—an ideological framework that has historically reinforced the regime’s control over its people. While public dissent remains unlikely due to the regime’s tight grip on society, the removal of this long-standing ideological pillar could lead to confusion within the belief systems of the North Korean people.

Moreover, replacing the unification agenda with the goal of “territorial integrity” (Ryongto Wanjeong) through military means necessitates a permanent state of military readiness and an increase in defense spending, which would place additional strain on North Korea’s already fragile economy. This shift signals a return to the Military-First (Songun) policy, moving away from the previous strategy of simultaneous economic and military development (Byungjin). The official designation of South Korea as an adversarial state would escalate systemic competition, thereby increasing pressure on Kim to demonstrate the superiority of his regime over that of the ROK.

II. Possibility of Leadership Collapse

Despite the unprecedented challenges confronting North Korea, such as marketization, ideological erosion, and a fundamental shift in its policy toward the ROK, the question of whether these factors will culminate in the leadership’s collapse remains uncertain. A leadership collapse is usually accompanied by organized mass resistance. However, determining the threshold at which public discontent escalates into open defiance remains a significant challenge. Even if these challenges weaken the legitimacy and authority of the Kim regime, the transition from widespread dissatisfaction to collective resistance is unlikely to occur immediately. This phenomenon is not unique to North Korea; in autocratic regimes, pervasive public grievances often fail to translate into mass uprisings. The extremely high initial cost of resistance, in which individuals must risk their lives (Olson 1965), the uncertainty of success due to limited opportunities for collective action (Scott 1985), and the absence of clear leadership to guide the movement (Hassan 2023) result in individuals opting to be passive observers rather than active participants in resistance efforts.

However, as history provides numerous examples of resistance surpassing such limitations, the possibility of the emergence of a ‘critical mass’ cannot be entirely ruled out. The concept of critical mass is a key determinant in large-scale mobilization against dictatorship (Cormer and Lim 2013) and emerges when uncertainty about mass participation is resolved (Kuran 1991) or confidence in the likely success of collective action spreads (Svolik 2012). In the case of North Korea, if the narratives of the anti-imperialist struggle and Juche ideology, which functioned as powerful mechanisms of population control during the Kim Il Sung era, lose their legitimacy and persuasive power even under the restructured ideology of the Kim Jong Un era, what remains is no longer voluntary compliance but mere physical coercion. In such a situation, any cracks in the state’s apparatus of repression could create opportunities for collective defiance, particularly among those who have not been fully indoctrinated. However, theoretical models suggest that successful uprisings require the presence of communication channels and mutual trust between those willing to initiate action and those who would join them, as well as confidence in the likely success of collective resistance—both of which remain significant barriers in North Korea. At present, the regime’s extreme levels of violence remain intact, while the cost of initiating resistance remains prohibitively high (Han 2023, 192-201). Reports indicate that severe punishments, including executions for even minor ideological or behavioral transgressions, have been carried out, particularly following the enactment of three draconian laws since 2020 (Lee 2023).

The likelihood of leadership collapse through organized elite backlashes remains limited under current conditions. As key supporters of the Suryong system, North Korea’s ruling elites partially share in the regime’s power and privileges. Thus, their defection could undermine the internal stability of the system. According to data from the MOU in August 2024, the number of high-profile North Korean defectors classified as “individually protected” by the National Intelligence Service increased from 54 during Kim Jong Il’s rule (1997–2011) to 134 under Kim Jong Un. In proportional terms, elite defectors constituted only 0.23% of the total 23,027 defectors during Kim Jong Il’s era, but this figure has risen to 1.22% of the 10,985 defectors under Kim Jong Un—representing an approximate five-fold increase (Kim 2024). However, this trend does not necessarily suggest an imminent leadership collapse. While North Korea operates under the sole leadership system of the Suryong, it also exhibits a characteristic typical of authoritarian regimes—a strong alignment between the ruler and the elite class. For the leadership collapse to occur, factors such as viable alternatives to Kim’s regime and credible assurances of security and stability outside the North Korea would be required; however, in the absence of such conditions, elites are more likely to support the regime as a survival strategy, thereby opting for a “shared fate.”

Ultimately, the decisive factor lies in the shift in state repression (Han 2023). The North Korean regime has historically relied on state violence, underpinned by coercion and control, as its fundamental mechanisms for survival. The key question is whether the North Korean regime, which has controlled independent behaviors through these coercive methods, can maintain or even intensify its level of repression. A defining characteristic of North Korean state repression is the demand for absolute compliance, requiring the overt demonstration of loyalty from every North Korean citizen, at least on the surface, rather than mere silence. As of 2025, there is no clear evidence indicating a weakening of the Kim regime’s coercive capabilities. Therefore, while challenges to the Kim’s leadership are undeniable, the direct link between these challenges and the prospect of an imminent leadership collapse remains tenuous. 

References

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Hassan, Mai. 2023. “When Movements Topple Dictators.” MIT Spectrum. https://betterworld.mit.edu/spectrum/issues/2023-spring/when-movements-topple-dictators/

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■ Won Gon PARK is Chair of EAI’s Center for North Korea Studies and a professor of North Korean Studies at Ewha Womans University.

■ Translated and Edited by: Sheewon Min, Research Associate; Chaerin Kim, Research Intern 
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