I. Unconfirmed Constitutional Amendments: Changes to Territorial Provisions and Removal of Unification

At the 9th Enlarged Plenum of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) in late December 2023, Kim Jong Un characterized inter-Korean relations as those between "two hostile states" and "two belligerent nations," signaling a fundamental shift in North Korea's policy toward South Korea (ROK).. He called for the overhaul and restructuring of state institutions responsible for handling relations with South Korea and stressed the need to be prepared to "suppress" South Korean territory using all available means, including nuclear forces, in case of a contingency (KCNA 2023). In a policy speech on January 15, 2024, at the 10th Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), Kim asserted, “As the southern border of our country has been clearly drawn, the illegal ‘Northern Limit Line’ and any other boundary can never be tolerated, and if the ROK violates even 0.001 mm of our territorial land, air, or waters, it will be considered an act of war .” He further ordered the removal of any “concepts contradictory to reality,” emphasizing the need to delete expressions in the constitution such as "northern half," "independence," "peaceful reunification," and "great national unity" (KCNA 2024a). During the test-fire of the surface-to-sea missile Padasuri-6 on February 14, Kim used the term “maritime border” for the first time when discussing the inter-Korean maritime boundary (KCNA 2024b).

As a follow-up measure, North Korea (DPRK) dismantled unification-related institutions and restructured public exchange groups. Since April, the DPRK has mobilized large-scale armed forces in the northern part of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) to undertake various activities, including installing what appear to be anti-tank barriers, laying landmines, erecting barbed wire, and clearing barren land. In an effort to sever land routes between the two Koreas, the DPRK has also placed landmines near roads, removed streetlights, dismantled railway tracks, and demolished nearby auxiliary buildings. These actions clearly signal the DPRK's rejection of “a special interim relationship stemming from the process toward unification,” as outlined in the 1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and the North (State Department Archive 2004).

However, the latest partial constitutional amendment passed during the 11th Session of the 14th SPA from October 7-8, did not introduce any new clauses concerning territory, territorial waters, or airspace, nor did it address the removal of the term “unification.” Instead, on October 9, the General Staff of the North Korean military announced plans to carry out explosions in the DMZ to divide the territory. On October 11, its Foreign Ministry escalated tensions by claiming that enemy drones had infiltrated the airspace over the WPK headquarters in Pyongyang on October 3, 9, and 10.

On October 12, the General Staff of the North Korean military issued orders to artillery units near the border and those assigned key fire missions, instructing them to be fully combat-ready by 8 p.m. on October 13. On October 14, Kim Jong Un convened a defense and security meeting to determine the direction of the military activities. Following this, on October 15, the North Korean military carried out explosions along the Gyeongui and Donghae railway lines, as previously announced on October 9. The objective was to sever railway and road connections between the two Koreas and to fortify the area. With these actions, the DPRK is now fully cutting off land routes between the two sides, actively implementing measures to construct fortifications and barriers.

II. Military Approach of the “Two Hostile States” Rhetoric

North Korea’s recent military actions likely reflect a strategic decision to prioritize the military approach outlined in its inter-Korean and unification policies from the 8th Party Congress. This choice appears to be more feasible than the politically challenging task of amending the constitution to erase the concept of unification or introduce new territorial clauses. The unification policy set forth in the 8th Party Congress emphasizes the expulsion of U.S. forces from South Korea, the termination of U.S. political and military influence, and the suppression of military threats through strong defense capabilities to hasten peaceful unification and achieve national prosperity.

