Nearly a year has passed since North Korea reopened its borders, marking a period of significant diplomatic activity. One of the most striking developments has been its deepening military cooperation with Russia. Observers have noted the exchange of arms and military technology between the two nations, further solidified by the DPRK-Russia Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, signed during their summit in June. Article 4 of this treaty symbolizes the revival of military alliance relations, sparking extensive analysis and commentary on the implications of this cooperation.

Despite the attention on military ties, North Korea’s broader diplomatic relations with Russia and other countries have been less scrutinized. This article seeks to explore and analyze North Korea’s diplomatic activities, external exchanges, and cooperation from August 2023, when the border restrictions were lifted, to July 31, 2024. It will examine the characteristics, intentions, and future outlook of these developments, offering a comprehensive view of North Korea’s evolving international relations.

A comprehensive review of all the articles published by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) over the past year reveals the following trends in North Korea’s foreign relations. First, North Korea has been rapidly expanding its exchanges and cooperation with Russia, extending beyond the military domain to encompass a wide array of sectors, including economics, public safety, intelligence, health, science and technology, education, culture, and sports. The catalyst for this was the North Korea-Russia summit at Russia’s Vostochny Spaceport in September 2023, where the two leaders discussed high-level exchanges and cooperation, agreeing to “make joint efforts to promote the well-being of the peoples of the two countries and steadily expand the comprehensive and constructive bilateral relations” (KCNA 2023c).

Following the summit, October saw a visit from the Russian Foreign Minister to North Korea for high-level talks, and in November, a Russian federal government delegation visited to discuss cooperation in trade, economics, science and technology, and sports with North Korean officials. The momentum continued in December with a visit from a delegation from Primorsky Krai (Maritime Territory Administration) to discuss economic cooperation. From March 2024 onward, high-level Russian officials and delegations from various sectors have continued to visit North Korea, engaging in talks and exchanges with their North Korean counterparts.

In January 2024, a North Korean government delegation led by the Foreign Minister visited Russia to discuss enhancing cooperation in various fields, including economics and culture, as well as joint responses to issues on the Korean Peninsula and broader regional and international matters. These exchanges have persisted, with ongoing visits and interactions between delegations, working-level officials, and youth from both countries.

[Table 1] Bilateral Diplomacy Between North Korea and Russia

*Data compiled by the author from the Korean Central News Agency covering period from August 2023 to July 31, 2024.

**This data excludes non-face-to-face exchanges such as the exchange of congratulatory messages and video conferences, as well as tourism exchanges. Since the first Russian tourist group visited North Korea on February 9, 2024, several Russian tourist groups have visited North Korea.

Second, North Korea has been actively pursuing bilateral diplomacy, exchanges, and cooperation not only with Russia but also with other non-Western countries, including China, Belarus, Vietnam, Laos, Mongolia, and Iran. Although the pace and scope of exchanges with China have not matched the rapid acceleration seen in its relations with Russia, both countries have been focused on deepening their traditional friendly ties and enhancing strategic cooperation through reciprocal visits by government and foreign ministry delegations. Additionally, there have been notable exchanges in areas such as sports, culture, and arts.

North Korea has held two high-level meetings with Belarus. In April 2024, the deputy foreign ministers discussed high-level exchanges and economic and cultural cooperation. This was followed by a July 2024 meeting between their foreign ministers, focusing on expanding and developing bilateral relations, cooperation in various fields, and addressing international affairs. There was also a high-level meeting with Mongolia. In March 2024, a delegation from North Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs visited Mongolia for vice-ministerial level talks, centered on advancing bilateral cooperation. Furthermore, in the same month, a WPK delegation conducted a tour of China, Vietnam, and Laos. During this tour, the delegation engaged in high-level discussions aimed at fostering friendly relations at both the national and party levels, while also working to strengthen solidarity and cooperation in external affairs. Moreover, in April 2024, a delegation from North Korea’s Ministry of External Economic Affairs visited Iran, where North Korea reportedly expressed its intention to collaborate with Iran in the automotive industry (Lee 2024).

[Table 2] Bilateral Diplomacy Between North Korea, China, and Other Countries

* Data compiled by the author from the Korean Central News Agency covering period from August 2023 to July 31, 2024

**This data excludes non-face-to-face exchanges such as the exchange of congratulatory messages and video conferences.

Third, North Korea has been expanding its diplomatic reach on a multilateral level, engaging with non-Western countries through participation in international conferences. One of the main multilateral diplomatic activities was its participation in the 19th Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit and the 3rd South Summit, both held in Uganda in January 2024. At these meetings, attended by representatives from 120 and over 80 countries, respectively, North Korea stressed the importance of solidarity and cooperation in defending sovereignty and the right to survival, while also highlighting the role of “South-South cooperation” in promoting economic development.

