In his 79th Liberation Day Address, President Yoon Seok Yeol introduced South Korea’s new approach toward North Korea, referred to as the “Unification Doctrine” (hereafter “the Doctrine”). While not an entirely new policy, it represents a reorganization and reaffirmation of the ROK government’s core principles and goals for Korean Peninsula unification. The Doctrine outlines three key strategies: (1) strengthening South Korea’s capacity and values needed to achieve unification based on freedom, (2) changing the minds of the North Korean people to make them desire for unification, and (3) garnering international support for North Korea’s transformation and unification (Office of the President 2024). Following this announcement, two notable developments have emerged: North Korea has remained silent, and debates within South Korea have intensified regarding how the Doctrine differs from previous visions, strategies, and policies on unification.

The term “doctrine” is indeed quite novel. While there is some skepticism about its feasibility, historical examples from other countries show that a doctrine typically conveys a proactive and strong message to its intended audience, often embodying a sense of continuity and long-term impact. In this sense, it serves as a compass that guides a nation’s foreign policy. Looking back at South Korea’s past policies related to North Korea and unification, Nordpolitik and the Sunshine Policy are the ones that left the most enduring impression on both the public and the international community. Nordpolitik began with the July 7 Declaration by former President Roh Tae-woo in 1988. Inspired by the success of West Germany’s Ostpolitik under Willy Brandt, it aimed to adapt the German experience to the Korean Peninsula. Meanwhile, the Sunshine Policy stands out as the most effective in terms of its branding. Even without understanding the details, the term “sunshine” itself instantly communicates the policy’s intention, making it easily comprehensible to people of all ages.

The recent Doctrine appears to mark the first time in South Korean history that the term “doctrine” has been used to outline the nation’s unification policy. If this is indeed the case, President Yoon likely has a significant policy goal he aims to achieve through this unprecedented approach. While the Doctrine outlines three key strategies, the focus on enhancing ROK’s values and capabilities to pursue unification is not a new concept; it has been a consistent priority for every previous South Korean government. Given the rapidly evolving international and domestic dynamics, particularly in an increasingly unstable global security environment, the argument that South Korea should strengthen its capacity to independently pursue unification is both logical and necessary.

Moreover, the third strategy—securing international support—is also not a new concept. Given the deep international implications of the division of the Korean Peninsula, previous administrations have consistently prioritized global cooperation in their policies. Initiatives such as “unification diplomacy” and “unification public diplomacy” were rooted in the understanding that Korean unification would be impossible without international backing. Additionally, surveys conducted among experts and the general public on the topic of unification often include the question, “Which country do you consider the most important partner for Korean unification?” This highlights the widespread recognition that international collaboration is essential for resolving the North Korean issue and ultimately achieving unification.

In this context, it seems reasonable to conclude that the central focus of the three strategies outlined in the Unification Doctrine is the second strategy: fostering a desire for unification based on freedom among the North Korean people. This naturally raises questions about how the government plans to achieve this. According to the Seven Action Plans associated with the three strategies, the Doctrine makes it clear that this goal will be pursued by “expanding North Korean residents’ access to information” (Ministry of Unification 2024). In other words, it aims to introduce information about South Korea and the international community into North Korean society, with the hope that North Korean citizens will become more aware of the harsh realities of their regime. Given North Korea’s unprecedented isolation from the global community, informing its citizens about the freedom and prosperity of South Korea, as well as how the world perceives North Korea, becomes one of the most critical steps toward achieving unification on the Korean Peninsula.

However, a crucial factor must be considered. First, if information about global economic development and the advancement of democracy can effectively flow into North Korea, these elements could serve as a significant catalyst for societal change. South Korea’s democratization experience is no exception in this regard. Often referred to as the “1987 system,” the country’s democratic transition was shaped by the “Third Wave” of democratization, a term coined by Samuel P. Huntington in 1991. A powerful wave of democratization that began in Eastern Europe in the late 1960s swept through many countries in South America and the Middle East before eventually reaching East Asia, where South Korea actively embraced this historical trend. If universal human values and diverse information can penetrate deeply into North Korean society, it could undoubtedly contribute to achieving the unification based on liberal democracy that we aspire to.

Second, the key strategy of the Unification Doctrine—encouraging North Koreans to desire unification based on freedom—should not be confined to merely increasing the flow of information into North Korea. If we aim for genuine change within North Korean society, additional measures must be implemented alongside this to minimize the resistance that North Koreans may have toward the outside world. Proactive humanitarian aid, bold economic cooperation initiatives, reducing security threats, and fostering a more favorable diplomatic environment are all crucial elements to consider. These efforts would act as a safety valve, helping to facilitate change in North Korea. Identifying and implementing specific policies related to these measures will make the vision of liberal democratic unification more tangible.

The Yoon government unveiled its “Audacious Initiative” exactly two years ago in the 2022 Liberation Day address. Shortly thereafter, North Korea’s Kim Yo Jong sharply criticized the policy. However, this year, North Korea has remained silent regarding the newly revealed Doctrine. Despite this, the Audacious Initiative has yet to make any significant progress. Domestically, the Doctrine has faced criticism for seemingly abandoning South Korea’s long-standing, step-by-step approach to unification—”reconciliation and cooperation, inter-Korean confederation, and eventual unification.” It should not become a one-sided policy that imposes South Korea’s agenda on North Korea under the guise of disregarding Pyongyang’s goodwill. ■

References

Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. “Democracy’s Third Wave.” Journal of Democracy 2, 2: 12-34. https://www.ned.org/docs/Samuel-P-Huntington-Democracy-Third-Wave.pdf

Ministry of Unification. 2024. “Unification Minister Kim Yung Ho attends a press conference at the invitation of the SFCC.” August 22. https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/news/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000167&mode=view&cntId=262&category=&pageIdx

Office of the President. 2024. “Address by President Yoon Suk Yeol on the 79th Liberation Day.” Speeches and Remarks. August 15. https://eng.president.go.kr/speeches/YhZsGrfN

■ Ihn-hwi PARK is a professor of International Relations and the Dean of Scranton College at Ewha Womans University.

■ Translated and edited by: Jisoo Park, Research Associate
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