In essence, North Korea seeks to achieve unification with South Korea by first ensuring the withdrawal of U.S. forces, dismantling the U.S.-ROK alliance, and ultimately unifying the Korean Peninsula, all anchored in its military strength. Its recent military actions, framed by the rhetoric of "two hostile states," align with its strategy to maintain a strong national defense, which is deemed an essential condition for the unification policies set forth in the Party rules, taking precedence over the constitution. At the same time, these actions serve to clearly delineate and visibly fortify the land border between North and South Korea, further reinforcing the division. North Korea’s recent military actions highlight several important aspects. First, during his speech commemorating the 60th anniversary of the Kim Jong Un National Defense University on October 7, coinciding with the SPA session, Kim expressed concerns about the potential disruption of the power balance on the Korean Peninsula and the threats it poses. He stated that “if the enemy attempts to resort to arms against our state, the armed forces of our Republic will use all strike capabilities without hesitation,” and made it clear that they “will not rule out the use of nuclear weapons.” With the ROK-U.S. alliance evolving into a nuclear-based partnership and the continuous military build-up between the two nations, Kim warned, “The disturbed balance of strategic strength on the Korean Peninsula precisely means the outbreak of war.” He emphasized, “Our Party and government … will never tolerate the balance of strength being disturbed on the Korean Peninsula.” Additionally, he reaffirmed North Korea's commitment to accelerating its progress toward becoming a military and nuclear superpower, with a specific mandate to perfect “the preparedness of our state for nuclear counteractions to an unprecedented level” (KCNA 2024c).

Second, KCNA reported on October 8 that DPRK Academy of Defence Sciences conducted a test-fire of 240 mm-caliber Controllable Multiple Rocket Launcher Shells. This follows the Academy’s February announcement of the development of a guided 240mm multiple rocket launcher, shortly after Kim Jong Un introduced the “two hostile states” rhetoric. Under Kim’s direct supervision, the test-firing of these rockets began in April. By May, trial runs of the rocket launch vehicles were completed, and in August, inspection test-firings of the entire upgraded 240mm multiple rocket launcher system were conducted, aiming for deployment to front-line units between 2024 and 2026.. The latest test aimed to confirm the reliability of the automatic firing system for the controllable 240mm rocket shells and to reaffirm their accuracy, which has a maximum range of 67 kilometers. North Korea seems intent on demonstrating its enhanced strike capabilities against South Korea, reviving the rhetoric of turning Seoul into a “sea of fire.”

Third, on October 9, the General Staff Department of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) announced that, in response to the “touch-and-go danger of war ever-escalating in the area along the southern border of the DPRK,” it would “take a substantial military step to completely separate the territory of the DPRK, where its sovereignty is exercised.” The statement emphasized that “for our army to permanently shut off and block the southern border with the ROK, the primary hostile state and invariable principal enemy, in the current situation is a self-defensive measure for inhibiting war and defending the security of the DPRK.” Additionally, they noted that they “sent a telephone message to the U.S. forces side” to prevent any “misjudgment and accidental conflict” regarding the fortification project planned for the highly sensitive southern border area (KCNA 2024d). Following this declaration, on October 15, North Korea destroyed the Gyeongui and Donghae routes that connected North and South Korea within the DMZ.

III. Contradictions in the Claim of “Nuclear Balance Disruption”

Several common themes emerge from Robert Carlin and Siegfried Hecker’s evaluations of North Korea’s strategic decisions regarding war earlier this year, Robert Gallucci’s analysis of the potential for a nuclear war in Northeast Asia in 2024, and Robert Manning’s recent discussion of the risk of another Korean War. These include the growing instability on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea’s increasing reliance on its nuclear military capabilities, and the heightened risk of escalation. All three factors are consistent with Kim Jong Un’s remarks in his October 7 speech, where he emphasized the “potential disruption of the balance of strategic power on the Korean Peninsula.”

However, the likelihood of such a disruption appears low. While North Korea argues that possessing more nuclear weapons is necessary to maintain this balance, as Robert Jervis notes, increasing the quantity or capability of nuclear weapons does not necessarily provided a strategic advantage (Jervis 1979-1980). Instead, North Korea may face escalating costs related to the production and storage of additional nuclear weapons, which could, in turn, exacerbate internal instability. The drone incident, which occurred between the General Staff Department’s October 9 announcement regarding the destruction of railways and roads and fortification, and the subsequent explosions on October 15, highlights that the greatest threat to the Kim Jong Un regime comes not from external forces, but from internal instability.