Additionally, in February 2024, North Korea sent a delegation, including the Minister of Land and Environmental Protection, to the 6th session of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Assembly in Kenya. In June, North Korea also sent a delegation led by the Minister of Public Health to the 77th World Health Organization (WHO) Assembly held in Switzerland. Notably, in June 2024, a delegation from North Korea’s Ministry of Physical Culture and Sports participated in the ministerial meeting of BRICS+, an organization that is gaining increasing influence in global politics and economics. Furthermore, North Korea participated in international conferences held in Brazil and Senegal, as well as in the World Festival of Youth in Russia.

[Table 3] North Korea’s Participation in Multilateral Conferences and Events

* Data compiled by the author from the Korean Central News Agency covering period from August 2023 to July 31, 2024

**This data excludes non-face-to-face exchanges such as the exchange of congratulatory messages and video conferences, and all the cases of international sports events in which North Korea participated, such as the Olympics, Asian Games, internaional weightlifting competitions, international wrestling competitions, and international taekwondo competitions.

The trends in North Korean diplomacy following the lifting of border restrictions can be summarized as follows: (1) Accelerated multifaceted exchanges and cooperation with Russia, (2) Diversification of bilateral exchanges and cooperation with non-Western countries, and (3) Strengthening of multilateral diplomacy and engagement with non-Western nations. These developments are largely driven by North Korea’s “new Cold War” diplomatic strategy. Since Kim Jong Un’s speech in September 2021, North Korea has argued that the shifting dynamics of the global order—characterized by the escalating U.S.-China rivalry and the U.S.-Russia confrontation—have created a “new Cold War” environment, necessitating proactive and decisive responses (KCNA 2021).

This strategy involves two key approaches: a confrontational policy - “might for might, frontal match” - towards the U.S. and South Korea, and the promotion of anti-U.S. solidarity, or more broadly, the formation of silidarity and cooperation with non-Western countries that do not align with or support the U.S. and Western powers (KCNA 2023a; 2023b). Since the lifting of border restrictions in August 2023, this “new Cold War” diplomatic strategy has become increasingly evident, manifesting in the strengthening of strategic cooperation with Russia and China, as well as in the expansion of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and exchanges with non-Western countries across Southeast Asia, Latin America, Africa, and other regions worldwide.

The objectives behind such strategy appear to be focused on strengthening regime security, pursuing economic development, and breaking out of diplomatic isolation, with some degree of success already evident. In terms of bolstering regime security, North Korea has faced reduced international pressure to advance its defense capabilities, including the development of new missiles and reconnaissance satellites. This is largely due to China and Russia’s vetoes of additional sanctions against North Korea at the UN Security Council, coupled with their framing of the U.S. as the primary source of tension on the Korean Peninsula. The military technology cooperation with Russia and the signing of the North Korea-Russia alliance treaty in June of this year have further strengthened North Korea’s regime security. Economically, the total trade volume between North Korea and China, which had significantly declined during the COVID-19 border lockdown, has rebounded to approximately 90% of pre-COVID-19 levels (comparing the period from 2023 to the first half of 2024 with the period from 2018 to the first half of 2019).[1] Moreover, while the exact scale is challenging to confirm, it is estimated that energy and food supplies from Russia will significantly aid the North Korean economy. Beyond its partnerships with China and Russia, North Korea’s growing bilateral and multilateral exchanges with countries such as Belarus, Vietnam, Laos, Mongolia, and Iran, as well as nations in Latin America and Africa, indicate that the country is, to some extent, breaking out of its diplomatic isolation, even if these efforts are primarily focused on non-Western nations.

Although North Korea’s recent diplomatic efforts have opened new opportunities and yielded some positive outcomes, particularly in the economic sphere, the sustainability of these achievements remains uncertain. The primary challenge lies in the ongoing sanctions. China, which accounts for over 95% of North Korea’s trade, opposes further sanctions and advocates for sanction relief. However, China also remains committed to fulfilling its international obligations, demonstrating caution in its approach to existing UN sanctions on North Korea. This cautious stance may be linked to the slight decrease (about 3%) in trade volume between North Korea and China in the first half of 2024 compared to the same period the previous year. It is also uncertain to what extent other non-Western countries, such as Belarus, Vietnam, and Iran, will pursue economic cooperation with North Korea beyond the constraints imposed by sanctions. In the case of Russia, while it largely disregards sanctions on North Korea, the pace at which economic cooperation will bear fruit is uncertain, given the relatively underdeveloped industries and infrastructure, small population, and limited investment capacity in Russia’s Far East region. Although cooperation with Russia in areas such as energy, food, science, and technology will undoubtedly benefit North Korea’s economy, the extent to which it can drive significant industrial development remains unclear.

