The year 2024 marks the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between North Korea (DPRK) and China, a milestone celebrated with the declaration of a “Friendship Year,” highlighted by high-level exchanges and cooperation. However, recent developments suggest potential strains in the bilateral relationship. On the day of the Ninth ROK-Japan-China Trilateral Summit in May, DPRK made a surprise announcement to launch a reconnaissance satellite, carrying it out immediately after the summit. North Korea condemned the discussion of its denuclearization during the summit as a “blatant challenge to the sovereignty of the DPRK” and “the most serious infringement upon sovereignty” (KCNA 2024).

DPRK has expressed dissatisfaction with China’s perceived passive stance toward the DPRK-China-Russia partnership, particularly as China engages with South Korea (ROK) and Japan in trilateral summits aimed at improving relations (Lee 2024). This perceived rift has drawn increased attention, especially when contrasted with the relatively closer ties between DPRK and Russia.

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has strongly refuted speculations of a strained North Korea-China relation, dismissing them as “unsubstantiated, ill-motivated claims” (Lin 2024). Despite these denials, both North Korea and China face inherent limitations in fully understanding the internal policy dynamics of each other’s regimes due to the nature of their political systems. As a result, assessments of North Korea-China relations often focus only on surface-level phenomena, which can lead to misjudgments.

To accurately determine whether the recent changes in North Korea-China relations are temporary fluctuations or indicative of a significant long-term shift, it is essential to explore various analytical approaches. In light of ongoing debates regarding the current state of their relationship, it is crucial to revisit and clarify the key factors that China prioritizes when shaping its policy toward North Korea. Doing so will provide a more precise understanding of the developments at hand.

China’s policy toward North Korea is fundamentally characterized by continuity rather than change. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between ROK and China three decades ago, China has consistently upheld its “three principles” on the Korean Peninsula: peace and stability, denuclearization, and the resolution of issues through dialogue and diplomacy. The primary objective behind China’s adherence to these principles is to maintain stability on the Peninsula by preserving the status quo. As a result, China’s approach has generally been reactive and cautious. However, there have been notable instances where China has adopted a more proactive and occasionally preemptive stance regarding DPRK, shedding light on the key factors that China considers when shaping its policy toward North Korea.

China has, at times, adopted a more proactive approach toward North Korea when it has perceived an imminent crisis within the North Korean regime. One notable instance of this occurred in the wake of Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994 and the severe famine that followed. In response, China resumed economic assistance to North Korea, aiding in the regime’s recovery. In 1996, the preferential pricing system between the two states was reinstated, and in May of the same year, an agreement on economic and technological cooperation was signed during the visit of Vice Premier Hong Song Nam, which included commodity loans and grant-type aid in both the economic and military sectors. This marked the beginning of the recovery of DPRK-China relations, which had cooled after China established diplomatic relations with the ROK. The relationship was further strengthened by the visit of Supreme People’s Assembly President Kim Yong Nam to China in 1999, followed by Kim Jong Il’s visit in 2000 and a reciprocal visit by PRC President Jiang Zemin in 2001.

A second occasion was when China shifted from its previous role as a bystander to that of an active mediator following North Korea’s declaration of withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the onset of the second DPRK nuclear crisis on January 10, 2003. China engaged in shuttle diplomacy between North Korea and the United States, facilitating both the DPRK-U.S.-China talks and the Six-Party Talks. This transformation of China into an active mediator after 2003, despite its prior support for DPRK’s insistence on bilateral talks with the U.S., was influenced by the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq. North Korea had been labeled, along with Iraq, as part of the “axis of evil,” raising the possibility that North Korea could also become a target of U.S. military action. To prevent this, China took on a more active role.

A third instance occurred following the sudden death of Kim Jong Il in December 2011. Despite widespread international skepticism regarding DPRK’s third-generation succession, China was the first to publicly recognize Kim Jong Un’s leadership. This unusual move significantly contributed to the stabilization of the new regime. Just before Kim Jong Il’s death, China had made unprecedented efforts to ensure the stability and management of the North Korean regime through a series of successive DPRK-China summits (May/August 2010, May 2011). During this period, tensions between the U.S. and China were escalating due to issues related to Taiwan and the South China Sea. Additionally, on the Korean Peninsula, the Cheonan sinking and the Yeonpyeong Island shelling had occurred in quick succession, leading to joint military exercises between the U.S. and ROK in the West Sea, further intensifying U.S.-China tensions.

Fourthly, following North Korea’s sixth nuclear test in September 2017, China unusually and swiftly participated in high-intensity sanctions against North Korea. Just nine days after the nuclear test, China agreed to the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2375, which included stringent additional sanctions, such as limiting the supply of oil to North Korea. As the Trump administration raised the possibility of a so-called “bloody nose” strategy—a precise preemptive strike in response to North Korea’s repeated nuclear and missile provocations—China preemptively intensified sanctions against North Korea in an unprecedented manner. This move aimed to counter U.S. pressure and manage the crisis within the North Korean regime. In short, as tensions with the United States heightened and North Korea’s strategic value as a buffer zone became more prominent, China implemented proactive and preemptive policies toward North Korea to prevent a regime crisis.