Second, North Korea is pursuing a dual strategy that combines assured destruction through second-strike capabilities with a flexible response approach, allowing it to address various military scenarios through tactical nuclear superiority. However, the 2018 and 2022 Nuclear Posture Reviews (NPR) have made it clear that any use of nuclear weapons by North Korea would lead to the end of regime, with no scenario in which Kim Jong Un could survive. This message is reinforced by the establishment of the U.S.-ROK Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) and its guidelines, along with the formation of the ROK Strategic Command on October 1. North Korea’s nuclear strategy aims to amplify fear by threatening mutual destruction, seeking to return the Korean Peninsula to a state of classical deterrence based on mutual vulnerability.

Lastly, one of Kim Jong Un’s critical misjudgments in suggesting that a disruption in the strategic balance could lead to war is the mistaken assumption that strategic power can be accurately measured. Hans J. Morgenthau argued that since it is impossible to precisely assess an adversary’s strategic strength, uncertainty actually reduces the likelihood of war. Even if relative power could be measured, historical evidence shows that wars have more frequently occurred between nations of comparable strength (Moul 1988). Given the significant disparity between North and South Korea, as well as between North Korean forces and the combined U.S.-ROK military, the stability of strategic deterrence has, in fact, increased.

Nevertheless, North Korea is likely to continue interpreting the stability of strategic deterrence as instability in the strategic balance, leading it to persist with provocative actions. The four basic military policies announced following the Inter-Korean Liaison Office bombing in June 2020, which were initially suspended, have been actively resumed since Kim Jong Un’s declaration of the “two hostile states” rhetoric. These provocations include launching trash balloons and destroying the Donghae and Gyeongui railway lines. In response, the South Korean government must reinforce its readiness against North Korea’s potential strategic provocations, such as the 28 instances of waste-filled balloon launches, the fortification of the DMZ, and the possibility of a seventh nuclear test or satellite launch, alongside cyberattacks and electronic warfare. At the same time, South Korea should show flexibility by offering North Korea an exit strategy, as preventing miscalculation by the North maintaining stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula.

References

Carlin, Robert L. and Siegfried S. Hecker. 2024. “Is Kim Jong Un Preparing for War?” 38North. January 11. https://www.38north.org/2024/01/is-kim-jong-un-preparing-for-war/.

Gallucci, Robert L. 2024. “Is Diplomacy Between the U.S. and North Korea Possible in 2024?” National Interest. January 11. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/diplomacy-between-us-and-north-korea-possible-2024-208528.

Jervis, Robert. 1979-1980. “Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn’t Matter.” Political Science Quarterly 94, 4: 617-633.

Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). 2023. “Report on 9th Enlarged Plenum of 8th WPK Central Committee.” December 31. http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2023/202312/news31/20231231-01ee.html.

_______. 2024a. “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Policy Speech at 10th Session of 14th SPA.” January 16. http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2024/202401/news16/20240116-02ee.html.

_______. 2024b. “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Test-Fire of Surface-to-sea Missile Padasuri-6.” February 15. ,http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2024/202402/2024-02-15ee.html.

_______. 2024c. “Speech at Congratulatory Visit to Kim Jong Un University of National Defence.” October 8. http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2024/202410/news08/20241008-02ee.html.

_______. 2024d. “Report of KPA General Staff.” October 9. http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2024/202410/news09/20241009-22ee.html.

Manning, Robert A. 2024. “The Risk of Another Korean War is Higher Than Ever.” Foreign Policy. October 7. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/10/07/northkorea-war-nuclear-russia-china/.

Moul, William Brian. 1988. “Balance of Power and the Escalation to War of Serious Disputes among the European Great Powers, 1815-1939.” American Journal of Political Science 32, 2: 241-275.

U.S. Department of State Archive. 2004. “Agreement of Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North Korea.” https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/rls/or/2004/31012.htm.

■ Ho Ryung LEE is the Director of the Center for Security and Strategy at Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA).

■ Translated and edited by: Jisoo Park, Research Associate
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