Despite these constraints and uncertainties, North Korea’s recent diplomatic expansion is likely to reduce its reliance on China and could introduce subtle shifts in the dynamics of the North Korea-China-Russia relationship. Notably, the comprehensive growth of North Korea-Russia exchanges and cooperation warrants close attention. Prior to COVID-19, interactions between North Korea and Russia were neither as active nor as multifaceted as they are now. Currently, a diversification and acceleration of exchanges and cooperation, almost unprecedented in the history of North Korea-Russia relations, is taking place. This shift suggests that China’s previously dominant role in North Korea’s external exchanges and cooperation may diminish to some extent. While North Korea’s trade dependence on China is likely to remain very high, even with a slight reduction, Russia’s role in various sectors—such as military and security, as well as social, cultural, health, and science and technology exchanges—could significantly increase. This could lead to a broader reduction in North Korea’s overall dependence on China and potentially strengthen North Korea’s strategic position within the North Korea-China-Russia relationship. Additionally, North Korea may seek to use its growing cooperation with Russia as leverage to further expand and enhance its cooperation with China, positioning itself more strategically in its relations with both powers.

North Korea is likely to continue its “new Cold War” diplomatic strategy, focusing on cooperation with non-Western countries for the foreseeable future. The inter-Korean border represents the front line of this “new Cold War,” and with the complete withdrawal from the September 19 inter-Korean military agreement, instability and military tension in these border areas could further escalate. From a policy perspective, managing the crisis in inter-Korean relations is of paramount importance. The situation remains precarious, with incidents such as the crossing of leaflets and waste balloons between North and South Korea, and the potential for clashes near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the Northern Limit Line (NLL) remains high. It is essential to focus on preventing such clashes and effectively managing the crisis. While maintaining an appropriate level of military deterrence is necessary, it is equally important to avoid excessive deterrence or displays of military power, which could exacerbate the situation and lead to further crises. To break the cycle of tension fueled by leaflet campaigns, trash balloons, and loudspeaker broadcasts, measures should be implemented to restrict the leaflet campaigns to North Korea. Furthermore, it is crucial to swiftly resume communication and dialogue with North Korea to ensure effective crisis management. In the current environment, where even minimal communication is absent, controlling and preventing the escalation of accidental local clashes becomes increasingly challenging.

Additionally, it is crucial to recognize that the deepening antagonism in international relations surrounding the Korean Peninsula could further accelerate North Korea’s non-Western and “new Cold War” diplomacy, making the pursuit of peace on the Korean Peninsula even more challenging. The intensifying U.S.-China rivalry and U.S.-Russia confrontation are offering North Korea opportunities to strengthen its non-Western solidarity, particularly with Russia and China, which in turn diminishes its incentives to improve relations with South Korea and the United States. If the divide between the South Korea-U.S.-Japan bloc and the North Korea-China-Russia bloc continues to solidify, reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula will become increasingly difficult, pushing the prospect of establishing peace even further out of reach. Therefore, it is essential to pursue policies aimed at easing the confrontations and conflicts in international relations surrounding the peninsula. In this context, managing and improving South Korea’s relations with China and Russia is vital. Strengthening cooperation not only with the U.S. and Japan but also with China and Russia is necessary to create an environment conducive to stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula. 

References

Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). 2021. “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Historic Policy Speech ‘On the Orientation of Present Struggle for a Fresh Development of Socialist Construction.’” September 30. https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1636372502-917357591/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-makes-historic-policy-speech-on-the-orientation-of-present-struggle-for-a-fresh-development-of-socialist-construction/

———. 2023a. “Report on 6th Enlarged Plenary Meeting of 8th WPK Central Committee.” January 1. http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2023/202301/news01/20230101-18ee.html

———. 2023b. “Report on 8th Enlarged Plenary Meeting of 8th WPK Central Committee.” June 19. http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2023/202306/news19/20230619-01ee.html

———. 2023c. “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Has Talks with Russian President.” September 14. http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2023/202309/news14/20230914-02ee.html

Lee, Minji. 2024. “N. Korean minister says Pyongyang ready to cooperate with Iranian carmaker Saipa.” Yonhap News Agency. May 7. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240507002200315

[1] Based on data from the General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China. http://english.customs.gov.cn/. (Date of Search: August 1, 2024).

■ Sang Ki KIM is a research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU).

■ Translated and edited by: Jisoo Park, Research Associate
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