Moreover, China adopted an assertive policy toward North Korea and the Korean Peninsula even when its regional influence seemed to be diminishing and concerns about being sidelined, or “China passing,” surfaced amidst escalating tensions with the United States. For instance, in October 1994, the United States and North Korea reached the Agreed Framework through negotiations in Geneva, without China’s participation. At the time, China was still grappling with U.S. containment and pressure in the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident, and it was particularly sensitive to being excluded from this negotiation between the U.S. and North Korea. In response, China initiated a diplomatic offensive toward South Korea. Following the establishment of diplomatic relations, Chinese Premier Li Peng made his first visit to South Korea in October 1994. In the following year, April 1995 saw a visit by Qiao Shi, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, followed by a state visit from President Jiang Zemin in November. This sequence of visits by China’s top three leaders to South Korea within just one year was a remarkable and unprecedented diplomatic development.

A second instance occurred after the PyeongChang Olympics in February 2018, when unexpected inter-Korean and North Korea-U.S. summits were held, sparking the discourse on “China’s marginalization.” In response, China sought to play a more active role by shifting its policy. Not only did the North Korea-China summits, which had been suspended for seven years since 2011, resume abruptly, but in an unusual move, a total of five summits were held, including four consecutive visits by Chairman Kim Jong Un to China between March 2018 and June 2019. Through this, China aimed to intervene in and slow down the rapid progress of North Korea-U.S. relations. The cases of 1994 and 2018 demonstrate that when relations between China and the U.S. are deteriorating, and when there are significant developments in the strategic landscape of the Korean Peninsula, such as the rapid progress in North Korea-U.S. relations or discussions of a peace declaration, China actively engages to secure its position and influence.

In contrast, following the unexpected “no deal” of the February 2019 Hanoi summit between North Korea and the United States, China responded in a composed and measured manner, seemingly having anticipated the result. During press conferences at the 13th National People's Congress, Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Premier Li Keqiang addressed the breakdown of the Hanoi summit. Wang Yi remarked, “As the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula has dragged on for decades with complicated factors involved, it can hardly be resolved overnight” (Wang 2019). Premier Li urged all parties involved to exercise patience and seize the opportunity to promote dialogue, with the aim of achieving mutually desired results (Li 2019). While China expressed hope for the resumption of U.S.-North Korea dialogue, it did not adopt an active mediating role, such as engaging in shuttle diplomacy, as it had in the past. Essentially, China sought to prevent the escalation of U.S.-North Korea tensions that could exacerbate the crisis on the Korean Peninsula, while also being cautious about rapid progress in U.S.-North Korea negotiations that might lead to significant changes, such as the establishment of a peace regime, without China’s involvement.

The Biden administration has largely refrained from applying aggressive pressure or actively pursuing dialogue to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, despite North Korea’s continued missile provocations. Similarly, the Xi Jinping government has maintained its existing policy of managing stability on the Korean Peninsula while closely monitoring the Biden administration’s actions. In summary, China has primarily maintained a management-focused policy aimed at stabilizing the Korean Peninsula. However, when it anticipates two significant changes—an impending regime crisis in North Korea amid heightened U.S. pressure on China, or a substantial weakening of China’s influence and position on the Peninsula—China has sought to manage and stabilize the situation through active intervention.

Since Xi Jinping came to power, the ideological and systemic alignment between China and North Korea, as well as the drivers of practical cooperation, have clearly weakened. As a result, the relationship between the two countries has become more volatile, influenced by various situations and variables. However, the primary consideration in China’s North Korea policy remains the geopolitical value of North Korea as a buffer zone. For China, the geopolitical importance of North Korea is a priority deeply embedded through long historical experience, akin to an absolute value in its policy decisions. Therefore, even if relations between North Korea and China deteriorate and relations between South Korea and China reach their peak, China will likely maintain its policy of preserving its influence over North Korea as a strategic buffer zone and managing the Korean Peninsula through this influence.

While the strategic value of North Korea as a buffer zone remains constant, the weight of this value fluctuates depending on various factors. The strategic importance of North Korea for China exhibits some degree of flexibility based on U.S.-China relations, China’s domestic political and economic conditions, and the stability of the North Korean regime. Specifically, as conflicts with the United States intensify, China’s domestic situation worsens, or North Korea’s regime becomes more unstable, the importance of North Korea as a strategic buffer zone increases, leading China to take a more proactive role in managing and intervening in North Korea. Given the current situation, characterized by escalating strategic competition with the United States, instability in China’s domestic political and economic environment, and uncertainty within the North Korean regime, the geopolitical value of North Korea as a critical asset that China must manage and maintain ties with is increasingly evident, despite North Korea’s provocative behavior and the signs of strain in the DPRK-China relationship.

Although China outwardly appears indifferent to North Korea’s growing ties with Russia and the formation of a new Cold War atmosphere, it harbors deep concerns and dissatisfaction. However, China does not yet view the North Korea-Russia partnership as severe enough to trigger a drastic change or crisis in the buffer zone that North Korea represents. In the context of heightened strategic competition with the United States, both Russia and North Korea, despite being problematic partners, are still seen by China as important strategic allies with whom it must maintain relationships.

