The dream of unification on the Korean Peninsula seems to be slipping further away. Earlier this year, Kim Jong Un officially abandoned North Korea’s long-standing unification policy, declaring that inter-Korean relations have solidified into those of two hostile, belligerent states that are no longer bound by shared blood or a common identity. In the same vein, public support for unification continues to decline in South Korea. While the German unification in 1990 offered many valuable lessons, now is the moment to revisit that experience. What was present in Germany then is missing on the Korean Peninsula today: the collective will for unification among East and West German people, and the geopolitical backing from neighboring countries.

I. The Unification Desired by East and West Germans

Germany has experienced two key moments of unification. The first, in 1871, was orchestrated by Otto von Bismarck's "Blood and Iron" policy, using war as the primary tool. This model, however, is not a desirable example for the Korean Peninsula. The second unification, in 1990, saw the unification of East and West Germany. While some view this as West Germany simply absorbing East Germany, that is not entirely true. Although East Germany’s five states (Länder) were integrated into West Germany’s federal system and the West German Basic Law remained intact, it was the will of the people on both sides that shaped unification, making it more of a democratic consensus than a forced absorption. In particular, the citizens of East Germany strongly favored a swift unification with West Germany, which ultimately led to the unexpectedly rapid unification.

Though many people view the German unification in October 1990 as a natural consequence of the Berlin Wall’s fall in November 1989, this view is an oversimplification. The collapse of Erich Honecker’s regime did not automatically trigger unification with West Germany. On March 18, 1990, East Germany held its first and only free election. Initially, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), which favored a gradual approach to unification, was expected to win. However, the election resulted in a victory for the Alliance for Germany, led by the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which secured 192 of the 400 seats. The Alliance’s strong support stemmed from its call for rapid unification with West Germany. This reflected the will of the East German people, who pushed for early unification, a sentiment embraced by West Germans. In this light, German unification was not simply an absorption of the East by the West, but rather a democratic consensus driven by the people of both nations.

II. The German Unification the International Community Desired

The process of German unification is widely recognized as having been shaped by the "Two Plus Four" talks, which involved East and West Germany, the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France. While the collapse of the Berlin Wall signaled the end of division, securing international approval for unification was far from straightforward. The support of the four victorious World War II powers was essential. West Germany's success in gaining this approval hinged on its timely and strategic diplomatic efforts, particularly its commitment to remaining in NATO after unification. This decision reassured both the U.S. and neighboring countries, as it ensured that a united Germany would continue to be part of the Western alliance, preventing potential destabilization in Europe. By firmly anchoring Germany within the U.S.-led multilateral alliance, West Germany mitigated fears that unification would upset the balance of power. For the United States, West Germany's decision to stay in NATO allowed it to manage potential risks in a stable and peaceful manner, which was more favorable to maintaining the status quo in Europe. The U.S. viewed West Germany as a trusted democratic ally, having undergone a long and stable transition since World War II. Any concerns about Germany that had existed in 1945 had long since dissipated, and the U.S. had no apprehensions about the implications of a unified Germany within the Western alliance.

Initially, neighboring countries such as the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, and Poland were strongly opposed to German unification. To ease their concerns, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl proposed a gradual unification process, suggesting that unification could be achieved over five to ten years, following a confederation phase as part of broader European integration. Shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the West German government introduced the "Ten-Point Program for Overcoming the Division of Germany and Europe," signaling its commitment to addressing the anxieties that unification might cause among other nations. A key aspect of West Germany's diplomatic efforts was persuading the Soviet Union that unification would not pose a threat. West German leaders made significant concessions, including accepting the Oder-Neisse Line, which recognized Poland's post-World War II territorial gains, and agreeing to reduce their military forces from 665,000 to 370,000 troops after unification. Additionally, West Germany promised to share the financial burden of supporting Soviet troops stationed in East Germany, a gesture that helped reassure Moscow of Germany’s peaceful intentions. These steps were critical in demonstrating that the reunified Germany would not adopt the aggressive, expansionist policies of the early 20th century. At the same time, West Germany worked closely with the United States, urging it to use its influence to help gain Soviet approval during the "Two Plus Four" talks. With strong backing from the U.S., West Germany was able to successfully navigate the complex international relations of the time. Ultimately, West Germany's diplomatic efforts, combined with U.S. support, enabled it to win the approval of all the neighboring countries that had suffered from Germany's invasions during the two world wars, paving the way for unification. The West German leaders had a keen understanding of the complex international dynamics in Europe at the time and skillfully navigated them to secure international approval for unification.

In summary, both domestic politics in Germany and international relations were conducive to unification. East Germans sought swift integration with the West, a desire that West Germans readily embraced. Initially, Germany's neighboring countries were opposed to unification, but they soon acknowledged it as a geopolitical advantage and lent their support. How does the situation compare on the Korean Peninsula? Do the people of North and South Korea support unification? And do the countries surrounding Korea support this goal?

III. Do the People of North and South Korea Want Unification?

In 1990, the people of East and West Germany strongly supported unification. How do the people of North and South Korea feel about unification on the Korean Peninsula today? A 2007 survey by Seoul National University's Institute for Peace and Unification found that 63.8% of respondents acknowledged the need for unification. However, a 2022 survey revealed that only 46% still recognized this need. The term "South-South Conflict" underscores the difficulties in achieving domestic consensus on unification. As for the North Korean people, while reliable surveys are not possible, there is no strong evidence to suggest a widespread desire for unification among them. The experience of German unification shows that securing the support of North Korean people is as crucial as garnering the backing of South Korean citizens for the successful unification of the Korean Peninsula.

