The objectives of this paper are twofold. First, it examines the historical context behind the Kim Jong Un regime’s policy toward South Korea. Based on the findings, it derives the implications of Kim’s depiction of the inter-Korean relations as “a relationship between two hostile countries and two belligerents at war,” and provides a general outlook on inter-Korean relations.

I. Positive and Negative Legacies of the Kim Jong Il Regime

Both the power structure and national policy direction of the Kim Jong Un regime were shaped and established against the backdrop of the positive and negative legacies of Kim Jong Il’s military-first (Songun) policy. The Kim Jong Il era (1995-2011) is marked by two major achievements that constitute its positive legacy. First, the era saw the restoration of internal governance and economic stabilization. Second, the nation successfully laid a foundation for deterrence capabilities in three dimensions: nuclear, missile, and cyber. Kim Jong Un’s policy of rapid advancement (sprint) in these areas was only possible due to the achievements of his predecessor.

The negative legacy of the Kim Jong Il era relates to the consequences of the relative pragmatism and openness of his Military-First Politics. His reign was marked by two extraordinary methods for regime finance: first, permissions granted to regime agencies to engage in commercial activities for foreign currency generation; second, the active acceptance of external aid. The money from them provided the financial foundation necessary not only for developing nuclear, missile, and cyber capabilities, but also for stabilizing regime institutions. However, these two methods led to three negative ramifications. First, domestic commercial activities expanded significantly, increasing conflicts among regime agencies over distribution of foreign trade rights. Second, the long-term reduction of external-internal tensions weakened watchfulness and hostility to various ‘enemies,’ traditionally been essential for regime stability. Third, defections increased as external information infiltrated the country, and admiration for South Korea grew.

II. The Kim Jong Un Regime and Transition to Tension and Hostility

By 2008 and 2009, still under the Kim Jong Il regime, North Korea revised its domestic and foreign policies based on the strategic achievements of the military-first era and changes in the domestic and international landscape. First, instead of concealing its nuclear, missile, and cyber development, it began to publicly flaunt its will to rapidly advance its capabilities. Second, it adopted a hardline stance towards South Korea, starting with the establishment of the Reconnaissance General Bureau. Third, in domestic policy, it promoted market repression, separation from South Korea, and fortified control over its citizenry. In other words, 2009 marked the beginning of the domestic and foreign policy framework that the Kim Jong Un regime continues to pursue today.

Since Kim Jong Un came to power in 2012, North Korea’s internal power structure and national policy direction have shown three significant differences from those during his father’s era. First, contrary to the domestic and international appeasement policy that characterized the Kim Jong Il era, Kim Jong Un adopted a hardline policy on all fronts. Second, the composition of the ruling class changed from the relatively pragmatic and open military of the Kim Jong Il era to the dogmatic and reclusive party organs of the Kim Jong Un era, both of which made policy decisions based on their institutional interests. Third, the international landscape also shifted significantly as the U.S.-led unilateral hegemonic structure gave way to an era marked by confrontation between the liberal Western bloc and the authoritarian dictatorship bloc. North Korea has historically mirrored China’s policy framework, with Kim Jong Il’s regime reflecting China’s reform and openness approach. In contrast, under Kim Jong Un, North Korea has shifted to align more closely with Xi Jinping’s governance model. The Kim-Xi model shares characteristics such as party dominance, emphasis on ideology, strengthened state control over the economy and citizens, and an aggressive foreign policy.

Although Kim Jong Un came to power in 2012, his struggles to eliminate remnants of the military-first era lasted until 2016, spanning three fronts. First, he purged the dominant and privileged elites of the previous era, represented by the elimination of Jang Song-thaek faction and the elements in the military advocating the continuation of the pragmatic and open policies of Kim Jong Il. Second, Kim altered the former domestic policy orientations that pursued market reforms and openings, abolishing policies such as the “Individual Field Responsibility System” and the “Socialist Corporate Responsibility Management System.” Third, domestic political structures were reorganized in a way that guaranteed the interests of the dogmatic Party faction. The 7th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) in 2016 held two significance: first, it commemorated the completion of the domestic political task of eliminating the remnants of the military-first policy; second, it marked the full-fledged launch of North Korea under Kim Jong Un’s distinct leadership.

III. Kim Jong Un’s Perception of Superiority and South Korea as a “Hostile Enemy State”

Kim Jong Un likely believes that the policy direction he has pursued so far has been highly successful and will continue to be so. North Korea declared ‘the completion of its national nuclear force’ in November 2017 and subsequently held multiple summits with South Korea, the United States, China, and Russia between 2018 and February 2019. After the 8th Party Congress in 2021, North Korea significantly enhanced its tactical nuclear attack capability against South Korea. Against this backdrop, Kim Jong Un recently promulgated two offensive policies. First, North Korea enacted a new “State Policy on Nuclear Forces” in September 2022, marking a significant uptick in belligerence. Second, in December 2023, North Korea redefined South Korea as the most “hostile” and “belligerent” adversary, threatening occupation and total annihilation.

IV. Inter-Korean Relations Based on Cold War Structures: South Korea’s Response

North Korea’s provocations against South Korea and the United States, which began between 2008 and 2009 and intensified since Kim Jong Un came to power in 2012, are expected to continue for the foreseeable future. During this period, the most favorable relationship South Korea can hope for with North Korea is avoiding a hot war while maintaining a cold war. In other words, a situation where a hot war could break out at any moment, but has not yet, must persist. During this time, South Korea’s ideal strategic position would be to strongly respond to North Korea’s offensives, substantially weaken North Korea, and maintain its international standing while waiting for the balance of power between the two Koreas to shift in its favor. Throughout this period, South Korea will find itself in a relatively weaker strategic position than North Korea. South Korea should not negotiate from a position of weakness but instead build up its strength and wait until the negotiation framework becomes more favorable.

On the other hand, North Korea, believing its strength is on the rise, will attempt to consolidate its perceived superiority through negotiations with South Korea or the United States. North Korea’s power has not yet reached its peak, indicating that its provocations will likely intensify in the near future. Kim Jong Un’s designation of South Korea as an “invariable principal enemy” is a strategic doctrine for this line of offense against South Korea and the United States. It suggests that North Korea’s strategic goal in the nuclear standoff between South Korea-U.S. and North Korea is not merely deterrence but domination.

South Korea is already facing a significant challenge. Although it will have to endure a perilous cold war with North Korea for an extended period, it is far from adequately prepared. The majority of South Korean experts and the public still hold strong expectations for improving inter-Korean relations, increasing exchanges and cooperation, and providing humanitarian aid to North Korea. This raises the possibility that South Korea’s North Korea policy, influenced by domestic politics, may lead to “underbalancing,” if not full appeasement. Anyhow, it is unlikely that South Korea will be able to unilaterally induce a definitive resolution in the new cold war with North Korea. A shift in the dynamics of power relations between the great powers in the new global cold war is required for a change in inter-Korean relations. If South Korea successfully endures this period, future inter-Korean relations will unfold under its leadership; however, the opposite outcome is also possible.

■ Hyeong Jung PARK is a former Senior Research Fellow and Visiting Fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU).

■ Translated and edited by: Jisoo Park, Research Associate; Chaerin Kim, Intern     

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