Despite growing concerns and wariness about North Korea, China continues to oppose the strengthening of sanctions and has expressed support for North Korea. For instance, in the March 2024 vote to extend the mandate of the United Nations Security Council’s Panel of Experts on North Korea sanctions, China abstained while Russia exercised its veto. Additionally, in the joint statement issued during the summit with Russia held in Beijing in May, China included a statement opposing military intimidations by the United States and its allies that could escalate confrontation with North Korea, which may lead to armed conflicts and increased tensions on the Korean Peninsula (PRC MFA 2024; Kim 2024). This represents a more explicit and forceful articulation of the responsibility of the United States, aligning with North Korea’s stance.

Among China’s three principles on the Korean Peninsula, denuclearization has traditionally received the most attention. However, references to it have virtually disappeared from recent official statements by the Foreign Ministry. It is premature to conclude that this signifies China’s recognition of North Korea as a de facto nuclear state. Currently, North Korea is strongly opposing any mention of denuclearization by China, and with the U.S. not exerting significant pressure on the North Korean nuclear issue, the topic has not become a sharply contested issue. As a result, China appears to be cautiously managing its policy, focusing on stabilization, while closely watching the outcome of the U.S. presidential election. In short, faced with increasing uncertainty and instability both domestically and internationally, Beijing is likely to carefully manage its relations with North Korea and Russia, ensuring that neither drifts out of China’s influence and control while preparing for the period following the U.S. presidential election.

Due to the unique geopolitical dynamics of the Korean Peninsula, South Korea is highly sensitive to developments trends in North Korea-China relations, and North Korea, in turn, is acutely aware of changes in South Korea-China relations. When North Korea-China relations cool, South Korea sees an opportunity to advance its relationship with China and hopes to leverage China’s role in pressuring North Korea. Conversely, when South Korea-China relations improve, North Korea may respond by escalating provocations to raise tensions on the Korean Peninsula or by seeking closer ties with Russia or the United States to send a message of caution to China and manage its dependence on Beijing. Given the complex domestic and international situation facing the Chinese government, its policy on the Korean Peninsula will likely continue to emphasize “stabilization through maintaining the status quo” and “balanced diplomacy between the two Koreas,” premised on the preservation of the North Korean regime.

The recent series of more proactive moves by China to improve ROK-China relations is less a response to the growing intimacy between North Korea and Russia and more a reflection of China’s efforts to preemptively manage anticipated changes in U.S. strategy toward China and East Asia due to the uncertainty surrounding the upcoming U.S. presidential election. As part of this broader activation of China’s peripheral diplomacy, China is also seeking to strengthen relations not only with South Korea but also with Vietnam, which shares similar geopolitical characteristics. In this context, the current strains in DPRK-China relations are seen as a burden, and there is likely a recognition within China that diplomatic efforts are needed to address and improve the situation.

Therefore, rather than reacting too sensitively to the fluctuations in DPRK-China relations, South Korea must clearly understand the underlying characteristics of China’s policy toward North Korea. On this basis, South Korea should explore the maximum extent to which it can engage and cooperate with China on DPRK-related issues. It is important to recall the lessons from past experiences when overly ambitious expectations and policy goals regarding North Korea, driven by the rapid development of ROK-China economic cooperation, not only failed to resolve North Korea and nuclear issues but also damaged ROK-China relations.

At this point, it is essential to carefully navigate the signs of gradually improving ROK-China relations, developing a phased and strategic approach based on a comprehensive understanding of the broader dynamics on the Korean Peninsula. Given the current reality of heightened U.S.-China strategic competition and the imminent threat of another North Korean nuclear test, it is critical to prioritize the preparation for and management of instability originating from North Korea. This includes fostering a certain level of consensus with China and making institutional preparations for close strategic communication.

References

Kim, Na-young. 2024. “Russia, China Oppose ‘Military Intimidation’ Against N. Korea by U.S., Allies: Report.” Yonhap News Agency. May 16. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240516010100320

Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). 2024. “Press Statement of Spokesperson of DPRK Foreign Ministry.” May 27. http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2024/202405/news27/20240527-11ee.html

Li, Keqiang. 2019.“China calls for continued DPRK-U.S. dialogue,” March 13. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-03/15/c_137897419.htm

Lin, Jian. 2024. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian’s Regular Press Conference on August 1, 2024.” PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs. August 1. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/lxjzh/202408/t20240801_11464855.html

PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). 2024. “中华人民共和国和俄罗斯联邦在两国建交75周年之际关于深化新时代全面战略协作伙伴关系的联合声明（全文）.” May 16. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202405/t20240516_11305860.shtml

Wang, Yi. 2019. “China urges continued dialogue on Korean Peninsula issue.” March 8. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-03/08/c_137879285.htm

■ Dong Ryul LEE is the Chair of EAI China Research Center and a Professor of Chinese Studies at Dongduk Women's University.

■ Translated and edited by: Jisoo Park, Research Associate
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