To achieve unification, it is crucial to ensure not only that the South Korean people firmly support it but also that the North Korean people desire it. Developing a well-crafted policy toward North Korea is essential to foster this desire. Promoting change in North Korea and improving the lives of its people through enhanced freedoms and human rights are vital. Additionally, continuing to provide humanitarian aid, including food and healthcare, to vulnerable groups such as infants, women, and the elderly is necessary. As more North Koreans come to support South Korea and unification, the likelihood of achieving it will increase significantly. From this perspective, South Korea's policy toward North Korea should focus on driving socio-economic structural changes and shifting the perceptions of North Korean residents. Promoting these changes requires prioritizing marketization and the influx of outside information within North Korea. Although the North Korean regime may attempt to control marketization while benefiting economically, there will inevitably come a point when such control becomes unmanageable as the market economy expands. Therefore, it is essential to implement policies that promote marketization and increase awareness of market economics among North Korean residents.

On the other hand, expanding access to outside information for the North Korean people is crucial for them to utilize various channels to secure their livelihoods. This does not imply that exposure to external information will inevitably lead to mass defections or a "revolution from below" among the North Korean people. In fact, such outcomes are likely to be rare given the strict control exerted by the North Korean regime. However, the influx of information can facilitate socio-economic changes by shifting the perceptions of North Korean people. As marketization and informatization progress, these shifts may influence the North Korean leadership's views, potentially leading to a de-prioritization of denuclearization within their national strategy. Long-term policies that promote marketization and informatization in North Korea could be more effective in altering the perceptions of the North Korean people and advancing the prospects for unification. When the genuine will of North Korean residents is taken into account during the unification process, it will likely result in a more democratic and free unification of the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, when the South Korean government seeks to implement a comprehensive unification policy, it should not only target the central government and regime but also address local-level needs and the perspectives of the residents. Above all, it is crucial to gain the support of the North Korean people.

IV. Do the Neighboring Nations Support Korean Unification?

Just as the surrounding countries supported German unification, it is crucial to consider the stance of the international community on Korean unification. Will the neighboring countries of the Korean Peninsula support unification? Specifically, will the United States and Japan back early unification of the two Koreas? Will China and Russia ever support unification on the Korean Peninsula? The case of German unification underscores the significance of the support from major powers in the unification process. West German leaders' diplomatic skills and strategic perception were instrumental in securing U.S. support for unification from the outset and overcoming opposition from neighboring powers.

First, the United States is likely to support the unification of the Korean Peninsula. A gradual unification could strengthen the Korea-U.S. alliance and help counterbalance China's growing influence in East Asia. However, it is uncertain whether the United States would support a rapid, German-style unification on the Korean Peninsula. Such a sudden shift could destabilize the region, especially given the U.S.'s strategic rivalry with China. Although the U.S. has recently emphasized the importance of the Indo-Pacific region, it is cautious about engaging in unforeseen military conflicts with China. Thus, the United States may be hesitant to risk regional instability and unpredictability that could arise from a sudden collapse of the North Korean regime and subsequent unification.

Second, similar to the German unification case, the question arises whether the United States can persuade China and Russia to support Korean unification. Given the current dynamics of the ‘New Cold War,’ both China and Russia are likely to oppose unification as long as the Korea-U.S. alliance remains strong. In this scenario, China and Russia could act as veto powers, much like the Soviet Union did during German unification. While the Soviet Union eventually shifted its stance due to domestic challenges, the current situation is different. China and Russia are more inclined to act based on their strategic interests rather than be swayed by external pressures. Both countries seem to favor maintaining the status quo in Northeast Asia rather than accepting sudden changes in the regional order. They would likely support the stability of North Korea’s internal situation but might view a collapse more as a specific regime collapse than as a state collapse leading to unification. Consequently, they might support the rebuilding of the state rather than a unified Korea.

Third, it is uncertain whether Japan will be persuaded by the United States and South Korea to support unification. Japan might oppose early unification due to concerns about the destabilizing effects it could have. Even if Korea aligns with the United States, Japan may view a unified Korea growing closer to China as a significant strategic challenge. Additionally, given the historical tensions between Japan and Korea, a unified Korea could potentially emerge as a rival, further complicating Japan's position in the region.

In summary, comparing Korean unification to the German case reveals numerous significant external challenges at every stage. German unification provided both the United States and the Soviet Union with a stabilizing factor in the evolving international relations of Europe. Similarly, Korean unification would need to create a stabilizing effect in Northeast Asia. For unification to gain international acceptance, both the United States and China must view it positively. If Korean unification is seen as undermining U.S.-China relations and disrupting the regional status quo, both nations would likely be deeply concerned. Thus, unless Northeast Asia experiences substantial changes, the major powers surrounding the Korean Peninsula may have little incentive to support unification.

V. Toward a Free, Democratic, and Peaceful Unification

The strength of German unification stemmed from the unified will of both Eastern and Western Germans. Despite opposition from neighboring countries, the deep desire for unification among the German people made it exceedingly difficult for external forces to obstruct the process. Similarly, Korean unification can only be achieved when the Korean people are resolutely committed to it, even in the face of opposition from neighboring major powers. Regardless of their disapproval, the Korean people’s determination to reunite cannot be undermined. This is why Korean unification should be pursued in a way that is free, democratic, and peaceful—one that is desired by both the people of the two Koreas and the international community.

■ Jihwan HWANG is a Professor in the Department of International Relations at the University of Seoul.

■ Edited by: Jisoo Park, Research Associate
    For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr